New York Law Review

Tag: 1982

  • Holt v. County of Tioga, 56 N.Y.2d 414 (1982): Validity of Local Laws Requiring Prior Notice of Defects

    Holt v. County of Tioga, 56 N.Y.2d 414 (1982)

    A local law requiring prior written notification of a dangerous condition as a prerequisite to suing a county does not conflict with general state law imposing liability for unsafe highways, and is therefore constitutional.

    Summary

    Leona Holt sued Tioga County for injuries sustained in a car accident allegedly caused by a defective highway shoulder. The County asserted Holt failed to comply with Local Law No. 2, requiring prior written notice of defects. Holt argued the local law was unconstitutional. The Appellate Division found the local law unconstitutional, reasoning it conflicted with Highway Law § 139, which imposes liability on counties without a prior notification requirement. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the local law constitutional because § 50-e(4) of the General Municipal Law, referenced by Highway Law § 139, allows for such prior notification requirements.

    Facts

    Leona Holt was injured in a one-vehicle accident on a highway owned by Tioga County.
    Holt alleged the accident was caused by a defectively low highway shoulder.
    She claimed the County was negligent in failing to inspect and repair the road.
    Tioga County Local Law No. 2 of 1978 required prior written notice to the County Clerk or Highway Superintendent of any defective highway condition as a condition precedent to a lawsuit for damages.
    Holt did not plead or prove compliance with the local law.

    Procedural History

    Holt sued Tioga County in Special Term, seeking damages for her injuries.
    The County moved to dismiss based on Holt’s failure to comply with Local Law No. 2.
    Special Term set a trial date, effectively denying the County’s motion without explanation.
    The County appealed, and the Appellate Division struck down the County’s affirmative defense, deeming Local Law No. 2 unconstitutional.
    The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of the local law’s constitutionality.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Tioga County Local Law No. 2, requiring prior written notification of a defective highway condition before a suit can be maintained against the county, is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with New York Highway Law § 139, a general law imposing liability on counties for highway defects.

    Holding

    No, because § 139 of the Highway Law defers to § 50-e of the General Municipal Law regarding the procedure for commencing an action, and § 50-e(4) specifically allows for prior notification statutes. Therefore, Local Law No. 2 does not conflict with general state law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the “exceedingly strong presumption” that local laws are constitutional when enacted under delegated legislative power.
    To overcome this presumption, a party must demonstrate inconsistency with the State Constitution or a general law enacted by the State Legislature.
    Article IX of the New York Constitution authorizes local governments to enact laws relating to claims against them and the management of their highways, as long as these laws are not inconsistent with the constitution or any general law.
    The Court analyzed Highway Law § 139, which imposes liability on counties for injuries caused by improperly maintained highways, and General Municipal Law § 50-e, which governs notice of claim procedures.
    Specifically, the Court focused on § 50-e(4), which states that its requirements are exclusive “except as to conditions precedent to liability for certain defects…where such notice now is, or hereafter may be, required by law, as a condition precedent to liability.”
    The Court reasoned that by deferring to § 50-e of the General Municipal Law, Highway Law § 139 implicitly allows for local laws requiring prior notification of defects.
    The Court stated, “There is no indication in the statutory language that the Legislature in any way intended to limit that provision’s applicability. The statutory language makes no distinction between general laws and local laws; it must be read to apply alike to all laws enacted by any legislative body in this State.”
    The Court cited past decisions like Fullerton v. City of Schenectady and MacMullen v. City of Middletown, where prior notification statutes were upheld as valid exercises of legislative power delegated to localities.
    The Court concluded that Tioga County acted within its constitutionally mandated powers in enacting Local Law No. 2, as neither Highway Law § 139 nor General Municipal Law § 50-e indicate any intent to restrict the County’s delegated powers or bar prior notification statutes.

  • Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300 (1982): Abolishing the Fellow-Servant Rule

    Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300 (1982)

    The fellow-servant rule, which historically shielded employers from liability for employee injuries caused by the negligence of co-workers, is abolished in New York, allowing employees to pursue negligence claims against their employers under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

    Summary

    Two City of New York employees, a police officer (Buckley) and a firefighter (Lawrence), were injured by the negligence of their co-workers. Both sued the city, which asserted the fellow-servant rule as a defense. The New York Court of Appeals abolished the fellow-servant rule, holding that it no longer serves a valid purpose and creates unjust hardship. The Court reasoned that the rule’s original justifications are outdated and that employees should have the same right as third parties to recover from employers under respondeat superior. This decision allows employees injured by co-worker negligence to sue their employers directly.

    Facts

    In Buckley v. City of New York, a police officer was accidentally shot in the leg by a fellow officer who was loading a gun in the station house locker room.
    In Lawrence v. City of New York, a firefighter was seriously injured when a fellow firefighter threw a smoldering couch from a second-story window, striking the plaintiff.
    Both plaintiffs sued the City of New York, alleging vicarious liability based on the negligence of their co-workers.
    The City defended on the basis of the fellow-servant rule.

    Procedural History

    In both cases, the plaintiffs secured jury verdicts against the City.
    The City’s motions to dismiss based on the fellow-servant rule were denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the fellow-servant rule continues to apply in New York, barring employees from recovering against their employers for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow employees.

    Holding

    No, because the fellow-servant rule serves no continuing valid purpose in New York and works an unjustifiable hardship on injured employees. The Court explicitly rejected the rule, aligning with modern principles of justice and employer responsibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history and rationale of the fellow-servant rule, noting its origins in 19th-century England and its adoption in the United States. The court acknowledged that the rule’s theoretical underpinnings had been discredited, particularly with the advent of workers’ compensation legislation, which significantly curtailed its application. The Court stated, “[t]he inherent injustice of a rule which denies a person, free of fault, the right to recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of another over whose conduct he has no control merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that the other is a fellow officer is manifest.” Despite the City’s argument that the rule should be retained due to its longevity, the Court emphasized that the vitality of a legal principle depends on its continuing practicality and the demands of justice. The court relied on the principle that it should act in the “finest common-law tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice”. The court determined that the fellow-servant rule no longer served a valid purpose and created an unjust hardship for injured employees. The court also made clear that abolishing the fellow-servant rule was within its power, stating: “The fellow-servant rule originated as a matter of decisional law, and it remains subject to judicial re-examination.”

  • Andretti v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 284 (1982): Written Consent and Parol Evidence in Right of Privacy Claims

    56 N.Y.2d 284 (1982)

    In a claim for violation of the right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51, summary judgment is inappropriate where there is a factual dispute as to whether written consent to use a person’s name or likeness for advertising purposes was given, and parol evidence is admissible to clarify the intent behind an equivocal writing.

    Summary

    Mario Andretti, a race car driver, sued Rolex for using his name and picture in advertisements without his written consent, violating New York Civil Rights Law § 51. Andretti had accepted a Rolex watch and acknowledged membership in the “Rolex Club” in writing, also sending a signed photo to the Rolex president. The issue was whether this membership constituted consent for Rolex to use his likeness in advertisements. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment to Andretti. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a factual issue existed regarding the scope of Andretti’s consent, and parol evidence could be used to clarify his intent, making summary judgment inappropriate.

    Facts

    Mario Andretti was a well-known race car driver. Rolex published two advertisements featuring Andretti’s name and picture. Andretti had previously accepted a Rolex watch and acknowledged his membership in the “Rolex Club” in writing. He also sent a photograph of himself to the president of Rolex with a handwritten inscription indicating his pleasure at being a member of the “Rolex Club”. Andretti claimed he never gave written consent for Rolex to use his name and likeness in advertisements, as required by New York Civil Rights Law § 51.

    Procedural History

    Andretti sued Rolex in the Supreme Court, seeking damages under Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law. The Supreme Court denied Andretti’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted Andretti’s motion for partial summary judgment. Rolex appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether summary judgment is appropriate when there is a factual dispute regarding the scope of written consent to use a person’s name and likeness in advertising, and whether parol evidence is admissible to clarify the intent behind the written consent.

    Holding

    No, because a factual issue exists as to what membership in the Rolex Club entailed, i.e., whether plaintiff thereby consented to the use of his name and likeness in Rolex advertisements. Summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of liability was therefore improper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law requires prior written consent for the use of an individual’s name or likeness for advertising purposes. While Andretti acknowledged his membership in the “Rolex Club” in writing and sent a signed photo to Rolex, the court found that it was unclear whether this membership encompassed consent to use his name and likeness in advertisements. The court stated that “Factual issues exist as to what membership in the Rolex Club entailed, i.e., whether plaintiff thereby consented to the use of his name and likeness in Rolex advertisements.” The court emphasized that parol evidence may be introduced to establish that an equivocal writing signed by the subject of the photograph was intended as the expression of consent contemplated by the statute to the use of the name. Therefore, because there was a factual dispute regarding the scope of Andretti’s consent, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court referenced Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 439 to support its determination of the law.

  • People v. Hutchinson, 56 N.Y.2d 868 (1982): Establishing ‘Ownership’ in Robbery and Intent in Escape

    People v. Hutchinson, 56 N.Y.2d 868 (1982)

    In a robbery case, an employee’s possessory right to an employer’s property, however limited, is superior to that of a robber; and, in an escape case, while specific intent to escape need not be proven, the act of escaping requires a conscious effort to evade custody.

    Summary

    Defendant Hutchinson appealed convictions for attempted robbery and escape. The attempted robbery charge stemmed from trying to steal money from a bank teller. The escape charge arose when he left police custody at a hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the prosecution didn’t need to prove the teller was the “owner” of the money, only that the teller’s possessory right was superior to the defendant’s. As for the escape charge, the court held that while specific intent wasn’t required, the act of escape itself requires a conscious effort to evade custody, and the judge’s instructions were sufficient. The court also found that the defendant’s claim regarding excessive testimony about another robbery was not properly preserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempting to steal money from Dennis O’Connor, a bank teller. He was also charged with escape after leaving the hospital where he was under police guard following an arrest for a felony. The defendant had been under police guard in the hospital for six weeks prior to the escape. He left the hospital without authorization at 5:30 a.m.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and escape. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a charge of attempted robbery, the prosecution must prove that the person from whom the defendant attempted to steal was an “owner” of the property.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in not charging the jury that the crime of escape requires a showing of knowledge or volition.

    3. Whether the trial court permitted an excessive volume of testimony with respect to another similar bank robbery.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution only needed to prove that the person had a possessory right superior to that of the defendant.

    2. No, because the jury was properly charged with the statutory definition of escape and custody, and the commonly understood definition of “escape” implies a conscious effort.

    3. The claim was not preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the attempted robbery charge, the court reasoned that the Penal Law only requires proof that the person from whom the property was taken had a possessory right superior to that of the defendant. The court stated, “Because the proof was uncontradicted that O’Connor was an employee of the bank it cannot be said that the jury was not warranted in concluding that as such employee he had a right of possession superior to that of defendant, who had no right of possession whatsoever.” The court emphasized that it was immaterial that the money in question came from other tellers’ drawers.

    Regarding the escape charge, the court acknowledged that while the better practice would have been to explicitly instruct the jury that escape involves conscious effort, independent proof of intent is not required unless the facts suggest a different purpose for leaving custody. The court cited the dictionary definition of “escape” as “to get away (as by flight or conscious effort)” and noted the defendant’s extended stay in the hospital under police guard as evidence suggesting a conscious effort to evade custody when he left without authorization. The court reasoned, “While the better practice in light of defendant’s specific request for a charge on knowledge or volition would have been to point up for the jury that escape involves conscious effort, independent proof of intent is not required absent facts suggesting a purpose other than the evasion of custody, as for example, to evade the outbreak of fire in the area of confinement.”

    Regarding the final claim, the court stated that the defendant’s argument regarding the excessive testimony was not preserved for review because it was not properly raised at trial.

  • Matarasso v. Continental Cas. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 264 (1982): Untimely Motion to Stay Arbitration Based on Lack of Agreement

    Matarasso v. Continental Cas. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 264 (1982)

    A motion to stay arbitration may be entertained outside the 20-day period specified in CPLR 7503(c) when the basis for the motion is that the parties never agreed to arbitrate.

    Summary

    Claimants sought uninsured motorist benefits under a commercial umbrella liability policy after recovering the maximum benefits from their primary policy. The insurer, Continental Casualty, moved to stay arbitration, arguing it never agreed to arbitrate such claims. Claimants argued the motion was untimely under CPLR 7503(c). The New York Court of Appeals held that the 20-day time limit to move for a stay of arbitration does not apply when the moving party argues that no agreement to arbitrate exists at all. In such cases, a motion to stay can be entertained even after the 20-day period expires.

    Facts

    Claimants were injured in an automobile accident involving an uninsured vehicle.

    They received the maximum benefits under their primary automobile insurance policy’s uninsured motorist indorsement.

    Claimants then sought to recover excess damages under Continental Casualty’s commercial umbrella policy.

    The umbrella policy covered Daniel Matarasso and A. Matarasso & Co., Inc. for general, automobile, and employer liability above the limits of underlying policies.

    One underlying policy was the automobile liability policy from which claimants already received uninsured motorist benefits.

    Procedural History

    Claimants served a demand for arbitration on Continental Casualty.

    Continental Casualty moved to stay arbitration, arguing no agreement to arbitrate existed.

    Special Term granted the stay.

    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a motion to stay arbitration can be entertained outside the 20-day period specified in CPLR 7503(c) when the moving party argues that no agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.

    Holding

    Yes, because the 20-day preclusion in CPLR 7503(c) only applies when there is an existing agreement to arbitrate and a party is arguing the agreement is invalid or unfulfilled, but does not apply when a party argues no agreement to arbitrate ever existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPLR 7503(c) speaks in terms of “parties,” implying the statute targets parties to an arbitration agreement. The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to bind individuals to arbitration by mere inaction when no agreement to arbitrate has ever been made.

    The court distinguished between challenging the validity or compliance of an existing arbitration agreement (which requires a timely motion to stay) and arguing that no agreement to arbitrate exists at all. The 20-day time limit applies only when an agreement to arbitrate exists.

    The court noted that the umbrella policy contained no arbitration provision. The court also determined that the mandatory uninsured motorist indorsement of section 167 of the Insurance Law, requiring uninsured motorist coverage in automobile liability policies, does not apply to the umbrella policy, because it is an excess liability policy covering various insurance types, not solely an automobile liability policy.

    The court cited Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Stekardis, 34 NY2d 182 to reinforce the strictness of the 20 day rule where an agreement to arbitrate exists. However, here the court emphasized that the statute’s wording implies it is directed towards actual parties to an agreement. The court stated, “Given the ease with which a broader class of persons could have been included within the statute’s ambit, we cannot impute to the Legislature an intent to bind persons to the arbitral process by their mere inaction for 20 days where no agreement to arbitrate has ever been made.”

  • Board of Education v. State Division of Human Rights, 56 N.Y.2d 257 (1982): Discrimination via Seniority Systems Based on Past, Compelled Pregnancy Resignations

    Board of Education of Farmingdale Union Free School District v. State Division of Human Rights, 56 N.Y.2d 257 (1982)

    A seniority system that appears neutral but perpetuates the effects of past discriminatory practices, such as compelled resignation due to pregnancy, can be found to be discriminatory under the Human Rights Law, even if the original discriminatory practice occurred before the law prohibited such discrimination.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a facially neutral seniority system that denies credit for service before a resignation, compelled due to a now-illegal pregnancy policy, constitutes present discrimination. Rose Burns was forced to resign in 1959 due to pregnancy. When she was rehired and a new seniority system was implemented in 1976, her prior service was not credited. The NY Court of Appeals held that denying seniority credit for a pregnancy-related forced resignation, even if the resignation occurred before sex-based discrimination was prohibited, constitutes a present discriminatory act because the seniority system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination and disproportionately impacts women. The court emphasized the Division of Human Rights’ expertise in evaluating discrimination claims.

    Facts

    Rose Burns was hired as a probationary teacher in 1956.
    In 1959, she was forced to resign due to a Board of Education policy requiring pregnant, non-tenured teachers to resign.
    The Board assured her that the resignation would not affect her return to work.
    In 1963, she was rehired, and her prior service was credited towards tenure and salary.
    She worked continuously until 1978, except for unpaid maternity leaves.
    In 1975, the forced resignation policy was rescinded.
    In 1976, a collective bargaining agreement eliminated a job security clause, prompting the Board to create a seniority list.
    In 1978, Burns learned she wasn’t credited for her pre-resignation service and filed a complaint.

    Procedural History

    Burns filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights (Division).
    The Division ruled in favor of Burns, finding the seniority list perpetuated past discrimination.
    The State Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed the Division’s decision.
    The Board of Education filed a review proceeding in the Appellate Division, which annulled the determination, finding the complaint time-barred.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a facially neutral seniority system that denies credit for service preceding a resignation compelled by a discriminatory policy (pregnancy resignation) constitutes a present act of discrimination under the Human Rights Law, even if the original policy was not illegal at the time of the resignation and the statute of limitations has expired for a claim based on that original policy.

    Holding

    Yes, because the seniority system perpetuates the effects of a past discriminatory policy and disproportionately disadvantages women who were subject to that policy. The court found that the Division of Human Rights properly determined that the seniority system currently disadvantages the complainant because of her sex.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the 1959 forced resignation was not itself actionable due to the statute of limitations and the fact that sex-based discrimination was not yet prohibited by the Human Rights Law. However, the court emphasized that the discriminatory practice at issue was the current denial of seniority credit for service preceding a pregnancy-related forced resignation. The court deferred to the Division’s expertise in evaluating discrimination claims, noting its broad discretion to weigh evidence and draw inferences.
    The court reasoned that the seniority system, while facially neutral, imposed a distinct burden on women who were forced to resign due to pregnancy, effectively penalizing them again for their prior pregnancy. The court stated that “[t]he facially neutral system cannot mask the unfavorable employment consequences attendant only upon pregnancy. The discrimination at its base need not go uncorrected.”
    The court rejected the Board’s argument that the loss of seniority was merely a latent effect of the 1959 resignation, stating that the complaint sought to redress a distinct discriminatory wrong perpetrated when the new seniority system was devised. The court found the system effectively revived the prior discriminatory policy.
    The court also dismissed the Board’s claim that the loss of seniority occurred upon resignation, noting that Burns was told her return would be unaffected and that her prior service was initially recognized for tenure and salary purposes. The discriminatory impact only became apparent when seniority-based benefits became available and her prior service was not credited. The complaint, filed shortly after she learned of the denial of credit, was deemed timely.

  • Camperlengo v. Blum, 56 N.Y.2d 254 (1982): Physician-Patient Privilege and Medicaid Fraud Investigations

    Camperlengo v. Blum, 56 N.Y.2d 254 (1982)

    The physician-patient privilege does not provide absolute protection to a doctor’s treatment records of Medicaid patients when those records are subpoenaed by the State Department of Social Services during a billing practices investigation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between physician-patient privilege and the state’s need to investigate potential Medicaid fraud. A psychiatrist, Camperlengo, faced a subpoena for patient records due to unusual billing patterns. He argued the records were protected by physician-patient privilege. The court held that while the privilege exists, it is abrogated to the extent necessary for effective Medicaid oversight. This exception is narrowly tailored to ensure funds are properly used and patient confidentiality is maintained as much as possible. The ruling balances patient privacy with the public interest in preventing Medicaid fraud, allowing access to records directly relevant to administering the program.

    Facts

    A psychiatrist, Camperlengo, treated Medicaid recipients. The State Department of Social Services noticed consecutive billing dates for some patients, which they considered unusual. The Department requested access to the psychiatrist’s records to check for unnecessary treatment or fraudulent billing. The psychiatrist’s initial cooperation was insufficient, leading the Department to issue a subpoena duces tecum for records of 35 Medicaid patients. The subpoena sought treatment plans, evaluations, diagnostic records, and payment records from third parties.

    Procedural History

    The psychiatrist moved to quash the subpoena in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the physician-patient privilege under CPLR 4504(a) protects a psychiatrist’s treatment records of Medicaid patients from a subpoena issued by the State Department of Social Services during an investigation of billing practices.

    Holding

    No, because the Federal and State record-keeping and reporting requirements of the Medicaid program demonstrate a clear intention to abrogate the physician-patient privilege to the extent necessary to ensure proper application of Medicaid funds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the physician-patient privilege, a statutory creation designed to protect patient confidentiality and encourage open communication with doctors. The court stated, “to protect those who are required to consult physicians from the disclosure of secrets imparted to them; to protect the relationship of patient and physician and to prevent physicians from disclosing information which might result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to patients”. However, the court also noted that the legislature has, in some instances, abrogated this privilege to effectuate other public policies, such as preventing child abuse or treating narcotic addiction.

    The court then examined the Medicaid program, which uses public funds and requires accountability. Federal regulations (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(27)) mandate that states participating in Medicaid have agreements with service providers to keep records fully disclosing the services provided and to furnish the state agency with information regarding payments claimed. New York regulations (18 NYCRR 540.7(a)(8)) also require providers to keep such information available for at least six years after payment.

    While there is no explicit statutory exception to the physician-patient privilege for Medicaid records, the court found that the federal and state record-keeping requirements demonstrate a clear intention to abrogate the privilege to the extent necessary for effective Medicaid oversight. The court emphasized that this exception is limited to ensuring Medicaid funds are properly applied. Confidentiality is maintained through restrictions on the use of the information, limiting its use to purposes directly connected with administering the Medicaid program. As the court explained, “the public must be assured that the funds which have been set aside for this worthy purpose will not be fraudulently diverted into the hands of an untrustworthy provider of services”.

  • Capital Newspapers v. Clyne, 56 N.Y.2d 870 (1982): Preliminary Inquiry Required Before Excluding Press from Sandoval Hearings

    56 N.Y.2d 870 (1982)

    Before excluding the press from a pretrial hearing (specifically, a Sandoval hearing), a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether closure is warranted, and must articulate its reasons for closure on the record.

    Summary

    During a criminal trial, the defendant requested a Sandoval hearing to determine the admissibility of his prior criminal acts for impeachment purposes if he testified. The trial court, at the defendant’s request, summarily excluded a reporter from the hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary inquiry before closing the hearing to the press. The Court emphasized the public interest in Sandoval hearings due to the significance of the rulings and their impact on the defendant’s decision to testify. The Court mandated that all proceedings on the motion, whether in open court or in camera, should be recorded for appellate review, and the reasons for closure should be given in open court.

    Facts

    During the midtrial of a criminal case, the defendant requested a hearing under People v. Sandoval to determine which, if any, of his prior criminal acts would be admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify. A reporter from Capital Newspapers sought permission to attend the hearing. The trial court, acting at the defendant’s instance, summarily denied the reporter’s request and closed the hearing.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner, Capital Newspapers, challenged the trial court’s decision to exclude their reporter. The Appellate Division’s judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry before excluding the press from a pretrial Sandoval hearing held during a criminal trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because despite the potential prejudice to the defendant, there is a genuine public interest in Sandoval hearings, thus requiring a preliminary inquiry before closure to the press.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, emphasizing the necessity of a preliminary inquiry before excluding the press from the Sandoval hearing. The court drew upon the procedural prescriptions set forth in Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, which established guidelines for balancing the public’s right to access court proceedings with a defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court acknowledged that the Sandoval hearing was not part of the trial itself, nor was it directly related to the issue of guilt or innocence. However, it recognized the significant public interest in such hearings, given the importance of the rulings made and their potential impact on the defendant’s decision to testify. The court stated that the procedures laid down in Leggett and Hearst Corp. v. Clyne should have been followed, requiring that “all proceedings on the [defendant’s] motion, whether in open court or in camera, should [have been] recorded for appellate review” and “the reasons for closure [should have been] given in open court” (quoting Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 442). Because no such preliminary inquiry was conducted, the Court did not reach the question of whether the reporter should have been permitted to attend the hearing. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings and the need for a careful balancing of competing interests when considering closure motions. This case is significant because it extends the preliminary inquiry requirement to pretrial hearings that, while not directly determinative of guilt or innocence, are nonetheless important to the administration of justice and of public interest. The practical implication is that trial courts must follow specific procedures to justify closing such hearings to the press and public.

  • People v. Dekle, 56 N.Y.2d 835 (1982): Preserving Issues for Appellate Review

    People v. Dekle, 56 N.Y.2d 835 (1982)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must make a specific objection or motion at trial, clearly stating the grounds for the objection; failure to do so forfeits the right to raise the issue on appeal.

    Summary

    Dekle was convicted of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the element of immediacy required for robbery conviction was not proven. However, his initial motion for dismissal at trial focused solely on the mechanics of the knife display, omitting the immediacy argument. Because the defendant did not specifically object to the jury charge regarding the meaning of “immediately,” he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, emphasizing that the defendant could not raise a new argument on appeal that was not properly presented and preserved at trial.

    Facts

    Following a taking, Dekle displayed a knife. At trial, Dekle’s motion for a trial order of dismissal argued the element of immediacy was not proved because the knife was closed, required two hands to open, and Dekle had only one hand free.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the element of immediacy. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant, by failing to specifically object to the jury charge or raise the issue of immediacy in his initial motion for a trial order of dismissal, preserved the issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal only addressed the mechanics of the knife and not the timing, and because he failed to object to the jury instruction. Therefore, the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue for review because his motion for a trial order of dismissal was based on a different argument than the one he raised on appeal. The Court stated that the motion argued “that the element of immediacy required for conviction of robbery was not proved because the knife displayed was closed, required two hands to open and defendant had but one hand free.” The Court emphasized that the defendant did not object to the jury instruction defining “immediately.” Therefore, the court reasoned, the defendant failed to preserve his argument regarding immediacy for appellate review, as required by CPL 470.05(2). The court further reasoned that allowing defendants to raise unpreserved issues on appeal would encourage “gamesmanship” and waste judicial resources. The court emphasized the importance of specific objections at trial to ensure that errors are addressed promptly and efficiently.

  • Feinberg v. Saks & Co., 56 N.Y.2d 206 (1982): The Intervening Fact Rule in Malicious Prosecution

    Feinberg v. Saks & Co., 56 N.Y.2d 206 (1982)

    A finding of probable cause for initial detention does not automatically bar a malicious prosecution claim if intervening facts arise after the detention that would negate probable cause and demonstrate malice.

    Summary

    Doris Feinberg sued Saks & Company for false arrest and malicious prosecution after being acquitted of petit larceny charges filed by Saks’ security. The jury found for Feinberg on malicious prosecution but for Saks on false arrest. Saks moved to set aside the malicious prosecution verdict, arguing inconsistency. The trial court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the malicious prosecution claim, reasoning that probable cause for detention barred the claim absent intervening exonerating facts. The Court of Appeals modified, holding that the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the complaint because some evidence existed that, if credited, could establish an intervening circumstance supporting an inference of malice, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Doris Feinberg was detained by Saks & Company security personnel who accused her of petit larceny. Criminal charges were filed against her. Feinberg was later acquitted of the charges. Feinberg then sued Saks & Company for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a general verdict for Feinberg on malicious prosecution and for Saks on false arrest. Saks moved to set aside the malicious prosecution verdict, which was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for a new trial on the malicious prosecution claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a jury verdict finding probable cause for false arrest necessarily bars a claim for malicious prosecution.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the malicious prosecution claim when there was some evidence of intervening facts suggesting a lack of probable cause and demonstrating malice.

    Holding

    1. No, because probable cause for an initial detention does not automatically bar a malicious prosecution claim if intervening facts arise after the detention that negate probable cause and demonstrate malice.
    2. Yes, because there was some evidence presented at trial that, if believed, could show an intervening circumstance supporting an inference of malice, which should have led to a new trial rather than dismissal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while the Appellate Division had the power to review the consistency of the verdicts, its dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim was improper. The court reasoned that dismissal was only appropriate if “there was no evidence at trial that the defendant, between the time of detention and the time of instituting the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, had knowledge of some intervening fact exonerating plaintiff.” The court found there was some evidence in the record that, if credited by the jury, could establish an intervening circumstance supporting an inference of malice. In resolving this question, appellate courts “should consider the facts adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the facts.” (Martin v City of Albany, 42 NY2d 13). Therefore, the proper disposition was a new trial to allow a jury to determine whether the plaintiff should recover on the malicious prosecution claim. The court emphasized that its review was limited to the corrective action of the Appellate Division, as Saks & Company had failed to preserve the inconsistency issue for review by not raising a timely objection at trial. The practical effect is that Saks & Company cannot rely on the initial probable cause for detention if new information came to light indicating Feinberg’s innocence, potentially vitiating their continued prosecution of the petit larceny charge. Failure to consider such “intervening facts” could lead to a finding of malice.