New York Law Review

Tag: 1986

  • Richardson v. Fiedler Roofing, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 246 (1986): Compensability of Injuries Sustained During Illegal Acts in Employment

    67 N.Y.2d 246 (1986)

    An employee’s injury is compensable under workers’ compensation even if sustained during an illegal act, provided the act is a reasonable and sufficiently work-related activity under the circumstances, and the employer has knowledge of and tolerates such activity.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a roofer’s death, occurring while stealing copper downspouts during work hours, was compensable under workers’ compensation. The court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision to award benefits, holding that the employee’s actions were within the scope of employment because the employer knew of and tolerated the practice of roofers stealing and selling scrap. The court reasoned that barring compensation would be inappropriate when the employer was aware of and permitted the illegal activity.

    Facts

    Norman Richardson, a roofer employed by Fiedler Roofing, Inc., died after falling from a roof. At the time of the accident, Richardson and a coworker were waiting for materials to arrive at their worksite. While waiting, they moved to another part of the building and removed copper downspouts to sell for scrap. Richardson slipped on ice and fell to his death during this activity.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision that the accident occurred during the course of Richardson’s employment and awarded benefits to his children. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The employer and its insurer appealed, arguing that Richardson’s death resulted from his theft, not his work duties.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee’s injury, sustained during an illegal act (theft) while technically on duty but waiting for materials, is compensable under Workers’ Compensation Law § 10, particularly when the employer knew of and tolerated such illegal acts.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that the decedent’s actions did not constitute a deviation from employment was supported by substantial evidence, including the employer’s knowledge and tolerance of the practice of roofers stealing and selling scrap.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Workers’ Compensation Law § 10, which requires an injury to arise out of and in the course of employment to be compensable. While purely personal pursuits are generally excluded, the court noted that employees waiting for materials are not required to be idle and can engage in reasonable, work-related activities. The court emphasized that the determination of what is reasonable is factual, and the Board has wide latitude. The court found significant that the employer knew of the practice of stealing downspouts and had not disciplined employees for it. The court distinguished this situation from non-work-related injuries caused by illegal acts, for which disability benefits are expressly precluded under Workers’ Compensation Law § 205(3). The court emphasized the remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation Law, which must be “construed liberally to accomplish the economic and humanitarian objects of the act” (Matter of Holcomb v Daily News, 45 N.Y.2d 602, 607). The court stated: “It is one thing to disqualify a claimant for injuries he sustains during the course of an illegal activity pursued on his own time, an activity unknown to the employer and one which it cannot control. It is quite another to deprive dependents of benefits because the employee’s death results from misconduct during the course of employment when the employer knows about the illegal activity and tolerates it”. The dissent argued that engaging in a larceny could never be a “reasonable” activity and that the employer’s tolerance does not make them responsible for injuries sustained during a crime.

  • People v. Casiano, 67 N.Y.2d 906 (1986): Right to Counsel on Appeal After Anders Brief Filed

    People v. Casiano, 67 N.Y.2d 906 (1986)

    When an appellate court identifies nonfrivolous issues in a criminal defendant’s appeal after assigned counsel has filed an Anders brief, the court must assign new counsel to provide effective assistance, as neither the court’s review nor a pro se brief can substitute for the advocacy of counsel.

    Summary

    Casiano was convicted in trial court, and his assigned appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, claiming the appeal was frivolous, without consulting Casiano or analyzing the record. The Appellate Division, reviewing Casiano’s pro se brief, identified appealable issues but affirmed the conviction without assigning new counsel. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Casiano was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on appeal. The court reasoned that once the Appellate Division found nonfrivolous issues, it was obligated to assign new counsel to provide single-minded advocacy, something neither the court’s review nor Casiano’s pro se brief could provide.

    Facts

    Casiano was convicted after trial. His assigned appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, asserting the appeal lacked merit. Counsel did not consult with Casiano before filing the brief. Counsel did not conduct a thorough analysis of the trial court record to identify potential issues for appeal.

    Procedural History

    The assigned counsel filed an Anders brief with the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division reviewed Casiano’s pro se brief. The Appellate Division found appealable issues in the record. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without assigning new counsel. Casiano appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s failure to assign new counsel to a criminal defendant after discovering nonfrivolous issues in his appeal, following the filing of an Anders brief by assigned counsel, deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

    Holding

    Yes, because once the Appellate Division identified nonfrivolous issues, the defendant was entitled to the single-minded advocacy of appellate counsel, which neither the court’s review nor a pro se brief could provide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Gonzalez, which established that neither a review of the record by the Appellate Division nor a pro se brief can substitute for the advocacy of appellate counsel. The Court emphasized the importance of effective assistance of counsel at all stages of a criminal proceeding, including the first appeal as of right. The court also cited Evitts v. Lucey and Anders v. California, underscoring the constitutional right to effective representation on appeal. The Court criticized the District Attorney for failing to address or distinguish these controlling precedents. The court stated, “neither a review of the record by the Appellate Division nor a pro se brief can substitute for the single-minded advocacy of appellate counsel.” The court’s decision highlights the crucial role of appointed counsel in identifying and presenting potentially meritorious arguments on appeal, even after initial counsel deems the appeal frivolous. This ensures that indigent defendants receive a fair and meaningful review of their convictions.

  • People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986): How Excludable Time Applies to Successive Indictments Under Speedy Trial Rules

    People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986)

    When a subsequent indictment replaces an earlier one in the same criminal action, it relates back to the original accusatory instrument for determining both the commencement of the speedy trial period and the computation of excludable time.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether excludable time under New York’s speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30(4)) applies to a second indictment that replaces an earlier one for the same criminal action. The Court of Appeals held that it does. The initial felony complaint was filed on November 20, 1981, followed by an indictment on December 3, 1981. A second indictment, correcting a legal deficiency in the first, was filed on July 13, 1982. The court reasoned that treating the subsequent indictment differently under subdivisions (1)(a) and (4) of CPL 30.30 would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose and create an arbitrary cutoff for replacement indictments. The court emphasized that CPL 30.30 is a prosecutorial readiness rule designed to ensure prompt trials.

    Facts

    Defendant was initially charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The first indictment was flawed because it charged possession in a “place of business,” which was excluded under the relevant Penal Law section. The second indictment corrected this by charging possession under a different subsection of the same Penal Law section, requiring proof of a prior felony conviction. Both indictments related to the same weapon and criminal transaction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed both indictments, finding delays exceeding six months chargeable to the People. The Appellate Division reinstated the first indictment but affirmed the dismissal of the second, reasoning that the excludable time periods were inapplicable since the second indictment was filed more than six months after the original complaint. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the second indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for purposes of CPL 30.30, a subsequent indictment replacing an earlier one in the same criminal action should be related back to the original accusatory instrument not only for determining the commencement of the six-month readiness period under CPL 30.30(1)(a), but also for computing excludable time under CPL 30.30(4)?

    Holding

    Yes, because treating a subsequent indictment differently under CPL 30.30(1)(a) and CPL 30.30(4) would contradict the statute’s intent and create an arbitrary six-month limit on replacement indictments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on prior decisions in People v. Lomax and People v. Osgood, which held that a new indictment after dismissal of the original relates back to the initial accusatory instrument for the six-month readiness period. The court reasoned that applying this principle only to CPL 30.30(1)(a) but not to CPL 30.30(4) would be inconsistent and violate statutory construction rules. The court stated, “[A] rule that succeeding indictments are not to be related back to the commencement of the criminal action for computing excludable time would have consequences which do not further the aim of CPL 30.30 and could not have been contemplated by the Legislature.” It emphasized that CPL 30.30 is a prosecutorial readiness rule and that the District Attorney is entitled to only one six-month readiness period, which commences upon filing the initial accusatory instrument. The court also noted that CPL 200.80 permits the People to seek another indictment anytime before a guilty plea or trial commencement. The Court stated that CPL 30.30 must be interpreted “so as to harmonize its various provisions.” The court emphasized that its decision only applies when the new indictment is “directly derived” from the first accusatory instrument.

  • People ex rel. Robertson v. New York State Division of Parole, 67 N.Y.2d 197 (1986): Habeas Corpus Requires Court Determination of Parole Violation Issues

    67 N.Y.2d 197 (1986)

    In a habeas corpus proceeding challenging parole revocation, issues of fact impacting the legality of detention must be determined by the court issuing the writ, not the Parole Board.

    Summary

    Robertson, a parolee, sought habeas corpus relief, alleging his detention for parole violation was illegal. The Supreme Court initially scheduled a hearing but later transferred the matter to the Parole Board for determination. Robertson appealed, arguing the transfer was improper. The New York Court of Appeals held that factual issues in habeas corpus proceedings must be resolved by the court, not delegated to the Parole Board. Transferring the matter to the Parole Board was an appealable final order, and the case was remitted for a court hearing on the factual disputes.

    Facts

    Robertson was paroled in 1977 after serving time for manslaughter. In 1981, he was arrested on felony charges and indicted for weapons possession, leading to a parole violation warrant. He waived his right to a preliminary parole hearing. He was later acquitted of the weapons charges but remained incarcerated. He filed a civil suit against the city and arresting officers. Robertson then filed a habeas corpus petition arguing the warrant was issued in bad faith as retaliation for his civil suit, his waiver of the preliminary hearing was involuntary and that his final revocation hearing was untimely.

    Procedural History

    Robertson filed a habeas corpus petition in Supreme Court, Queens County. After initially setting the matter for a hearing, the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Parole Board based on an Appellate Division decision. Robertson’s request for subpoenas duces tecum was denied, subject to renewal before the Parole Board. The Appellate Division dismissed Robertson’s appeals from both orders as non-appealable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging parole revocation, the court can transfer the determination of factual issues regarding the legality of detention to the Parole Board, or whether the court itself must resolve those issues.

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 7009(c) directs the court to hear the evidence and proceed in a summary manner, and CPLR 410 requires that triable issues of fact be tried by the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the summary nature of habeas corpus proceedings, designed to swiftly address unlawful detention. The court cited CPLR 7009(c), stating that the court must “hear the evidence produced in support of and against detention and to dispose of the proceeding as justice requires.” The Court further reasoned that designating habeas corpus as a special proceeding invokes CPLR 410, mandating that “if triable issues of fact are raised they shall be tried forthwith and the court shall make a final determination thereon”. The court criticized delegating fact-finding to the Parole Board as contrary to statutory directives and established practice. The Court highlighted that such delegation improperly changes the standard of judicial review from weight of the evidence to whether substantial evidence existed before the Parole Board. The Court stated, “The delegation to the Parole Board of the fact-finding function on which turns release on habeas corpus or dismissal and further detention was, thus, improper for at least three reasons. First, it was contrary to the statutory directions that ‘[t]he court * * * hear the evidence’ and ‘proceed in a summary manner’ (CPLR 7009 [c] [emphasis supplied]). Second, it injects a procedure neither contemplated by the statute, which calls for either judgment of discharge (CPLR 7010 [a]) or remand of the person detained (CPLR 7010 [c]), nor recognized by prior precedent. Third, and most importantly, it changes the process from one in which the factual determination is made by a Trial Judge, reviewable as to the weight of the evidence by the Appellate Division and, when that body disagrees with the trial court, by this court as well, to one in which the only questions to be decided by any of the courts are whether there was substantial evidence before the Parole Board to support its determination and whether required procedural rules were followed”. The court clarified that an evidentiary hearing is not automatically required; it is unnecessary if no triable issues of fact exist, but that the determination must be made by the Supreme Court, not the Parole Board.

  • Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169 (1986): Statute of Limitations for No-Fault Insurance Liens

    Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169 (1986)

    The statute of limitations for an insurance company to enforce a statutory lien against an insured’s recovery from a third party for the same losses covered by no-fault benefits begins to run when the insured actually receives payment from the third party, not when judgment is entered.

    Summary

    Aetna, an insurer, sought to recoup no-fault benefits paid to the Nelsons, who were injured in a car accident, by enforcing a statutory lien against the Nelsons’ settlement with the State of New York. The Nelsons had already received compensation from Aetna for medical expenses and lost earnings. The Nelsons argued that the three-year statute of limitations for liabilities created by statute barred Aetna’s claim. The Court of Appeals held that while the three-year statute of limitations applied, Aetna’s cause of action accrued when the Nelsons received payment from the State, not when the judgment was entered, making Aetna’s action timely.

    Facts

    Kenneth Nelson was injured in a car accident on August 14, 1977, when his car skidded on water and hit a utility pole. His wife suffered permanent brain damage, and Aetna paid them first-party benefits under New York’s No-Fault Law for medical expenses and lost earnings. The Nelsons sued the State for negligence in maintaining the highway, and the Court of Claims found the State liable. Judgment was entered against the State on September 23, 1980. The State appealed, staying enforcement of the judgment. The parties then settled, reducing the judgment, and the State paid the Nelsons on May 28, 1981. A portion of the settlement represented reimbursement for losses already covered by Aetna’s first-party benefits.

    Procedural History

    Aetna sued the Nelsons on November 7, 1983, to recover the first-party benefits, relying on Insurance Law § 673(2), which creates a lien in favor of the insurer. The Nelsons moved to dismiss, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations barred the claim, as it accrued on September 23, 1980, when judgment was entered against the state. Aetna moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted Aetna’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the three-year statute applied, but the cause of action accrued upon settlement, not judgment. The Nelsons appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the insurer’s suit is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to liabilities created or imposed by statute (CPLR 214 [2]), or by the six year “residual” Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]).

    2. Whether the insurer’s cause of action against the defendants accrued when the defendants’ judgment against the State was entered, or later, when the case was finally settled on appeal and the State actually paid the defendants.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Insurance Law § 673(2) creates a new liability subject to the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[2]).

    2. No, because the Statute of Limitations commenced when the defendants actually received payment from the State, not when the judgment was entered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(2) applies to liabilities that would not exist but for a statute. Insurance Law § 673(2) offers an insurer two means of recoupment: a direct action against the tortfeasor (akin to subrogation) and a lien against the injured party’s recovery from the tortfeasor. Both options create new liabilities subject to the three-year statute. The court reasoned that the No-Fault Law creates new and independent statutory rights and obligations to efficiently adjust financial responsibilities from car accidents. As to when the statute of limitations began to run, the court stated, “The Statute of Limitations begins to run once a cause of action accrues (CPLR 203 [a]), that is, when all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court.” The court emphasized that the lien could only be enforced against “any recovery” obtained by the insured, as expressed in Insurance Law § 673(2). The purpose of the lien is to prevent double recovery. Therefore, the insurer’s right to foreclose on the lien accrues only when the insured actually obtains funds representing a “double recovery.” The Court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, finding that Aetna’s suit was timely.

  • People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897 (1986): Establishing Causation in Felony Murder Cases

    People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897 (1986)

    In a felony murder case, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions during the commission of the felony directly caused the victim’s death, but the exact manner of death need not be foreseeable.

    Summary

    Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary after Melvin Cooper died of a heart attack shortly after Ingram burglarized his home. Cooper, who had a history of heart trouble, collapsed after confronting Ingram, who had broken into his residence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove that Ingram’s actions during the burglary caused Cooper’s death. The court also noted that the defense failed to preserve objections regarding the foreseeability of the manner of death and the severity of the sentence.

    Facts

    Ingram and his companions surveyed Melvin Cooper’s house before breaking in to determine if anyone was home. Their activities awakened Cooper, who confronted Ingram inside the house with a gun. Cooper ordered Ingram to lie down and then called the police. After the police arrested Ingram, Cooper collapsed and died shortly afterward at the hospital. Cooper had a pre-existing heart condition. The prosecution argued that the stress of the burglary caused Cooper to suffer a fatal myocardial infarction.

    Procedural History

    Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary in the trial court. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove causation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Ingram then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People presented sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant caused the victim’s death during the course of a burglary.
    2. Whether the defendant may be guilty of felony murder only if the fact of death and the manner in which it occurred was a foreseeable consequence of the burglary.
    3. Whether the defendant’s sentence constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People presented sufficient medical evidence linking the stress of the burglary to the victim’s myocardial infarction.
    2. This issue was not preserved for review because the defense failed to object to the jury charge or request additional instructions.
    3. This issue was not properly before the court because the defendant failed to challenge his sentence before the trial court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s medical expert provided sufficient evidence to link the burglary to Cooper’s death. The expert testified that Cooper’s myocardial infarction was precipitated by the stress of finding a burglar in his home. The court stated that the expert’s testimony was not “so baseless or riddled with contradiction that it was unworthy of belief as a matter of law” (citing People v Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 281; People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 699). The court found it insignificant that there was a lack of postmortem clinical signs of an infarction. The expert clarified that such signs do not appear unless death occurs at least 12 hours after the incident.

    Regarding foreseeability, the Court found that the defendant’s argument wasn’t preserved, because his counsel didn’t challenge the given charge or request supplementary directions. Similarly, his claim that the sentence was cruel and inhumane wasn’t reviewed as it wasn’t raised initially in the trial court.

  • Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bekins Van Lines, 67 N.Y.2d 901 (1986): Insurer’s Subrogation Rights Prevail Over Carrier’s Payment to Insured

    67 N.Y.2d 901 (1986)

    A common carrier who settles with an insured party after receiving notice of an insurer’s subrogation rights is liable to the insurer for the amount of the subrogation claim, up to the limits of the carrier’s liability to the insured.

    Summary

    Aetna, an insurer, sought to recover from Bekins Van Lines after Bekins paid its full liability to the insured, Smith, despite knowing that Aetna had already paid Smith for part of the loss and had subrogation rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that Bekins’ payment to Smith was a violation of Aetna’s subrogation rights. Bekins was obligated to pay Aetna the amount Aetna had already paid Smith, up to Bekins’ total liability. The settlement between Bekins and Smith, made after Bekins knew of Aetna’s subrogation rights, did not affect Aetna’s ability to recover from Bekins.

    Facts

    Gerald Smith hired Bekins to ship his belongings, including a Mercedes Benz, from Houston to New York. Smith chose a “released value” of $58,000 with Bekins and also had an insurance policy with Aetna on the Mercedes. A fire completely destroyed the contents of the truck. Aetna paid Smith $14,161.87 for the loss of the car under his insurance policy. Smith then claimed $119,475 in losses with Bekins. Bekins was notified of Aetna’s subrogation claim while investigating Smith’s claim. Bekins determined that Smith’s loss exceeded the released value of $58,000 and paid the full amount directly to Smith.

    Procedural History

    Aetna sued Bekins to recover the $14,161.87 it had paid to Smith, asserting its subrogation rights. Bekins brought Smith in as a third-party defendant. The Special Term granted summary judgment to Bekins, arguing that Bekins’ liability was limited to the $58,000 it had already paid to Smith. The Appellate Division affirmed. Aetna appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a common carrier, having received notice of an insurer’s subrogation rights, is liable to the insurer when it subsequently pays the full extent of its liability to the insured, thereby extinguishing funds from which the insurer could recover its subrogated claim?

    Holding

    Yes, because Bekins’s payment of the entire $58,000 “released value” to Smith was a violation of Aetna’s subrogation rights. The settlement between Bekins and Smith, after Bekins was informed of Aetna’s subrogation rights, has no effect upon Aetna’s rights against Bekins.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that an insurer has a right to subrogation when it pays for a loss covered by its policy. The court stated that Bekins’ payment to Smith disregarded Aetna’s known subrogation interest. “[T]he settlement between Bekins and Smith, after Aetna informed Bekins of its subrogation rights, has no effect upon Aetna’s rights against Bekins.” The court cited Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v Greger, 246 NY 162; Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 NY 37, 47; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v Erie Ry. Co., 73 NY 399, emphasizing that a party cannot settle with the insured in a way that prejudices the insurer’s subrogation rights once they have notice of those rights.

    The court emphasized that Aetna and Bekins were not coinsurers. Bekins was responsible for the full amount of Aetna’s claim, which it had improperly paid to Smith. While Bekins may be entitled to reimbursement from Smith, the court could not grant such relief since Bekins had not appealed to the Court of Appeals on that issue. Bekins could pursue a judgment against Smith at Special Term to recover the additional payment it had to make to Aetna to satisfy Aetna’s subrogation rights. This ruling reinforces the importance of recognizing and honoring an insurer’s subrogation rights to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure that losses are ultimately borne by the responsible party.

  • Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y.2d 854 (1986): Competitive Bidding and Municipal Ordinances

    Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y.2d 854 (1986)

    A municipal ordinance that establishes a precondition to awarding a contract to the lowest responsible bidder is inconsistent with General Municipal Law § 103 and is thus invalid unless expressly authorized by the legislature.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a municipal ordinance requiring contractors to participate in apprentice training programs as a condition for bidding on city contracts violates New York’s General Municipal Law § 103, which mandates competitive bidding. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was invalid because it imposed a precondition not expressly authorized by the legislature, thereby conflicting with the state’s policy of fostering honest competition to secure the best work at the lowest price. The court emphasized that while apprentice training is a desirable goal, it cannot be a mandatory qualification affecting an otherwise responsible low bidder.

    Facts

    The City of Rochester enacted Ordinance 82-450, which required contractors bidding on city projects to participate in apprentice training programs. Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. challenged the ordinance, arguing that it violated General Municipal Law § 103, which requires competitive bidding for municipal contracts.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Monroe County, initially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring the ordinance invalid and enjoining its enforcement. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Supreme Court’s original ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipal ordinance that establishes participation in apprentice training programs as a precondition to awarding a contract to the lowest responsible bidder is inconsistent with General Municipal Law § 103 and, therefore, invalid.

    Holding

    Yes, because the ordinance imposes a precondition to the award of a contract that is not expressly authorized by the legislature and thus conflicts with the state’s competitive bidding requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strong public policy of fostering honest competition to obtain the best work or supplies at the lowest possible price, as embodied in General Municipal Law § 103. The court stated that a municipal ordinance establishing a precondition to the award of a contract to the lowest responsible bidder is invalid unless expressly authorized by the legislature. While Labor Law Article 23 encourages apprenticeship programs, it applies only when a contractor voluntarily elects to conform with its provisions. Similarly, while Labor Law § 220 allows paying apprentices less than the prevailing wage under certain conditions, its purpose is to equalize labor costs, not to mandate apprentice training. The court noted, “[t]he predominate purpose of the State Legislature was the protection of the public fisc by requiring competitive bidding (General Municipal Law § 103), that apprentice training, while a desirable end, was not intended by the State Legislature to affect the qualification of an otherwise responsible low bidder.” Therefore, the ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with General Municipal Law § 103. The court distinguished *Matter of Skyway Roofing v County of Rensselaer*, noting that the prior case suggested apprentice training was already required by statute, a suggestion with which the court now disagreed. The court clarified that even a broader reading of the *Skyway Roofing* decision would not have precedential effect because the denial of leave to appeal is not a binding decision.

  • Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 120 (1986): Statute of Limitations in Malpractice Cases Involving Prosthetic Devices

    Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc. , 67 N.Y.2d 120 (1986)

    In medical malpractice cases involving prosthetic devices, the cause of action accrues upon the implantation of the device, not when the injury manifests.

    Summary

    Robert Goldsmith sued Dr. Chitranjan Ranawat for malpractice after a hip implant broke eight years after implantation. The suit was filed in 1983. The court addressed whether the statute of limitations began at implantation or injury. The court held the cause of action accrued upon implantation, barring the claim. The court reasoned that while products liability actions against manufacturers differ, in medical malpractice, the statute of limitations begins at the time of the alleged malpractice to provide repose for defendants, a principle that outweighs the potential for actions being foreclosed before injury manifestation.

    Facts

    In 1973, Robert Goldsmith underwent a total hip replacement performed by Dr. Chitranjan S. Ranawat.
    The femoral component of the hip implant, manufactured by Howmedica, Inc., fractured in 1981, eight years after implantation.
    Goldsmith filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Ranawat in 1983, alleging negligence related to the implantation of the device.
    Goldsmith’s wife also sued for loss of consortium.

    Procedural History

    Special Term granted Dr. Ranawat’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint based on the statute of limitations.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision but granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a medical malpractice action involving a prosthetic device, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of implantation or at the time the injury caused by the device’s malfunction occurs.

    Holding

    No, because the general rule is that a cause of action accrues and the Statute of Limitations begins to run at the time of the commission of the alleged malpractice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the general rule that a medical malpractice action accrues at the time of the alleged malpractice, citing Davis v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257, 259. The court acknowledged two exceptions to this rule: the continuous treatment doctrine and the foreign object exception, neither of which applied here.
    The court distinguished Martin v. Edwards Labs., 60 N.Y.2d 417, which allowed claims against prosthetic device manufacturers within three years of injury. The court stated that products liability actions differ from medical malpractice actions, as there is no cause to complain against a manufacturer until the device malfunctions. “Products liability actions are vastly different from medical malpractice actions in this context, because until the device malfunctions, there is no cause to complain against, or privity to, the manufacturer of a prosthetic device.”
    The court noted the legislative intent behind CPLR 214-a, which excludes prosthetic aids from the definition of “foreign object” in medical malpractice cases. Although CPLR 214-a did not govern this case, the court considered the legislative intent not to broaden the foreign object exception. “Although this case is not governed by CPLR 214-a and plaintiffs do not urge that a prosthetic device is a foreign object, we cannot ignore the clearly expressed legislative intent that the present exception to the general time of commission accrual rule not be broadened beyond its existing confines”.
    The court addressed the argument that requiring an action within three years of implantation effectively forecloses a claim before injury occurs. The court weighed this detriment against the impact of potentially open-ended claims on defendants and society, concluding that the statute of limitations must run from the time of the act. The court stated that this determination was appropriate until the legislature directs otherwise. “In each, we weighed the detriments of such a result against the effect of potentially open-ended claims upon the repose of defendants and society, and held that the Statute of Limitations must run from the time of the act until the Legislature decrees otherwise”.

  • People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125 (1986): Admissibility of Dying Declarations and Excited Utterances

    People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125 (1986)

    For a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration, the declarant must have a settled, hopeless expectation that death is near at hand, and the admissibility of evidence cannot be sustained on appeal based on a theory (e.g., excited utterance) not raised before the trial court.

    Summary

    Angel Nieves was convicted of manslaughter based largely on statements made by the stabbing victim, Josephine Gonzalez, before she died. The trial court admitted these statements as dying declarations. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but on the grounds that the statements were admissible as excited utterances, a theory the prosecution had disavowed at trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements did not qualify as dying declarations because the victim’s state of mind did not indicate a settled expectation of imminent death and that the Appellate Division erred in relying on the excited utterance theory because it was not raised at trial, thus depriving the defendant of the opportunity to counter it.

    Facts

    Josephine Gonzalez was brought to the emergency room suffering from a stab wound. Initially in shock and unable to speak, she later identified Angel Nieves as her assailant, stating he stabbed her out of jealousy at a party. She complained of chest pains and stated she did not want to die. The wound punctured her heart and the sac around it. Medical staff did not inform her that her condition was critical or that death was imminent. Gonzalez died approximately one and a half hours after arriving at the hospital.

    Procedural History

    Nieves was indicted for second-degree murder. The trial court denied Nieves’ motion to dismiss the indictment but ordered a pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of Gonzalez’s statements. At the hearing, the prosecution argued solely for admissibility as dying declarations, expressly disclaiming reliance on the excited utterance exception. The trial court admitted the statements as dying declarations. Nieves was convicted of second-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the statements inadmissible as dying declarations but admissible as excited utterances. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the victim’s statements were admissible as a dying declaration.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court’s admission of the statements based on the theory of “excited utterance,” when that theory was not raised by the prosecution at trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the victim’s state of mind did not reflect a settled, hopeless expectation of imminent death.
    2. Yes, because the defendant was denied the opportunity to present evidence to counter the factual theory supporting the admissibility of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the requirements for the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule require that the declarant speaks “under a sense of impending death, with no hope of recovery.” The court emphasized that a belief that death is possible or even probable is insufficient. The court found that Gonzalez’s statements expressing a desire not to die, the lack of any statement by medical personnel about the severity of her condition, and the fact that her condition was improving at the time of the statements, all indicated she did not have the requisite state of mind for a dying declaration.

    Regarding the excited utterance theory, the Court held that the Appellate Division erred in relying on it because the prosecution had disclaimed it at trial. The court reasoned that the defendant was prejudiced because he was denied the opportunity to present evidence to counter the factual basis for the excited utterance argument, such as the time elapsed between the stabbing and the statements, the victim’s condition during that time, and whether she appeared excited or stressed when she spoke. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that because the pre-trial hearing was discretionary, the People should be allowed to raise new arguments on appeal. The court stated: “If the Appellate Division’s determination were allowed to stand, the defendant would still be denied the opportunity to present evidence to counter a factual theory advanced by the People in support of the admissibility of evidence.”