New York Law Review

Tag: 1989

  • In re Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532 (1989): Child’s Testimony as Corroboration in Abuse Cases

    In re Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532 (1989)

    In child protective proceedings, a child’s in-court, cross-examined, but unsworn testimony can corroborate their prior out-of-court statements to support a finding of abuse.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a child’s in-court testimony can corroborate their prior out-of-court statements in a child protective proceeding, where the child alleges sexual abuse. The Onondaga County Department of Social Services initiated proceedings against the father, alleging abuse of his daughter. The Family Court found the father had abused his daughter, relying on the daughter’s testimony and previous statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the child’s in-court testimony, subject to cross-examination, could corroborate her prior statements, satisfying the corroboration requirement under the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    Five-year-old Christina told a detective that her father had done “bad things” to her, including touching her vagina and masturbating in the bathroom. She demonstrated these acts with anatomically correct dolls. The father admitted to a police officer that Christina had placed his hand on her vagina on two occasions. Christina testified in court, without oath, recounting the same incidents with more detail. The father denied all allegations of abuse.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found that Christina’s in-court testimony corroborated her earlier statements and concluded that the father had abused Christina. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s ruling. The New York Court of Appeals granted review to determine if the child’s testimony was sufficient corroboration.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child’s in-court, unsworn, but cross-examined testimony can corroborate their previous out-of-court statements to establish a prima facie case of abuse in a child protective proceeding, in the absence of other corroborative evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the child’s in-court testimony provides an opportunity to test the child’s veracity and the accuracy of their perceptions, adding to the reliability of the hearsay evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the purpose of corroboration is to ensure the reliability of hearsay evidence, not to reflect an inherent distrust of children’s statements. The court pointed to Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (vi), stating that corroboration is defined as “any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements”. Unlike mere repetition of out-of-court statements, in-court testimony allows for cross-examination and observation of the child by the court, which can enhance the reliability of the child’s prior statements. The court distinguished this situation from Matter of Nicole V., where the court held that multiple out-of-court statements cannot cross-corroborate each other because that does nothing to enhance their trustworthiness or eliminate their inherent unreliability. The Court stated that, “Merely replicating the out-of:court hearsay statements in other out-of-court hearsay settings obviously does nothing to enhance their trustworthiness or eliminate their inherent unreliability.” The court deferred to the Family Court’s discretion in determining whether the child’s testimony reliably corroborated her out-of-court statements in this specific case, stating that “Family Court Judges presented with the issue have considerable discretion to decide whether the child’s out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse or neglect have, in fact, been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of abuse.” The court noted that the Family Court had the opportunity to observe the child and assess her credibility. Ultimately, the court found that the petitioner had satisfied its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

  • Monteleone v. Floral Park, 74 N.Y.2d 917 (1989): Prior Notice Statute Applies to Overhanging Tree Branches

    74 N.Y.2d 917 (1989)

    A municipality’s prior written notice statute, requiring notice of unsafe conditions before a negligence action can be brought, applies to low-lying tree branches overhanging sidewalks that obstruct pedestrian passage.

    Summary

    Thomas Monteleone was injured by a low-hanging tree branch while walking on a sidewalk in the Village of Floral Park. He sued the Village, alleging negligence. The Village’s code required prior written notice of sidewalk obstructions before a lawsuit could be filed. The Court of Appeals held that the overhanging branch constituted an obstruction under the statute, requiring prior notice, which the Village did not receive. Furthermore, the Village’s failure to prune the tree was considered nonfeasance, not affirmative negligence, and therefore the prior notice requirement still applied.

    Facts

    Thomas Monteleone sustained an eye injury after being struck by a low-lying tree branch overhanging a sidewalk in the Village of Floral Park.

    The Village of Floral Park had a local law (Section 57-1 of the Village Code) that mirrored Village Law §6-628, requiring prior written notice to the Village Clerk of any defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed sidewalk condition before a civil action could be brought against the Village for related accidents. The Village did not receive any prior notice of the low-hanging branch.

    Procedural History

    Monteleone brought a negligence action against the Village of Floral Park. The lower courts dismissed the complaint, citing the Village’s prior notice statute. The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a low-lying tree branch overhanging a sidewalk constitutes an “obstructed” condition within the meaning of the Village of Floral Park’s prior notice statute, thus requiring prior written notice to the Village before a negligence action can be maintained.

    Whether the Village’s planting of the tree and subsequent failure to prune it constituted affirmative negligence, rendering the prior notice statute inapplicable.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the low-lying tree branch created a condition that would not immediately come to the attention of Village officers without actual notice, thus falling under the purview of the prior notice statute.

    2. No, because the Village’s planting and failure to prune the tree amounted to nonfeasance, not affirmative negligence; therefore, the prior notice statute remains applicable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prior notice statute should be strictly construed and applies to physical conditions in streets or sidewalks that do not immediately come to the attention of village officers unless actual notice is given. The Court distinguished this case from prior cases such as Alexander v. Eldred and Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, which concerned defective or missing traffic signs. The Court in those cases refused to extend the prior notice requirement to such conditions, because those conditions are likely to be noticed by village officers.

    The Court emphasized that the overhanging tree branch was a condition that would not readily come to the Village’s attention without specific notice.

    Regarding the affirmative negligence argument, the Court stated that the Village’s conduct amounted to nonfeasance (failure to act), not affirmative negligence. The Village’s initial planting of the tree did not create an immediate hazard; the hazard arose over time due to the lack of pruning. The court cited Muszynyski v. City of Buffalo, which held that failure to maintain a condition does not constitute affirmative negligence. The Court distinguished the facts from cases like Siddon v. Fishman Co., where the municipality’s actions directly created the hazardous condition.

    The Court quoted Doremus v Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 18 NY2d 362, 366, supra: prior written notice statutes refer “to physical conditions in the streets or sidewalks * * * which do not immediately come to the attention of the village officers unless they are given actual notice thereof.”

  • McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989): Double Jeopardy and Federal vs. State Prosecutions

    McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989)

    Under New York’s statutory double jeopardy protections, a prior federal conspiracy conviction for stealing funds does bar a subsequent state prosecution for larceny based on the same underlying theft, as the federal government is not considered “another state” under CPL 40.20(2)(g).

    Summary

    Thomas McNeil was indicted in New York for grand larceny. He had previously been convicted in federal court for conspiracy to transport stolen property interstate, based on the same underlying theft. McNeil sought to dismiss the state charges, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state prosecution was barred. The Court reasoned that the federal conviction was based on the same criminal transaction as the state charges, and that the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), which allows prosecution for a “result offense” after a conspiracy prosecution in “another state”, did not apply to prior federal prosecutions. Therefore, the writ of prohibition barring Thomas McNeil’s prosecution was granted.

    Facts

    Thomas McNeil and his brother were charged in New York with stealing funds from their respective companies, Triad and Everest. Prior to being apprehended on the state charges, McNeil was indicted federally for interstate transportation of stolen property and conspiracy to commit that crime, for stealing funds from Triad and Everest and transporting them to Switzerland. McNeil pleaded guilty to the federal charges. He was then arraigned on the State charges.

    Procedural History

    McNeil moved to dismiss the state charges based on statutory double jeopardy grounds (CPL 40.20). The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding an exception applied. McNeil then sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division to prevent the state prosecution, but the Appellate Division denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the federal and state prosecutions were based on the same criminal transaction, triggering double jeopardy protections under CPL 40.20(2)?
    2. Whether the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), for conspiracy prosecutions in “another state,” applies to prior federal conspiracy convictions, thus permitting the state prosecution?
    3. Whether the exceptions in CPL 40.20(2)(a) or (b) apply, permitting the state prosecution despite the federal conviction?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the federal conspiracy charge encompassed the same underlying theft that formed the basis of the state larceny charges.
    2. No, because the term “another state” in CPL 40.20(2)(g) does not include the federal government.
    3. No, because the offenses did not have substantially different elements, and the statutes were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the federal conspiracy charge, which included the theft of funds as an overt act, was part of the same criminal transaction as the state larceny charges. The court emphasized that “the significant inquiry is not what overt acts were actually charged as part of the conspiracy but whether ‘the particular activity for which the State seeks to hold defendants responsible could have been alleged to support the [Federal] conspiracy charge’” (citing People v. Abbamonte). The Court rejected the argument that the federal and state prosecutions were not based on the same criminal transaction, stating that the conspiracy count charged the very conduct that constitutes the crime of larceny.

    Regarding CPL 40.20(2)(g), the Court held that the plain language of the statute limits the exception to prior prosecutions in “another state,” which does not include the federal government. The Court reasoned that when the Legislature intends to broaden the scope of an exception to the double jeopardy bar, it does so explicitly, as seen in other subdivisions of CPL 40.20(2). The court stated, “[w]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, it is to be construed ‘according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction.’”

    The Court also rejected the People’s argument that CPL 40.20(2)(a) and (b) permitted the state prosecution. It found that the acts establishing the state and federal offenses were not clearly distinguishable. The Court stated, “it is the same theft ‘charged and proved and for which a conviction was had’” that constitutes the state larceny charges. Additionally, the Court held that the federal and state offenses were designed to prevent the same evils (theft and protecting property owners), thus making the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(b) inapplicable.

  • People v. Mayers, 74 N.Y.2d 931 (1989): Preserving Claims of Defective Plea Allocutions

    74 N.Y.2d 931 (1989)

    A defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to explicitly advise him of potential second felony offender sentencing at the time of a guilty plea must be preserved by a motion to withdraw the plea or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction; otherwise, the claim is unpreserved for appellate review unless it implicates fundamental fairness.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant, Mayers, could not be relieved of his guilty plea because he failed to preserve his claim that the trial court did not explicitly advise him of the potential for second felony offender sentencing. The Court reasoned that because Mayers was informed of the potential sentence enhancement before entering his plea and received the bargained-for sentence, the claimed error was not a matter of fundamental fairness and was subject to standard preservation rules, which he did not follow by moving to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment.

    Facts

    Defendant Mayers pleaded guilty. On appeal, Mayers claimed that the trial court committed a per se error by failing to explicitly advise him at the time of his guilty plea that he might be sentenced as a second felony offender. The record indicated that Mayers was informed of the potential sentence and enhancement before entering his plea and received the precise sentence bargained for.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts did not find error in the plea allocution. The case reached the Court of Appeals after Mayers appealed the lower court decisions upholding his conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who was informed of potential sentencing enhancements and received the bargained-for sentence, can challenge his guilty plea on appeal based on the trial court’s failure to explicitly advise him of second felony offender sentencing at the time of the plea, when he did not move to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the claimed error, under these specific circumstances, is not a matter of fundamental fairness and is governed by standard preservation rules, which require the defendant to move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of preserving legal arguments at the trial level. It noted that CPL 220.60(3) and CPL 440.10 provide mechanisms for a defendant to challenge a guilty plea, either by moving to withdraw it before sentencing or by moving to vacate the judgment of conviction after sentencing. By failing to utilize these mechanisms, Mayers failed to give the trial court an opportunity to address the alleged error. The court distinguished the alleged error from claims implicating fundamental fairness. The Court highlighted that Mayers was informed of the potential sentence and enhancement before entering his plea and received the precise sentence for which he bargained. The court reasoned that under these circumstances, the alleged error did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness requiring the court to overlook the lack of preservation. The court implicitly determined that the error did not affect the voluntariness or intelligence of the plea given that the defendant was aware of the potential consequences and received the agreed-upon sentence. The decision serves as a reminder that procedural rules and preservation requirements are strictly enforced unless the alleged error rises to the level of fundamental unfairness, thus undermining the integrity of the proceedings.

  • Medicon Diagnostic Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 74 N.Y.2d 539 (1989): Upholding Medicaid Payment Withholds Pending Fraud Investigation

    74 N.Y.2d 539 (1989)

    Regulations authorizing the withholding of Medicaid payments to providers based on reliable information of fraud do not violate due process rights if they provide adequate procedural safeguards, balancing the provider’s interests with the government’s interest in protecting public funds.

    Summary

    Medicon and FYM, clinical medical laboratories participating in the New York Medicaid program, challenged the constitutionality of regulations allowing the state to withhold Medicaid payments pending investigations into potential fraud or abuse. The New York Court of Appeals held that the regulations did not violate the laboratories’ due process rights. The court reasoned that while providers may have a property interest in Medicaid payments, the regulations provided sufficient procedural safeguards, including notice and an opportunity to respond, balancing the providers’ interests with the state’s compelling interest in safeguarding public funds from fraud and abuse within the Medicaid system. The court emphasized that prompt action was necessary to prevent the potential misuse of taxpayer money.

    Facts

    Medicon and FYM, enrolled Medicaid providers, experienced a significant increase in billings in 1988, prompting an investigation by the Department of Social Services (DSS). DSS auditors found discrepancies, including physicians denying ordering tests claimed by the laboratories. Based on this information, DSS initiated withholding payments to Medicon and FYM pending further review, citing regulatory authority to safeguard public funds and verify claims. Medicon’s billings rose dramatically, and FYM had similar increases.

    Procedural History

    Both Medicon and FYM filed Article 78 proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the payment withholding regulations (18 NYCRR 518.7). Medicon’s proceeding was converted to a declaratory judgment action, and the Supreme Court initially declared the regulation unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the regulation’s constitutionality. FYM’s petition was initially dismissed, but the Appellate Division modified the judgment, declared the regulation constitutional and validly promulgated. Both cases reached the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the withholding of Medicaid payments to medical providers, without prior notice and a hearing, based on reliable information of fraud or program abuse, violates the providers’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment?

    Holding

    No, because the regulations authorizing the withholding of Medicaid payments provide sufficient procedural safeguards that adequately balance the providers’ private interest in receiving payments with the government’s compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the Medicaid program and preventing the misuse of public funds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine if the procedures for withholding payments satisfied due process requirements. This test considers (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including administrative burdens. The court found that the regulations in question adequately addressed these factors. While providers have a property interest in receiving Medicaid payments for services rendered, this interest is not absolute and is subject to the State’s regulatory authority to ensure proper use of public funds.

    The court emphasized that the regulations require “reliable information” of fraud or abuse before withholding payments, mandate prompt notice to the provider (within five days) explaining the reasons for the withholding, and provide an opportunity for the provider to submit written arguments. The withholding is temporary, not exceeding 90 days unless further action is taken, at which point the provider is entitled to a hearing. The court stated, “due process is a flexible constitutional concept calling for such procedural protections as a particular situation may demand”.

    The court rejected the argument that pre-withholding notice and a hearing were required, finding that the State’s interest in preventing fraud and quickly recovering public funds outweighed the burden of providing such procedures. The Court stated that the state must be assured “that the funds which have been set aside (for providing medical services to the needy) will not be fraudulently diverted into the hands of an untrustworthy provider of services”.

    The court also dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the withholding was arbitrary and capricious, noting that the decision was based on “reliable information” from physicians who denied ordering the tests for which the laboratories sought reimbursement.

  • People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989): Warranting a Wade Hearing for Undercover Officer Identifications

    People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989)

    A pretrial Wade hearing is not automatically required when a trained undercover officer identifies a defendant shortly after a drug transaction, but the specific facts of the encounter must be examined to determine if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Wharton was convicted of drug sale and possession based on an undercover officer’s identification. The officer bought drugs from Wharton, radioed a description to a backup team who arrested him, and then identified Wharton at the precinct three hours later. Wharton’s motion for a Wade hearing to suppress the identification was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a Wade hearing isn’t automatically precluded for police identifications, the circumstances here didn’t suggest undue suggestiveness because the officer was trained, the viewing was close in time to the arrest, and it served to confirm the correct person was arrested. The dissent argued for a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, emphasizing the fleeting nature of the initial encounter.

    Facts

    An undercover police officer purchased cocaine from Wharton in a “buy and bust” operation. The officer radioed Wharton’s description to a backup team, who arrested Wharton at the scene. Within five minutes, the undercover officer drove past and saw Wharton being detained. Approximately three hours later, the same undercover officer identified Wharton through a one-way mirror at the police precinct.

    Procedural History

    Wharton moved to suppress the identification testimony, seeking a Wade hearing. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Wharton was convicted by a jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pretrial station house identification of the defendant by an undercover police officer, who purchased drugs from the defendant in a “buy and bust” operation, requires a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by unnecessarily suggestive factors.

    Holding

    No, because the identification was made by a trained undercover officer shortly after the drug transaction as a completion of an integral police procedure and to ensure that the correct person was detained, and the circumstances did not suggest undue suggestiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the identification was made by a trained undercover officer who observed Wharton during a face-to-face drug transaction, knowing Wharton would be arrested soon after. The station house viewing occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest, constituting the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure. This ensured an innocent person was not mistakenly detained. The officer’s participation in the operation was planned, and he was experienced and expected to observe Wharton carefully for later identification. The court distinguished this situation from show-up identifications by civilian witnesses, which are more prone to misidentification. The court emphasized they were not creating a categorical rule exempting police officer identifications from Wade hearings but held that based on the record, the trial court did not err in denying the hearing. Titone, J., dissented, arguing that the fleeting nature of the initial contact warranted a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, citing CPL 60.25 and 60.30 regarding constitutional rights during identification procedures. The dissent highlighted examples from other cases where suggestive circumstances, revealed during Wade hearings, tainted police officer identifications. The dissent argued that the majority’s approach created an “insuperable threshold” by requiring knowledge of the specific events before granting a hearing.

  • People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 902 (1989): Presumption of Regularity in Competency Examinations

    People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 902 (1989)

    In the absence of contrary evidence, a court will presume that a director’s designation of a psychiatrist and psychologist, instead of two psychiatrists, to conduct a competency examination was regular and in accordance with the statutory directive if the director believed the defendant might be mentally defective.

    Summary

    Defendant Jones was convicted of sexual abuse, and during sentencing, his counsel requested a competency examination. The director of Community Mental Health Services designated a psychiatrist and a psychologist, who found Jones competent. Jones’s counsel raised no objection at the time. On appeal, Jones argued the examination was defective because it didn’t involve two psychiatrists, as seemingly required by CPL 730.20(1). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court would presume the director acted properly under the statute, which allows for a psychologist if the director believes the defendant may be mentally defective. Since Jones raised the objection for the first time on appeal, there was no factual record to review the contention.

    Facts

    • Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse.
    • During sentencing, defense counsel requested a competency examination under CPL Article 730.
    • The director of Community Mental Health Services designated a psychiatrist and a psychologist to conduct the examination.
    • The psychiatrist and psychologist reported that the defendant was competent.
    • Defense counsel did not object to the court adopting the report.

    Procedural History

    • The trial court convicted and sentenced the defendant for sexual abuse.
    • On appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued the competency examination was defective.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the designation of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, instead of two qualified psychiatrists, renders a competency examination defective under CPL 730.20(1).

    Holding

    1. No, because in the absence of contrary evidence, the court presumes the director acted in accordance with the statutory directive, which allows for a psychologist to participate in the examination if the director is of the opinion that the defendant may be mentally defective.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the presumption of regularity, stating, “In the absence of any contrary evidence, we presume that the director’s designation of a psychiatrist and a psychologist to examine defendant was regular and in accordance with statutory directive (Richardson, Evidence § 72, at 49 [Prince 10th ed]).” The court noted that CPL 730.20(1) requires two qualified psychiatrists but allows for a psychologist if the director believes the defendant may be mentally defective. The court reasoned that because the defendant raised the objection for the first time on appeal, there was no factual record to determine if the director believed the defendant was mentally defective. Therefore, the court would presume the director acted properly. The court effectively placed the burden on the defendant to raise a timely objection and create a factual record, preventing him from challenging the designation on appeal. This ruling highlights the importance of raising objections at the trial level to preserve issues for appellate review and to allow the trial court to develop a complete record.

  • Board of Education v. Watertown Education Association, 74 N.Y.2d 912 (1989): Determining Arbitrability in Collective Bargaining Agreements

    74 N.Y.2d 912 (1989)

    When an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of a dispute, the question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the contract is a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator, not the courts.

    Summary

    The Watertown Education Association sought arbitration, alleging the Board of Education violated their collective bargaining agreement by failing to distribute funds received under Education Law § 3602 (27) to a member. The Board argued the “Excellence in Teaching” (EIT) agreement was separate and not subject to arbitration. The Supreme Court granted the Board’s petition to stay arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement to arbitrate was clear and broad and that determining whether the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration provision was the arbitrator’s responsibility, not the court’s. The court emphasized that CPLR 7501 prohibits a court from considering the merits of the claim when arbitration is sought.

    Facts

    The Watertown Education Association (respondent) claimed that the Board of Education of the Watertown City School District (petitioner) violated their collective bargaining agreement, specifically exhibit B concerning the salary schedule. The Association alleged the Board failed to distribute funds received pursuant to Education Law § 3602 (27) to one of its members. These funds, known as EIT funds, were considered part of the teacher’s salary for the school year. The collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitration clause.

    Procedural History

    The Watertown Education Association sought arbitration. The Board of Education commenced a proceeding under CPLR 7503 to stay arbitration, arguing the EIT agreement was separate from the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the demand for arbitration and granted the Board’s petition to stay arbitration, concluding the dispute was not arbitrable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dispute over the distribution of EIT funds, arguably covered by a separate agreement, falls within the scope of a broad arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, thus requiring arbitration.

    Holding

    Yes, because the parties’ agreement to arbitrate is clear and unequivocal, and the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the dispute. Any dispute as to the coverage of the substantive provisions of the contract is for the arbitrator to resolve.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that if the arbitration clause is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the dispute, the scope of the substantive provisions is a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. The court cited Board of Educ. v Barni, 49 NY2d 311, 314, stating, “[t]he question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the contract is itself a matter of contract interpretation and application, and hence it must be deemed a matter for resolution by the arbitrator.” The court also noted that CPLR 7501 prohibits courts from considering the merits of the claim when arbitration is sought. The arbitration clause defined a “grievance” as “[A] claim by any party to the contract that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of: (a) law; (b) the employment contract; (c) by-laws and written policies or any unilateral attempt to change the terms and conditions of employment.” The court found that the Supreme Court improperly focused on the separate terms of the EIT agreement instead of determining whether the dispute fell within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision. The court emphasized that it was not the court’s role to inject itself into determining the underlying merits of this arbitrable contract dispute.

  • Hooper Associates, Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487 (1989): Indemnification Clauses and Recovery of Attorney’s Fees in Direct Suits

    Hooper Associates, Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487 (1989)

    An indemnification clause in a contract will not be interpreted to allow a party to recover attorney’s fees in a suit against the indemnitor unless the contract language clearly and unmistakably indicates that intention, especially when the clause is susceptible to a reading that limits indemnification to third-party claims.

    Summary

    Hooper Associates sued AGS Computers for breach of contract, seeking to recover attorney’s fees under an indemnity clause. The New York Court of Appeals held that the indemnity clause did not entitle Hooper to recover attorney’s fees incurred in its direct suit against AGS. The court reasoned that indemnity clauses are strictly construed and will not be interpreted to include attorney’s fees in suits between the contracting parties unless the contract language clearly indicates such an intent. Because the clause in question was typical of those covering third-party claims, Hooper could not recover its attorney’s fees from AGS.

    Facts

    In 1977, Hooper Associates, Ltd. (Hooper) contracted with AGS Computers, Inc. (AGS) for AGS to design, install, and supply a computer system. In 1980, Hooper sued AGS for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. Hooper also sought attorney’s fees based on Article 9(A) of their contract, which contained an indemnity clause.

    Procedural History

    The trial court severed the attorney’s fees claim. The jury found for Hooper but awarded no damages. The trial court awarded nominal damages and then granted summary judgment to Hooper on the attorney’s fees claim, finding the contract unambiguous. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Breed, Abbott & Morgan v. Hulko. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indemnity clause that obligates one party to indemnify and hold harmless the other party from all claims, damages, liabilities, costs, and expenses, including reasonable counsel fees, arising out of certain events, entitles the indemnitee to recover attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting a breach of contract action directly against the indemnitor.

    Holding

    No, because the indemnity clause did not contain language clearly permitting Hooper to recover attorney’s fees from AGS in a suit against AGS itself. The clause was more typical of those contemplating reimbursement when the indemnitee is required to pay damages on a third-party claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by stating the general rule that attorney’s fees are incidents of litigation and are not recoverable unless authorized by agreement, statute, or court rule. The court noted that indemnity contracts are to be strictly construed, especially when a party is under no legal duty to indemnify. A promise to indemnify for attorney’s fees in litigation between the parties must be unmistakably clear from the language of the promise. The court found that the indemnity clause in this case was “typical of those which contemplate reimbursement when the indemnitee is required to pay damages on a third-party claim.” The court further reasoned that other provisions in the contract, such as the requirement for prompt notification of claims and the right to assume the defense of any claim, related to third-party claims. Extending the indemnification clause to cover attorney’s fees in a suit between the parties would render these provisions meaningless. The court distinguished its prior holding in Breed, Abbott & Morgan v. Hulko, stating that the intent of the parties in that case was manifest. Here, the indemnity clause clearly covered circumstances involving third-party claims for issues like personal injury or property damage caused by computer malfunctions. The court emphasized that “the court should not infer a party’s intention to waive the benefit of the rule [that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees] unless the intention to do so is unmistakably clear from the language of the promise”.

  • People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989): Determining Predicate Felonies Based on Out-of-State Convictions

    People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989)

    When determining if an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate felony in New York, courts generally compare the statutory elements of the crimes, and may only consider the factual allegations in the foreign accusatory instrument when the foreign statute criminalizes multiple acts, some of which would be felonies and others misdemeanors in New York.

    Summary

    Muniz pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree burglary in New York. The prosecution sought to classify him as a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction. The New Jersey statute defined burglary as entering with intent to commit any “offense,” while New York required intent to commit a “crime” (felony or misdemeanor). The Court of Appeals held that the New Jersey conviction could not serve as a predicate felony because “offense” was broader than “crime,” including acts that would only be violations in New York. The court further clarified that the accusatory instrument from the New Jersey case could not be considered, as the statute was not divisible in the way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

    Facts

    Defendant, Muniz, was charged in Bronx County with attempted second-degree burglary and fourth-degree criminal mischief.
    The People filed predicate felony statements, alleging Muniz was a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction.
    The accusatory instrument from New Jersey alleged that Muniz committed third-degree burglary by breaking and entering premises with the intent to commit a theft.
    Defense counsel argued that the New Jersey conviction should not qualify as a predicate felony because the New Jersey statute criminalized unlawful entries with the intent to commit any “offense,” whereas New York burglary provisions require intent to commit a “crime.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected Muniz’s arguments and found that his prior New Jersey burglary conviction qualified as a predicate felony, sentencing him as a second felony offender.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the “intent to commit an offense” in the New Jersey statute was equivalent to the “intent to commit a crime” required by New York burglary provisions.
    Muniz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New Jersey crime of third-degree burglary, which requires intent to commit any “offense,” is the equivalent of a New York felony, which requires intent to commit a “crime,” for the purpose of determining predicate felony status under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i)?
    If not, whether the trial court could properly consider the factual allegations in the New Jersey accusatory instrument to elucidate the nature of Muniz’s prior crime?

    Holding

    No, because the New Jersey statute’s definition of “offense” is broader than New York’s definition of “crime,” encompassing acts that would not constitute felonies or misdemeanors in New York.
    No, because the New Jersey statute defines a single crime, and is not divisible in such a way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) requires the foreign conviction to have an equivalent among New York’s felony-level crimes.
    Generally, this determination is made by comparing the elements of the crimes as defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes, and the accusatory instrument underlying the foreign conviction is ordinarily not considered.
    However, the accusatory instrument may be considered when the foreign statute criminalizes several different acts, some of which would constitute felonies and others misdemeanors if committed in New York.
    New Jersey’s definition of “offense” includes acts that are the equivalent of petty offenses or violations in New York, while New York’s definition of “crime” encompasses only felonies and misdemeanors.
    Therefore, it is possible to violate the New Jersey third-degree burglary provisions by acting with the intent to commit a petty offense, without necessarily acting with the level of intent required for a felonious burglary in New York.
    The court distinguished this case from cases like People ex rel. Gold v. Jackson, where the foreign crime could be committed in several different, alternative ways, some of which would constitute felonies if committed in New York and others of which would constitute only misdemeanors. Here, the foreign crime was rendered a felony because of a particular aggravating circumstance (criminal intent), which included, but was broader in coverage than, the analogous aggravating element of the New York felony.
    Quoting People v. Olah, the court stated that “ ‘the controversy did not turn upon [them]’ ” and that it is improper to look to the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument as a means of clarifying the nature of the defendant’s claimed predicate crime.