New York Law Review

Tag: 1983

  • Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253 (1983): Municipal Liability for Negligent Issuance of Certificate of Occupancy

    Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253 (1983)

    A municipality can be held proportionately liable to property owners for negligently issuing a certificate of occupancy despite the absence of a direct duty to injured third parties, if the municipality breached a special duty to the owners, leading to foreseeable harm.

    Summary

    Following a motel fire, the motel guests sued, among others, the Town of Greece. The town was dismissed from the primary suit because the plaintiffs alleged only a general duty owed to the public. The motel owners then filed a third-party complaint against the town, alleging negligence in approving building plans and issuing a certificate of occupancy despite known fire and safety violations. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the town owed no duty to the motel guests directly, it could still be proportionately liable to the motel owners if a special duty to them was breached, causing foreseeable harm.

    Facts

    An extensive fire occurred at the Holiday Inn in the Town of Greece, resulting in wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage claims by motel guests. The guests sued Holiday Inns, the developers, owners, and the Town of Greece. The claims against the town were based on its failure to enforce fire and safety laws and adequately inspect the motel’s construction. The original complaints against the town were dismissed because they alleged only a violation of a general duty owed to the public.

    Procedural History

    The remaining defendants (motel owners and lessee/operator) then filed third-party complaints against the Town of Greece, seeking contribution or indemnification. Special Term denied the town’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaints. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the town could not be liable to the third-party plaintiffs absent a duty owed to the original plaintiffs (motel guests). The motel owners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality, not owing a duty to injured motel guests, can be held proportionately liable to the motel owners and operator for breaching an independent duty owed to them regarding the issuance of a certificate of occupancy and approval of construction alterations.

    Holding

    Yes, because a municipality can be held proportionately liable to property owners if it breaches a special duty owed to them, leading to foreseeable harm, even if no direct duty was owed to the injured third parties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that apportionment rights arise when tortfeasors share responsibility for an injury, violating respective duties to the injured party. However, the court emphasized that proportionate liability among tortfeasors is analytically distinct from the duties owed to the injured person. Citing Nolechek v. Gesuale, the court noted that a duty to prevent foreseeable harm could exist independently of a duty to the injured party. The court stated, “If an independent obligation can be found on the part of a concurrent wrongdoer to prevent foreseeable harm, he should be held responsible for the portion of the damage attributable to his negligence, despite the fact that the duty violated was not one owing directly to the injured person.”

    The court determined that municipalities can be liable for negligently exercising governmental functions when a special duty exists to the injured person, distinct from a general duty to the public. A special duty arises when a statute is enacted for the benefit of particular persons, a duty is voluntarily assumed and justifiably relied upon, or positive direction and control are assumed with a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation. The court noted that the third-party complaints alleged known, blatant fire and safety code violations, yet the town approved building plan changes and issued a certificate of occupancy representing the premises as safe. If these allegations are proven, a basis for imposing liability on the town exists, potentially including economic damages suffered due to judgments in favor of the motel guests.

    The court distinguished the discretionary nature of granting or denying a building permit from the mandatory duty to refuse a certificate of occupancy when blatant code violations are known. The court concluded there was no basis for implied indemnification as the third-party complaints did not support the theory that the appellants were being cast in damages solely for the negligence of the town.

  • Aero-Travis Corp. v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas, 59 N.Y.2d 789 (1983): Priority of Liens After Vacatur and Reinstatement of Foreign Judgment

    Aero-Travis Corp. v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas, 59 N.Y.2d 789 (1983)

    When a foreign judgment filed in New York is vacated following an intermediate appeal, and subsequently reinstated on further appeal, the judgment creditor’s lien in New York dates from the new filing after reinstatement, not the original filing date; a court cannot retroactively create substantive rights when third-party rights have intervened.

    Summary

    This case addresses the priority of judgment liens when a Texas judgment, initially filed in New York, is vacated upon an intermediate appellate reversal in Texas, and then reinstated by the Texas Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals held that the lien’s priority in New York dates from the refiling of the judgment after reinstatement, not the initial filing. The court reasoned that vacating the original filing nullified the lien, and a court cannot retroactively create a lien to prejudice intervening rights of a third-party judgment creditor.

    Facts

    Republic National Bank of Dallas (the Bank) obtained a judgment in Texas against a debtor and filed an authenticated copy in New York on June 16, 1977. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the Texas judgment on February 23, 1978. The Bank then moved to vacate the New York filing, which was granted on July 28, 1978. The Texas Supreme Court reinstated the Texas judgment on November 7, 1978. Aero-Travis Corp. (the Title Company) docketed its New York judgment against the same debtor on November 21, 1978. On March 30, 1979, the Bank obtained authorization to refile the Texas judgment in New York. The Bank then sought a nunc pro tunc order to reinstate the filing retroactively to June 16, 1977.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the Bank’s motion for nunc pro tunc reinstatement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lien of a foreign judgment filed in New York, which was subsequently vacated after reversal in the foreign jurisdiction and then reinstated on further appeal, dates back to the original filing date or only to the date of refiling after reinstatement, where the rights of a third-party judgment creditor have intervened.

    Holding

    No, because the vacatur of the original filing in New York nullified the lien, and the subsequent reinstatement of the Texas judgment did not automatically revive that lien in New York with retroactive effect. The intervening rights of the Title Company, which docketed its judgment while no lien from the Texas judgment existed, take priority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the initial filing of the Texas judgment in New York on June 16, 1977, created a lien equivalent to a New York Supreme Court judgment, pursuant to CPLR 5402(b). However, the subsequent reversal of the Texas judgment and the voluntary vacatur of the New York filing effectively nullified the lien. The court stated, “Following the 1978 vacatur of the filing in New York, that filing was a nullity, all liens evolving therefrom were dissolved…” The subsequent reinstatement of the Texas judgment did not retroactively recreate the lien in New York, especially given the intervening rights of the Title Company, which docketed its judgment on November 21, 1978, when no Texas judgment lien was of record. The court reasoned that anyone searching the records was entitled to rely on the absence of an existing lien. The court rejected the Bank’s attempt to use nunc pro tunc relief to create a new substantive right retroactively. The court explained, “The relief sought by the bank was not to correct any irregularity, mistake, omission or other error; the bank sought the creation of a new lien retroactive to the date of its prior lien which, on its own motion, had been effectively nullified.” The court found the denial of nunc pro tunc relief was mandatory because the Title Company’s rights had intervened. This decision underscores the importance of maintaining a clear record of liens and the principle that judicial actions cannot unfairly prejudice the established rights of third parties.

  • Goncalves v. Regent International Hotels, Ltd., 58 N.Y.2d 206 (1983): Defining ‘Safe’ Under New York’s Hotel Liability Statute

    58 N.Y.2d 206 (1983)

    A hotel seeking limited liability under General Business Law § 200 for lost guest property must prove it provided a “safe” that offers reasonable protection against foreseeable risks; a simple safe-deposit box may not suffice.

    Summary

    Two guests at the Mayfair Regent hotel lost jewelry from their safe-deposit boxes and sued the hotel for negligence and breach of contract. The hotel claimed limited liability under General Business Law § 200. The court addressed whether the hotel provided an adequate “safe” as required by the statute and the enforceability of agreements limiting the hotel’s liability. The Court of Appeals held that the hotel must prove the safe provided adequate protection against foreseeable risks and that the signed agreements were unenforceable. This ruling clarifies the hotel’s burden and the scope of protection offered by § 200.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs Goncalves and Cecconi, guests at the Mayfair Regent hotel, deposited their extensive jewelry collections (allegedly worth $1,000,000 each) in the hotel’s safe-deposit boxes. Notices were posted indicating the availability of a safe for valuables. Plaintiffs signed “Safe Deposit Box Receipts” with certain terms and conditions. The security consisted of rows of safe-deposit boxes in a plasterboard room with hollow-core wood doors, one with a residential lock and the other without any lock. The room was allegedly unlocked, unattended, and open to the public. On November 25, 1979, thieves broke into the boxes and stole the jewelry.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs independently sued the hotel. The cases were consolidated. The hotel moved to dismiss or limit liability to $500 based on General Business Law § 200 and the safe-deposit agreements. Plaintiffs cross-moved to strike the hotel’s affirmative defenses and for summary judgment. Special Term granted the hotel judgment limited to $500 per plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether General Business Law § 200 limits a hotelkeeper’s liability for negligence in the loss of goods delivered for safekeeping.
    2. Whether a hotelkeeper who does not provide a “safe” within the meaning of the statute can claim the benefits of § 200.
    3. Whether the safe-deposit agreements signed by the plaintiffs are enforceable.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statutory scheme limits liability for general negligence assuming the proprietor meets the requirements of section 200.
    2. No, because to claim the benefits of the statute, the hotel must strictly adhere to its provisions, including providing a “safe”.
    3. No, because the agreements are void for lack of consideration and unenforceable as against public policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that § 200, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed. To obtain its protection, the hotelkeeper must strictly adhere to its provisions. Negligence can arise if the hotelkeeper fails to satisfy the statute’s conditions or if, having satisfied them, a negligent act causes the loss. If the proprietor meets the requirements of § 200, the statutory scheme limits their liability for general negligence. The statute requires the proprietor to “provide a safe” as a condition for receiving the statute’s protection.

    The Court defined a “safe” as a receptacle that, under the circumstances, provides adequate protection against fire, theft, and other reasonably foreseeable risks. The burden of proof to show a “safe” was provided lies on the defendant hotel. The court rejected the argument that “other convenient place” in the statute allows for something less than a safe, stating it only refers to the location of the safe, not the nature of the receptacle itself. The Court found summary judgment was improper because there was a material issue of fact as to whether the hotel’s safe-deposit boxes constituted a “safe” within the meaning of § 200, based on conflicting expert testimony.

    The Court also found the safe-deposit agreements unenforceable. If the hotel provided a “safe”, the agreements were cumulative to the statute’s protection. If not, they were unenforceable against public policy because they would encourage hotels to provide lesser protection. The court stated, “A promise to perform an existing legal obligation is not valid consideration to provide a basis for a contract”. Allowing such agreements without warning the guest of lesser security would result in a waiver of rights, which is unacceptable. As stated in the opinion, “In summary, defendants may not invoke the protection of section 200 of the General Business Law without proving that it provided a ‘safe’ within the meaning of that law.”

  • Bossuk v. Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916 (1983): Valid Service When Summons Left Outside Door After Refusal

    Bossuk v. Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916 (1983)

    Under CPLR 308(2), the delivery requirement for substituted service is satisfied when a process server leaves a summons outside the door of the person to be served after a person of suitable age and discretion refuses to open the door to accept it, provided the process server informs them that this is being done.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the delivery requirement of CPLR 308(2) was satisfied when a process server left a summons outside the defendant’s door after two teenagers inside the house refused to open the door, provided the process server informed them that he was doing so. The court reasoned that the delivery requirement should be interpreted consistently across different subdivisions of CPLR 308. The court also rejected the defendant’s due process argument, holding that the method of service was reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the action.

    Facts

    A process server attempted to serve process on the defendant, Steinberg, at his residence. Upon arrival, two teenagers, ages 14 and 15, were inside the house, but refused to open the door to accept the summons. The process server informed the teenagers that he was leaving the summons outside the door and proceeded to do so. The process server also followed up with a mailing of the summons as required by the statute. The defendant challenged the validity of the service.

    Procedural History

    The lower court upheld the validity of the service. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether service was proper under CPLR 308(2).

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the delivery requirement of CPLR 308(2) is satisfied when a process server leaves a summons outside the door of the person to be served after a person of suitable age and discretion refuses to open the door to accept it, provided the process server informs them that this is being done.

    2. Whether service under CPLR 308(2) as interpreted in this case violates due process.

    3. Whether proof of mailing was sufficient when the Sheriff’s employee who mailed the summons was not produced, but proof of the Sheriff’s regular course of business was presented.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the delivery requirement of CPLR 308(2) can be satisfied by leaving the summons outside the door when a person of suitable age and discretion refuses to accept it, provided the process server informs them of their actions.

    2. No, because a constitutionally proper method of substituted service need not guarantee actual notice; it suffices if the method is reasonably calculated to apprise the interested party of the action.

    3. Yes, because proof of the Sheriff’s regular course of business in mailing the summons is sufficient evidence of mailing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the delivery requirements in CPLR 308(1) and CPLR 308(2) should be interpreted consistently. The court cited McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 NY2d 111, 115, where it held that under CPLR 308(1), a summons could be left in the “general vicinity” of a person resisting service. Extending this logic, the court held that leaving the summons outside the door after refusal by someone of suitable age and discretion satisfied the delivery requirement of CPLR 308(2), as long as the person was informed that the summons was being left there.

    Regarding due process, the court stated, “It is hornbook law that a constitutionally proper method of effecting substituted service need not guarantee that in all cases the defendant will in fact receive actual notice (Dobkin v Chapman, 21 NY2d 490, 502). It suffices that the prescribed method is one “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [the] interested part[y] of the pendency of the action” (Mullane v Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314).”

    The court also found that the proof of mailing was sufficient, relying on Nassau Ins. Co. v. Murray, 46 NY2d 828, 829, which established that proof of the Sheriff’s regular course of business is sufficient to establish mailing.

  • Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Board of Estimate, 59 N.Y.2d 796 (1983): SEQRA Compliance Requires Environmental Review Before Action

    Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Board of Estimate, 59 N.Y.2d 796 (1983)

    Under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), a governmental body must conduct an environmental review, resulting in either an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a determination of nonsignificance, before taking action on a proposal that may affect the environment.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements of SEQRA concerning the timing of environmental review. The Court of Appeals held that a county legislature improperly passed a resolution to sell county-owned property because it did not have either an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a determination of nonsignificance before voting on the resolution. The court emphasized that SEQRA mandates a preliminary environmental review to determine the potential impact of a proposed action, and this review must be completed before the legislative body takes action. This ensures informed decision-making regarding environmental considerations.

    Facts

    A county legislature sought to sell county-owned property. Prior to passing Resolution No. 83 approving the sale, the legislature did not prepare or consider either an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a determination of nonsignificance regarding the potential environmental impact of the sale. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the resolution based on non-compliance with SEQRA.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, which ruled on the SEQRA challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a county legislature violates SEQRA by passing a resolution to sell county-owned property without first preparing either an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a determination of nonsignificance regarding the potential environmental impact of the sale.

    Holding

    Yes, because SEQRA requires a responsible agency to make an initial determination of whether an EIS is needed “as early as possible in the formulation of a proposal for an action” (ECL 8-0109, subd 4), and the legislature failed to do so before passing the resolution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on the intent and specific provisions of SEQRA (State Environmental Quality Review Act) and its implementing regulations. The court cited Matter of Tri-County Taxpayers Assn. v Town Bd. of Town of Queensbury, 55 NY2d 41, emphasizing that environmental impact statements must be accessible to decision-makers prior to action on a proposal. The court highlighted ECL 8-0109 (subd 4), which requires agencies to make an initial determination of whether an EIS is necessary “as early as possible.” The court noted the regulatory scheme requires either a determination of nonsignificance or a determination of significance (leading to an EIS) before an action is taken. Here, the county legislature failed to meet either requirement before voting on Resolution No. 83. The court stated: “Regardless of its impact, however, Resolution No. 83 was not properly passed because the county legislature did not have prior to passing that resolution either an EIS or a determination of nonsignificance.” This failure violated the core principle of SEQRA, which aims to ensure that environmental factors are considered before irreversible decisions are made. The ruling reinforces the procedural requirements of SEQRA and the importance of timely environmental review in governmental decision-making. The court explicitly ties its decision to the earlier *Tri-County Taxpayers* case, clarifying that even when the environmental impact isn’t immediately obvious, the *process* of environmental review must still be followed.

  • People v. Narayan, 58 N.Y.2d 904 (1983): Limits on Attorney-Client Consultation During Cross-Examination

    People v. Narayan, 58 N.Y.2d 904 (1983)

    A trial court has discretion to limit attorney-client consultation during cross-examination to prevent improper coaching of the witness, especially when the examination has been temporarily interrupted for an evidentiary ruling.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s request to consult with his attorney during a temporary break in cross-examination. The court emphasized that while a defendant has a right to consult with counsel, that right is not absolute and cannot be used to interrupt the examination process for coaching purposes. The court found that the trial judge acted within his discretion to prevent potential impropriety, especially since a negative answer to the pending question would have ended that line of questioning.

    Facts

    Defendant’s cross-examination was interrupted on a Monday afternoon. The interruption occurred to allow the trial court to research the admissibility of a question posed by the prosecution. The following Tuesday morning, after concluding his research, the judge ruled the question was permissible. Before the defendant resumed the witness stand, his attorney requested to speak with him regarding the question.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the attorney’s request for consultation while the defendant was “on the stand.” The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding no reversible error. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request to consult with his attorney during a temporary break in cross-examination, after the court had ruled on the admissibility of a specific question but before the defendant answered it.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court has the discretion to manage the trial process and prevent potential coaching of the witness during cross-examination, especially after an interruption for an evidentiary ruling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the defendant’s right to consult with counsel, but clarified that attorneys cannot freely interrupt examinations to advise clients on anticipated questions. The Court emphasized the trial court’s discretion in managing the examination process. The court reasoned that because the cross-examination had only been temporarily paused for an evidentiary ruling, the trial court did not err in directing that the cross-examination continue without further interruption. The court highlighted that a negative answer to the question would have precluded further inquiry on the subject. Quoting Judge Meyer’s concurring opinion in an earlier appeal of the same case, the court stated: “[I]t is not error for the Trial Judge in such a situation to make the ruling here made preventing conference until questioning on the issue has been concluded.” The court thus balanced the defendant’s right to counsel with the need for the trial court to control the proceedings and prevent potential impropriety.

  • Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 143 (1983): Determining Compensation for a Permanent Physical Occupation

    Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 143 (1983)

    When a state statute authorizes a permanent physical occupation of property, the property owner is entitled to just compensation, and the statute must be construed to provide a mechanism for determining that compensation, even if it was initially intended as a police power regulation.

    Summary

    After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of compensation for a permanent physical occupation caused by a cable television wire installed on Loretto’s property under Section 828 of the Executive Law. The court held that the statute must be construed to allow for compensation. While the statute was initially intended as a valid exercise of police power, the Supreme Court’s ruling that it constituted a taking necessitated interpreting the law to include a mechanism for just compensation. The Court of Appeals modified the lower court’s judgment to clarify that the validity of the statute was contingent on the commission’s determination of just compensation.

    Facts

    Loretto purchased an apartment building in 1972. Unbeknownst to her, Teleprompter installed a cable television wire on the building’s roof in 1970, pursuant to a prior agreement with the previous owner. After Loretto bought the building, Teleprompter maintained the installation relying on Section 828 of the Executive Law, which limited the compensation a landlord could demand for permitting cable TV facilities on their property.

    Procedural History

    Loretto sued Teleprompter, arguing trespass. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of Section 828. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed, holding that the law was a valid exercise of police power. The Supreme Court reversed, finding a taking had occurred and remanding for determination of just compensation. The New York Court of Appeals then reconsidered the case on remand.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 828 of the Executive Law provides a mechanism for determining just compensation for a permanent physical occupation, as now required by the Supreme Court’s decision.
    2. Whether Section 828 is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine, fails to provide for compensation in advance of the taking, or violates due process.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute can be construed to empower the commission to fix reasonable compensation, subject to judicial review.
    2. No, because determination of compensation by a commission is permissible, advance payment is not an absolute requirement under the circumstances, and due process concerns are adequately addressed through judicial review and potential amendment of regulations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because the Supreme Court had determined that the statute resulted in a taking, it must be construed, if possible, to provide for just compensation. The court found that Section 828, along with Section 816 of the Executive Law, provided the commission with the power to determine reasonable compensation through an adjudicatory process, subject to judicial review. The court dismissed the separation of powers argument, noting that administrative agencies can perform adjudicatory functions subject to judicial review. The court also rejected the argument that advance payment was absolutely required, finding that the circumstances of the case, including the small amount of compensation involved and the potential for judicial review, provided reasonable certainty that just compensation would be received. The Court addressed due process objections, stating that concerns regarding lack of notice could be addressed by modifying existing regulations. The court emphasized the importance of construing the statute to achieve the legislative aim of promoting the rapid development of the cable television industry while respecting constitutional requirements.

  • In re Estate of Riefberg, 58 N.Y.2d 136 (1983): Stockholder Agreements as Testamentary Substitutes

    In re Estate of Riefberg, 58 N.Y.2d 136 (1983)

    A buy-sell provision of a corporate stockholder’s agreement, amended shortly before death to divert proceeds directly to beneficiaries other than the estate, can be a testamentary substitute subject to a surviving spouse’s right of election under EPTL 5-1.1.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a buy-sell agreement, amended just before the decedent’s death, constituted a testamentary substitute subject to the surviving spouse’s elective share. The decedent, Sid Riefberg, amended a stockholder agreement to direct payment of his shares’ value to his former wife and her children instead of his estate, thereby circumventing his current wife’s (Maria’s) right of election. The court held that the amended agreement was indeed a testamentary substitute, emphasizing the decedent’s control over the disposition of the property and the agreement’s impact on estate assets available to the surviving spouse. The court also upheld the lower court’s finding that Maria had not abandoned the decedent, thereby preserving her right to election.

    Facts

    Sid Riefberg’s will left the bulk of his estate to his former wife, Henrietta, and her children, with only a small bequest to his daughter from his second wife, Maria. Sid and his brother were equal shareholders in a close corporation. The original stockholder agreement mandated the corporation to purchase a deceased shareholder’s stock, with proceeds going to the estate. Shortly before Sid’s death, the agreement was amended to direct payment for Sid’s shares to Henrietta and her children, bypassing the estate. Maria had requested that the locks be changed on the marital apartment, and the couple was living apart at the time of Sid’s death.

    Procedural History

    Maria filed a spousal election, which Henrietta (as executrix) challenged based on alleged abandonment. The Surrogate’s Court ruled in Maria’s favor on the abandonment issue. Maria then initiated a proceeding to determine if the stockholder agreement constituted a testamentary substitute. The Surrogate’s Court found it to be a testamentary substitute and directed Henrietta to include the stock’s value in calculating Maria’s elective share. The Appellate Division affirmed both decrees, and Henrietta appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Maria forfeited her right to elect by unjustifiably abandoning Sid during his lifetime.
    2. Whether the amended buy-sell agreement constitutes a testamentary substitute under EPTL 5-1.1, thereby subject to Maria’s spousal right of election.

    Holding

    1. No, because the estate failed to prove that Maria’s departure from the marital home was unjustified and without Sid’s consent.
    2. Yes, because the agreement, particularly after the amendment, allowed Sid to retain control over the disposition of his property, effectively circumventing Maria’s elective share.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding abandonment, the court emphasized that more than mere separation is required; the abandonment must be unjustified and without consent. The estate failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet this burden. As the court noted, proving abandonment is difficult without the testator’s testimony due to the Dead Man’s Statute (CPLR 4519). Regarding the testamentary substitute issue, the court delved into the history of EPTL 5-1.1 and its purpose of preventing circumvention of spousal rights. The court reasoned that the “in trust or otherwise” language of EPTL 5-1.1 (subd [b], par [1], cl [E]) should be interpreted broadly to include arrangements that, like the amended buy-sell agreement, allow a decedent to control the beneficial enjoyment of property while stripping the estate of assets. The court rejected the argument that because a contract can be abrogated by mutual consent, that it cannot be considered a testamentary substitute. The court stated, “[T]he agreement here was the means by which the decedent not only controlled the beneficial enjoyment of the property right at stake, but stripped the estate of assets which should have been subject to his surviving spouse’s right to her elective share. Indeed, its ‘express provisions’ enabled the decedent, in terms of an appropriate use of ejusdem generis, to retain a power to ‘revoke’, ‘consume’, ‘invade’, or otherwise ‘dispose’ of the corpus.” The court emphasized that while certain assets are specifically excluded from being considered testamentary substitutes (e.g., pension plans, insurance proceeds), stockholder agreements are not among them. Thus, the amended agreement fell within the statute’s definition of a testamentary substitute.

  • Plainedge Federation of Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free School District, 58 N.Y.2d 902 (1983): Standard of Review for Advisory Arbitration

    Plainedge Federation of Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free School District, 58 N.Y.2d 902 (1983)

    When a collective bargaining agreement provides for advisory arbitration, a school district’s determination based on the arbitrator’s recommendation should be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard applicable to Article 78 proceedings, unless the parties’ conduct converts the arbitration to a binding determination.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over whether a substitute teacher was covered by a collective bargaining agreement and entitled to sick leave benefits. The dispute went to advisory arbitration, where the arbitrator found the teacher was not covered. The school district adopted this decision. The teachers’ union challenged the district’s action in an Article 78 proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that because the bargaining agreement expressly provided for advisory arbitration and the parties’ conduct did not convert it to binding arbitration, the school district’s determination should be reviewed to see if it was arbitrary or capricious. The Court found it was not.

    Facts

    Sharon Licht, a permanent substitute teacher, claimed she was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the Plainedge Federation of Teachers and the Plainedge Union Free School District. Licht sought full sick leave benefits under the agreement. The school district denied her claim. The collective bargaining agreement’s grievance procedure led to advisory arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The arbitrator concluded Licht was not covered by the agreement, and the school district adopted the arbitrator’s decision. The Plainedge Federation of Teachers brought an Article 78 proceeding challenging the district’s action. Special Term vacated the determination. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition, finding the parties’ conduct had converted the advisory arbitration to binding arbitration and that the arbitrator’s award was not irrational. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, but on a different rationale.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the arbitrator’s award was advisory or binding.
    2. If the arbitrator’s award was advisory, whether the school district’s determination was arbitrary or capricious and should be overturned.

    Holding

    1. No, because the collective bargaining agreement expressly provided that arbitration awards were advisory only, and the parties’ conduct did not convert it to a binding determination.
    2. No, because the school district’s determination was based on the recommendations of the arbitrator, as allowed for in the agreement, and had support in both the plain terms of the agreement and the prior bargaining history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erred in finding that the arbitration had become binding. The Court emphasized that the collective bargaining agreement expressly provided that arbitration awards were advisory only. Submitting the issue of the agreement’s coverage to the arbitrator was insufficient to convert the arbitration to binding. The Court distinguished this case from others where the parties stipulated the remedy to be implemented or granted the arbitrator powers beyond those in the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court then applied the standard of review applicable to Article 78 proceedings to the school district’s determination. Under this standard, the Court held that the district’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The determination was based in large part on “careful consideration [of] the recommendations of the Arbitrator” in accordance with the agreement of the parties. The determination also found support in the plain terms of the agreement and in the prior bargaining history between the district and union. Therefore, the Court upheld the school district’s determination. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the explicit terms of the collective bargaining agreement regarding the nature of arbitration (advisory vs. binding) and the appropriate standard of review.

  • People v. Thomas, 58 N.Y.2d 831 (1983): Defining Forcible Compulsion in Sodomy Cases

    58 N.Y.2d 831 (1983)

    A jury instruction that allows a finding of forcible compulsion based on either physical force overcoming earnest resistance or a threat of immediate death or physical injury, when the indictment only charges the former, constitutes reversible error.

    Summary

    Defendant Thomas was convicted of sodomy in the first degree. The trial court’s charge to the jury regarding the definition of forcible compulsion was erroneous because it allowed the jury to convict if they found either physical force or a threat of immediate harm, while the indictment only alleged physical force. Although the Appellate Division based its decision on the nonretroactivity of the Payton rule, the Court of Appeals modified the order, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial. The court found that the defendant’s affidavit supporting the motion to suppress was insufficient.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for sodomy in the first degree, charged with forcible compulsion “by means of physical force which overcame earnest resistance.” At trial, the court instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty if the jury found either physical force overcoming earnest resistance or a threat placing the victim in fear of immediate death or physical injury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reviewed the case and made a decision based on the nonretroactivity of the Payton rule. The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury on the definition of forcible compulsion by instructing that the jury could find the defendant guilty based on a threat of immediate death or physical injury, when the indictment only charged forcible compulsion “by means of physical force which overcame earnest resistance”.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division’s decision requires reversal, considering their reliance on the nonretroactivity of the Payton rule.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court’s instruction broadened the basis for conviction beyond what was alleged in the indictment.
    2. No, because although the Appellate Division’s reasoning was erroneous, the defendant’s affidavit in support of the motion to suppress was insufficient as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury regarding the definition of forcible compulsion. The indictment specifically charged forcible compulsion “by means of physical force which overcame earnest resistance” only. However, the court instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty if they found either such force or a threat placing the victim in fear of immediate death or physical injury. This broadened the scope of the indictment, allowing the jury to convict on a basis not specifically alleged. The Court cited CPL 710.60, subd 3, par [b] and People v. Grosfeld, 58 N.Y.2d 887, noting the defendant’s affidavit in support of the motion to suppress was insufficient. The court stated that reversal was not required because defendant’s affidavit in support of the motion to suppress was insufficient as a matter of law to support the ground alleged. The court modified the order by reversing the conviction of sodomy in the first degree and ordering a new trial as to the second and third counts of the indictment, and affirmed the remaining portions of the order.