New York Law Review

Tag: 1985

  • Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 66 N.Y.2d 90 (1985): Enforceability of Unconditional Guarantees Despite Fraud Claims

    Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 66 N.Y.2d 90 (1985)

    An unconditional guarantee, explicitly waiving defenses, is enforceable despite claims of fraudulent inducement unless the alleged fraud contradicts the specific disclaimers within the guarantee itself.

    Summary

    Citibank, N.A. sued corporate officers Plapinger et al. on a guarantee after United Department Stores defaulted on a loan. The officers claimed fraudulent inducement, alleging the banks promised an additional line of credit that never materialized. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “absolute and unconditional” nature of the guarantee, containing waivers of defenses, precluded the officers from claiming they relied on the banks’ oral promise of additional credit. The court reasoned that enforcing the guarantee prevented the officers from contradicting their written agreement.

    Facts

    The Plapingers, officers of United Department Stores, secured a $15.2 million line of credit from Citibank and other banks. After United defaulted, restructuring was discussed involving a term loan guaranteed by the Plapingers and an additional $8 million line of credit. The term loan closed, but the line of credit was never funded. United filed for bankruptcy, and the banks sued the Plapingers on their guarantee.

    Procedural History

    Citibank sued the Plapingers in New York Supreme Court. The Plapingers asserted fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and failure of a condition precedent as defenses and counterclaims. The Supreme Court struck these defenses and counterclaims and granted summary judgment to Citibank. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the fraud allegations “shadowy” and the disclaimer in the guarantee sufficient to bar the defenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the disclaimer sufficiently specific to foreclose the defenses.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an “absolute and unconditional” guarantee, containing waivers of defenses, can be enforced despite the guarantor’s claim of fraudulent inducement based on an oral promise that contradicts the terms of the guarantee.

    Holding

    Yes, because the guarantors’ explicit agreement to an unconditional guarantee, irrespective of potential defenses, forecloses their ability to claim reliance on prior oral representations that contradict the guarantee’s terms.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the rule established in Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317 (1959), which held that a specific disclaimer of reliance on oral representations in a contract precludes a party from later claiming fraud based on those representations. While the guarantee did not contain an explicit disclaimer like in Danann, the court found the “absolute and unconditional” nature of the guarantee, coupled with waivers of defenses, served the same purpose. The court emphasized the sophistication of the parties and the extensive negotiations leading to the agreement. Permitting the Plapingers to claim fraud would condone their misrepresentation of their true intention when signing the guarantee. The court stated, “To permit that would in effect condone defendants’ own fraud in ‘deliberately misrepresenting [their] true intention’ when putting their signatures to their ‘absolute and unconditional’ guarantee.” Finally, the court held that the alleged oral condition precedent (the funding of the additional line of credit) could not be proved because it contradicted the express terms of the written agreement, citing Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y.2d 488 (1961). The court distinguished Millerton Agway Coop. v. Briarcliff Farms, 17 N.Y.2d 57 (1966), noting that the guarantees in that case lacked both a general merger clause and a specific disclaimer. The court acknowledged criticism of the Danann rule but found it applicable given the negotiated nature of the guarantee and the explicit waiver of defenses.

  • Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 26 (1985): State Law Imposing Shareholder Liability is Not Preempted by ERISA

    66 N.Y.2d 26 (1985)

    A state law that imposes personal liability on shareholders for a corporation’s failure to make required contributions to employee benefit plans is not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) because it provides a remedial enforcement mechanism rather than regulating the terms and conditions of the benefit plan itself.

    Summary

    The trustees of a union welfare and pension fund sued the shareholders of a construction company to recover unpaid contributions to the fund, pursuant to New York Business Corporation Law § 630, which allows employees to recover unpaid wages and benefits from the ten largest shareholders of a closely held corporation. The New York Court of Appeals held that ERISA did not preempt this state law. The court reasoned that § 630 provides a mechanism to enforce existing obligations, not to dictate the terms of the employee benefit plan, and therefore only has a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” effect on the plan, which is insufficient for preemption.

    Facts

    Local Union 282 established a welfare and pension trust fund. Vacar Construction Company was obligated under collective bargaining and trust agreements to contribute to this fund for its Local 282 employees. Vacar failed to make the required contributions between May 1978 and February 1979. Vacar then filed for bankruptcy, thwarting the fund’s initial attempts to recover the unpaid amounts.

    Procedural History

    The trustees sued Vacar’s shareholders under Business Corporation Law § 630 and Vacar’s officers under Labor Law § 198-c. Special Term granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the Labor Law claim but dismissed the claim against Helen Vachris (not an officer) and dismissed the Business Corporation Law claim as preempted by ERISA. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the Labor Law claim entirely, finding no private right of action under that statute. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the Business Corporation Law claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Business Corporation Law § 630, which imposes personal liability on the ten largest shareholders of a closely held corporation for wages and salaries (including benefit contributions) owed to the corporation’s employees, is preempted by ERISA.

    Holding

    No, because Business Corporation Law § 630 is a remedial statute that provides an additional enforcement mechanism for collecting delinquent contributions and does not regulate the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by noting the broad preemption clause in ERISA, which supersedes state laws that “relate to” any employee benefit plan. However, the court also acknowledged that this clause is not unlimited, and only state laws that “regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans” are preempted. State laws with only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” effect are not preempted.

    The court found that Business Corporation Law § 630 is remedial, providing an additional enforcement mechanism for collecting delinquent contributions that are already owed under existing collective bargaining and trust agreements. It does not dictate what benefits must be provided or how they are calculated. The court distinguished § 630 from state laws that the Supreme Court had previously found to be preempted, such as those requiring specific benefits or practices in employee benefit plans.

    The court likened § 630 to a garnishment statute or a law imposing liability on corporate officers, which have been found not to be preempted because their effect on employee benefit plans is only indirect. The court also noted that the 1980 amendments to ERISA, which added specific provisions dealing with delinquent contributions, were intended to supplement, rather than supersede, existing state remedies like § 630.

    “Under ERISA [as originally enacted] delinquent contributions were enforced by an action founded either on state law, the collective bargaining agreement between the parties or the trust agreement.”

    Ultimately, the court concluded that Congress intended ERISA’s civil remedies to merely supplement, rather than supersede, existing state remedies for collecting delinquent employer contributions to employee benefit plans.

  • Klapper v. Klapper, 66 N.Y.2d 626 (1985): Establishing a Hearing Standard for Maintenance Modification Based on Inability to be Self-Supporting

    Klapper v. Klapper, 66 N.Y.2d 626 (1985)

    A party seeking modification of maintenance based on an “inability to be self-supporting” under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b) is entitled to a hearing if their allegations raise a factual issue as to their inability to be self-supporting, regardless of whether they demonstrate a change in circumstances.

    Summary

    This case concerns the standard for obtaining a hearing on a motion to modify maintenance based on the recipient’s inability to be self-supporting under New York Domestic Relations Law. The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking such modification need only present allegations sufficient to raise a factual issue regarding their inability to be self-supporting to warrant a hearing. The court emphasized that allegations of a change in circumstance are not required when the basis for modification is the recipient’s inability to achieve self-sufficiency. The case was remitted for a hearing because the defendant’s claim of an inability to find employment over a six-week period was deemed sufficient to raise a factual question.

    Facts

    The defendant sought modification of maintenance payments from her former spouse, asserting an “inability to be self-supporting” under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b). The defendant claimed she was unable to find employment over a six-week period.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed this denial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party seeking modification of maintenance based on an “inability to be self-supporting” under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b) must demonstrate a change in circumstance in order to be granted a hearing on the modification request.

    Holding

    No, because allegations of a change in circumstance are not necessary when the basis for modification is the recipient’s inability to be self-supporting; the party need only present allegations sufficient to raise a factual issue as to whether they have been unable to be self-supporting.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the specific language of Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b), which allows for maintenance modification based on an “inability to be self-supporting.” The court reasoned that requiring a showing of changed circumstances in addition to the inability to be self-supporting would impose an unnecessary burden on the moving party. The court determined that as long as the party seeking modification presents allegations sufficient to raise an issue of fact regarding their inability to support themselves, a hearing is warranted to determine if modification is appropriate. The court emphasized the importance of a factual inquiry, particularly since the defendant’s allegations of a six-week job search raised a sufficient question. The court stated, “As long as the party seeking modification on the basis of ‘inability to be self-supporting’ presents allegations sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether he or she has been unable to be self-supporting, as defendant did here, the court should refer the matter for a hearing on whether modification is warranted.” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61 (1985): Interlocking Confessions Exception to Bruton Rule

    People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61 (1985)

    The interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule allows the admission of a codefendant’s confession at a joint trial, even if the codefendant does not testify, provided the defendant’s own confession is substantially similar and covers the major elements of the crime.

    Summary

    Eulogio Cruz and Belton Brims were convicted of murder in separate cases but tried jointly with codefendants. They appealed, arguing that the admission of their codefendants’ confessions violated their rights under Bruton v. United States. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the confessions were “interlocking” because they were substantially similar and covered all the major elements of the crimes. The court reasoned that because the defendants had already confessed, the codefendants’ statements did not have a “devastating effect” and the interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule applied.

    Facts

    In People v. Cruz, Eulogio Cruz and his brother, Benjamin, were charged with felony murder. Eulogio confessed to Norberto, a friend, that he and Benjamin intended to rob a gas station. During a struggle, the attendant shot Eulogio, and Benjamin then shot the attendant. Benjamin later gave a video-taped confession to the police. Norberto testified at trial about Eulogio’s confession.

    In People v. Brims, Belton Brims was convicted of murder and other charges related to a burglary and homicide. Brims confessed to his cousin, Willie Brims, and to a fellow inmate, John Riegel, about planning the robbery with the victim’s daughter and killing the victims. The daughter, Sheryl Sohn, also confessed to police about helping Brims and Sheffield enter her parents’ home. Willie Brims and John Riegel testified at trial about Brims’s confessions to them. Sheryl Sohn’s confession was also admitted into evidence.

    Procedural History

    Both Cruz and Brims moved for severance, arguing that the admission of their codefendants’ confessions violated their rights under Bruton. The trial courts denied the motions. Cruz and Brims were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession violates a defendant’s right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States when the defendant has also confessed to the crime?
    2. Whether the interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule applies when the confessions differ in reliability?

    Holding

    1. No, because the interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule applies when the defendant’s own confession is substantially similar to the codefendant’s and covers the major elements of the crime. Appropriate limiting instructions are sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights in such cases.
    2. Yes, because the interlocking confession exception applies even when the confessions differ in reliability, as long as they are substantially similar regarding the material facts of the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the confessions in both cases “interlocked” because they were substantially similar and covered all the major elements of the crimes. The court explained that the Bruton rule prohibits the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession because of the substantial risk that the jury will consider it against the defendant, despite limiting instructions. However, this risk is minimized when the defendant has also confessed, because the codefendant’s statement is no more inculpating than the defendant’s own. The court emphasized that the confessions need not be identical, but must be “essentially the same” as to motive, plot, and execution of the crimes.

    The court rejected the argument that the interlocking confession exception does not apply when the confessions differ in reliability. It noted that prior decisions have tolerated differences in scope and reliability, such as one confession being oral and the other written, or one being made to police officers and the other to lay witnesses. The court stated that credibility is a question for the jury once admissibility is determined by the court.

    Regarding the defendants’ fair trial claims, the court held that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is not impaired when there is substantial independent evidence of guilt or when the defendant has made substantially identical inculpatory admissions. The court concluded that the trial courts properly denied severance because there was no substantial risk that the jury would use the codefendants’ statements to fill gaps in the evidence against the defendants. The court emphasized that the primary concern is whether the joint trial prevented the defendant from presenting exculpatory evidence or resulted in substantial prejudice by filling gaps in the evidence against him.

  • Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691 (1985): Establishing Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence Standards

    Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691 (1985)

    To prove testamentary capacity, the proponent of a will must show the testator understood the nature of the will, the extent of their property, and the natural objects of their bounty; undue influence requires proof of moral coercion that restrained independent action and destroyed free agency.

    Summary

    This case addresses the burden of proof in will contests, specifically regarding testamentary capacity and undue influence. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that there was insufficient evidence to submit the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence to the jury. The court emphasized the proponent’s burden to prove the testator understood the will’s nature, their property’s extent, and their beneficiaries. It found that testimony from witnesses close to the decedent and the treating physician indicated competency, while the objectant’s evidence was insufficient. Similarly, the court found no evidence of undue influence, emphasizing the high standard of proving moral coercion that overcomes the testator’s free will.

    Facts

    The decedent’s will was challenged based on lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The will contained a bequest to a deceased brother described as living in “Cuba, Cattaraugus County, New York.” The will drafter was named trustee and was described as having an opinionated personality. A physician reviewed the decedent’s medical records, and testified they were unable to definitively determine the competency of the decedent at the time she signed the will. The decedent’s attorney testified that he assumed the person referenced in the will was the decedent’s brother. The decedent’s nephew also had the same name as the brother, and resided in Cuba, Cattaraugus County.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court initially allowed the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence to be decided by a jury. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to the Surrogate’s Court for entry of a decree granting the petition for probate.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of testamentary capacity to the jury.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of undue influence to the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to warrant submitting the issue of testamentary capacity to the jury.
    2. No, because there was no evidence that the decedent’s attorney exercised a moral coercion that restrained independent action and destroyed free agency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the proponent had presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate testamentary capacity. The court noted that the subscribing witnesses and those close to the decedent testified that she was alert and understood her actions. The treating physician opined that the decedent was competent when she signed the will. The court dismissed the objectant’s evidence, finding the physician’s testimony inconclusive. The court also deemed the bequest to the deceased brother insignificant because the attorney made an assumption that the person referred to was the decedent’s brother, and the nephew had the same name and resided in Cuba, Cattaraugus County.

    Regarding undue influence, the court emphasized that the objectant needed to show more than the will drafter benefitting from the will and possessing a strong personality. The court cited Matter of Walther, 6 NY2d 49, 53, quoting Children’s Aid Socy. v Loveridge, 70 NY 387, 394, stating that undue influence requires ” ‘moral coercion, which restrained independent action and destroyed free agency, or which, by importunity which could not be resisted, constrained the testator to do that which was against h[er] free will’ “. Since there was no evidence of such coercion, the issue should not have been submitted to the jury.

  • People v. Roth, 66 N.Y.2d 690 (1985): Limits on Plain View Exception After Frisk

    66 N.Y.2d 690 (1985)

    The “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does not apply if the incriminating nature of an object is not immediately apparent and is discovered only after further examination.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted a motion to suppress evidence, and dismissed the indictment against the defendant. The court held that while the police officer was justified in frisking the defendant based on a reasonable fear for safety, the subsequent seizure and examination of papers found during the frisk exceeded the permissible scope of the search. The incriminating nature of the papers was not immediately apparent, making the “plain view” exception inapplicable. Furthermore, the “inevitable discovery” exception did not apply because the papers would not have inevitably been discovered during an inventory search of the car.

    Facts

    A police officer frisked the defendant based on a reasonable fear that the defendant might be armed. During the frisk, the officer found papers in the defendant’s jacket pocket. These papers were folded over, secured with a rubber band, and were not immediately identifiable as gambling records. After removing the papers, the officer unwrapped and examined them, discovering they were gambling records.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted, and he moved to suppress the gambling records as evidence. The suppression hearing supported the finding that the frisk was justified. However, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the seizure and examination of the papers found during the frisk were justified under the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
    2. Whether the “inevitable discovery” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies to the seizure of the papers.

    Holding

    1. No, because the incriminating nature of the papers was not immediately apparent, and the discovery was not inadvertent.
    2. No, because the papers would not have been in the car during the inventory search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “plain view” exception did not apply because the discovery of the gambling records was not inadvertent, but rather the result of the officer opening the bundled papers. The court stated that the papers were “discovered” as a result of the officer’s opening the bundled papers, properly taken from defendant during a frisk, although it was not immediately apparent that the papers seized were evidence of criminality. Citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446-447, the court emphasized that the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent. The record lacked evidence that the officer knew the papers were gambling records or that they were readily identifiable as such by their outward appearance, citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 653 and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559.

    Regarding the “inevitable discovery” exception, the court found it inapplicable because the officer permitted the defendant to remove his personal property after indicating the vehicle was being impounded. Therefore, the papers would not have been in the car during the inventory search. The court thus rejected the prosecution’s attempt to justify the seizure under either the “plain view” or “inevitable discovery” exceptions, emphasizing the importance of the warrant requirement and its limitations in protecting individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. The decision highlights the need for a clear nexus between the object seized and probable cause of its incriminating nature for the plain view exception to apply.

  • Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 684 (1985): Employer Liability for Employee Discrimination

    Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 684 (1985)

    An employer is not liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved it; mere employment is insufficient to establish liability.

    Summary

    This case addresses employer liability for an employee’s discriminatory actions under the New York Human Rights Law. A black woman alleged racial discrimination by a hospital emergency room doctor. The New York Court of Appeals held that the hospital could not be held liable for the doctor’s actions solely based on the employment relationship. The court emphasized that employer liability requires evidence that the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved the discriminatory conduct. The case was remanded for further findings on whether the hospital condoned the doctor’s actions by, for instance, failing to investigate or take corrective measures.

    Facts

    Deborah Greene, a black woman, sought treatment at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital for back pain. Dr. Louis Mascitelli treated her and provided notes excusing her from work. On a subsequent visit, Dr. Mascitelli refused to provide another note, claiming no medical basis for her pain. When Greene questioned him, Mascitelli allegedly tore up the note, made racially charged comments, and ordered her out of the hospital without a specialist referral. Greene reported the incident, claiming racial discrimination.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) found both Dr. Mascitelli and St. Elizabeth’s Hospital liable for discrimination. The Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination, finding the delay in proceedings not prejudicial. The hospital appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employer (St. Elizabeth’s Hospital) can be held liable under the New York Human Rights Law for an employee’s (Dr. Mascitelli) discriminatory acts solely based on the employment relationship, without evidence that the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved the discriminatory conduct.

    Holding

    No, because an employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling regarding the hospital’s liability. The court relied on the principle established in Matter of Totem Taxi v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., stating that “an employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” The court found that the DHR erroneously based the hospital’s liability solely on the employment relationship with Dr. Mascitelli. The court acknowledged the DHR’s argument that the hospital’s failure to adopt an anti-discrimination policy, apologize to Greene, or take action against Mascitelli could constitute condonation. Condonation, according to the court, involves a “knowing, after-the-fact forgiveness or acceptance of an offense,” and an employer’s inaction could indicate such condonation. However, because the DHR did not make specific findings regarding condonation, the court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the hospital’s actions or inactions constituted condonation of Dr. Mascitelli’s discriminatory behavior. The court recognized the hospital’s claim that it lacked knowledge of the incident and would have presented evidence of its investigative measures had condonation been asserted as a basis for liability earlier in the proceedings.

  • People ex rel. Vega v. Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130 (1985): Sufficiency of Misbehavior Reports as Evidence in Prison Disciplinary Hearings

    People ex rel. Vega v. Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130 (1985)

    Written misbehavior reports, when specific and detailed, can constitute substantial evidence to support disciplinary determinations against inmates in prison disciplinary hearings, satisfying both state law and federal due process requirements.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether written misbehavior reports alone can provide sufficient evidence to support findings that inmates violated prison rules. The New York Court of Appeals held that such reports can be sufficient, provided they are detailed and specific, and the inmate is afforded procedural due process, including notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. The court emphasized that the reports must be reliable and probative and that inmates have the right to call witnesses unless doing so would jeopardize institutional safety.

    Facts

    Six inmates at Attica Correctional Facility were found guilty of violating various institutional rules based on written misbehavior reports. Vega was found with a razor blade in his Bible. Corcoran and Nesmith refused to stand for a count. Porter refused to produce his ID card. Semper was insubordinate and threatening. Primo refused to comply with a frisk and was verbally abusive. In each case, the inmate received a misbehavior report describing the incident, was offered assistance in preparing for a hearing, and was given the opportunity to present a defense.

    Procedural History

    Each inmate challenged the disciplinary determination, primarily arguing that the misbehavior reports were insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court varied in its rulings, some dismissing the petitions and others granting them. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court in some cases, finding insufficient evidence. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals to address the common issue of the sufficiency of misbehavior reports.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under New York State law, written misbehavior reports can constitute “substantial evidence” sufficient to support an administrative determination that an inmate violated institutional rules.

    2. Whether, under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, disciplinary determinations based solely on written misbehavior reports are permissible.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the misbehavior reports were sufficiently relevant and probative to constitute substantial evidence supporting the determinations that the inmates violated institutional rules.

    2. Yes, because given the facts of each case and the procedures afforded by the applicable regulations, the inmates were not denied due process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the governing standard under State law is whether the determination is supported by “substantial evidence,” which can include hearsay if it is sufficiently relevant and probative. The Court found that the misbehavior reports in these cases met this standard because they described specific incidents witnessed by the reporting officer, were made contemporaneously with the incident, and were endorsed by other officers. The Court highlighted that inmates were offered assistance in preparing for their hearings and given the opportunity to call witnesses.

    Regarding federal due process, the Court stated that Wolff v. McDonnell requires inmates facing disciplinary proceedings be apprised of the charges in writing and have a hearing, but it does not require correctional authorities to present a case that the inmate can probe or test. The hearing allows the inmate to call witnesses and present evidence in their defense, but there is no right to confrontation or cross-examination.

    The Court weighed the inmate’s interest against the State’s interests, concluding that requiring hearing officers to interview the charging officer in every case would impose a considerable administrative burden, given the high volume of Tier II and Tier III hearings. The Court emphasized the need for quick disciplinary determinations for security and rehabilitative reasons. Ultimately, the Court held that due process is satisfied when there is “some evidence” supporting the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board, which was plainly satisfied in these cases. “Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances” (Superintendent of Mass. Correctional Inst. v Hill, 472 US—, 105 S Ct 2768).

  • People v. Gallina, 66 N.Y.2d 50 (1985): Strict Compliance Required for Wiretap Extensions and Evidence Sealing

    People v. Gallina, 66 N.Y.2d 50 (1985)

    Wiretap evidence is inadmissible if authorities fail to strictly comply with statutory requirements for obtaining extensions, inactivating devices, and sealing recordings.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of adherence required to Criminal Procedure Law article 700 in wiretap investigations and the repercussions of non-compliance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to suppress wiretap evidence due to inadequate compliance with statutory requirements. The court emphasized that applications for wiretap extensions must be made before the original warrant expires, eavesdropping devices must be fully inactivated during lapses in authority, and recordings must be promptly sealed. Failure to meet these requirements necessitates suppression of the evidence obtained.

    Facts

    Law enforcement obtained authorizations for multiple wiretaps during a heroin sales investigation at a meat market where the defendant worked. Wiretap three targeted two phones at the market. An extension was sought, resulting in wiretap four. After wiretap four ended, the equipment was turned off but remained in place, and the tapes were sealed with a delay. A further warrant led to wiretap five, followed by wiretap six. The tapes from wiretap six were also sealed with a delay. The delay in obtaining the extension for wiretap four was attributed to transcription and translation difficulties and a broken typewriter.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the wiretap evidence, leading to his conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to suppress evidence from wiretaps two and five (and subsequent extensions), and ordered a new trial. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an order extending a wiretap can be issued after the original wiretap order has expired?

    2. Whether merely turning off an eavesdropping device satisfies the statutory requirement of permanent inactivation during a lapse in wiretapping authority?

    3. Whether evidence obtained from a wiretap is admissible when the application for that wiretap was preceded by violations of the extension and inactivation provisions of the eavesdropping statutes?

    4. Whether a delay of almost two full business days in sealing wiretap recordings is excusable under CPL 700.50(2)?

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 700.40 requires that an application for an extension order be made prior to the expiration of the original eavesdropping warrant.

    2. No, because permanent inactivation requires steps that would cut off the possibility of listening in on communications to or from the tapped premises, and simply turning off the equipment does not meet this standard.

    3. No, because the warrant authorizing the later wiretap depended on information obtained from the earlier wiretap which was the result of a direct violation of the extension application and inactivation statutes.

    4. No, because a delay of that length requires a satisfactory explanation, and inadequate police procedures do not constitute a valid excuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the clear language of CPL 700.40 mandates that extension applications be made before the original warrant’s expiration. The Court rejected the People’s argument to treat the extension application as a new, original application, emphasizing that this would circumvent the notice requirements of CPL 700.50(3). The Court also found that merely turning off the eavesdropping equipment did not satisfy the requirement of permanent inactivation, as it did not eliminate the potential for unauthorized eavesdropping. Regarding the admissibility of evidence from wiretap six, the Court found that the warrant authorizing it depended on information from wiretap five, which was obtained in violation of the extension and inactivation statutes. The Court emphasized that the extension and inactivation requirements reflect a policy of limiting the use of eavesdropping devices. Finally, the Court held that the delay in sealing the tapes violated CPL 700.50(2), as the People failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Court cited People v. Basilicato, 64 NY2d 103, 116 stating that “because of the potential for abuse, it is the People who must provide a satisfactory explanation for untimely sealing.”

  • Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 21 (1985): Barring Indemnification for Manufacturers of Defective Products

    Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 21 (1985)

    A manufacturer of a defective product cannot obtain indemnification from the purchaser when the purchaser’s employee is injured due to the manufacturer’s failure to provide adequate safety devices, even if the sales contract requires the purchaser to install such devices.

    Summary

    Hector Rosado, an employee of Comet Fibers, was injured while operating a garnett machine purchased by Comet from Proctor & Schwartz. The sales contract required Comet to install necessary safety guards, but the machine lacked adequate safeguards, leading to Rosado’s injuries. Rosado sued Proctor, who then sought indemnification from Comet. The New York Court of Appeals held that Proctor, as the manufacturer of a defective product, could not obtain indemnification from Comet, as Proctor had a non-delegable duty to ensure the machine was reasonably safe when it left their control. Allowing indemnification in this situation would undermine the policy goals of strict products liability.

    Facts

    Comet Fibers purchased a garnett machine from Proctor & Schwartz in 1970. The sales contract stipulated that Comet was responsible for installing safety guards and disconnect switches.
    The machine was delivered without safety devices. Comet installed a mesh fence with a gap and doors that exposed moving parts when opened.
    Hector Rosado, a Comet employee, was injured when his hand came into contact with unprotected chains and gears while cleaning the machine, which was often operated with the safety gate open.

    Procedural History

    Rosado sued Proctor & Schwartz.
    Proctor initiated a third-party action against Comet, seeking contribution and indemnity.
    The trial court dismissed Proctor’s indemnification claim. Comet settled with Rosado, precluding Proctor’s contribution claim.
    Proctor settled with Rosado before a verdict and appealed the dismissal of its indemnification claim.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, and Proctor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a manufacturer of a defective product can obtain indemnification from the purchaser when the sales contract requires the purchaser to install safety devices and the purchaser’s employee is injured due to the absence of such devices.

    Holding

    No, because the manufacturer has a non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe product, and allowing indemnification in this circumstance would undermine the public policy goals of strict products liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between contribution and indemnity, noting that contribution involves distributing the loss among tortfeasors, while indemnity shifts the entire loss to another party.
    Indemnity arises from contract, either express or implied. Proctor conceded there was no express agreement for indemnification.
    The court rejected Proctor’s argument for implied indemnity, stating that strict products liability is not akin to vicarious liability; manufacturers are held accountable as wrongdoers and must ensure their products are reasonably safe when they leave their control. The court stated that “a prima facie case is not established unless it is shown, among other things, that in relation to those who will use it, the product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer because it was not reasonably safe”.
    The court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Proctor & Schwartz v. United States Equip. Co., which allowed a similar indemnity claim, stating that the manufacturer is in the best position to determine appropriate safety devices, particularly when the dangers do not vary by job site.
    The court emphasized that “Preventing injuries in the first place is the primary public policy underlying the doctrine of strict products liability.”
    Allowing manufacturers to shift their duty of care through boilerplate contract language would erode the incentive to maintain safety and sanction the marketing of dangerous machines.
    The court distinguished McDermott v. City of New York, where indemnification was allowed because the manufacturer breached a duty to the injured plaintiff, whereas in this case, Proctor sought to recover from Comet based on a contract between them, despite Proctor’s breach of duty to Comet’s employee.