New York Law Review

Tag: 1989

  • Kovarsky v. Housing Development Administration, 74 N.Y.2d 852 (1989): Statute of Limitations for Civil Rights and Housing Claims

    Kovarsky v. Housing Development Administration, 74 N.Y.2d 852 (1989)

    Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(5), and challenges to the validity of the Rent Stabilization Code cannot be brought as Article 78 proceedings.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to certain housing practices under the Civil Rights Act, Rent Stabilization Law, and Private Housing Finance Law. The plaintiffs brought a class action against the Housing Development Administration and other defendants, alleging various violations. The defendants moved to dismiss based on statute of limitations and the impropriety of using a plenary action instead of an Article 78 proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were timely and properly brought as a plenary action.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, representing a class of individuals, initiated an action against the Housing Development Administration (HDA) and other defendants, alleging violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of the Rent Stabilization Law and the Private Housing Finance Law. The specific facts underlying the housing practices challenged are not detailed in this memorandum decision.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s order. The case then reached the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were timely asserted given the applicable statute of limitations.
    2. Whether the plaintiffs’ claims arising under the Rent Stabilization Law and the Private Housing Finance Law should have been litigated in an Article 78 proceeding and were thus barred by the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217.
    3. Whether Supreme Court abused its discretion by ordering the joinder of additional parties as defendants.
    4. Whether the lower court abused its discretion by allowing the class action to proceed against the governmental defendants.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the action was brought within the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214(5).
    2. No, because an Article 78 proceeding is not the appropriate remedy to attack the validity of the Rent Stabilization Code, which is a quasi-legislative enactment.
    3. No, because the record fails to support the claim that the action was not commenced against them within three years of its accrual.
    4. No, because, in the circumstances presented, it was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law to permit this class action to proceed against the governmental defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were timely because they were filed within the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by CPLR 214(5), citing 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 480. The court distinguished between challenging a specific administrative decision (which would be appropriate for an Article 78 proceeding) and challenging the validity of the Rent Stabilization Code itself, which is a quasi-legislative enactment. Citing Matter of Lakeland Water Dist. v Onondaga County Water Auth., 24 NY2d 400, 408, the Court held that an Article 78 proceeding is inappropriate for challenging the validity of a quasi-legislative enactment. The court did not specify whether CPLR 214(2) or 213(1) applied, but it stated that the action was timely under either provision. Regarding the joinder of parties, the Court found no abuse of discretion, as the record did not support the claim that the action was untimely against the joined parties. Finally, while acknowledging the general rule that class action relief is ordinarily inappropriate in cases involving governmental operations, the Court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the class action to proceed, particularly because the presence of the governmental defendants might aid in implementing retroactive awards if the plaintiffs were to succeed.

  • Gross v. New York, 73 N.Y.2d 860 (1989): Autopsies as the Practice of Medicine

    73 N.Y.2d 860 (1989)

    The performance of an autopsy constitutes the practice of medicine under New York Education Law § 6521, thereby subjecting medical examiners to the jurisdiction of the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct.

    Summary

    Gross, New York City’s Chief Medical Examiner, faced professional misconduct charges related to autopsy performance. An Administrative Officer (AO) initially dismissed the charges, deeming autopsies outside the scope of “practice of medicine” as defined in Education Law § 6521, thus asserting a lack of jurisdiction by the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct. The Board of Regents reversed the AO’s decision. Gross then initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of Gross’s petition, holding that autopsies do constitute the practice of medicine, and the AO’s decision was subject to administrative review.

    Facts

    Petitioner Gross, as New York City’s Chief Medical Examiner, was accused of professional misconduct in conducting autopsies. These charges were brought under Education Law § 6509 (2). An Administrative Officer (AO), designated within the disciplinary hearing committee, ruled that performing an autopsy did not constitute the “practice of medicine” as defined by Education Law § 6521. The AO consequently dismissed the charges based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct.

    Procedural History

    1. The AO dismissed the charges against Gross.
    2. The Commissioner of Health and the Regents Review Committee reviewed and reversed the AO’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.
    3. Gross initiated an Article 78 proceeding under Education Law § 6510-a (4), seeking relief in the nature of prohibition.
    4. The Appellate Division dismissed Gross’s petition.
    5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the performance of autopsies constitutes the “practice of medicine” as defined in Education Law § 6521, thus granting the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct jurisdiction over such activities.
    2. Whether the decision of the Administrative Officer (AO) to dismiss the charges against Gross was subject to review by the Commissioner of Health and the Board of Regents.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Education Law § 6521 defines the practice of medicine as “diagnosing, treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition,” and an autopsy is the ultimate diagnostic procedure to determine the cause and means of death.
    2. Yes, because neither Public Health Law § 230 nor Education Law § 6510-a precludes the reversal of an AO’s rulings through administrative review, and absent a specific legislative mandate, an AO’s order erroneously dismissing charges is not final.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Education Law § 6521, defining the practice of medicine, lacks any limitation suggesting it applies only to living patients. It emphasized that an autopsy is fundamentally a diagnostic procedure used to determine the cause and manner of death. Therefore, it falls squarely within the definition of “diagnosing… any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition.” The court stated, “Clearly, an autopsy is the ultimate diagnostic procedure through which are determined the cause and means of death. Accordingly, since the practice of medicine includes the performance of autopsies, subject matter jurisdiction obtains.”

    Regarding the reviewability of the AO’s decision, the Court found no statutory basis to prevent the Commissioner of Health and the Board of Regents from reviewing and reversing the AO’s ruling. While Public Health Law § 230 (10) (e) defines the AO’s authority to make legal rulings, it does not grant those rulings finality. The court noted, “Absent a specific legislative mandate to the contrary, we perceive no basis for attributing finality to an order made by an Administrative Officer which erroneously dismisses charges of professional medical misconduct.” This ensures that errors in initial legal rulings can be corrected through established administrative processes.

  • Pius v. Director, Bldg. & Housing, 74 N.Y.2d 919 (1989): Discretionary Authority and SEQRA Review for Building Permits

    Pius v. Director, Bldg. & Housing, 74 N.Y.2d 919 (1989)

    Issuance of a building permit is not always a ministerial act exempt from SEQRA review; if the issuing authority possesses discretionary power to approve site plans and make case-by-case judgments, the permit process constitutes an “action” subject to environmental review.

    Summary

    Pius, a contract purchaser, sought a building permit to construct an office building. The Town of Huntington’s Director of Engineering, Building and Housing (Director) denied the permit, requiring Pius to submit a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) due to potential adverse environmental impacts. Pius initiated an Article 78 proceeding to compel the permit issuance. The lower courts, relying on *Filmways*, held that permit issuance was ministerial and not subject to SEQRA. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the Director possessed discretionary authority over site plan approvals and construction materials, the permit process was an “action” requiring SEQRA review.

    Facts

    Pius sought a building permit for an office building in a commercial zone.
    The Town’s Department of Environmental Control made a preliminary assessment.
    A positive SEQRA declaration indicated potential significant adverse environmental impact.
    The Director refused the permit and required a DEIS.

    Procedural History

    Pius commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to annul the Director’s determination and compel the permit issuance.
    Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the petition.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on *Matter of Filmways Communications v Douglas*.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the issuance of a building permit by the Director of Engineering, Building and Housing of the Town of Huntington is a ministerial act exempt from review under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), or whether it constitutes a discretionary “action” requiring environmental review.

    Holding

    No, because the Director possessed discretionary authority over site plan approvals and construction materials, the permit process was an “action” requiring SEQRA review. The prior case, *Filmways*, was misinterpreted; it did not establish a broad rule that all building permits are ministerial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that SEQRA requires an environmental impact statement for “any action… which may have a significant effect on the environment” (ECL 8-0109[2]). While SEQRA exempts “official acts of a ministerial nature, involving no exercise of discretion” (ECL 8-0105[5][ii]), the Court distinguished the case from *Filmways*. In *Filmways*, the building inspector’s function was deemed ministerial because the building code provided no “latitude of choice.” The Court clarified that *Filmways* should not be interpreted as establishing a blanket rule that all building permit issuances are ministerial.

    Here, the Director had specifically delegated site plan approval powers, including the authority to make case-by-case judgments on site plan design and construction materials. This discretionary power transformed the permit issuance into an “action” subject to SEQRA review. The Court stated that “in light of the Director’s specifically delegated site plan approval powers coupled with the authority to make certain case-by-case judgments on site plan design and construction materials issues, the Town of Huntington’s subdivision regulations and site improvement specifications vests discretion of a kind which qualifies as an unexempted ‘action’ in connection with the issuance of a building permit.”

    Because the issuance was an “action,” the Director, as head of the lead agency, was entitled to require a DEIS. This decision reinforces the importance of examining the specific powers and duties of the issuing authority when determining whether a permit process is subject to SEQRA review. It highlights that even when a permit appears to be a routine matter, discretionary authority can trigger environmental review obligations. The dissent is not mentioned because there was none.

  • People v. Ford, 73 N.Y.2d 905 (1989): Public Benefit Corporations and Intent to Defraud the State

    People v. Ford, 73 N.Y.2d 905 (1989)

    A public benefit corporation is not automatically considered “the state or any political subdivision thereof” under Penal Law § 175.35, and a conviction for offering a false instrument for filing requires proof of intent to defraud the State itself, not merely the public benefit corporation.

    Summary

    Ford, an assistant train conductor for Metro-North, was convicted of petit larceny and offering a false instrument for filing after submitting fraudulent time sheets. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for offering a false instrument, holding that Metro-North, a public benefit subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, is not automatically equivalent to “the state or any political subdivision thereof” under Penal Law § 175.35. The Court emphasized that the statute requires proof of intent to defraud the State, not just the corporation. The petit larceny conviction was upheld because the defense was not prejudiced by the late notice of the lesser included offense.

    Facts

    Defendant Ford worked as an assistant train conductor for Metro-North, a commuter railroad. He was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny and offering a false instrument for filing. The indictment alleged that Ford stole money from Metro-North by submitting false time sheets indicating he worked more hours than he actually did. The time sheets were submitted on 10 separate occasions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court charged petit larceny as a lesser included offense of grand larceny. The jury convicted Ford of petit larceny and one count of offering a false instrument for filing. Ford appealed, arguing that Metro-North is not “the state or any political subdivision thereof” under Penal Law § 175.35, and that the petit larceny conviction should be overturned due to lack of notice. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Metro-North, a public benefit subsidiary corporation of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, can be considered “the state or any political subdivision thereof” for the purposes of Penal Law § 175.35.
    2. Whether the trial court’s failure to inform counsel prior to summations that it intended to submit petit larceny as a lesser included offense requires reversal of the petit larceny conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because public benefit corporations are not automatically considered the same as the State or its political subdivisions, and the statute requires proof of intent to defraud the State.
    2. No, because the error was harmless as the defense summation focused on a different charge and was not prejudiced by the lack of notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that public benefit corporations are not identical to the State and are only treated as such for specific purposes, requiring a particularized inquiry. The Court noted, “Only conduct that falls within the plain, natural meaning of the language of a Penal Law provision may be punished as criminal.” Because public benefit corporations are not invariably treated as the State, they do not fall within the plain meaning of “state or any political subdivision thereof” in Penal Law § 175.35. The Court further emphasized that Metro-North was acting as a private employer when accepting the fraudulent time sheets, not as an agent of the sovereign. The court stated that criminal statutes must afford fair warning, and absent clear language, section 175.35 does not provide adequate notice that filing a false instrument with Metro-North constitutes defrauding the State. Therefore, the People had to prove the defendant intended to defraud the State itself, not just Metro-North. Regarding the petit larceny conviction, the Court found any error in failing to timely apprise counsel of the charge harmless because the defense summation focused exclusively on the charge of offering a false instrument and was not prejudiced because the elements of grand larceny and petit larceny were the same except for the value of property stolen.

  • O’Connell v. O’Connell, 74 N.Y.2d 926 (1989): Enforceability of Modifiable Foreign Judgments

    O’Connell v. O’Connell, 74 N.Y.2d 926 (1989)

    A New York court is not constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment that is not final under the laws of the issuing state, particularly if the judgment is modifiable.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of a New Hampshire alimony judgment in New York. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the New Hampshire judgment was modifiable under New Hampshire law, New York was not constitutionally required to give it full faith and credit. The Court clarified that enforcing the foreign judgment under Family Court Act § 466 (c) (i) did not transform it into a New York decree, and the Family Court’s powers are limited to the statute’s authorization. Once the alimony obligation expired under the terms of the New Hampshire decree, the New York Family Court lacked the authority to act further.

    Facts

    The petitioner sought an order from the New York Family Court to enforce a New Hampshire judgment regarding alimony. The New Hampshire judgment was for a fixed duration of three years. The petitioner sought enforcement under Family Court Act § 466 (c) (i), which allows for the enforcement of foreign judgments. After the three-year period specified in the New Hampshire judgment expired, the petitioner attempted to extend the alimony payments, but the Family Court denied the request.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially granted the petitioner’s application to enforce the New Hampshire judgment. However, after the alimony obligation’s three-year term expired, the Family Court refused to extend the payments. The Appellate Division order was brought up for review. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Family Court’s judgment and the Appellate Division order, holding that the New Hampshire judgment was not final and enforceable beyond its original terms.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York is constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a New Hampshire judgment for alimony when that judgment is modifiable under New Hampshire law.

    Holding

    No, because New York is not constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment that is not final under the laws of the issuing state, and the New Hampshire judgment was modifiable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that full faith and credit need not be extended to foreign judgments that are not final. Citing Barber v. Barber and Sistare v. Sistare, the Court emphasized that modifiable judgments are not considered final. Because New Hampshire law (NH Rev Stat Annot § 458:19) allows for the modification of alimony judgments, the New Hampshire judgment lacked the finality required for mandatory full faith and credit. The court emphasized that the Family Court’s powers are restricted to those authorized by statute, citing Matter of Silver v Silver. The Court stated that the enforcement order operated only to enforce the provisions of the foreign decree in accordance with its express terms and not to renew, extend or modify the alimony provision. As the Court noted, “upon the expiration of the underlying alimony obligation after three years, there was no longer any obligation in respect thereto under the terms of the order of the issuing State.” The Court distinguished between enforcing a foreign judgment under Family Court Act § 466 (c) (i) and modifying it under § 466 (c) (ii), noting that the petitioner only sought enforcement, not modification. The Court also pointed out that the mere enforcement of the alimony award by the New York Family Court could not extend the duration of the award under the law of New Hampshire. The Court made reference to Clevesy v. Clevesy from the state of New Jersey for additional support.

  • Matter of Board of Educ. v. Watertown Educ. Ass’n, 74 N.Y.2d 906 (1989): Arbitrability of Teacher Assignment Disputes

    Matter of Board of Educ. v. Watertown Educ. Ass’n, 74 N.Y.2d 906 (1989)

    A court should not stay arbitration unless public policy considerations absolutely prohibit the arbitrator from deciding particular matters or granting specific relief; questions of procedural compliance with a grievance process are for the arbitrator to decide.

    Summary

    The Watertown City School District sought to stay arbitration demanded by the Watertown Education Association concerning the appointment of a non-bargaining unit member to a coaching position. The Association argued this violated their collective bargaining agreement. The School District claimed the issue was not arbitrable due to public policy and the Association’s failure to follow pre-arbitration grievance procedures. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to stay arbitration, holding that it was premature to intervene, as the arbitrator could potentially fashion a remedy that did not violate public policy. The court also determined that procedural compliance with the grievance process was an issue for the arbitrator.

    Facts

    The Watertown City School District (School District) and the Watertown Education Association (Association) had a collective bargaining agreement stating that instructional position vacancies would be filled from within the bargaining unit.
    When a part-time head varsity basketball coach position opened, the School District appointed someone outside the bargaining unit.
    Two Association members, both former head basketball coaches, applied for the position but were rejected. The School District claimed they were unqualified, which the Association disputed.
    Following the appointment, the Association filed a grievance, which was denied, and then demanded arbitration, claiming the appointment violated the collective bargaining agreement. They sought the immediate appointment of a member applicant and back pay.

    Procedural History

    The School District initiated a CPLR article 75 proceeding seeking to stay arbitration on public policy grounds.
    Special Term denied the stay and ordered arbitration.
    The Appellate Division reversed and granted a stay.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether arbitration should be stayed on public policy grounds where the remedy sought might infringe upon the School District’s supervisory responsibilities.
    2. Whether arbitration should be stayed because the Association allegedly failed to comply with a contractual pre-grievance informal resolution requirement.

    Holding

    1. No, because it is possible the arbitrator could fashion a remedy that does not violate public policy, and preemptive judicial intervention is not justified where the arbitrator may use broad powers to fashion a narrowly tailored procedural remedy.
    2. No, because questions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process are matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the limited role of courts in reviewing applications to stay arbitration, stating that courts should not interpret contract conditions or determine the merits of a dispute. Citing Board of Educ. v Barni, 51 NY2d 894, 895-896. They should also not stay arbitration merely because the remedy sought might impinge on the board’s supervisory responsibility. A stay is only justified if public policy considerations, embodied in law or statutes, absolutely prohibit the matter from being decided by an arbitrator or certain relief from being granted. Citing Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631.

    Even if the School District remains the ultimate judge of qualifications, the court found it unclear whether the arbitrator’s interpretation or resolution would necessarily substitute the arbitrator’s judgment for the School District’s or require hiring an “unqualified” person. Because relief was possible without violating public policy, the lower court’s stay was premature. As the court noted, “To justify preemptive judicial intervention in the arbitration process, public policy considerations embodied in decisional law or statutes must ‘prohibit, in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator.’” Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631

    Regarding the pre-grievance informal resolution requirement, the Court held that compliance with a step-by-step grievance process is a matter of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator to decide. The Court highlighted that the collective bargaining agreement in effect provided a three-step grievance process, and that questions concerning compliance with such a process should be resolved by the arbitrators. Citing Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 8.

  • People v. Quarles, 74 N.Y.2d 819 (1989): Determining if Handcuffing Creates an Arrest Requiring Probable Cause

    People v. Quarles, 74 N.Y.2d 819 (1989)

    Whether handcuffing a suspect during police questioning constitutes an arrest requiring probable cause depends on the timing of the handcuffing relative to the incriminating statements made by the suspect.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the court addressed whether the defendant’s statements and recovered cocaine should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The central issue was the timing of when the defendant was handcuffed relative to when he made incriminating statements. Because the lower courts failed to make a clear factual finding on this point, the Court of Appeals remitted the case for further factual determination. The court held that if the handcuffing occurred before or simultaneously with the statements, suppression was warranted; otherwise, the judgment should stand.

    Facts

    The uncontradicted testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that the defendant was handcuffed at some point during his encounter with the police. The critical ambiguity was when the handcuffing occurred in relation to the questioning and the defendant’s admissions.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court made no specific finding regarding the timing of the handcuffing. The Appellate Division stated that the defendant was frisked and handcuffed, and “[a]t that time” he made his initial damaging admission but provided no precise timeline. Due to the lack of clarity, the New York Court of Appeals remitted the case to the County Court for a specific factual determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s statements and the cocaine should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest, based on when the defendant was handcuffed relative to making incriminating statements?

    Holding

    1. If the County Court finds that defendant was handcuffed before, or at the same time as, he made his initial statement, then suppression motion should be granted, defendant’s plea vacated, and the indictment dismissed because such handcuffing, in these circumstances, would constitute an illegal arrest requiring probable cause.
    2. If the County Court finds that defendant made his initial statement before handcuffing, the judgment should be amended to reflect that determination because the statements would not be the fruit of an illegal arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the timing of the handcuffing was crucial to determining whether an illegal arrest occurred prior to the defendant’s statements. The court noted that if the defendant was handcuffed before or during the questioning, it would effectively constitute an arrest, requiring probable cause. Without a clear finding on this factual issue, the court could not determine whether the statements were the product of an illegal arrest and therefore inadmissible.

    The court stated, “The factual question of when defendant was handcuffed is material to the only preserved issue of law —i.e., whether defendant’s statements and the cocaine were the fruit of an illegal arrest.”

    The court reasoned that remittal was necessary because neither the suppression court nor the Appellate Division had adequately addressed the critical factual question. The absence of a clear finding on the timing of the handcuffing prevented the Court of Appeals from resolving the legal issue of whether the evidence should be suppressed.

    The decision highlights the importance of establishing a clear factual record in suppression hearings, particularly regarding actions that may constitute an arrest. It also emphasizes that handcuffing a suspect can, under certain circumstances, transform an investigatory detention into a full-blown arrest, triggering the requirement of probable cause.

  • People v. McLemore, 73 N.Y.2d 340 (1989): Delayed Appeal Due to State Action and Loss of Records

    People v. McLemore, 73 N.Y.2d 340 (1989)

    When a defendant is deprived of their right to appeal due to state action and the records of the trial are lost, making reconstruction or a new trial impossible, the conviction must be vacated and the indictment dismissed, even after a significant passage of time.

    Summary

    McLemore sought to reverse a 1963 New York assault conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in a Mississippi murder trial where he was sentenced to death. He argued that he was never advised of his right to appeal the 1963 conviction and that the State thwarted his attempts to obtain review. The New York Court of Appeals held that because McLemore was denied his right to appeal due to state action and the trial records were lost, making a new trial impossible, the conviction was vacated, and the indictment dismissed.

    Facts

    In 1963, McLemore was convicted of assault in New York.

    McLemore was not advised of his right to appeal the assault conviction.

    The 1963 New York conviction was later used as an aggravating factor in a Mississippi murder trial, where McLemore was sentenced to death.

    McLemore made several attempts to appeal the 1963 conviction pro se, but these efforts were unsuccessful due to actions by the State.

    The records of McLemore’s 1963 trial were lost.

    Procedural History

    McLemore sought post-conviction relief in Mississippi, challenging the use of the 1963 New York conviction.

    He then sought to reverse the 1963 New York assault conviction.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of resentence, determining that review of the underlying 1963 conviction was unavailable.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the passage of time bars an appeal of a conviction when the defendant was not advised of their right to appeal, made diligent attempts to appeal pro se, and was prevented from obtaining review by the State.

    Whether vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy when the trial records are lost, and neither reconstruction nor a new trial is possible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s right to appeal was thwarted by the state, and the conviction was used as an aggravating factor in a capital case. The passage of time does not bar appeal in these circumstances.

    Yes, because the loss of trial records and the impossibility of reconstruction or a new trial leaves vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment as the only available remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the passage of time did not bar the appeal due to the unusual circumstances: McLemore was never advised of his right to appeal, he made diligent pro se attempts to appeal, and the State prevented him from obtaining review. The court stated, “It is undisputed that the actions of this State prevented defendant from ever obtaining the review of the conviction to which he was entitled.”

    The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Corso, noting that Corso did not involve a situation where the defendant had made timely efforts to raise an appealable issue before the statute imposing time limitations was adopted.

    Because the trial records were lost, making reconstruction or a new trial impossible, the Court determined that the only available remedy was vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment. The court cited People v. Rivera in support of this remedy.

    The court emphasized the People’s concession that McLemore had raised appealable issues with possible merit and that the records were lost preventing reconstruction or a new trial. This concession significantly influenced the Court’s decision to reverse the Appellate Division’s order.

  • Morgenthau v. Altman, 74 N.Y.2d 733 (1989): Limits on the Use of Prohibition to Review Criminal Court Actions

    74 N.Y.2d 733 (1989)

    The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is available only where a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers, and is not a means to review arguable errors of law in pending criminal actions.

    Summary

    Morgenthau sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a lower court from allegedly acting improperly in a criminal case. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition was not the appropriate remedy because the trial court had jurisdiction over the criminal matter. The Court emphasized that prohibition is reserved for instances where a court lacks jurisdiction or acts in excess of its powers, not for correcting potential legal errors. Furthermore, the Court declined to convert the proceeding into a declaratory judgment action because a necessary party, the District Attorney’s office, was not before the court.

    Facts

    The specific underlying facts of the criminal action are not detailed in this decision. The key fact is that a party (presumably a defendant in a criminal case) sought certain actions from the criminal court, and the District Attorney, Morgenthau, sought to prohibit the court from taking those actions.

    Procedural History

    Morgenthau, likely in his official capacity as District Attorney, initiated a special proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. Morgenthau then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition against the trial court’s actions in the underlying criminal matter.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court had jurisdiction over the criminal actions and the authority to issue orders relating to the disposition of those actions; therefore, prohibition is not available to collaterally review an arguable error of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, emphasizing the limited scope of the remedy of prohibition. The court reiterated the established principle that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. The court noted that prohibition is not a tool for correcting arguable legal errors within a pending criminal action. Even when a court arguably oversteps its bounds, the issuance of a writ of prohibition is discretionary. The court emphasized that the lower court had jurisdiction over the criminal case and the authority to issue orders related to it. The Court specifically stated: “Prohibition is generally not available to collaterally review an arguable error of law committed in a pending criminal action.” The court also declined to convert the proceeding into a declaratory judgment action, pointing out that the District Attorney’s office, a crucial party with a significant interest, was not properly before the court. This procedural defect prevented the court from considering declaratory relief. The court explicitly avoided expressing any opinion on the merits of the petitioner’s claim that the trial court acted improperly, clarifying that its decision was based solely on the inappropriateness of prohibition as a remedy.

  • People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense and Attempted Murder

    People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance when sufficient evidence is presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that would allow a jury to find the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation or excuse.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court reasoned that, under the specific circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question as to whether the defendant was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court also held that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempted murder and raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. At trial, the defendant presented evidence concerning his subjective state and the external circumstances as he perceived them. The specific facts contributing to the claim of extreme emotional disturbance are not detailed in this memorandum opinion.

    Procedural History

    The defendant requested a jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the charge should have been given. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the defense was inapplicable to attempted murder. The defendant cross-appealed the Appellate Division’s failure to remit the case for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People preserved the argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder for appellate review.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the People did not argue against the charge on extreme emotional disturbance based on its inapplicability to attempted murder at the trial level.
    2. Yes, because under the circumstances and viewing the evidence favorably to the defendant, there was enough evidence to present a jury question on whether the defendant was acting under extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. No, because under the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Division’s decision not to remit for resentencing was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the People’s argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder, finding that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at trial. Citing People v. Villani, the Court reiterated that issues not raised at the trial level are generally waived on appeal.

    Regarding the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on extreme emotional disturbance, the Court emphasized the standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence. It cited People v. Casassa, stating that the assessment requires consideration of “the subjective, internal situation in which defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time.” The Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (as required by People v. Moye), concluded that the evidence presented a jury question on the defense.

    Finally, the Court addressed the defendant’s cross-appeal concerning resentencing, holding that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion. The Court cited People v. Cohen, indicating that the decision to remit for resentencing is generally discretionary.