New York Law Review

Tag: 1982

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Limits of Privacy Claims Absent Statutory Violation

    55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    In New York, a cause of action for invasion of privacy is strictly limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, precluding common-law claims for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs sued over portrayals in books and a movie, claiming invasion of privacy and defamation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, holding that New York does not recognize a common-law right to privacy beyond the statutory protections in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, which prohibit the use of a person’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes without consent. Since the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures were not used, no cause of action existed under the statute. The defamation claims were not addressed in this motion to dismiss and remained for later consideration.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, for commercial gain, portrayed them with detailed accuracy in books and a movie represented as true stories. They asserted that the portrayals were so accurate regarding their physical characteristics and activities that they were effectively identified, leading to an invasion of their privacy.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought suit alleging invasion of privacy and defamation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion regarding the invasion of privacy claim, but the appellate division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s order dismissing the invasion of privacy claim, while the defamation claims were not part of this appeal and remained for future proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State recognizes a common-law right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity, beyond the protections afforded by Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy is limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, and does not extend to common-law claims based on unreasonable publicity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy failed because Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law exclusively govern such claims in New York. These sections prohibit using a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for commercial purposes without consent. Since the defendants did not use the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures in the books or movie, there was no violation of the statute. The court explicitly stated, “whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions with respect to the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy in consequence of unreasonable publicity, in our State thus far there has been no recognition of such right other than under sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.” The court reinforced the idea that any expansion of privacy rights in New York must come from the legislature, not the courts. The court distinguished this case from defamation claims, which were not addressed by the motion to dismiss and remained open for future litigation. This underscores the court’s strict interpretation of the statutory limits on privacy claims, leaving potential plaintiffs with limited recourse in situations where their likeness or identity is not directly exploited.

  • Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167 (1982): Considering Children’s Preferences in Custody Disputes

    Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167 (1982)

    In child custody disputes, while children’s preferences should be considered, they are not determinative; the court must prioritize the child’s long-term best interests based on objective criteria, particularly the stability of the custodial environment and the avoidance of separating siblings when the custodial parent is fit.

    Summary

    A father petitioned for custody of his three children after the two older children expressed a preference to live with him during a summer visit. The Family Court dismissed the petition, maintaining custody with the mother, who had been the custodial parent since the divorce. The Appellate Division modified, granting custody of the two older children to the father. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the children’s preferences were not determinative and emphasizing the importance of maintaining sibling unity and custodial stability when the mother remained a fit parent. The court found no material change in circumstances to justify altering the existing custody arrangement.

    Facts

    The parents divorced, and the mother was granted custody of their three children (ages nine, eight, and four) per a separation agreement. The father had generous visitation rights. The father filed a petition seeking custody, primarily based on the two older children’s expressed desire to live with him during a summer visit. The father lived in the family’s former home, while the mother resided in a smaller apartment in another state. There was no evidence suggesting the mother was unfit or had become unfit as a parent.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the father’s petition, upholding the mother’s custody. The Appellate Division reversed in part, awarding custody of the two older children to the father while maintaining the youngest child’s custody with the mother. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the children’s expressed preference to live with the father should be the determining factor in a custody modification proceeding.
    2. Whether the disparity in living conditions between the parents’ homes constitutes a material change in circumstances warranting a change in custody.
    3. Whether it is appropriate to separate siblings when determining custody arrangements.

    Holding

    1. No, because the children’s wishes are not determinative; the court must consider the children’s best interests based on objective criteria.
    2. No, because a disparity in living conditions alone does not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to alter custody.
    3. No, because the separation of siblings is disfavored, particularly when the custodial parent is fit and willing to care for all the children.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while children’s preferences are a relevant factor, they are not controlling in custody decisions. The court must prioritize the children’s long-term welfare based on objective factors, including the stability of the custodial environment and the maintenance of sibling relationships. The court found that the Family Court Judge had properly considered the children’s preferences alongside other relevant factors, including the fitness of both parents. The court noted that no material change in circumstances, aside from the children’s expressed preferences, justified a modification of the existing custody arrangement. Specifically, the court stated, “[t]he rearing of a child requires greater stability than a roller-coaster treatment of custody.” The court further reasoned that separating siblings should be avoided when the custodial parent is fit, as close familial relationships are crucial for long-term stability and healthy development. The court quoted Glueck & Glueck, stating that the family is the “cradle of personality and character” and that separating siblings strikes a vital blow to the family unit. The court distinguished between the children’s subjective desires and their long-term best interests, stating, “the best interests of a child, particularly over the long term, often require the overbalancing of subjective desires by more dependable objective criteria.” The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Family Court to ensure the return of the older children to their mother, minimizing any disruption to their lives.