New York Law Review

Tag: 1986

  • Town of Islip v. Powell, 68 N.Y.2d 834 (1986): Rational Basis for Property Tax Classification

    Town of Islip v. Powell, 68 N.Y.2d 834 (1986)

    Tax classifications are presumed constitutional if rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, even if uneven in application, unless palpably arbitrary.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of New York’s Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) which provides a simplified procedure for owners of one-, two-, and three-family residences to challenge their tax assessments. The plaintiffs, property owners, argued that this classification violated equal protection and the requirement of uniform property assessment. The Court of Appeals upheld the law, finding that the classification was rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of easing the burden on small homeowners in challenging assessments and was not palpably arbitrary. The court emphasized that the legislature could reasonably conclude that the difference in return from properties warranted the exclusion of other property owners from the small claims procedure.

    Facts

    Several property owners in the Town of Islip challenged the constitutionality of Title 1-A of the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL), which established a small claims assessment review procedure for owners of one-, two-, and three-family residences. The property owners, who did not qualify for this procedure, argued that the classification violated equal protection principles because it treated them differently from owners of smaller residential properties.

    Procedural History

    The property owners initiated a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the RPTL classification. The lower courts ruled in favor of the Town of Islip, upholding the statute. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the classification in Title 1-A of the Real Property Tax Law, which provides a simplified review procedure for owners of one-, two-, and three-family residences, violates equal protection principles?

    2. Whether the classification conflicts with the requirement of RPTL 305(2) that all real property be assessed at a uniform percentage of value?

    Holding

    1. No, because the differentiation between owners of one-, two-, and three-family residences and other property owners is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and not palpably arbitrary.

    2. No, because the small claims procedure contemplates a correction in assessment, not rates, and the Legislature did not intend for its use to depend on whether the assessing unit had adopted RPTL Article 19.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that tax classifications do not require precise scientific uniformity and are presumed constitutional if rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The court found that the differentiation in the RPTL was rationally related to easing the burden on owners of smaller residential properties, who previously faced complex and expensive assessment review procedures. The court noted that the legislature could reasonably conclude that the difference in return from properties warranted the exclusion of other property owners from the small claims procedure.

    The court distinguished the case from situations where classifications were deemed arbitrary, emphasizing that the small claims procedure established by the RPTL was a reasonable response to the difficulties faced by small homeowners. The court also clarified that the procedure’s contemplation of assessment correction does not conflict with the requirement of uniform assessment percentages, as the procedure concerns assessments, not tax rates.

    The court cited prior cases such as Trump v. Chu, Foss v. City of Rochester, and Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v. State Tax Commn. to support the principle that tax classifications are permissible as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

    The court emphasized the importance of deferring to legislative judgments in tax matters, stating that classifications will be upheld unless they are “palpably arbitrary.” The court found no such arbitrariness in the RPTL classification. The court also addressed concerns about uniformity of assessment, stating that the small claims procedure allows for correction of assessments without disrupting the overall uniformity requirement.

    The court reasoned that the Legislature didn’t intend to make the property owner’s use of the small claims procedure dependent on whether the assessing unit had opted into article 19, because “that could result in complete frustration of its purpose in enacting that procedure.”

  • Zona v. Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 824 (1986): Contribution Allowed Under Dram Shop Act for Pain and Suffering

    Zona v. Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 824 (1986)

    Contribution is permissible under New York’s Dram Shop Act for claims related to pain and suffering and loss of support, even when the intoxicated individual who caused the harm is deceased and the claimant is a relative, as long as allowing contribution does not directly frustrate the Act’s policy.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether contribution is allowed under New York’s Dram Shop Act when the intoxicated person who caused the injury is deceased and related to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that contribution is permissible for claims of pain and suffering and loss of support. Even though allowing contribution might reduce the total recovery for the plaintiff, the court reasoned that because the reduction stems from the deceased’s death and is an indirect consequence, it does not violate the policy of the Dram Shop Act. The court emphasized the legislative intent to allow contribution unless it clearly frustrates the statute’s underlying policy.

    Facts

    An intoxicated individual (the vendee) caused injury and death. The vendee subsequently died after the accident. The injured party and the vendee were married, and the plaintiff seeking loss of support was their daughter. The plaintiff brought suit against the bar that served the vendee (Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc.) under the Dram Shop Act. The defendant bar then sought contribution from the estate of the deceased vendee.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially dismissed the third-party complaint seeking contribution from the vendee’s estate. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, thereby allowing the third-party claim for contribution to proceed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether contribution from the estate of a deceased intoxicated person is permissible under the Dram Shop Act for claims related to the pain and suffering of a deceased injured person and the loss of means of support of her daughter, when the deceased intoxicated person was the husband of the deceased injured person and the father of the plaintiff seeking loss of support.

    Holding

    Yes, because allowing contribution in this instance does not directly violate the policy of the Dram Shop Act, as the reduction in potential recovery stems from the fortuitous circumstance of the tortfeasor’s death and is an indirect consequence of allowing contribution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the legislative intent behind CPLR 1401, which favors allowing contribution unless it directly frustrates the policy of the statute violated. The court stated, “The policy of the law, as declared by the Legislature in CPLR 1401, is to allow contribution ‘unless it is clear that the legislative policy which led to the passage of the statute would be frustrated by the granting of contribution in favor of the person who violated the statute’.” The court determined that allowing contribution from the vendee’s estate, even though it might reduce the total amount available to the daughter, did not directly contravene the Dram Shop Act’s goals. The court emphasized that the reduction was an indirect result of the vendee’s death, a “fortuitous circumstance.” The court distinguished this situation from one where contribution would directly undermine the Act’s purpose of protecting innocent third parties from alcohol-related harm. The court cited previous cases (Herrick v Second Outhouse, Smith v Guli, Weinheimer v Hoffman) that established contribution between a vendor and vendee doesn’t violate the Dram Shop Act.

  • Midan Restaurant, Inc. v. Board of Estimate, 67 N.Y.2d 800 (1986): Scope of Review for Revocable Consent Franchises

    Midan Restaurant, Inc. v. Board of Estimate, 67 N.Y.2d 800 (1986)

    The Board of Estimate has broad authority to review the character and fitness of applicants seeking a revocable consent franchise, including considerations beyond land use impact.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of review the New York City Board of Estimate can exercise when considering an application to renew a revocable consent to operate a sidewalk cafe. The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s review extends beyond land use impact to include the character and fitness of the applicant. The Board acted rationally in denying the application based on evidence suggesting the applicant’s principal had a criminal conviction and was attempting to force tenants out of nearby apartments. This decision clarifies that the Board’s oversight is broader than that of community or borough boards.

    Facts

    Midan Restaurant, Inc. applied to the New York City Board of Estimate for renewal of its revocable consent to operate an enclosed sidewalk cafe. Thomas Lydon signed a sidewalk cafe occupancy contract as “V.P.” for Midan Restaurant, Inc., and two checks on behalf of the restaurant. Information was presented to the Board indicating that Thomas Lydon, a de facto corporate principal of Midan Restaurant, Inc., had been convicted of assaulting a tenant. Testimony at a public hearing suggested Lydon was attempting to force tenants out of apartments in buildings adjoining the restaurant.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Estimate denied Midan Restaurant’s application to renew its revocable consent. Special Term reversed the Board’s determination, holding that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Board of Estimate’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Estimate, in reviewing an application for renewal of a revocable consent to operate a sidewalk cafe, is limited to considering only land use impact or whether its scope of review can include the character and fitness of the applicant.

    Holding

    No, because the New York City Charter provisions grant the Board of Estimate a broader scope of review that includes the authority to review the character and fitness of applicants seeking a revocable consent franchise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the New York City Charter distinguishes between the scope of review for community or borough boards and that for the Board of Estimate. Section 366-a(b) of the City Charter proscribes community and borough boards from considering issues other than land use impact. However, sections 67(4) and 197-c(f) grant the Board of Estimate a broader scope of review, allowing it to consider the character and fitness of applicants. The court found that the Board had a rational basis for denying the application, citing evidence that Thomas Lydon was a de facto corporate principal, his prior conviction for assault, and testimony indicating attempts to force tenants out of nearby apartments. The Court stated, “The Board was entitled to conclude, on the basis of the information before it, that Thomas Lydon was at least a de facto corporate principal of Midan Restaurant, Inc.” and that “This conviction, together with public hearing testimony pointing to the conclusion that Lydon was seeking to force tenants out of apartments, some of which were located in buildings adjoining the restaurant, provided the Board with a rational basis for denying the application to renew the revocable consent to operate the enclosed sidewalk cafe.”

  • Crosland v. New York City Transit Authority, 68 N.Y.2d 165 (1986): Duty of Transit Authority Employees to Aid Passengers Under Attack

    Crosland v. New York City Transit Authority, 68 N.Y.2d 165 (1986)

    A publicly owned common carrier can be held liable for the negligence of its employees who fail to render aid to a passenger under attack by a third party, provided the employee could have summoned help without risk to themselves, as this falls outside the scope of governmental immunity.

    Summary

    Steven Crosland, Jr., was fatally injured during an attack by hoodlums on a subway platform. His estate sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate police presence and in employees’ failure to assist during the attack. The NYCTA moved for summary judgment, arguing governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals held that while the NYCTA is generally immune from liability for resource allocation decisions (like policing), its employees have a duty to render aid to passengers when they can do so safely. Failure to act in such a situation can be actionable negligence.

    Facts

    Steven Crosland, Jr., and friends were attacked by a group of hoodlums armed with weapons on a subway platform. The attack occurred at the 125th Street station of the Independent subway line. There were no police present at the station during the attack. Some track workers witnessed the attack but did nothing to summon aid. At least two trains passed through the station during the attack, and the train personnel also did nothing.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the NYCTA, the City of New York, the Board of Education, and the Police Department. The trial court dismissed the claims against the City, Board of Education, and Police Department, and the plaintiff did not appeal that dismissal. The NYCTA moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial and granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NYCTA is immune from liability for the failure to provide adequate police presence at the subway station.
    2. Whether the NYCTA can be held liable for the failure of its employees to render aid to a passenger under attack when the employees could have done so without risk to themselves.

    Holding

    1. No, because the allocation of police resources is a governmental function for which the NYCTA cannot be held liable.
    2. Yes, because an employee witnessing an assault who unreasonably fails to summon aid, although they can do so safely, acts outside the scope of governmental immunity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., which held that a publicly owned carrier could not be liable for the allocation of police resources. The Court emphasized that Weiner did not provide blanket immunity for all actions of NYCTA employees. The Court stated, “[i]t is the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed to have arisen and the capacity in which that act or failure to act occurred which governs liability, not whether the agency involved is engaged generally in proprietary activity.” The Court reasoned that while resource allocation is a governmental function, the failure of an employee to render aid when they can do so safely is an operational act for which the NYCTA can be held liable. The court noted that the NYCTA’s own regulations and common standards of behavior suggest that employees have a duty to assist passengers in distress when they can do so safely. Quoting from the opinion, the court found that “Watching someone being beaten from a vantage point offering both safety and the means to summon help without danger is within the narrow range of circumstances which could be found to be actionable.” The Court rejected the argument that exposing the NYCTA to liability would be burdensome, stating that this concern must be balanced against the policies of compensating victims and ensuring that public authorities manage their systems responsibly. The dissent is not mentioned as there wasn’t one.

  • People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 737 (1986): Requirements for Self-Representation in Criminal Trials

    68 N.Y.2d 737 (1986)

    A defendant in a criminal case may invoke the right to defend pro se, but the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry to determine whether the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

    Summary

    John Smith was convicted of murder. Prior to jury selection, Smith requested to represent himself, but the trial court, without proper inquiry, initially granted the motion and then reversed course by ordering assigned counsel to participate, even against Smith’s objections. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court failed to adequately determine whether Smith’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. The court emphasized the importance of a thorough inquiry to ensure a defendant’s right to self-representation is protected.

    Facts

    John Smith was charged with murdering an off-duty police officer and related crimes.
    Prior to trial, Smith was represented by two Legal Aid attorneys. Smith expressed a desire to proceed without counsel.
    Despite Smith’s request, the trial court ordered assigned counsel to participate in the trial, even when Smith declared he would remain mute and wanted his attorneys excluded.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Smith.
    Smith appealed, arguing he was denied his right to self-representation.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    Smith appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Smith’s request to represent himself without first conducting a sufficient inquiry into whether the waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court failed to conduct a thorough inquiry to determine whether Smith’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary before ordering assigned counsel to participate in the trial against Smith’s wishes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10 (1974) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which established the criteria for a defendant to proceed pro se. These criteria include: (1) the request is unequivocal and timely, (2) there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would disrupt the trial.
    The court emphasized that when a defendant timely requests to proceed pro se, the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry to ensure the waiver of counsel is made intelligently and voluntarily. “When the right is timely interposed, the trial court should conduct a thorough inquiry to determine whether the waiver was made intelligently and voluntarily”.
    The court found that the trial court failed to make such an inquiry, rejecting Smith’s request “out of hand” without determining whether it was a knowing and intelligent waiver or a good-faith attempt to exercise his right to self-representation. The court further noted that the trial court compelled assigned counsel to participate and take specific actions despite Smith’s objections, thus denying him his constitutional right to present his own defense. As the court stated, “the trial court denied defendant his constitutional right to present his own defense”.
    Judge Kaye dissented, arguing that Smith’s statements were not an unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation and that the trial court should have the discretion to manage the proceedings. The dissent argued that “defendant’s demands were neither unambiguous nor timely.”

  • Myers v. Key Bank, 68 N.Y.2d 744 (1986): Establishing Presumption of Deed Delivery Through Recording

    Myers v. Key Bank, 68 N.Y.2d 744 (1986)

    Recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery and thus valid transfer of ownership, which must be overcome by sufficient evidence to the contrary.

    Summary

    This case addresses the presumption of deed delivery when a deed is recorded. Key Bank sought to enforce a lien on property owned by Myers based on a judgment against Dolores Clark, who had guaranteed a loan. Myers had purchased the property from Clark, who had received the property via a deed from her deceased husband. Myers argued the deed to Clark was never delivered, making it void and thus preventing Key Bank’s lien from attaching. The court held that the recording of the deed created a presumption of delivery and ownership in favor of Clark, and Myers failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.

    Facts

    Dolores Clark guaranteed a loan from Key Bank to 340 Main Street Corp.
    Clark had previously included the subject property in a list of her assets provided to Key Bank as part of the loan application.
    A title search would have revealed a recorded deed transferring the property from her deceased husband, Robert Clark, to her.
    Myers purchased the property from Clark in her capacity as executrix of her husband’s estate.
    Key Bank initiated procedures to enforce a lien on the property to satisfy a default judgment against Clark.

    Procedural History

    Myers and Dime Savings Bank brought a proceeding against Key Bank pursuant to CPLR 5239 to determine the parties’ rights in the property.
    The lower courts ruled in favor of Key Bank, upholding the validity of the lien.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by Myers was sufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery of the deed to Dolores Clark resulting from its recording, and thus invalidate Key Bank’s lien on the property.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence submitted by Myers was insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery of the deed and Dolores Clark’s record ownership of the subject property resulting from the recording of the deed to her from Robert Clark.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the established legal principle that recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery. The court cited Sweetland v Buell, 164 NY 541, 552 and Rametta v Kazlo, 68 AD2d 579, 581, affirming this principle.
    The Court stated, “The evidence submitted by petitioners is insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery of the deed and Dolores Clark’s record ownership of the subject property resulting from the recording of the deed to her from Robert Clark… together with her other conduct with respect to the property.”
    The court highlighted that along with the recorded deed, Dolores Clark acted as if she owned the property. She included the property as an asset on her loan application. This further supported the presumption of delivery.
    Since Myers failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption, the court upheld the validity of the deed to Clark. As a result, Key Bank’s lien against Clark was valid and could be enforced against the property Myers purchased.
    This case reinforces the importance of properly challenging a recorded deed with sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of delivery. Absent such evidence, the recorded deed stands as proof of ownership.

  • People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734 (1986): Justification for Police Pursuit Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734 (1986)

    When police observe a suspect passing what appears to be drug packaging in an area known for drug activity, and the suspect immediately flees upon being approached by police, reasonable suspicion exists to justify police pursuit.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of suspicion required for police to pursue a fleeing suspect. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car observed Leung in a high-narcotics area passing a three-by-five-inch brown envelope resembling drug packaging. When the officers identified themselves, Leung fled. He discarded a hat and a gun during the pursuit. The Court of Appeals held that the officers’ observations, coupled with Leung’s flight, created reasonable suspicion justifying the pursuit and subsequent arrest. The recovery of the discarded gun was deemed lawful.

    Facts

    Police officers patrolling a high-crime, high-narcotics area in Queens observed Leung handing another man a brown envelope approximately three-by-five inches in size. The officers believed the envelope resembled the packaging used for drug transactions (“three dollar bags”). The officers exited their vehicle and identified themselves as police. Leung immediately fled on foot. During the pursuit, Leung discarded a hat and threw a black object under some bushes. The officers apprehended Leung approximately five houses from where the pursuit began. They recovered a loaded, operable nine-millimeter pistol from under the bushes where Leung had thrown it.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after Leung was convicted on weapons charges. Leung appealed, arguing that the initial police action was an investigatory stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and that his flight did not create reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant, based on his observed actions and subsequent flight, such that the recovery of the discarded weapon was lawful.

    Holding

    Yes, because the passing of what appeared to be a drug package in a narcotics-prone area, coupled with the defendant’s immediate flight upon the officers’ approach, established reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime, thus justifying the pursuit and the subsequent recovery of the discarded weapon.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. De Bour, which established a framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court stated that the level of police intrusion must be weighed against the circumstances known to the police as the encounter unfolds. The Court determined that the officers’ initial approach was justified because observing Leung pass what appeared to be a “three dollar bag” in a high-narcotics area provided at least an “objective credible reason” for the police to approach him. The Court emphasized that Leung’s immediate flight, when coupled with the initial observation, elevated the officers’ suspicion to the level of “reasonable suspicion.” The court cited People v. Howard, stating that flight can be a significant factor in establishing reasonable suspicion. The Court distinguished the case from situations involving discarded containers where an intent to abandon the property must be proven, explaining that Leung’s attempt to discard the gun was not a direct result of unlawful police action, as the pursuit was justified. Therefore, the gun was lawfully discovered during a legitimate detention, providing probable cause for arrest on the weapons charge. The court found that the trial judge’s instruction on “possession” was an accurate statement of the law, and that claims of prosecutorial misconduct were without merit.

  • People v. Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729 (1986): Sufficiency of Misdemeanor Complaints for Drug Sales

    People v. Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729 (1986)

    A misdemeanor complaint charging a drug sale must contain factual allegations of an evidentiary character establishing reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime, and conclusory statements are insufficient without supporting facts.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s orders, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal of misdemeanor complaints. The court held that the complaints were facially insufficient because they lacked evidentiary facts to support the conclusion that the substance sold was marijuana. The complaints relied on conclusory statements from an undercover officer without detailing the officer’s expertise in identifying marijuana or any representations by the defendant about the substance. The court emphasized that a misdemeanor complaint must provide sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the defendant should be held for further action and to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant.

    Facts

    An undercover police officer allegedly purchased marijuana from the defendant, Dumas. The misdemeanor complaint stated that the deponent was informed by an undercover officer that Dumas knowingly and unlawfully sold marijuana, specifically, two clear plastic bags of marijuana, for a sum of U.S. currency. A similar complaint was filed in the Fausto case.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court dismissed the misdemeanor complaints as facially insufficient. The Appellate Term reversed the Criminal Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Term’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a misdemeanor complaint alleging the sale of marijuana is facially sufficient when it relies on a conclusory statement from an undercover officer without providing evidentiary facts supporting the conclusion that the substance sold was marijuana.

    Holding

    No, because the factual part of a misdemeanor complaint must allege “facts of an evidentiary character” demonstrating “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant committed the crime charged. The complaint must allow the court to determine whether the defendant should be held for further action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the misdemeanor complaints facially insufficient because they contained only conclusory statements that the defendant sold marijuana without providing any evidentiary facts to support that conclusion. The court noted the absence of any allegation that the police officer was an expert in identifying marijuana, referencing People v. Kenny, or any allegation that the defendant represented the substance as being marijuana. The supporting depositions, in which the undercover officer merely adopted the statements in the complaints, did not provide additional facts. The court emphasized that misdemeanor complaints must contain sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the defendant should be held for further action, especially considering that the complaint alone may serve as the basis for issuing an arrest warrant. As the court stated, the factual part of a misdemeanor complaint must allege “facts of an evidentiary character” (CPL 100.15 [3]) demonstrating “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant committed the crime charged (CPL 100.40 [4] [b]). The court distinguished this from a mere pleading defect, highlighting the importance of factual allegations for establishing reasonable cause.

  • de St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66 (1986): Burden of Proof in Wetlands Taking Claims

    de St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66 (1986)

    In a regulatory taking claim involving tidal wetlands restrictions, the landowner bears the burden of proving that the regulation prevents any reasonable economic use of the property, including demonstrating that there is no reasonable probability of obtaining a variance or zoning change that would permit such use.

    Summary

    Petitioners, landowners of tidal wetlands, were denied a permit to develop their property due to environmental regulations. They claimed this denial constituted a taking without just compensation. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the claim was ripe for review, the lower courts erred by placing the burden on the state to prove a reasonable probability of rezoning. The court clarified that the landowner bears the burden of proving that the regulation prevents any reasonable economic use of the property, including demonstrating that there is no reasonable probability of obtaining a variance or zoning change.

    Facts

    Petitioners owned 103 acres of land, 81 of which were designated as tidal wetlands by the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation. They sought a permit to fill the wetlands and build 607 single-family residences. The permit was denied. The Town of Hempstead had zoned the properties as Residence B, permitting only single-family dwellings on lots of at least 6,000 square feet. Prior to the Tidal Wetlands Act, petitioners’ application to rezone the property for multifamily development had been denied. After the denial of the wetlands permit, the state proposed alternative development plans involving smaller lot sizes or cluster zoning of the uplands.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners filed suit challenging the permit denial and claiming a taking. Special Term upheld the permit denial but found a taking, ordering the state to either grant the permit or commence condemnation proceedings. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether petitioners’ claims, instituted before petitioners had sought and been denied a variance or rezoning of the properties by the Hempstead Town Board, are ripe for judicial review?
    2. Whether the courts below erred in placing the burden on respondent to prove that there existed a reasonable probability that petitioners could obtain a rezoning of the subject parcels?
    3. Whether petitioners had that burden, does the evidence in the record support their claim?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the matter is ripe for review, because the Commissioner’s decision was final.
    2. Yes, the courts below erroneously shifted to respondent the burden of proving that there was a reasonable probability of rezoning.
    3. No, because the burden of proof should have been on petitioners, and the record doesn’t conclusively establish they met it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while ripeness generally requires a final decision from all relevant regulatory bodies, it would be impractical to force the landowners to seek relief from every conceivable agency. The court acknowledged the difficulty that landowners face when regulated by both state and local governments. However, to succeed on a taking claim, a landowner must prove that the regulation deprives them of any reasonable economic use of the property. This includes showing that there is no reasonable probability of obtaining a variance or zoning change from the town that would allow such use. The court emphasized the heavy burden on the landowner to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. The court found that the lower courts erred by placing the burden of proof on the State to show that a zoning change was likely. The burden is on the landowner to demonstrate that no reasonable use is possible, including showing the improbability of a zoning change. The court noted that the landowners conceded that one request for cluster zoning (after a change in zoning laws) was granted for a parcel only five miles from the parcel in question. The court also said that the landowner could wait until the state condemned the land and then petition for a zoning variance, which could allow the landowner to potentially “profit from the condemnation of the wetlands and still retain the full potential value of the uplands.” The court remanded the case for a new hearing with the burden of proof properly placed on the petitioners. As the court stated, “If the courts were forced to look to the property as it is, rather than as it could be [landowners] could frustrate any land use restrictions”.

  • People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986): People’s Delay and ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Under Speedy Trial Law

    People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986)

    Delays attributable to the prosecutor’s vacation are chargeable to the People and do not constitute exceptional circumstances excusing speedy trial violations, even if the defendant caused other delays in the case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment against the defendant. The court held that the lengthy post-readiness delays caused by the trial assistant’s planned European vacation were not an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3) (b) sufficient to excuse the delay. The court emphasized that only the People’s delay is considered, unless the delay directly results from the defendant’s actions. Even though the defendant caused substantial delays, the People were also responsible for delays exceeding the statutory limit, requiring dismissal.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted and the People declared their readiness for trial. However, the trial was significantly delayed. The defendant was responsible for a substantial portion of post-readiness delay, totaling approximately 17 months. The trial assistant was scheduled for a European vacation, which resulted in a 28-day adjournment. The People argued that the defendant’s delays constituted exceptional circumstances that excused the delay caused by the trial assistant’s vacation.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the Appellate Division, which presumably affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered the indictment dismissed, finding a violation of the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether lengthy post-readiness delays attributable to the trial assistant’s planned vacation constitute an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3)(b) sufficient to excuse adjournments chargeable to the People?
    2. Whether the defendant’s post-readiness delays, even if substantial, constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (3)(b) in the absence of a causal relationship to the People’s delay?

    Holding

    1. No, because a prosecutor’s planned vacation does not constitute an exceptional circumstance, especially when another trial assistant could have been substituted.
    2. No, because under CPL 30.30(3)(b), it is the People’s delay alone that is considered, unless the delay directly results from action taken by the defendant, and there was no causal relationship between the defendant’s delays and the prosecutor’s vacation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 28-day adjournment due to the trial assistant’s vacation was chargeable to the People, citing precedent that shortages of personnel and illness of the prosecutor are chargeable to the People. The court found that the vacation did not qualify as an “exceptional fact or circumstance” that would excuse the delay, especially since a substitute trial assistant could have been assigned. The court further clarified the interpretation of CPL 30.30 (3) (b), stating that “[I]t is the People’s delay alone that is to be considered, except where that delay directly ‘results from’ action taken by the defendant.” Because the defendant’s post-readiness delays were not causally related to the trial assistant’s vacation, and the People were chargeable with more than six months of delay (164 days of prereadiness delay plus the 28-day vacation delay), the court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated, requiring dismissal of the indictment.