New York Law Review

Tag: 1989

  • Hoopes v. Carota, 74 N.Y.2d 716 (1989): Attorney-Client Privilege and Fiduciary Duty

    Hoopes v. Carota, 74 N.Y.2d 716 (1989)

    The attorney-client privilege does not protect communications when a fiduciary relationship exists, or can be pierced by a showing of good cause when the client consults the attorney, at least in part, in their capacity as a fiduciary.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the attorney-client privilege, particularly in the context of a fiduciary relationship. The New York Court of Appeals held that certain questions asked of the defendant during a pre-trial examination were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court reasoned that the questions regarding whether legal advice was obtained and how it was paid for were not confidential communications. Furthermore, because the defendant consulted the attorneys in his capacity as a trustee, the attorney-client privilege either did not attach or was overcome by a showing of good cause. Thus, disclosure was warranted.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, beneficiaries of a trust, sought to compel the defendant, the trustee, to answer certain questions during a pre-trial examination. These questions concerned whether the defendant had obtained legal advice and how he paid for it. The defendant refused to answer, asserting the attorney-client privilege. It appeared the defendant consulted the attorneys, at least in part, as trustee of the trust.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court determined that the attorney-client privilege was not applicable. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, finding that “good cause” existed to compel disclosure. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether questions regarding if legal advice was obtained, and how such advice was paid for, are protected by attorney-client privilege?
    2. Whether the attorney-client privilege applies when a client consults an attorney, at least in part, in their capacity as a trustee of a trust for which the plaintiffs are beneficiaries?

    Holding

    1. No, because questions regarding whether legal advice was obtained and how such advice was paid for do not ordinarily constitute confidential communications.
    2. No, because when a fiduciary relationship is present, the attorney-client privilege does not attach at all, or it may be set aside by a showing of good cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order compelling the defendant to answer the questions. Regarding the payment of legal fees, the court stated, “The attorney-client privilege extends only to confidential communications made to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice (see, Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 69). Whether an attorney was consulted and who paid the legal fees do not ordinarily constitute such confidential communications (see, id.)”

    The Court then addressed the fiduciary relationship, noting a split among jurisdictions: some hold that the privilege does not attach at all in such circumstances, while others hold that it attaches but can be overcome by a showing of good cause. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that “good cause” was present in this case. Thus, even if the attorney-client privilege initially applied, it was overcome by the plaintiffs’ need for disclosure as beneficiaries of the trust. This decision reflects a balancing of the attorney-client privilege against the duties of a fiduciary to the beneficiaries.

  • Matter of Birnbaum v. State, 73 N.Y.2d 638 (1989): Government Regulation Requiring Continued Business Operation Is Not a Taking

    Matter of Birnbaum v. State, 73 N.Y.2d 638 (1989)

    A state regulation requiring a business, particularly one in a pervasively regulated industry like nursing homes, to continue operating for a reasonable period to allow for alternative arrangements does not automatically constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the State’s action of requiring a nursing home to remain open until alternative arrangements could be made for patients did not constitute a “taking” of property requiring compensation. The nursing home owners sought to close the facility due to unprofitability, but the state intervened to prevent immediate closure, citing regulations requiring notice and approval. The court reasoned that the nursing home industry is heavily regulated, and the state’s action was a reasonable measure to prevent a public emergency, not an unconstitutional taking.

    Facts

    Bernard Birnbaum operated Abbott Manor Nursing Home. After his death, his executors (respondents) found the nursing home unprofitable due to insufficient Medicaid reimbursement rates. They attempted to increase reimbursement rates, sell the facility, or find a receiver, but were unsuccessful. Respondents notified relatives of Medicaid patients of the imminent closure of the nursing home.

    Procedural History

    The State sought and obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the nursing home’s closure. The Supreme Court appointed coreceivers to operate the facility and held the State responsible for operating costs. The Appellate Division determined the Court of Claims had sole jurisdiction regarding compensation. The Court of Claims later granted summary judgment to respondents, finding a “taking.” The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State’s action of requiring a nursing home to remain open and operating until reasonable alternative arrangements could be made for the continued care of the patients constituted a “taking” of property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the State’s actions, preventing the precipitous closing of a nursing home in contravention of the regulations of the Department of Health, did not constitute a “taking” of property under the Federal or State Constitutions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the nursing home industry is subject to extensive state regulation to control costs and ensure adequate provision of facilities. Regulations prevent nursing homes from discontinuing operation without 90 days’ notice and the Commissioner of Health’s approval. The court applied factors used to determine if a taking has occurred: the economic impact of the government’s action, its frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the action’s public purpose. Citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The court cited Justice Holmes stating that a person “cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch of business at a loss, much less the whole business”. However, the court emphasized the narrowness of that rule, and that a person’s right to cease operations is not a per se taking in a pervasively regulated industry with administrative procedures for terminating service. The court held that a business “may be made to suffer interim reasonable losses, without compensation, for a reasonable period of time during which solutions accommodating the public and private interests can be devised.” The State conferred upon the owners the exclusive right to operate a nursing home because the public interest required exclusivity. Therefore, the State may enforce the obligation that there not be immediate termination of nursing home services, because such use of the property threatens imminent injury to the public. “Long ago it was recognized that ‘all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community’ “, citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

  • People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989): Defining “Depraved Indifference” in Homicide

    People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989)

    “Depraved indifference to human life,” as an element of murder, requires conduct that is so wanton, deficient in a moral sense of concern, and devoid of regard for the life or lives of others as to equal in blameworthiness intentional murder.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a 15-year-old juvenile offender for depraved indifference murder. The defendant, while playing a game of “Polish roulette,” shot and killed his best friend’s 13-year-old brother with a shotgun he loaded, despite knowing some shells were live ammunition. The court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s reckless conduct evinced a depraved indifference to human life, meeting the standard for murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2). The dissent argued that the evidence only supported a conviction for manslaughter, as the defendant’s actions, while reckless, did not demonstrate the extreme callousness required for depraved indifference murder.

    Facts

    The 15-year-old defendant invited two younger boys, including the 13-year-old brother of his best friend, to his home. The boys examined the defendant’s weapons collection. The defendant then retrieved a 12-gauge shotgun and asked the victim to retrieve shells, some live and some dummy rounds, from his bedroom. The defendant loaded the shotgun with four shells, knowing that two were live. Standing 10 feet away from the other boys, the defendant exclaimed, “Let’s play Polish roulette. Who’s first?” He pointed the shotgun, pulled the trigger, and shot the victim in the chest, killing him. Immediately after the shooting, the defendant expressed remorse and directed one of the boys to call an ambulance.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney presented the evidence to a Grand Jury, seeking a depraved indifference murder charge. The Grand Jury complied, and the defendant was tried without a jury, convicted of depraved indifference murder as a juvenile offender. The defendant appealed the conviction arguing insufficient evidence to support the depraved indifference element.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s conduct in playing “Polish roulette” with a loaded shotgun, resulting in the death of the victim, constituted conduct “evincing a depraved indifference to human life” sufficient to support a conviction for murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2)?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s reckless actions, in the context of the circumstances, demonstrated a sufficiently wanton disregard for human life to be considered equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder and, thus, constituted depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that to satisfy the element of “depraved indifference to human life”, the defendant’s conduct must be “so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to render him as culpable as one whose conscious objective is to kill.” The court emphasized that the focus should be on the objective circumstances of the act, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The court cited prior cases where depraved indifference was found, such as firing a gun multiple times in a crowded bar or continuously beating a young child. The court distinguished this case from simple recklessness, stating that it involved a higher level of culpability. The fact that the defendant loaded a shotgun with live ammunition, pointed it at another person, and pulled the trigger during a game of “Polish roulette” demonstrated the required depraved indifference. The Court dismissed the dissent’s argument that the defendant’s post-shooting remorse negated depraved indifference, stating that the focus must remain on the defendant’s actions immediately surrounding the shooting. The court found no reason to disturb the trial court’s findings. The dissent argued that the defendant’s conduct, while reckless, did not demonstrate the extreme callousness required for depraved indifference murder, especially considering his age and immediate remorse following the shooting. The dissent further criticized the admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior handling of firearms, arguing that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

  • People v. De George, 73 N.Y.2d 614 (1989): The Ambiguity of Silence and its Admissibility as Evidence

    People v. De George, 73 N.Y.2d 614 (1989)

    A defendant’s pre-arrest silence in the face of general police inquiries is generally inadmissible as evidence of guilt or for impeachment purposes due to its ambiguity and potential for prejudice, unless specific circumstances establish a duty to speak or make the silence more probative of guilt than innocence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault and criminal use of a firearm. A key piece of evidence against him was testimony regarding his silence when police made general inquiries at the scene of the shooting before his arrest. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that using the defendant’s pre-arrest silence as evidence was improper. The court reasoned that such silence is inherently ambiguous and potentially prejudicial, as an individual might have numerous reasons for remaining silent other than guilt. Unless a specific duty to speak existed, or the circumstances made the silence uniquely probative, it should not be admitted as evidence.

    Facts

    On February 11, 1985, the defendant, along with Donna Barreiro and Cynthia Cassano, were at Captain Steve’s Bar. Gary Campbell joined their conversation and became increasingly obnoxious. An argument ensued, leading to a physical altercation during which the defendant drew a handgun. The gun discharged, hitting Campbell in the neck. Police Officer Carl Lisi arrived to find Campbell injured and the defendant sitting at the bar. Lisi made general inquiries but received no information. The defendant did not respond to Lisi’s initial questions about what happened or who had the gun.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with first-degree assault. At trial, the prosecution used the defendant’s silence at the scene as evidence of depraved indifference and to impeach his claim that the shooting was accidental. The defense objected, but the evidence was admitted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in response to general inquiries made by police officers at the scene of the crime is admissible as evidence of guilt or for impeachment purposes.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in this case was inherently ambiguous and its probative value was minimal, creating a substantial risk of prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decisions in People v. Conyers, which addressed the admissibility of a defendant’s silence. While Conyers primarily dealt with post-arrest silence, the court extended its reasoning to pre-arrest silence in this case. The court emphasized that silence is often ambiguous. An innocent person might remain silent for various reasons, including awareness of the right to remain silent, fear of self-incrimination, mistrust of law enforcement, or simply confusion. The court noted, “Silence in these circumstances is ambiguous because an innocent person may have many reasons for not speaking.”

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Rothschild, where an officer’s silence was admissible because he had a duty to report his undercover activities. Here, the defendant had no such duty. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the officer’s questions were general and not directed at the defendant specifically. The court stated, “Officer Lisi’s questioning was not directed at any particular person at the scene and no direct statement or implied accusation was made to defendant that would naturally result in protest if untrue”.

    The Court also rejected the prosecution’s argument that the silence was direct evidence of “depraved indifference to human life.” It reasoned that the objective circumstances surrounding the shooting, not the defendant’s subjective state of mind or post-incident behavior, should determine whether his actions demonstrated depraved indifference. As such, the defendant’s silence held little relevance in this determination. The Court concluded that the admission of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.

  • In re Intemann, 73 N.Y.2d 580 (1989): Judicial Conduct and the Sanction of Removal

    In re Intemann, 73 N.Y.2d 580 (1989)

    A judge’s participation in business activities, practicing law while in office, failure to disqualify himself in cases involving close associates, and lack of candor during investigations warrant removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    Judge Intemann was charged with violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct for engaging in business activities, practicing law while serving as a judge, and failing to recuse himself in cases involving a close friend and business associate. The Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained the charges and recommended removal, finding that the judge also lacked candor during the investigation. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination and imposed the sanction of removal, emphasizing the serious nature of the misconduct and the judge’s dishonesty.

    Facts

    William H. Intemann, Jr., was elected as a Judge in Hamilton County in November 1983, taking office on January 1, 1984. From January 1984 to January 1986, Intemann actively participated in managing three businesses organized for profit, including retaining counsel and executing contracts. After assuming his judicial role, Intemann continued to practice law, specifically attempting to finalize three estate matters without informing the clients or transferring the files to the attorney who took over his practice. He also instructed a client to sign an undated estate tax form, which he later signed and backdated to appear as if he completed it before taking office. Furthermore, he intercepted mail addressed to the attorney who took over his practice to handle estate matters himself. During his first two years in office, Judge Intemann presided over 21 cases brought by an attorney who was a close friend, business associate, and his personal attorney.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Intemann’s conduct and sustained charges of violating the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Judge Intemann’s participation in business activities after assuming judicial office violated section 100.5(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct?

    2. Whether Judge Intemann’s actions in continuing to practice law, deceiving clients, and falsifying documents constituted judicial misconduct?

    3. Whether Judge Intemann’s failure to disqualify himself from cases involving a close friend and business associate created an appearance of impropriety and conflict of interest?

    4. Whether the sanction of removal from office was appropriate given the nature and extent of Judge Intemann’s misconduct and lack of candor during the investigation?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the unrebutted evidence showed Judge Intemann actively participated in the management of three businesses organized for profit after taking judicial office, violating section 100.5(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.

    2. Yes, because Judge Intemann continued to practice law after becoming a judge, deceived his clients, and falsified documents related to estate matters, all of which constituted judicial misconduct.

    3. Yes, because the close relationship between Judge Intemann and the attorney appearing before him in 21 cases created an appearance of impropriety and a potential conflict of interest, requiring disqualification.

    4. Yes, because the serious nature of Judge Intemann’s improper acts, including deception practiced on clients and his lack of candor during the investigation and hearing, warranted removal from office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission’s findings that Judge Intemann violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The court emphasized that Judge Intemann’s active participation in business activities, continuing to practice law while in office, and failure to recuse himself created an appearance of impropriety. The court found his attempts to conceal his continued legal practice, including intercepting mail and falsifying documents, particularly egregious. The court noted, “In evaluating the sanction imposed, we find significant not only the serious nature of petitioner’s improper acts, including the deception practiced on several of his clients, but also petitioner’s lack of candor during the investigation and hearing. Such conduct cannot be condoned in a Judge and petitioner should be removed from office.” The court concluded that because of the serious misconduct and lack of candor displayed by the judge, removal from office was the appropriate sanction. The court cited Matter of Conti, 70 NY2d 416, 419 for the principle that judges must avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

  • Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989): Extinguishment of Easement by Adverse Possession

    Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989)

    An easement, once definitively located and developed through use, can be extinguished by adverse possession without a prior demand for the removal of obstructions, provided the adverse use is exclusive, open, notoriously hostile, and continuous for the prescriptive period.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extinguishment of a granted easement by adverse possession. Spiegel sued to enjoin Ferraro’s tenant, Ernie’s Auto Body (Ernie’s), from obstructing an easement on Ferraro’s property that benefitted Spiegel’s land. Ernie’s had fenced off and used the easement for parking wrecked cars for over ten years. The Court of Appeals held that Ernie’s adverse use of the easement, which was open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous for more than ten years, extinguished the easement, even without a prior demand from Spiegel to remove the obstructions. The Court distinguished easements definitively located and used from ‘paper’ easements, where a demand might be required.

    Facts

    In 1954, the Masone brothers sold a parcel of land with a non-exclusive easement for access to Broadway. In 1970, Jerry Spiegel acquired this parcel along with the easement. In 1964, Frank Boni and Michael Pavone bought the servient parcel and later sold it to Nicholas and Stephan Ferraro in 1982. In 1966, Boni and Pavone leased the servient premises to Ernie’s Auto Body, Inc. Ernie’s erected gates, regraded and paved the easement, installed lights, used guard dogs, and parked wrecked cars on the easement, effectively blocking Spiegel’s access. Spiegel did not use the easement after Ernie’s tenancy began.

    Procedural History

    In 1977, Spiegel demanded Ernie’s remove the obstructions. In 1982, Spiegel sued to enjoin Ernie’s from obstructing the easement. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding the easement extinguished by Ernie’s adverse possession. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the prescriptive period did not begin to run until Spiegel demanded the easement be opened in 1977. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an easement that has been definitively located and developed through use must have a demand for removal of obstructions before it may be extinguished by adverse possession?

    Holding

    No, because where an easement has been definitively located and developed through use, there is no requirement that its owner demand the removal of obstructions blocking the easement before it may be extinguished by adverse possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an easement created by grant can be extinguished by adverse possession if the use is adverse, under a claim of right, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for 10 years. The court distinguished this case from situations involving “paper” easements (easements not definitively located or used), where a demand to open the easement might be required before adverse possession can begin. Here, the easement was definitively located and had been used prior to Ernie’s obstruction. Ernie’s actions (erecting gates, parking cars, etc.) were sufficient to put Spiegel on notice of the adverse claim. The court emphasized that Ernie’s exclusive use of the easement, affirmed by lower courts and supported by the record, demonstrated a claim of right that was open and notoriously adverse to Spiegel’s interest for over 10 years. The court stated that “an easement may be lost by adverse possession if the owner or possessor of the servient estate claims to own it free from the private right of another, and excludes the owner of the easement, who acquiesces in the exclusion for [the prescriptive period]”. Finally, the Court stated that Ernie’s use of the easement was not an assertion of an interest hostile to its landlord. By statute such a use could not be deemed adverse (see, RPAPL 531). Rather, Ernie’s use is adverse only to plaintiff and that use satisfied the requirements of adverse possession and operated to extinguish that easement.

  • MGM Court Reporting Service, Inc. v. Greenberg, 74 N.Y.2d 691 (1989): Express Contract Terms Override Implied Covenants

    MGM Court Reporting Service, Inc. v. Greenberg, 74 N.Y.2d 691 (1989)

    When parties expressly define the limits of a non-solicitation restriction in a contract, a court will not imply a broader restriction, even if one party sought a more general prohibition during negotiations.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a non-solicitation covenant can be implied when the parties have already negotiated and expressly defined the limits of such a restriction in a contract. MGM Court Reporting Service sued Stanley Greenberg, a former shareholder, alleging he breached an implied restrictive covenant by soliciting MGM’s clients after selling his shares back to the company. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the parties had explicitly limited the non-solicitation restriction to three specific customers, a broader limitation could not be implied. The court affirmed the dismissal of MGM’s claims, emphasizing that express contractual terms take precedence over implied covenants.

    Facts

    Stanley Greenberg, a 40% shareholder in MGM Court Reporting Service, commenced dissolution proceedings against the corporation, alleging oppressive actions by the majority shareholder, Michael Yesner. Yesner and MGM then elected to purchase Greenberg’s shares. During settlement negotiations, Yesner attempted to secure a general prohibition against Greenberg soliciting MGM customers. The final settlement agreement, however, contained a specific non-solicitation clause that restricted Greenberg from performing services for only three named companies for a period of five years. Greenberg later started his own court reporting business and allegedly began soliciting MGM’s clients. MGM then sued Greenberg for breach of an implied covenant against impairment of goodwill.

    Procedural History

    MGM Court Reporting Service sued Stanley Greenberg in New York State court, alleging breach of an implied restrictive covenant and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court’s decision is not specified in the provided text. The Appellate Division granted Greenberg’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that a non-solicitation covenant could not be implied because the sale of Greenberg’s shares was akin to a sale “under compulsion.” MGM appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court can imply a broader non-solicitation restriction when the parties have expressly defined the limits of such a restriction in a written contract.

    Holding

    No, because the parties expressly limited the non-solicitation restriction to three specific customers, a more general limitation may not be implied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the parties’ explicit agreement regarding the non-solicitation restriction precluded implying a broader restriction. The court emphasized that the parties had negotiated and expressly defined the reach of the limitation on solicitation. The court stated, “The parties having thus negotiated and expressly defined the reach of the limitation on solicitation, a more general limitation may not be implied.” There was no claim that the agreed restriction was anything other than a specific non-solicitation covenant limited to three customers. The court distinguished the case from situations where the agreed restriction is not what it appears to be. Because the parties had the opportunity to include a broader restriction and did not, the court declined to imply one. The court did not reach the issue of whether the sale of shares was “under compulsion,” as the Appellate Division had.

  • Scott v. Uljanov, 74 N.Y.2d 663 (1989): Distinguishing Medical Malpractice from Ordinary Negligence

    Scott v. Uljanov, 74 N.Y.2d 663 (1989)

    Conduct constitutes medical malpractice, rather than ordinary negligence, when it constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.

    Summary

    This case addresses the distinction between medical malpractice and ordinary negligence in the context of a hospital’s care of an intoxicated patient. Plaintiff, while highly intoxicated, fell out of his hospital bed and sustained injuries. He sued the hospital, alleging negligent supervision. The central issue was whether the claim constituted medical malpractice, subject to a 2.5-year statute of limitations, or ordinary negligence, subject to a 3-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals held that the hospital’s actions constituted medical malpractice because the alleged negligence was an integral part of rendering medical treatment to the patient, specifically assessing and addressing his supervisory and treatment needs given his intoxicated state. Therefore, the medical malpractice statute of limitations applied, barring the claim.

    Facts

    Plaintiff arrived at the hospital emergency room with a .29 blood alcohol level and having consumed Valium.
    He was placed in a hospital bed with side rails up.
    Approximately 30 minutes later, he climbed out of the end of the bed and fell, sustaining a head injury.
    He was then treated and admitted to the psychiatric ward under the care of Dr. Uljanov.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the hospital (UHS) and Dr. Uljanov.
    Claims related to wrongful detention were dismissed as time-barred.
    The claim of negligent supervision leading to the fall was dismissed by the Supreme Court as barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations (CPLR 214-a).
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the claim sounded in negligence, subject to a 3-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214).
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hospital’s alleged negligence in supervising the plaintiff constituted medical malpractice, subject to the shorter statute of limitations, or ordinary negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the hospital’s actions constituted an integral part of rendering medical treatment to the patient, specifically assessing and addressing his supervisory and treatment needs given his highly intoxicated state.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that medical malpractice is a form of negligence, but the legislature has assigned different statutes of limitations for policy reasons. The Court relied on Bleiler v. Bodnar, 65 NY2d 65, 72, stating that conduct constitutes malpractice when it “constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.”

    The Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations challenged the hospital’s assessment of the supervisory and treatment needs of its highly intoxicated patient during his initial emergency room care. The Court emphasized that the relevant inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was an integral part of the process of providing medical treatment.

    The Court concluded that supervising a highly intoxicated patient involves medical assessment and treatment decisions regarding the patient’s safety and well-being, thus falling within the realm of medical malpractice.

    There were dissenting judges in the Appellate Division who agreed with the Supreme Court’s original determination that the claim sounded in medical malpractice.

  • People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989): Larceny and Enforcement of Default Judgments

    People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989)

    Taking money pursuant to a default judgment, even if the judgment is later found to be jurisdictionally defective due to improper service, does not constitute larceny unless the defendants misrepresented the facts to the court.

    Summary

    Defendants, attorneys, obtained a default judgment against Prior for unpaid legal fees. Prior’s bank account was levied to satisfy the judgment. Prior had been part of a communal group and had lived at a group-owned apartment. She moved out, allegedly without informing the group of her new address and attempting to conceal it. The defendants served the summons at the group address, although service may have been improper. The People charged the attorneys with larceny, arguing they knew service was defective and the judgment was invalid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the guilty verdict, holding that enforcing a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally flawed, does not automatically constitute larceny absent misrepresentation to the court.

    Facts

    Mia Prior was a member of a communal group for 10 years, during which time she received benefits, including legal assistance. Defendant Foster, also a member and an attorney, assisted her with legal issues related to her father. After her father’s death in 1984, Prior inherited a trust and decided to leave the group. A dispute arose over Foster’s legal fees. Prior moved out of the group’s apartment at 415 East 12th Street and allegedly concealed her new address. Foster, represented by codefendant Paolo, sued Prior for unpaid fees and served a summons at the East 12th Street address, claiming it was Prior’s “last known residence”. The service arguably violated CPLR 308(2). A default judgment was entered, and Prior’s bank account was levied for over $7,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with grand larceny in the second degree. The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. A jury found the defendants guilty, but the trial court set aside the verdict, reasoning that the judgment was valid when executed. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the conviction, holding that obtaining a judgment with knowledge of improper service and intent to deprive property constitutes larceny. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether obtaining money pursuant to a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally defective due to improper service and the defendant’s knowledge of the defect, constitutes larceny.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court when applying for the default judgment. The Court reasoned that merely obtaining a judgment known to be defective is not sufficient for a larceny conviction; there must be evidence of fraud or misrepresentation to the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court. While the affidavit of service contained the legal conclusion that service was “duly made,” the affidavits also disclosed that service was made at Prior’s “last known residence” and mailed to the same address, which, on its face, reveals a potential defect under CPLR 308(2). The court distinguished the case from others where defendants obtained court orders through forgery, perjury, or other factual misrepresentations. The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that taking money under a void order constitutes larceny under Penal Law § 155.05(1). However, the Court stated this section is not a “catchall” for acts not specifically prohibited by the Legislature. The Court cited the reluctance to elevate civil wrongs to criminal larceny, especially in business activities where intent is unclear. The Court noted the need for specific legislative action to criminalize such conduct, including safeguards against abuse. “Conduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily ‘wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes”. The Court emphasized that the Legislature has generally identified prohibited conduct quite specifically and provided some additional safeguard, such as the corroboration requirement for perjury. The Court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not larceny as defined by the Legislature and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544 (1989): Zoning Ordinance Restricting Adult Uses Upheld

    Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544 (1989)

    A municipality may restrict adult business uses to certain areas of the community through zoning ordinances without violating the state constitution, provided the restrictions are designed to address the secondary effects of such businesses on the surrounding community and are no broader than necessary to achieve that purpose.

    Summary

    The Town of Islip sought to enjoin the respondents from operating an adult bookstore in a prohibited zone, arguing the business violated a zoning ordinance that restricted adult uses to Industrial I districts and required nonconforming uses to be amortized over time. The New York Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the Town’s zoning power, as it primarily aimed to control the negative secondary effects of adult businesses on the community rather than suppress speech. The court found that the ordinance met both federal and state constitutional standards for regulating land use, providing reasonable alternative avenues of expression and being no broader than necessary to achieve its purpose.

    Facts

    Respondent Caviglia operated the Happy Hour Bookstore, an adult bookstore, in a Business I district of the Village of Bay Shore since 1980. The Town of Islip adopted a zoning ordinance in 1980 that restricted adult uses, including adult bookstores, to Industrial I districts. The ordinance also provided a schedule for amortizing nonconforming uses. The Happy Hour Bookstore was a nonconforming use, and its amortization period had expired. The Town of Islip prepared a report indicating the harmful effect of adult businesses on the surrounding area. The Town then sought to enjoin the store’s operation. Respondents opposed the injunction, contending that the ordinance violated their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the State Constitution.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied a preliminary injunction and upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, granting the Town a permanent injunction. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by striking the provision of the ordinance requiring proprietors to obtain a special permit before establishing an adult use in an Industrial I district, but otherwise affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The respondents appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Islip’s zoning ordinance, which restricts adult uses to Industrial I districts and provides for the amortization of nonconforming uses, constitutes an impermissible limitation of the respondents’ constitutional free speech rights under the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because the ordinance is a valid time, place, and manner restriction that is designed to address the secondary effects of adult businesses on the surrounding community and is no broader than necessary to achieve that purpose. The amortization provisions are also valid because they provide a reasonable period for recouping investment and are not content-based.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that municipalities have broad power to implement land-use controls. Zoning ordinances are presumed constitutional if there is a reasonable relationship between the end sought and the means adopted. The court acknowledged that while the zoning power is broad, it is not unlimited, particularly when it affects First Amendment rights. Citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, the court stated that municipalities could regulate adult uses through zoning if the predominant purpose is to control the secondary effects, the ordinance serves a substantial governmental interest, it is narrowly tailored, and it allows for reasonable alternative avenues of expression.

    The court found that the Town’s ordinance met these federal requirements, as it was predicated on a study demonstrating the deleterious effect of adult uses on the quality of life in the community. The court noted that the ordinance was part of a plan for downtown renewal. The court explicitly rejected the argument that the ordinance was content-based, noting the Town’s effort to control secondary effects, not to suppress speech. It found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored and provided alternative locations for adult businesses.

    Turning to the state constitutional issue, the court stated that New York could interpret its own constitution to extend greater protection to its residents than the federal constitution. Quoting People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, the court reiterated that the regulation of businesses which incidentally burden free expression may be sustained only if the state action is “no broader than needed to achieve its purpose.” The court distinguished Arcara, noting that in this case, the adverse effects of adult uses were not subject to direct attack through criminal proceedings or injunctions, making the zoning power the most appropriate means to address the Town’s substantive problems.

    The court also found that the amortization provisions were valid, stating that reasonableness is determined by examining all the facts, including the length of the amortization period. The respondents failed to overcome the presumption of validity, as they had continued to operate well past the amortization period and presented no evidence of economic loss. The court concluded that the ordinance was neither vague nor overbroad.