New York Law Review

Tag: 1989

  • Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989): Market Share Liability for DES Manufacturers

    73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989)

    When plaintiffs cannot identify the manufacturer of a fungible product (DES) that caused their injury, liability is apportioned among manufacturers based on their national market share at the time of exposure, and defendants cannot exculpate themselves by proving they did not manufacture the specific dose ingested by the plaintiff’s mother.

    Summary

    This landmark case addresses liability for injuries caused by diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug administered to pregnant women. Plaintiffs, unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES ingested by their mothers, sued multiple manufacturers. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a “national market share” theory, holding that liability should be apportioned based on each manufacturer’s share of the national DES market at the time of the plaintiff’s mother’s ingestion. Critically, the court rejected the possibility of exculpation; a manufacturer could not escape liability even if it proved it did not produce the specific pills ingested. This decision balances the need to provide redress for injured plaintiffs with the difficulties of proving causation in DES cases.

    Facts

    Multiple plaintiffs brought suit against numerous drug manufacturers, alleging injuries resulting from their mothers’ ingestion of DES during pregnancy. The plaintiffs were unable to identify which specific company manufactured the DES their mothers took, a common problem due to the generic nature of the drug and the passage of time.
    DES was prescribed to pregnant women to prevent miscarriages, but was later found to cause various health problems in their daughters.
    Traditional tort law requires plaintiffs to prove that a specific defendant’s actions caused their injuries. This requirement posed a significant obstacle for DES plaintiffs.
    The plaintiffs sued multiple DES manufacturers, seeking to hold them liable based on theories of concerted action, alternative liability, and market share liability.

    Procedural History

    Several lower court cases involving DES-related injuries were consolidated for appeal.
    The Appellate Division certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the appropriate theory of liability to apply in DES cases.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the novel issues presented by the DES litigation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a DES manufacturer can be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries even if the plaintiff cannot identify that manufacturer as the specific producer of the DES ingested by the plaintiff’s mother.
    Whether, under a market share theory of liability, a DES manufacturer should be permitted to exculpate itself by proving that it did not manufacture the specific DES ingested by the plaintiff’s mother.
    What constitutes the appropriate market (national vs. local) for determining market share.
    Whether joint and several liability or several liability should apply to DES manufacturers held liable under a market share theory.

    Holding

    Yes, because under a market share theory, liability is apportioned based on a manufacturer’s overall risk contribution to the market, not on proof of direct causation in each individual case.
    No, because exculpation would undermine the goal of providing a remedy for injured plaintiffs and would be inconsistent with the risk-based rationale of market share liability.
    The relevant market is the national market, because focusing on a national market provides a more accurate reflection of the overall risk created by each manufacturer.
    Several liability applies, because joint and several liability would unfairly penalize manufacturers with a small market share.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court rejected traditional tort principles requiring identification of the specific tortfeasor because it recognized the unique difficulties faced by DES plaintiffs in proving causation. The court stated: “[W]e are presented with aHelp us understand a problem that has caused great suffering, and which has no clear solution under traditional tort law principles.”
    The court adopted a market share theory, reasoning that each manufacturer contributed to the overall risk of injury by marketing DES, and therefore should bear a portion of the responsibility for the resulting harm. The court reasoned that “the wrongdoers are better able to bear the cost of the injury than are the innocent victims”.
    The court explicitly rejected allowing manufacturers to exculpate themselves, finding that such a rule would “frustrate” the goal of providing a remedy. According to the court, this is because “…the ever-present possibility of exoneration would undermine the efficacy of the remedy.”
    By adopting a national market share, the court aimed to achieve a more equitable apportionment of liability, reflecting the overall risk created by each manufacturer’s conduct across the entire country. The court stated that “…over the course of many years, each company’s share of the market will approximate its responsibility for the risk of injury to the population”.
    The court also rejected the imposition of joint and several liability, concluding that it would unfairly burden smaller manufacturers with a disproportionate share of the damages. The court decided that “…each defendant’s liability for injuries would be several only, and would be based on its share of the national market.”
    A dissenting opinion, argued that precluding exculpation was inconsistent with traditional tort principles of causation and fairness.

  • People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378 (1989): Handcuffing During a Terry Stop

    People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378 (1989)

    The use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a Terry stop into a full-blown arrest if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures to ensure the safety of the officers and the public.

    Summary

    Defendant Allen was apprehended by plain-clothes police officers responding to a radio report of an armed robbery. Allen and three other black males were seen running from the direction of the crime. The officers, identifying themselves, approached the group, who then scattered. Allen led an officer into a dark alley, where he was eventually handcuffed. Before any questioning, Allen spontaneously admitted his involvement in the robbery and moved to suppress this statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that handcuffing Allen in the alley did not automatically constitute an arrest, as the officers’ actions were reasonable to ensure their safety given the circumstances. Therefore, the statement was admissible.

    Facts

    Three plain-clothes police officers received a radio report of an armed robbery in progress involving four black males with multiple guns. Moments later, near the crime scene, they observed Allen and three other black males running away. The officers identified themselves and approached the group, who scattered and fled. Allen led one officer into a dark alley. The officer, concerned for his safety, called for backup. Allen was apprehended while attempting to scale a wall in the alley, then handcuffed and moved to a brighter area for a search and questioning. Allen spontaneously admitted his complicity in the robbery immediately after being handcuffed, but before any questioning occurred.

    Procedural History

    Allen moved to suppress his statements, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause when handcuffed. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and Allen was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the handcuffing did not constitute an arrest. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the handcuffing of a suspect during a Terry stop, based on reasonable suspicion, automatically escalates the encounter into a full-blown arrest requiring probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because, under the circumstances presented, the police officers were entitled to handcuff defendant to effect his nonarrest detention in order to ensure their own safety while they removed him to a more suitable location to pat him down for weapons.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the application of handcuffs does not automatically transform a Terry stop into a full arrest. The critical inquiry is whether the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances. The court emphasized that police officers in rapidly developing and dangerous situations must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety. The court stated, “Where, as here, police officers find themselves in a rapidly developing and dangerous situation presenting an imminent threat to their well-being, they must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety and they should not be expected ‘to await the glint of steel’ before doing so.” In this case, the court considered factors such as the poor lighting in the alley and the officers’ reasonable belief that Allen might be armed. The court found that handcuffing Allen was a justified, limited measure to prevent him from accessing a concealed weapon while being moved to a safer location.

  • People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351 (1989): Standing to Challenge Search Based on Constructive Possession

    People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351 (1989)

    A defendant does not have standing to challenge a search based solely on an allegation of constructive possession of contraband; the defendant must demonstrate a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Summary

    Wesley was convicted of drug and weapons possession after a search of his girlfriend’s house, where police found drugs, weapons, and items with Wesley’s identification. Wesley sought to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied his motion for lack of standing, based on Wesley’s prior grand jury testimony stating that he did not reside at the premises. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the People relied on constructive possession to charge Wesley, they could not simultaneously deny him standing to challenge the search. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wesley failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises, a prerequisite for challenging the search, and that the constructive possession charge did not automatically confer standing.

    Facts

    Police searched the house of Jacquelin Glass, Wesley’s girlfriend, pursuant to a “no-knock” warrant, acting on information that a large quantity of marijuana had been delivered there. Wesley attempted to prevent the police from entering. During the search, police found approximately 75 pounds of marijuana, a handgun, and $800 in cash in a bedroom closet. Men’s clothing and masculine toiletries were in a dresser, along with a shoe box containing Wesley’s identification. Additional identification, mail addressed to Wesley, and photographs of Wesley were found throughout the house. Glass initially told police that “all the stuff upstairs” belonged to Wesley.

    Procedural History

    Wesley and Glass were charged with drug and weapons possession. Both moved to suppress the evidence from the search. Wesley’s motion was denied for lack of standing based on his Grand Jury testimony denying any privacy interest in the residence. Glass’s motion was denied after a hearing. Wesley was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed Wesley’s conviction, citing the constructive possession doctrine as a basis for automatic standing, and the inadequacy of the search warrant, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a search that results in the discovery of contraband based solely on the allegation that he constructively possessed the contraband.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant must demonstrate a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises to have standing to challenge the search. Simply being charged with constructive possession is insufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the exclusionary rule aims to deter unlawful police conduct, balancing the loss of probative evidence against deterring lawless conduct. Citing Rakas v. Illinois, the court stated that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and limit the exclusionary remedy to those whose own protection has been infringed by the search and seizure. The Court explicitly rejected the concept of “automatic standing” derived from Jones v. United States, which had previously granted standing to defendants charged with possessory offenses without requiring them to assert ownership or possession of the property or premises. The court relied on People v. Ponder, which abrogated the automatic standing rule in New York, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises. The court reasoned that a defendant’s possession of seized property does not automatically confer standing; a defendant must assert a cognizable privacy interest in the searched area. The court distinguished the narrow exception created in People v. Millan, applicable only to cases involving the statutory presumption of gun possession in a vehicle, which is not applicable here. The Court emphasized that placing the burden on the defendant to assert an interest in the searched premises is fair because the defendant knows his or her connection with the searched area. The Court stated, “To point out that a defendant has failed to meet the burden of asserting facts showing a legitimate expectation of privacy is not a denial that the defendant had any connection to the premises; it is simply an insistence that the required personal privacy interest be asserted by the defendant”.

  • Block v. Ambach, 73 N.Y.2d 323 (1989): Specificity of Charges in Administrative Proceedings

    73 N.Y.2d 323 (1989)

    Due process in administrative proceedings requires only that the charges be reasonably specific, considering all relevant circumstances, to adequately inform the party of the allegations and allow preparation of a defense; the strict specificity required in criminal indictments is not necessary.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the due process rights of a licensed nurse and a medical doctor were violated in administrative disciplinary proceedings because the charges of misconduct lacked specific dates. The New York Court of Appeals held that the charges were sufficiently specific because they provided reasonable notice of the alleged misconduct and enabled the petitioners to prepare a defense. The court emphasized that administrative proceedings do not require the same level of specificity as criminal proceedings due to the less severe consequences and absence of double jeopardy concerns.

    Facts

    Block, a licensed nurse, was charged with professional misconduct for having a sexual relationship with a 16-year-old patient during and after her hospitalization at Marcy Psychiatric Center between 1981-1982. Ackerman, a licensed medical doctor, was charged with professional misconduct for engaging in sexual acts with patients and encouraging lewd conduct during therapy sessions between 1969 and 1975. Both petitioners argued that the charges were insufficiently specific regarding the dates of the alleged misconduct, hindering their ability to mount a defense.

    Procedural History

    In Block, the Hearing Panel of the Department of Education found Block guilty, and the Commissioner of Education revoked his licenses. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. In Ackerman, the Hearing Panel sustained the charges, and the Commissioner of Health recommended revocation of Ackerman’s license, which the Board of Regents accepted. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination. Both petitioners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the charges against Block and Ackerman were sufficiently specific to satisfy the due process requirement of fair notice, despite the lack of specific dates for the alleged misconduct?

    2. Whether the Commissioner of Education had the authority to discipline Block for his relationship with a former patient after her discharge?

    3. Whether the administrative determinations in Block and Ackerman were supported by substantial evidence?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because due process in administrative proceedings requires only reasonable specificity to apprise the party of the charges and allow for an adequate defense, and the charges in both cases met this standard.

    2. Yes, because a reasonable inference could be drawn that Block’s influence extended after the patient’s discharge, making the relationship a proper basis for determining professional misconduct.

    3. Yes, because the testimony presented in both cases provided substantial evidence to support the administrative determinations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while due process requires fair notice of charges in administrative proceedings, the strict requirements of criminal indictments (regarding specificity of dates) do not apply. The Court emphasized the differences between criminal and administrative proceedings, noting that the former carries more severe consequences and involves double jeopardy considerations. The Court stated, “in the administrative forum, the charges need only be reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights are being determined of the charges against him and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense.”

    The Court distinguished People v. Keindl and People v. Morris, noting that those cases involved criminal prosecutions for specific acts, whereas the charges against Block and Ackerman involved continuing misconduct. The Court noted that the nature of the misconduct allowed it to be characterized as a continuing offense. It also considered factors such as the age and condition of the complainant in Block, and the extensive hearing and defenses presented by Ackerman.

    Regarding Block’s relationship with the former patient, the Court found it reasonable to infer that his influence extended beyond her discharge, justifying the Commissioner’s determination. Finally, the Court held that substantial evidence supported the administrative determinations in both cases, deferring to the Hearing Panel’s credibility assessments.

    The court emphasized that judicial review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s determination.

  • People v. Smith, 73 N.Y.2d 961 (1989): Preserving Sentencing Challenges

    73 N.Y.2d 961 (1989)

    A defendant must timely challenge the allegations in a predicate felony statement to preserve the issue of whether a prior out-of-state conviction is equivalent to a New York felony for second felony offender sentencing.

    Summary

    Benjamin Kou Smith appealed his sentence as a second felony offender. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Smith failed to preserve the argument that his prior federal kidnapping conviction was not equivalent to a New York felony. Smith did not properly controvert the allegations in the predicate felony statement as required by CPL 400.21(3). A concurring opinion argued the police action of transporting the defendant was supported by probable cause. The majority opinion does not address the legality of the transport.

    Facts

    The facts of the underlying crime are not stated in the Court of Appeals decision. The only facts relevant to the decision relate to the sentencing proceeding after Smith’s conviction. The prosecution sought to sentence Smith as a second felony offender based on a prior federal conviction for kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Smith did not properly challenge the predicate felony statement.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted and sentenced as a second felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the sentencing was improper because his prior federal conviction did not qualify as a predicate felony in New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved the issue of whether his prior federal kidnapping conviction is equivalent to a felony conviction in New York for purposes of second felony offender sentencing, when he failed to timely controvert the allegations in the predicate felony statement.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to timely raise the issue of whether he was properly sentenced as a second felony offender by not controverting the allegations in the predicate felony statement as required by CPL 400.21(3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Smith failed to preserve the issue for review because he did not properly controvert the allegations in the predicate felony statement. CPL 400.21(3) requires a defendant to specify the particular grounds upon which the prior conviction is being challenged. By not raising a timely objection, Smith waived his right to argue that the federal kidnapping conviction was not equivalent to a New York felony.

    The court stated: “We would only add that defendant failed to timely raise the issue of whether he was properly sentenced as a second felony offender by not controverting the allegations in the predicate felony statement (CPL 400.21 [3]). Accordingly, any question concerning whether defendant’s prior conviction of kidnapping under 18 USC § 1201 is equivalent to his conviction of a felony in New York has not been preserved for our review.”

    Judge Hancock’s concurring opinion disagreed with the Appellate Division’s application of *People v. Hicks*, arguing that the police action of transporting the defendant to the victim’s home for identification without probable cause was improper. However, Judge Hancock concurred in the result because he believed that the circumstances created probable cause justifying the intrusion, although this argument was not raised before the suppression court.

  • People v. Stone, 73 N.Y.2d 296 (1989): Recommitment After Initial Finding of No Dangerous Mental Disorder

    People v. Stone, 73 N.Y.2d 296 (1989)

    A defendant acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect, and initially found not to have a dangerous mental disorder, can be recommitted to a secure psychiatric facility under CPL 330.20(14) if, while subject to an order of conditions, they are later found to have a dangerous mental disorder.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant acquitted due to mental illness and initially discharged with an order of conditions can be recommitted under CPL 330.20(14) if their condition deteriorates. The Court of Appeals held that recommitment is permissible, even without a prior commitment order, if the defendant is under an order of conditions and currently suffers from a dangerous mental disorder. The Court based its reasoning on statutory interpretation and legislative intent, emphasizing the importance of public safety and the comprehensive nature of the CPL 330.20 framework.

    Facts

    Stone assaulted two police officers after they responded to a 911 call from his mother. He was acquitted of assault by reason of mental disease or defect. After a psychiatric exam, the court determined Stone did not have a dangerous mental disorder or mental illness, and discharged him subject to an order of conditions that mandated continued psychiatric treatment. Five months later, Stone’s condition worsened, and he assaulted a physician while seeking admission to a psychiatric facility.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney sought a recommitment order, alleging Stone violated his order of conditions and suffered from a dangerous mental disorder. The Supreme Court, after a hearing, ordered Stone’s placement in a secure psychiatric facility. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that recommitment was not authorized without a prior secure facility placement. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 330.20(14) authorizes the recommitment of a defendant acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect, who was initially found not to be suffering from a dangerous mental disorder, but who, while subject to an order of conditions, is later found to have a dangerous mental disorder?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 330.20(14) allows for recommitment during the period covered by an order of conditions if the defendant is found to have a dangerous mental disorder, regardless of whether there was a prior commitment order. The Court explicitly stated that a recommitment order is expressly premised on an “order of conditions” and on a current dangerous mental disorder, not on a prior commitment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its decision on statutory construction and legislative intent. CPL 330.20 establishes three tracks for handling criminal acquittees based on their mental condition. The court noted that an order of conditions enables courts to maintain a supervisory role over discharged criminal acquittees. CPL 330.20(14) allows for recommitment during the period covered by an order of conditions when the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder. The Court emphasized that the statute does not require a prior commitment order for recommitment. The Court stated, “Nowhere does the statute predicate it on a prior commitment.”

    The Court further supported its interpretation by examining the legislative history of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980, quoting the Law Revision Commission’s explanation that a recommitment order could be sought at any time during the effective period of an order of conditions. The Court noted that this legislative history confirmed the independent nature of the recommitment provision. It emphasized the legislative objectives of ensuring public safety, safeguarding the rights of defendants, and providing treatment for acquittees suffering from mental illness, all of which are furthered by the recommitment provisions. The court reasoned that upholding the respondent’s theory would drain the order of conditions predicate for a recommitment order of its meaning and purpose.

    The Court cited Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 675 and Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208 to reinforce the principle that statutory language should be interpreted according to its plain meaning. Also cited were Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v Beekman, 52 NY2d 463, 471; Matter of Erie County Agric. Socy. v Cluchey, 40 NY2d 194, 200 reinforcing the need to appreciate comprehensive, coherent statutory language and scheme and the practical interrelationship of commitment orders, recommitment orders, and orders of conditions.

  • People v. Ricardo, 73 N.Y.2d 224 (1989): Authorizing Dual Juries in Joint Trials to Avoid Bruton Violations

    People v. Ricardo, 73 N.Y.2d 224 (1989)

    A trial court has the discretion to impanel separate juries for co-defendants in a joint trial when one defendant’s confession implicates the other, and redaction is insufficient to protect the non-confessing defendant’s right to confrontation, provided that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent prejudice.

    Summary

    Ricardo and Ahrens were jointly tried for criminally negligent homicide stemming from a car accident. Ricardo’s statement to police implicated both defendants in drag racing, but was inadmissible against Ahrens. To avoid a Bruton violation, the trial court impaneled separate juries for each defendant. The Court of Appeals upheld the procedure, finding that while not explicitly authorized by statute, the use of dual juries was within the court’s inherent power to manage trials efficiently while protecting defendants’ rights. The Court emphasized that dual juries should be used sparingly and with careful consideration of due process.

    Facts

    Mildred Carmen was killed when her car was struck by two vehicles driven by Ricardo and Ahrens. The prosecution alleged the defendants were racing prior to the collision. Ricardo made a statement to an off-duty police officer immediately after the accident requesting the officer’s son not to tell the police they were drag racing. This statement was admissible against Ricardo but not Ahrens.

    Procedural History

    Ricardo and Ahrens were jointly indicted for second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. Ahrens moved for severance due to Ricardo’s statement. The People opposed severance and requested a joint trial with separate juries for each defendant. The trial court granted the People’s request over defendants’ objections. Ricardo was adjudicated a youthful offender based on the jury verdict finding him guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court is authorized to impanel separate juries for co-defendants in a joint trial when one defendant’s confession implicates the other.
    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Ricardo’s guilt of criminally negligent homicide.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court’s power to employ multiple juries may logically be implied from the terms of the joinder statutes and is consistent with the general practice and procedure authorized by the Legislature.
    2. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Ricardo guilty of criminally negligent homicide for failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while no statute explicitly authorizes dual juries, the court has inherent power to adopt procedures consistent with general practice authorized by statute. The Legislature’s preference for joint trials, as expressed in CPL 200.20 and 200.40, supports the use of dual juries as a means of avoiding severance. The court found the procedure consistent with the court’s responsibility to administer justice efficiently while protecting a defendant’s rights. The court emphasized this procedure should be used sparingly and with careful consideration of due process. Quoting Judiciary Law § 2-b [3]: “A court of record has power * * * to devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it”.

    Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the Court held the People proved more than excessive speed. There was evidence that Ricardo failed to observe a vehicle plainly visible in front of him or take steps to avoid it, and that his failure was caused by engaging in a race with another car on a busy divided highway in a metropolitan area. This, the Court reasoned, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The court explained that criminal negligence requires failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. The inadvertent risk created must be apparent to anyone sharing the community’s general sense of right and wrong.

  • People v. Day, 73 N.Y.2d 208 (1989): Determining When Consecutive Sentences Are Permissible

    73 N.Y.2d 208 (1989)

    Under New York Penal Law § 70.25(2), consecutive sentences are permissible when offenses arise from separate and distinct acts, and when the statutory definition of one crime does not include the other as a material element.

    Summary

    Defendant Day was convicted of attempted grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal possession of a forged instrument. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the attempted grand larceny conviction, arguing it was a separate crime. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the offenses were separate acts and that the possessory crimes were not material elements of the attempted larceny. The court clarified that for sentencing purposes, one offense is a material element of another only if the statutory definition of the second crime includes the first as a necessary component.

    Facts

    Day, a precious metals broker, received checks worth approximately $221,000 from an associate. These checks, originally payable to the “City Collector,” had been stolen and the payee altered to “Intercity Collector’s Ent. Inc.” Day deposited the checks into his company’s account. The checks were discovered to be stolen, and Day was arrested while attempting to withdraw the account’s balance.

    Procedural History

    Day was convicted in the trial court of attempted grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal possession of a forged instrument, and received consecutive sentences for the larceny conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for attempted grand larceny, arguing that the crimes of conviction were part of the same act or that the possessory offenses were material elements of the attempted grand larceny, thus violating Penal Law § 70.25(2).

    Holding

    No, because the criminal actions constituted more than a single act, and the possessory counts do not constitute material elements of the larceny count according to the pertinent statutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25(2), which mandates concurrent sentences for offenses committed through a single act or when one offense is a material element of another. Citing People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, the court stated that punishment for separate and distinct acts violating multiple Penal Law sections is permissible, even if arising from a single transaction. The Court emphasized that for sentencing purposes, a material element exists only if the statutory definition of one crime necessarily includes the other. The court reasoned that the possessory offenses (possessing stolen property and forged instruments with intent) are distinct from attempted grand larceny (attempting to steal property over a specified amount). "[T]he commission of one offense is a material element of a second for restrictive sentencing purposes if, by comparative examination, the statutory definition of the second crime provides that the first crime is also a necessary component in the legislative classification and definitional sense." Since the statutes define these crimes separately, consecutive sentences were permissible. The court also noted that factual interdependence is a discretionary factor for the sentencing court to consider when deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. The court stated, ” ‘The test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent’ ”.

  • Celetti v. Lippman, 653 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1989): Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Factor in Pain and Suffering Damages

    Celetti v. Lippman, 653 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1989)

    Loss of enjoyment of life is not a distinct element of damages meriting a separate award, but rather a factor to be considered when assessing damages for conscious pain and suffering.

    Summary

    Elaine Celetti died from cancer nearly two years after its misdiagnosis. A malpractice suit alleged failure to properly diagnose her condition during a checkup. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could award damages for loss of enjoyment of life separately from conscious pain and suffering. The Court of Appeals held that loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages but a factor in assessing pain and suffering. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial on the issue of damages for the first cause of action.

    Facts

    Elaine Celetti discovered a painful lump in her left breast. It was later determined the lump was cancerous and had already begun to metastasize.

    Prior to the discovery, Celetti had a regular checkup approximately 10 months before the cancer was discovered.

    Celetti died on June 8, 1985, nearly two years after the cancerous lump was discovered.

    Procedural History

    Celetti’s estate commenced a malpractice action against Dr. Alan Gibstein and his professional corporation.

    The first cause of action sought damages for Celetti’s conscious pain and suffering; the second cause of action was for wrongful death.

    The defendants’ liability was established at trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the award of damages. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging only the award of damages on the first cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could make an award for the loss of enjoyment of life separate and distinct from an award for conscious pain and suffering.

    Holding

    No, because loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages deserving a distinct award but is, instead, only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for conscious pain, and suffering.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in the companion case, McDougald v. Garber, which addressed the same issue. The court reasoned that while loss of enjoyment of life is a component of the overall suffering experienced by a plaintiff, it is not a distinct category of damages that warrants a separate monetary award. The court aimed to avoid potentially duplicative compensation for the same injury, ensuring that juries focus on the totality of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering when determining damages.

    The court states, “loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages deserving a distinct award but is, instead, only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for conscious pain, and suffering.”

    The dissenting judges, Alexander and Titone, would have affirmed the Appellate Division order, referencing Judge Titone’s dissenting opinion in McDougald v. Garber. This suggests that the dissent believed loss of enjoyment of life should be considered a separate and compensable element of damages.

  • Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312 (1989): Foreseeability of Consequential Damages in Contract Law

    Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312 (1989)

    In breach of contract cases, consequential damages are recoverable only if they were reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by both parties at the time the contract was executed.

    Summary

    Kenford Co. sued Erie County for breach of contract after the County failed to build a domed stadium, resulting in Kenford’s loss of anticipated appreciation in the value of its surrounding land. The New York Court of Appeals held that Kenford could not recover these damages because the County’s liability for Kenford’s lost land appreciation was not within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract. The court emphasized that the damages recoverable are limited to those that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting to limit unassumed risks.

    Facts

    Kenford owned land near a proposed stadium site. Kenford offered to donate land to Erie County for the stadium in exchange for the County allowing Kenford’s affiliate, Dome Stadium, Inc. (DSI), to manage the stadium. The agreement stipulated that DSI would lease and manage the stadium for 40 years, generating revenues for the County, including taxes from the peripheral lands owned by Kenford. After the County solicited construction bids that exceeded its budget, it terminated the contract. Kenford sued for breach of contract, seeking damages for lost land appreciation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court awarded Kenford $18 million for lost land appreciation. The Appellate Division affirmed the finding of liability but ordered a new trial on damages for land appreciation, finding the appraisal evidence improper. On appeal concerning DSI’s claim, the Court of Appeals held that DSI’s lost profits were not recoverable because they were not foreseeable and were too speculative (67 N.Y.2d 257). Following the Appellate Division’s decision, a retrial on Kenford’s land appreciation damages resulted in a $6.5 million award, which the Appellate Division affirmed based on law of the case. The County appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Erie County could be held liable for Kenford’s lost appreciation in the value of land near the proposed stadium site due to the County’s breach of contract.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no indication that the parties contemplated that the County would assume liability for Kenford’s loss of anticipated appreciation in the value of its peripheral lands if the stadium were not built.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the damage award, applying the principle that contract damages are limited to those reasonably foreseen or contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. The court reasoned that while both parties expected the stadium to increase land values, this expectation did not mean the County assumed liability for Kenford’s lost appreciation if the stadium wasn’t built. The court emphasized that there was no contractual provision or evidence suggesting the County agreed to be responsible for Kenford’s land appreciation expectations. Quoting their previous decision on DSI’s lost profits, the court reiterated that “the commonsense rule to apply is to consider what the parties would have concluded had they considered the subject.” The court distinguished “bare notice of special consequences” from circumstances implying that liability for those consequences formed the basis of the agreement. The court emphasized the importance of limiting liability to assumed risks, citing Hadley v. Baxendale, to promote business enterprise. Therefore, Kenford voluntarily assumed the risk that the stadium might not be built, and the County had not agreed to insure Kenford against this risk.