New York Law Review

Tag: 1980

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Probable Cause and Observations of Glassine Envelopes

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    Observations of glassine envelopes, even in a high crime area, are not sufficient, without more, to establish probable cause for a search and arrest, if the observed actions are susceptible of innocent interpretation.

    Summary

    McRay was arrested after a police officer observed him holding a small purse, opening it, and then handing it to a woman. The officer testified he saw what appeared to be glassine envelopes inside, but admitted he could not distinguish them from candy wrappers. The court held that the officer lacked probable cause for the arrest and search, as the defendant’s actions were susceptible to innocent interpretation. The observation of glassine envelopes, without additional suspicious behavior, was insufficient to justify a warrantless search and arrest.

    Facts

    A Housing Department patrolman, Hackett, in a high-crime area, observed McRay holding a small, zippered purse. McRay opened the purse halfway and withdrew matches. Hackett, approaching closer, thought he saw glassine envelopes in the purse. He conceded he couldn’t distinguish them from candy wrappers. McRay then handed the purse to a woman who accepted it without comment. Both were arrested, and a search of the purse revealed heroin-filled glassine envelopes.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted McRay’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding a lack of probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s suppression order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest and search McRay based on the observation of what appeared to be glassine envelopes in a purse, coupled with the act of handing the purse to another person, in a high-crime area.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s actions were susceptible to an innocent interpretation, and the officer’s observation of the glassine envelopes, without more, did not elevate suspicion to probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the observed acts were “susceptible of various innocent interpretations.” The court emphasized that more is required to establish probable cause than merely observing actions that could be innocent, even in a high-crime area or involving someone with a narcotics background. The court distinguished this case from situations where behavior is unequivocally suspicious. Here, McRay’s actions—holding a purse, taking out matches, and handing the purse to a woman—could easily be explained innocently. The officer’s testimony that he could not distinguish the glassine envelopes from a candy wrapper further weakened the basis for probable cause. The court stated, “Defendant’s actions are susceptible of innocent explanation, since he may have been handed the purse to find a match or take a piece of chocolate therefrom and then return the purse to the owner.” The court reinforced that an equivocal observation coupled with innocent actions does not create probable cause. The Court cited People v. Russell, 34 N.Y.2d 261, 264 (1974), emphasizing the need for “supplementation by any additional behavior raising the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause.”

  • Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278 (1980): State Agencies and Overriding Local Zoning Laws

    Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278 (1980)

    When acting pursuant to a state-wide concern, a state agency like the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) can override local zoning ordinances if the legislature has granted them that power, and this power doesn’t violate the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) can disregard local zoning laws when planning and executing projects. The plaintiff, a property owner near a proposed UDC project, argued that the UDC’s actions violated the home rule provision of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the UDC, acting under the authority of Article XVIII of the State Constitution related to state housing projects, could override local zoning laws because housing is a matter of state-wide concern and the legislature granted the UDC such power. This power doesn’t violate home rule provisions when applied to general laws affecting all municipalities.

    Facts

    Plaintiff owned property near a 12-acre site (the Banay property) in the Village of Ossining, where the UDC planned a development project. The proposed UDC project included facilities that would violate the village’s zoning ordinance, which prohibited high-rise apartments, multiple dwellings, and residences on lots smaller than 7,500 square feet in the affected area. The plaintiff brought suit, alleging the statute enabling the UDC’s actions was unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Term granted summary judgment in favor of the UDC. The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Term’s decision. The dissenting justices in the Appellate Division argued that the statute only allowed deviation from local laws regarding materials and processes, not zoning laws. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) may plan and execute projects in disregard of local zoning laws, considering the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution (Article IX) and the provisions regarding state housing projects (Article XVIII).

    Holding

    Yes, because Article IX is expressly subject to other provisions of the State Constitution, and section 3 of article IX provides that “ [e]xcept as expressly provided, nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to * * * Matters other than the property, affairs or government of a local government.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislature intended to allow the UDC to override local zoning laws. The Court pointed to a vetoed bill (Assembly Bill No. 650) that would have required the UDC to comply with local zoning ordinances, and the Governor’s veto message stating that the UDC was created to overcome restrictive local standards that impede urgently needed development. This demonstrated that both the executive and legislative branches believed the UDC was exempt from local zoning. The court emphasized that housing is a matter of state-wide concern. Because the statute is general in nature and affects housing, local laws cannot inhibit the operation of general laws. The UDC’s powers stem from Article XVIII of the State Constitution, which establishes the legislative power to create such an agency to alleviate housing problems. The Court noted, “This grant of power reaffirmed the traditional immunity that instrumentalities of the State have enjoyed when carrying out State purposes.” (N. Y. Legis. Annual, 1972, p. 448.)

  • People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980): Establishing Abandonment of Property in Fourth Amendment Cases

    People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980)

    For property to be deemed abandoned, thereby allowing its seizure without a warrant, there must be sufficient evidence demonstrating a voluntary relinquishment of control and intent to abandon the property by the individual.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a defendant’s act of dropping a tin box was sufficient to constitute abandonment, justifying its seizure and subsequent search by a police officer without a warrant. The Court held that the mere act of dropping an object, without further evidence of intent to relinquish control, does not constitute abandonment. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally discarded the box or was given the opportunity to retrieve it before the officer seized it, rendering the seizure unlawful.

    Facts

    A police officer encountered the defendant. The officer testified that the defendant “dropped a tin box” just before the officer made contact with the defendant’s hand. The officer picked up the box immediately after it was dropped. Upon opening the box, the officer discovered glassine envelopes containing heroin.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with drug possession based on the heroin found in the tin box. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant appealed. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of dropping a tin box, without additional evidence of intent to abandon, constitutes a voluntary abandonment of the property, thereby permitting a warrantless search and seizure of the box by a police officer.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of the defendant’s intent to abandon the tin box. The mere act of dropping the box, without evidence of intent to discard it or being afforded an opportunity to retrieve it, does not constitute abandonment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that for a search to be justified on the grounds of abandonment, there must be clear evidence that the individual intended to relinquish control over the property. The Court found the evidence presented by the prosecution to be insufficient to establish such intent. The Court emphasized that the officer picked up the box immediately after it was dropped, making it impossible to determine whether the defendant would have retrieved it if given the chance. The Court stated: “There is no proof that the defendant threw it away or attempted to dispose of it in any manner which might have manifested the requisite intention to abandon. Moreover, the police officer’s testimony reveals that he picked up the box so soon after it had been dropped that it is impossible to determine whether or not the defendant, if given the opportunity, would have picked up the box himself.” Absent such proof of intent, the seizure was deemed unlawful. The court explicitly stated that the search could not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because the police lacked probable cause prior to opening the tin box.