New York Law Review

Tag: 1981

  • People v. Gallego, 55 N.Y.2d 35 (1981): Warrantless Search of Closed Containers During Vehicle Inventory

    People v. Gallego, 55 N.Y.2d 35 (1981)

    A warrantless search of a closed container found in an impounded vehicle is permissible as part of a routine inventory search, provided the search is reasonable and conducted according to standard police procedures.

    Summary

    Gallego was arrested for driving with a suspended license after being stopped for traffic violations. His car was impounded, and during an inventory search, police opened a brown paper bag hanging under the dashboard, discovering cocaine. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search, reasoning that it was a valid inventory search and thus a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The court emphasized that the search was conducted according to routine police procedures, not as a pretext for a criminal investigation, and that the unusual location and apparent concealment of the bag justified opening it to inventory its contents.

    Facts

    Two police officers stopped Gallego for turning left without signaling and driving without a taillight. Gallego could not produce a driver’s license and admitted it was suspended. He was arrested for driving with a suspended license. One officer drove Gallego to the police station in the squad car. The other officer followed in Gallego’s car and noticed a brown bag suspended by a wire under the dashboard. At the station, police conducted an inventory search of the car and opened the paper bag, discovering cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Gallego was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. He moved to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, upholding the search as a valid inventory search. The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police lawfully searched a closed container found in Gallego’s car, without a warrant, as part of an inventory search.

    Holding

    Yes, because the search was a valid inventory search conducted according to routine police procedures, and the unusual location and apparent concealment of the bag justified opening it to inventory its contents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on South Dakota v. Opperman, which established that police may conduct inventory searches of impounded vehicles to protect the owner’s property, protect the police from false claims, and protect the police from potential danger. The court noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. LaFayette, which held that it is reasonable for police to search “any container or article” in an arrestee’s possession as part of a routine inventory procedure. Applying the standard of reasonableness from Delaware v. Prouse, the court balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against legitimate governmental interests. The court stated, “Examining all the items removed from the arrestee’s person or possession and listing or inventorying them is an entirely reasonable administrative procedure” (quoting Illinois v. LaFayette). The court found the search in this case analogous to the search in LaFayette, noting the same governmental interests apply to inventory searches of impounded vehicles. The court emphasized that there was no evidence the search was a pretext for a criminal investigation. Given “the unusual location of the bag, the manner in which it was affixed to the car and the apparent effort to conceal it under the dashboard,” the police could reasonably conclude that the bag contained items requiring discovery and inventory. The court distinguished its earlier decision in People v. Roman, where it had found the inventory search of a closed cigarette case unreasonable, explaining that it was constrained by then-existing Supreme Court precedent, which has since evolved to permit such searches. The court prioritized maintaining consistency with Supreme Court rulings on inventory searches.

  • Harrington v. State, 54 N.Y.2d 624 (1981): Who Pays for Trial Transcripts on Appeal?

    Harrington v. State, 54 N.Y.2d 624 (1981)

    When a non-indigent defendant appeals a conviction, they are responsible for paying for the trial transcripts required to be filed with the court.

    Summary

    This case concerns who bears the cost of trial transcripts when a defendant appeals a conviction in New York. Harrington, a non-indigent defendant, appealed his conviction. The central issue is whether the state is obligated to pay for the trial transcripts required for the appeal, even though Harrington is not indigent. The New York Court of Appeals held that non-indigent defendants are responsible for paying for their own trial transcripts when pursuing an appeal. The court reasoned that a 1977 amendment to CPL 460.70 (subd 1) was intended to reduce the financial burden on taxpayers by requiring non-indigent defendants to pay for their transcripts.

    Facts

    Harrington, a defendant who was not classified as indigent, appealed his criminal conviction. As part of the appeal process, a trial transcript was required to be filed with the court. Harrington sought to have the State of New York cover the cost of preparing this transcript.

    Procedural History

    The specific procedural history prior to the appeal is not detailed in the opinion. However, the case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a decision by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division’s decision is referenced as supporting the idea that the public should bear the cost of the transcript. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 460.70(1) requires the state to pay for trial transcripts when a non-indigent defendant files an appeal pursuant to CPL 450.10.

    Holding

    No, because the 1977 amendment to CPL 460.70(1) was intended to place the cost of preparing transcripts upon the individual prosecuting the appeal who is able to afford it, and to reduce the financial burden on taxpayers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the legislative intent behind the 1977 amendment to CPL 460.70 (subd 1). Prior to 1977, the state bore the expense of transcripts regardless of the defendant’s indigency. The amendment conspicuously omitted the broad provision requiring the public to pay for all transcripts and instead specified that “[t]he expense of transcripts prepared for poor persons under this section shall be a state charge.” The court interpreted this omission as intentional, designed to reduce unnecessary expenditures of public funds. The dissent quotes Assemblyman Siegel, the sponsor of the legislation, stating the bill insures transcript preparation at government expense “only when the defendant manifests an actual intent to appeal and when the defendant is unable to afford transcripts.” This legislative history further supports the view that the amendment was intended to provide for public assumption of costs only when the defendant is indigent. The court also referenced a memorandum from the Office of Court Administration, stating that “[b]y the courts’ not ordering the minutes until a poor person application is made, the public is also spared the expense of paying for minutes in cases where the defense is able to afford them.” This interpretation aligns with the State Comptroller’s opinion that “where the defendant takes an appeal and is not indigent, the cost of transcripts must be borne by the defendant.” The court emphasizes that agencies charged with implementing the statute’s interpretations should not be lightly disregarded.

  • People v. Stone, 54 N.Y.2d 103 (1981): Burden of Proof for Continued Confinement of Insanity Acquittees

    People v. Stone, 54 N.Y.2d 103 (1981)

    The People’s burden of proof to justify continued confinement of a defendant acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is satisfied when the People establish by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that the defendant continues to suffer from a dangerous mental disorder or is mentally ill.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the burden of proof required for the continued confinement of a defendant found not responsible for a crime due to insanity. The defendant was acquitted of assault and burglary charges due to mental disease or defect. After psychiatric evaluations, the court initially committed him to a secure facility. Subsequent hearings addressed his continued confinement. The court held that the District Attorney needed to prove the defendant’s mental disorder by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the People must prove the defendant’s dangerous mental disorder or mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence, aligning with constitutional due process and legislative intent to balance public safety and defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    The defendant, Stone, stabbed Miguel Carrasquillo in George Rodriguez’s apartment. Stone was charged with burglary, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. He was initially found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene. Later certified competent, Stone was found not responsible for the crimes due to mental disease or defect after a nonjury trial. A psychiatric examination was ordered to determine if Stone had a dangerous mental disorder or was mentally ill.

    Procedural History

    Following psychiatric evaluations, an initial commitment hearing was held. The court found that the District Attorney had to establish Stone’s mental disorder by clear and convincing evidence and then determined that this burden had been satisfied. Stone was committed to a secure facility. After an unsuccessful habeas corpus petition, Stone moved for a rehearing, consolidated with a first retention hearing. The court determined Stone had a dangerous mental disorder when initially committed, but the District Attorney failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Stone continued to suffer from a dangerous mental disorder or was presently mentally ill. Stone was granted conditional release. The Appellate Division modified the order regarding the conditions of release, but upheld the clear and convincing standard. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney must prove that an insanity acquittee continues to be either mentally ill or suffer from a dangerous mental disorder to justify continued confinement by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence?

    Holding

    No, the District Attorney needs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the insanity acquittee continues to be either mentally ill or suffers from a dangerous mental disorder, because this standard satisfies due process and equal protection requirements while fulfilling the legislature’s intent to balance public safety and the rights of the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the language of CPL 330.20, subdivisions 6 and 8, which state that the defendant’s mental disorder must be established “to the satisfaction of the court.” While this could suggest a lenient burden, the court examined the statute’s history. Legislative history indicated the intent was to comply with federal constitutional requirements, as informed by Addington v. Texas. The court noted the legislature’s decision to not explicitly incorporate the “clear and convincing” standard into the CPL 330.20, implying a desire to adhere to evolving federal constitutional standards.

    The court referenced Jones v. United States, where the Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia statute requiring an insanity acquittee to prove they regained sanity by a preponderance of evidence to be released. New York’s statute, placing the burden on the District Attorney instead of the defendant, offered greater due process protection. Therefore, requiring only a preponderance of evidence from the District Attorney was constitutionally permissible.

    The court emphasized that the preponderance standard best balances public safety and the defendant’s rights, aligning with the legislative intent in enacting the statutory scheme. The court reasoned that imposing a clear and convincing evidence standard on the District Attorney would be too heavy a burden, given the earlier unsuccessful attempt to prove criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. The court overruled its prior dicta in Matter of Torsney, which stated that the same procedural and substantive standards should be applied in both civil commitment proceedings and proceedings to continue insanity acquittees. The court stated, “the preponderance of the evidence standard, and not that requiring clear and convincing evidence, should have been applied at both the initial commitment and first retention hearings.”

  • People v. සංඥානායක, 54 N.Y.2d 1022 (1981): Defining Circumstantial Evidence and Jury Instructions

    People v. සංඥානායක, 54 N.Y.2d 1022 (1981)

    When the prosecution’s case relies entirely on circumstantial evidence, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that the inference of guilt must be the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, excluding beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a “total circumstantial charge” to the jury and that the circumstantial evidence charge provided was also erroneous. The defendant admitted to being at the victim’s apartment and hitting her, but the prosecution’s theory was that the victim was strangled. Thus, the key issue was the identity of the strangler. The Court found that the defendant’s statements were circumstantial evidence, and the jury should have been instructed that they must find the inference of guilt was the only one that could fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The Court also expressed disapproval of the prosecutor’s improper comments during summation.

    Facts

    The defendant admitted to being at the victim’s apartment, his former girlfriend’s grandmother, on the night of the murder. He stated that he hit the victim twice after she made offensive remarks. He recalled leaving the apartment with the door open and seeing a teen-aged male he had seen earlier in the hall. The prosecution argued that the victim was strangled with a telephone wire.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and that the prosecutor made improper comments during summation. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s statements constituted direct or circumstantial evidence of guilt?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a “total circumstantial charge” to the jury?

    3. Whether the circumstantial evidence charge given by the trial court was erroneous?

    4. Whether the prosecutor’s comments during summation were improper?

    Holding

    1. The defendant’s statements constituted circumstantial evidence because the statements, while placing him at the scene, did not establish that he was the strangler.

    2. Yes, because the evidence against the defendant was entirely circumstantial, the trial court erred in refusing to so instruct the jury.

    3. Yes, because when the evidence is circumstantial, the jury should be instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

    4. Yes, the prosecutor’s comments were improper because prosecutorial advocacy may not go so far as to threaten that jurors will be censured by the community if they vote to acquit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that since the prosecution’s theory was strangulation, the key issue was the identity of the strangler. The defendant’s statements proved his presence at the scene but did not establish that he was the strangler. Therefore, the statements were circumstantial evidence. The court stated that “it is not necessary that the words ‘moral certainty’ be used, when the evidence is circumstantial the jury should be instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The court also addressed the prosecutor’s summation, noting its impropriety: “Prosecutorial advocacy may not go so far as to threaten that jurors will be censured by the community if they vote to acquit.” This type of appeal to community pressure is impermissible and can unduly influence the jury’s decision-making process.

  • Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. Fischer, 54 N.Y.2d 679 (1981): Waiver of Statutory Labor Protections Through Collective Bargaining

    Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. Fischer, 54 N.Y.2d 679 (1981)

    Employees can waive or modify specific statutory benefits designed to protect workers’ welfare through collective bargaining agreements, provided the legislative purpose behind the statute is not undermined and the agreement is reached in good faith.

    Summary

    Capital Cities Communications challenged a labor law violation notice for failing to provide a mandatory 20-minute meal break to certain employees. The employees, represented by a union, had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that provided alternative rest periods and compensation. The New York Court of Appeals held that the employees effectively waived the specific statutory meal break requirement through their collective bargaining agreement because the agreement, tailored to the unique needs of the broadcasting industry, provided adequate substitute provisions for rest and meals, fulfilling the underlying legislative purpose.

    Facts

    Capital Cities Communications, a television programming producer, found it impractical to provide specific rest periods to technical crew members due to the nature of live broadcasts and news gathering. The Industrial Commissioner issued a violation notice for not providing a 20-minute meal break between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. to employees starting work before noon and working past 7:00 p.m., as required by New York Labor Law § 162(3). The company and its employees, through their union, had a collective bargaining agreement providing alternative rest periods and compensation when the second meal break was missed.

    Procedural History

    The Industrial Commissioner issued a notice of labor law violation. Capital Cities sought review, challenging the order’s validity. The Industrial Board of Appeals affirmed the order concerning employees regularly scheduled to work beyond the prescribed hours. Special Term and the Appellate Division concluded that the employees waived the statutory benefit through collective bargaining. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether employees can waive the specific requirements of New York Labor Law § 162(3) regarding mandatory meal breaks through a collective bargaining agreement that provides alternative rest periods and compensation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the employees, through their union, negotiated in good faith an alternative arrangement that met the needs of the broadcasting industry while still fulfilling the underlying legislative purpose of ensuring adequate rest and meal periods for workers. The statute itself did not expressly prohibit such waivers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized that the statute’s purpose is to benefit individual workers by ensuring adequate rest and meal opportunities, implicating a public interest in worker health and safety. However, the court stated that “where there is no express indication of the legislative intent, waiver or modification of such a statutory benefit will be permissible to the extent that it can be ascertained that the legislative purpose is not contravened”. Citing previous cases like Matter of Abramovich v Board of Educ., the court emphasized the importance of a bona fide agreement, absence of coercion, and an open and knowing waiver. Here, the collective bargaining agreement was a result of good-faith negotiations, tailored to the broadcasting industry’s unique demands, and provided adequate substitute provisions for rest and meals. The court found no express prohibition against waiver in the statute and concluded that the agreement did not compromise the legislative purpose of ensuring adequate rest and meal periods. The court noted, “the legislative purpose to assure that workers receive adequate rest and meal periods is in no way compromised by the agreement between petitioner and its employees.”

  • Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12 (1981): Limits on Mandamus Relief for Discretionary Acts

    Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12 (1981)

    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is inappropriate to compel the performance of acts involving the exercise of discretion, even where an entity makes recommendations; the ultimate decision rests with the officer with the authority to make it.

    Summary

    This case addresses the availability of mandamus relief to compel the Commissioner of Correction to reinstate passes for individuals providing legal services to inmates. The New York Court of Appeals held that mandamus was inappropriate because the Commissioner’s decision to grant or revoke passes involved discretionary authority, not purely ministerial acts. The Board of Correction’s recommendations were not binding. The court emphasized that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought and the duty to be compelled is ministerial. Because the Commissioner had discretion, the lower courts erred in considering the merits of the case.

    Facts

    Thomas McCreary’s pass, granting access to correctional facilities in New York City, was revoked. Naomi Burns had her institutional pass initially revoked, but the Commissioner later withdrew his objections and reinstated it. Both McCreary and Burns sought reinstatement of their passes, apparently arguing that the Commissioner was improperly applying standards promulgated by the Board of Correction.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners sought mandamus relief in lower courts to compel the Commissioner of Correction to reinstate the passes. The lower courts granted relief. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that mandamus was not the appropriate remedy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the Commissioner of Correction to reinstate passes to correctional facilities when the decision to grant or revoke such passes involves discretionary authority?

    Holding

    No, because the decision to grant or revoke passes involves the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner of Correction, and mandamus is only appropriate to compel the performance of purely ministerial acts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Board of Correction has the authority to make recommendations, the Commissioner of Correction retains the discretion to apply the board’s standards in individual cases. The court cited prior cases, including Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Scheinman, 53 NY2d 12; Matter of Association of Surrogates & Supreme Ct. Reporters v Bartlett, 40 NY2d 571,574; and Matter of Gimprich v Board of Educ., 306 NY 401, 406, to support the principle that mandamus is appropriate only when a petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought and the duty sought to be compelled is ministerial, not discretionary. The court stated that “[a]uthority to revoke the pass of Thomas McCreary granting access to the correctional facilities in the City of New York lay within the discretion of the commissioner in conformity with the standards promulgated by the board pursuant to subdivision e of section 626 of the New York City Charter, and the reinstatement of his pass cannot be classified as a purely ministerial act.” Because the Commissioner’s decision involved discretion, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy. The Court also noted that, in the case of Naomi Burns, the Commissioner had already withdrawn his objections and reinstated her pass, rendering the issue moot. Finally, because the petitioners were not entitled to relief, they were also not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code.

  • People v. Crant, 52 N.Y.2d 824 (1981): Admissibility of Evidence After “Opening the Door”

    People v. Crant, 52 N.Y.2d 824 (1981)

    When a party introduces evidence on direct examination that would otherwise be inadmissible, they “open the door” to cross-examination on that issue, making otherwise collateral matters material and admissible.

    Summary

    In this criminal case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant’s direct examination opened the door to cross-examination regarding his prior suspension as a Medicaid provider. The Court reasoned that by raising the issue on direct examination, the defendant made the otherwise collateral matter material and thus subject to inquiry by the prosecution. The Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s handling of the cross-examination or the denial of the defendant’s motions for a mistrial.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial for an unspecified crime. During the defendant’s direct examination, he presented evidence or testimony that related to his standing as a Medicaid provider. Prior to the trial, the defendant had been suspended as a Medicaid provider. The prosecution sought to cross-examine the defendant regarding his prior suspension as a Medicaid provider. The defense objected to this line of questioning.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a trial court, where the defendant was tried and convicted. The defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant regarding his prior suspension as a Medicaid provider, when the defendant had introduced evidence relating to his standing as a Medicaid provider during direct examination.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant opened the door to this line of questioning by introducing evidence on direct examination that made the issue of his standing as a Medicaid provider material, even though it would have otherwise been collateral.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in permitting cross-examination regarding the defendant’s prior suspension as a Medicaid provider. The court relied on the principle that when a party introduces evidence on direct examination, they “open the door” to cross-examination on that issue, even if the issue would otherwise be inadmissible as collateral. The court cited Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386, 393, to support this principle. The Court stated, “The door was opened on defendant’s direct examination in consequence of which an issue which would otherwise have been collateral was made material.” The court also noted that the trial court sustained several objections to questions on cross-examination and gave curative instructions in one instance, further mitigating any potential prejudice to the defendant. The court considered a stipulation signed by the defendant admissible as an admission and found no prejudicial error in the reading of its caption. The Court concluded that, to the extent cross-examination was permitted over defense counsel’s objections, it was not error, and the denial of the motions for a mistrial was also proper. The court found the defendant’s other contentions to be without merit.

  • People v. Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d 614 (1981): Criminal Contempt Based on Evasive Testimony

    People v. Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d 614 (1981)

    A witness can be found guilty of criminal contempt for providing false and evasive answers, even if they do not outright refuse to answer questions.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions for criminal contempt and perjury. The Court held that the defendant’s repeated professions of memory loss and denials regarding payments, in light of entries in his “black book” and testimony from his bookkeeper, constituted evasive and perjurious testimony. The Court found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant’s testimony before the grand jury was intentionally false and evasive, thereby obstructing the investigation and warranting a contempt conviction. The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove both criminal contempt and perjury.

    Facts

    The defendant, Fischer, was convicted of criminal contempt and perjury based on his testimony before a grand jury. Key evidence included cryptic entries in Fischer’s “black book” and testimony from his bookkeeper regarding overheard conversations about payments to a union official. Fischer repeatedly responded with “I don’t remember,” “I don’t recall,” and “I don’t know” when questioned about the entries and denied making specific payments.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a trial court where Fischer was convicted of criminal contempt and perjury. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, upholding the convictions. Fischer then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Fischer’s repeated professions of memory loss and denials of knowledge constituted evasive testimony sufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence, including the black book entries and the bookkeeper’s testimony, to support the perjury conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury was warranted in finding that the cryptic entries in the defendant’s black book were made in circumstances so memorable as to render his protestations of no recollection incredible and thus evasive.
    2. Yes, because the entries in the defendant’s black book, combined with his testimony and the bookkeeper’s testimony, provided sufficient evidence that the defendant committed perjury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fischer’s repeated claims of memory loss, when considered in the context of the entries in his black book, were so implausible as to be evasive and obstructive, supporting the criminal contempt conviction. The court cited People v. Ianniello, 36 NY2d 137, 142, stating, “To be guilty of contempt the witness need not flatly refuse to answer the questions put to him; false and evasive profession of an inability to recall, which amounts to no answer at all, is punishable as criminal contempt.” The Court found that the defendant’s repeated responses of “I don’t remember”, “I don’t recall”, and “I don’t know”, together with his reiterated statements that the moneys went to no one specifically, were sufficient to sustain the finding of contemptuous evasion.

    Regarding the perjury conviction, the Court found that the entries in the black book, Fischer’s testimony regarding them, and the bookkeeper’s testimony about overheard conversations collectively established that Fischer lied under oath about making payments to a union official. Each piece of evidence corroborated the others, satisfying the corroboration requirement for perjury convictions under Penal Law § 210.50.

    The court also addressed the admissibility of extended portions of Fischer’s grand jury testimony, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence, even after the dismissal of one count of criminal contempt. The court referenced People v McGrath, 46 NY2d 12, 32.

  • Matter of Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 54 N.Y.2d 335 (1981): Standard of Review for Accidental Disability Benefits Determinations

    Matter of Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 54 N.Y.2d 335 (1981)

    When a board of trustees denies accidental disability benefits due to a tie vote, a court can only overturn that decision if the retiree is entitled to the greater benefits as a matter of law, meaning the disability was undeniably the result of a service-related accident.

    Summary

    Meyer, a police officer, sought accidental disability retirement benefits due to a 1971 car accident. The medical board initially denied his request, then later recommended ordinary disability, and finally accidental disability. The Board of Trustees rejected the final recommendation, citing Meyer’s medical history and the opinion of the chief surgeon, who believed Meyer’s condition was due to arthritis, not the accident. The court held that because the Board’s denial of accidental disability benefits resulted from a tie vote, the denial can only be overturned if the claimant is entitled to accidental disability as a matter of law, which was not the case here.

    Facts

    • Meyer, a NYC police officer since 1963, was in a car accident in 1971 and treated for contusions.
    • He returned to full duty after 11 days.
    • In 1979, he applied for accidental disability retirement related to the 1971 accident.
    • The Police Medical Board initially denied the request, citing degenerative changes due to “wear and tear.”
    • The Medical Board later recommended ordinary disability retirement, then accidental disability benefits.
    • The Board of Trustees rejected the accidental disability recommendation.
    • The Chief Surgeon believed Meyer’s condition was from arthritis, not the accident, noting Meyer’s short sick leave and subsequent years of full duty.

    Procedural History

    • Meyer commenced an Article 78 proceeding after the Board of Trustees denied accidental disability benefits.
    • Special Term vacated the Board’s determination and ordered accidental disability retirement benefits.
    • The Appellate Division reversed, reinstated the Board’s determination, finding it was not arbitrary.
    • The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    • Whether the Board of Trustees acted properly in denying Meyer accidental disability retirement benefits and granting him only an ordinary disability pension.
    • When the Board of Trustees denies accidental disability benefits because of a tie vote, what is the standard for judicial review of that decision?

    Holding

    • No, the Board of Trustees acted properly.
    • The denial of accidental disability benefits can be set aside only if the courts conclude that the retiree is entitled to the greater benefits as a matter of law; otherwise, the decision of the board must stand.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Medical Board’s determination of disability is binding on the Board of Trustees, the Board of Trustees determines whether the disability resulted from a service-related accident. Ordinarily, the Board’s decision on the cause of disability is upheld unless unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious.

    However, because the Board’s decision resulted from a tie vote, a different standard of review applies, as established in Matter of City of New York v. Schoeck. The court stated that the denial of accidental disability benefits due to a tie vote can be overturned only if the retiree is entitled to the greater benefits as a matter of law. “Unless it can be determined as a matter of law on the record that the disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident, the decision of the board of trustees denying accidental disability benefits as a consequence of a tie vote must stand.”

    Based on the record, the court could not conclude that Meyer was entitled to accidental disability benefits as a matter of law. The Chief Surgeon’s opinion and Meyer’s medical history provided credible evidence supporting the Board’s decision. Therefore, the Board of Trustees’ denial was upheld. The key factor is whether the causal connection between the accident and disability is so clear that reasonable minds could not differ.

  • Voss v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 862 (1981): No Special Duty Owed to Teacher Under School Security Plan

    Voss v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 862 (1981)

    A municipality’s adoption of a school security plan, mandated by state law, does not create a special duty of care to teachers, absent evidence the plan was specifically designed for their benefit beyond that of students, staff, and the general public.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a teacher injured while intervening in a school fight, sued the City of New York, alleging negligence in failing to enforce a school security plan. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the action. The Court held that the security plan, mandated by Education Law § 2801, created no special duty to teachers above that owed to the general school population. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate the plan was specifically designed for the teachers’ benefit, thus no governmental liability existed. The court distinguished the teacher’s role in implementing the plan from being a special beneficiary of it.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, an industrial arts teacher, was injured when he tried to stop a fight between students in the school hallway. The Board of Education had a security plan in place, as required by New York Education Law § 2801, to maintain order and safety on school property. The plaintiff argued the city was liable because it failed to adequately observe this detailed security plan. The security plan’s beneficiaries were students, teachers, staff, visitors, and other invitees.

    Procedural History

    The trial court’s decision is not mentioned. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the adoption of a school security plan by the Board of Education, pursuant to Education Law § 2801, creates a special duty of care owed to teachers such that the City can be held liable for injuries sustained due to a failure to fully enforce the plan.

    Holding

    No, because the security plan was not designed or intended specifically for the benefit of teachers, placing them in the same position as students, other personnel, and members of the public. Therefore, no special duty existed that would allow the imposition of governmental liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that, absent a special duty owed to the plaintiff, the City cannot be held liable for breaching a duty owed generally to the school population and the public, citing Glick v. City of New York, Bass v. City of New York, and Riss v. City of New York. The plaintiff attempted to distinguish his case from Glick, arguing that the security plan created a special relationship due to his role as a teacher. However, the court found no evidence that the plan was specifically designed or intended for the benefit of teachers. The Court rejected the argument that teachers were special beneficiaries simply because they had a role in implementing the plan. The court stated: “Nothing in the adoption or content of the plan warrants a finding that it was designed or intended specially for his benefit or that of other teachers in the school. They stood as its beneficiaries in exactly the same position as students, other personnel in the school system, and members of the public who came on the school property.” The Court emphasized that merely having responsibilities for implementing the plan does not automatically create a special duty. The Court concluded that the teacher’s role in implementation, without more, does not establish the condition precedent of a special duty required for governmental liability. The practical implication is that teachers, like other members of the public, cannot sue the city for negligence in enforcing a generally applicable security plan unless they can show the plan was specifically designed for their protection, distinguishing them from other beneficiaries.