New York Law Review

Tag: 1978

  • People v. Colon, 46 N.Y.2d 722 (1978): Admissibility of Negative Identification Testimony

    People v. Colon, 46 N.Y.2d 722 (1978)

    Negative identification testimony (i.e., testimony that a witness failed to identify the defendant in a prior lineup or viewing) is generally inadmissible as evidence-in-chief because it lacks probative value and constitutes bolstering, unless offered to rebut a specific defense claim.

    Summary

    In a rape and robbery case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of testimony that the victim failed to identify the defendant in a prior lineup where the defendant was not present. The Court held that such evidence was inadmissible because it was not probative and served only to bolster the victim’s in-court identification. The dissent argued that the defense’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that the evidence was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit the testimony, because the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.

    Facts

    The victim testified that she knew her attackers from previous encounters at her apartment, where they discussed potential employment opportunities. During the investigation, the police took the victim to the moving company where the alleged attackers worked. On two occasions, the victim viewed employees but did not identify the defendant or his co-defendant. Evidence was also presented that the victim failed to identify anyone in a “blank lineup” that did not include the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape and robbery. The defendant objected to the admission of the negative identification testimony, arguing it was irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of admissibility was not properly preserved for appellate review because the defense did not specifically object on hearsay grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the victim failed to identify the defendant or others in prior lineups when the defendant was not present, and whether the defendant’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was not specific enough to preserve the issue of inadmissibility for appeal. The Court found that the objection needed to be based on hearsay grounds to alert the trial court to the specific nature of the error alleged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant’s general objection to the evidence as “irrelevant” was insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. The dissent argued that the basis of the objection (bolstering) was clear to the trial judge and that the evidence was both nonprobative and hearsay. The dissent stated, “Fairness to the defendant requires that, rather than turn aside his contention on the basis of the hairsplitting distinction which the majority makes, we hold it sufficiently preserved and, since it was both improper and prejudicial bolstering, that we reverse and remand for a new trial.” The dissent cited to People v Jung Hing, 212 NY 393, 402: “Testimony of nonidentification is admissible, if at all, only on rebuttal and even then is not admitted to prove or disprove any fact involved in the issues on trial, but solely to support the credibility of the witness”. The dissent argued the evidence was not relevant because it did not make any fact in issue more or less probable.

  • Batista v. State Division of Human Rights, 46 N.Y.2d 38 (1978): Establishing Discrimination Through Statistical Evidence

    Batista v. State Division of Human Rights, 46 N.Y.2d 38 (1978)

    Statistical evidence showing a pattern of replacing minority employees with white employees can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decisions.

    Summary

    Roberto Batista and Theodore Fletcher, both minority school administrators, were removed from their positions as interim acting principals. They alleged racial discrimination. The New York State Division of Human Rights found unlawful discrimination based on statistical evidence showing a pattern of replacing minority principals with white principals. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s annulment, holding that the statistical evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that the employer failed to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the removals. The case highlights the importance of statistical evidence in discrimination cases.

    Facts

    Roberto Batista, of Puerto Rican heritage, and Theodore Fletcher, who is black, were appointed as interim acting principals in Community School District No. 1.
    Due to non-compliance with a procedural directive (Special Circular No. 30), their appointments were reclassified, making them interim acting principals without vested rights.
    The school board subsequently removed Batista and Fletcher, assigning them to other duties.
    They filed complaints with the Division of Human Rights, alleging racially motivated removals, claiming they were replaced by white principals.

    Procedural History

    The Division of Human Rights found the removals discriminatory and granted injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
    The State Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed the Division’s orders.
    The Appellate Division annulled and vacated the orders, finding insufficient evidence.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the Appeal Board’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether statistical evidence demonstrating a pattern of replacing minority principals with white principals is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
    2. Whether the employer provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the removal of the minority principals, sufficient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because statistical evidence can demonstrate a pattern of discrimination, especially when direct evidence is difficult to obtain.
    2. No, because the employer’s asserted justification (poor job performance) was not substantiated and appeared pretextual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that discrimination is often subtle and difficult to prove directly. Therefore, statistical evidence is valuable in demonstrating a pattern of discriminatory conduct.
    The Court noted that the statistical evidence showed that all principalship vacancies were filled with white persons during the relevant period, and only minority principals were removed (with one exception).
    This evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the removals.
    While the employer claimed poor job performance, the Court found that this justification was not supported by the evidence and may have been a pretext for discrimination. Crucially, there was “no evidence that such criticism was considered by the Community School Board or played any part in its decisions to remove Fletcher and Batista.”
    The Court cited 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180, stating that “where there is room for choice, neither the weight which might be accorded nor the choice which might be made by a court are germane.” The Court’s role is limited to determining if substantial evidence supports the Division’s determination.
    The Court also clarified the standard for rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination, stating that the employer must show “that the employee was terminated for some independently legitimate reason which was neither a pretext for discrimination nor was substantially influenced by impermissible discrimination” citing Matter of Pace Coll, v Commission on Human Rights of City of N. Y., 38 NY2d 28, 40.

  • Lowcher v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 45 N.Y.2d 751 (1978): Impartiality in Administrative Decision-Making

    Lowcher v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 45 N.Y.2d 751 (1978)

    Due process is violated when a member of an administrative board reviewing a claim previously served as an independent physician evaluating the same claim and recommended its denial.

    Summary

    Lowcher, a former school secretary, applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. Her claim was initially rejected by a medical board after an independent psychiatrist, Dr. Gould, recommended denial. Following a federal court ruling that the initial denial violated due process, the board designated Dr. Schneck as a second independent psychiatrist, who essentially concurred with Dr. Gould. Subsequently, Dr. Schneck was appointed to the medical board itself. The New York Court of Appeals held that Dr. Schneck’s presence on the board reviewing his own prior determination violated Lowcher’s due process rights because it presented a conflict of interest, undermining the impartiality of the review process.

    Facts

    Lowcher applied for accidental disability retirement after an on-the-job assault. She had pre-existing coronary and psychiatric issues, but her condition worsened after the assault. The key issue was whether the deterioration was causally related to the assault. The medical board initially rejected her claim after an independent psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Gould. Following a court ruling that the initial process was flawed, a second independent psychiatrist, Dr. Schneck, was appointed and also recommended denial. Later, Dr. Schneck himself was appointed as a member of the medical board.

    Procedural History

    1. Lowcher initially applied for accidental disability benefits, which were denied.

    2. A federal court overturned the denial, citing due process violations.

    3. On remand, the medical board again denied the claim, with Dr. Schneck now a member of the board.

    4. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Lowcher’s Article 78 proceeding.

    5. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether due process is violated when a member of the medical board reviewing a claim for accidental disability retirement previously served as an independent physician evaluating the same claim and recommended its denial.

    Holding

    Yes, because it is improper for an impartial reviewer of an issue of fact to sit in review of his own prior determination of fact. This creates a conflict of interest and undermines the impartiality required for administrative decision-making.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Dr. Schneck’s presence on the board, after having already concluded that Lowcher was not disabled as a result of the assault, violated fundamental fairness and due process. The court cited Goldberg v. Kelly, emphasizing that due process does not allow an administrative decision-maker to review their own decisions. The court rejected the city’s argument that the medical board was merely engaging in independent expert inquiry, stating that, in reality, the other two members of the board, who were not psychiatrists, likely deferred to Dr. Schneck’s psychiatric opinion. The court stated, “it is, indeed, improper for an impartial reviewer of an issue of fact to sit in review of his own prior determination of fact.” The court found that requiring Lowcher to establish prejudice by demonstrating that the other board members were influenced by Dr. Schneck’s dual role would be unreasonable, stating “Human nature being what it is, the presumption, if any, should be the other way”. The court emphasized the importance of an impartial decision-making process, particularly when expert opinions are in conflict.

  • Sibley v. Sheppard, 405 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978): Grandparent Visitation Rights After Adoption

    405 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978)

    A natural grandparent has the right to visitation with their grandchild, even after the child’s adoption, when authorized by court decree and in the best interest of the child.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandparent has visitation rights after their grandchild is adopted, despite the adoptive parents’ objections. The New York Court of Appeals held that Domestic Relations Law § 72 allows a grandparent to seek visitation rights, even post-adoption, if it’s in the child’s best interest. The court found that adoption does not automatically extinguish grandparental rights and that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring a child maintains beneficial family ties, especially after the death of the child’s parents. The court emphasized that visitation must not hinder the adoptive relationship and that the statute’s application doesn’t unconstitutionally infringe on the adoptive family’s privacy.

    Facts

    Agatha Sibley, the petitioner, sought visitation rights with her grandson, Willie Sheppard. Willie’s parents were deceased. Willie lived with Sibley until he was about two years old. Following his mother’s death, Willie was placed in foster care and eventually adopted by his paternal grandparents, Mamie and Willie Sheppard, the respondents. After the adoption, the respondents interfered with Sibley’s attempts to visit Willie.

    Procedural History

    Sibley initiated a habeas corpus action under Domestic Relations Law § 72 to obtain visitation rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the adoption didn’t extinguish Sibley’s rights and awarded her visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72 permits a grandparent to seek visitation rights with a grandchild after the child has been adopted.
    2. Whether granting visitation rights to a grandparent over the objection of adoptive parents constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the adoptive family’s right to privacy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Domestic Relations Law § 72 allows a grandparent to seek visitation rights with a grandchild, even after adoption, if it is in the child’s best interest and does not unduly hinder the adoptive relationship.
    2. No, because the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and granting visitation rights under limited circumstances is reasonably related to that goal and does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72 permits a proceeding against any person who has custody of the child, including adoptive parents. Nothing in the statute excludes custody obtained through adoption. The Court highlighted that § 117, which describes the effects of adoption, doesn’t expressly terminate all contacts between the child and their natural relatives. The court stated, “The purpose of the section, as manifested by its own terms, is to facilitate maintenance of family ties between grandparents and grandchildren where one or both of the natural parents have died.” The court noted that the Legislature was presumed to know about both statutes (§ 117 and § 72) and intended each to have full effect.

    Regarding the constitutionality challenge, the Court acknowledged parents’ rights to raise their families but noted that such rights are not absolute. The Court applied a less rigorous standard of review, asking whether the law had a “reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.” The Court found that allowing grandparent visitation, subject to the child’s best interests, was a valid exercise of the State’s power to protect children. The Court emphasized that visitation rights may not be awarded if they hinder the adoptive relationship. The court stated: “Section 72 expressly provides that the court’s decision is to be rendered ‘as the best interest of the child may require’. Consequently, visitation rights may not be awarded when doing so will hinder the adoptive relationship.”
    The court emphasized that the power to interfere is severely limited and does not extend to dictating other aspects of the child’s upbringing. The court acknowledged that protecting the best interest of a child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power.

  • Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24 (1978): Res Judicata in Administrative Determinations

    Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24 (1978)

    A prior court ruling, even if reversed on procedural grounds, can have preclusive effect on subsequent administrative determinations regarding the same substantive issues, especially when the administrative body on remittal considered arguments and reaffirmed its prior determination.

    Summary

    This case addresses the application of res judicata to administrative proceedings following a court reversal on procedural grounds. Reilly, a teacher, challenged her dismissal by the Board of Education. After an initial legal challenge failed procedurally but addressed substantive issues, Reilly sought administrative review by the Commissioner of Education. The Court of Appeals held that the Commissioner’s decision to abstain from deciding issues already considered by the court was reasonable, as the prior court ruling had a preclusive effect. The court emphasized that the Board did not introduce new charges, but merely reconsidered the case, reinforcing its original decision.

    Facts

    Reilly was dismissed from her teaching position by the Board of Education. She initially challenged this decision in court, but the case was reversed on procedural grounds. Subsequently, the Board reconsidered her case, allowing Reilly to contest the findings. Reilly then initiated a new review proceeding through the Commissioner of Education, raising similar issues from her prior court case.

    Procedural History

    1. Reilly’s initial Article 78 proceeding against the Board of Education was transferred to the Appellate Division, which reversed the decision on procedural grounds but considered the substantive issues. 2. The Board of Education made a redetermination after the Appellate Division’s ruling. 3. Reilly initiated a new review proceeding with the Commissioner of Education. 4. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the Commissioner’s determination was rationally based.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner of Education erred in abstaining from deciding issues previously considered by the court in a prior proceeding, which was reversed on procedural grounds, concerning the teacher’s dismissal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prior court ruling, despite being reversed on procedural grounds, had a preclusive effect on the subsequent administrative determination, and the Board of Education did not introduce new charges or evidence upon remittal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division had already considered and passed on the substantive issues raised by Reilly in the initial Article 78 proceeding. Even though the initial court decision was reversed on procedural grounds, it still had a preclusive effect. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Venes v Community School Bd. of Dist. 26, 43 NY2d 520, because that case dealt with the effect of a prior administrative ruling without a hearing, not a prior court ruling. The court emphasized that the Board of Education, upon remittal, did not make new findings or base its decision on new or additional charges; it simply gave Reilly an opportunity to contest the trial examiner’s findings and reaffirmed its original determination. The court also noted that the Commissioner’s decision to abstain from deciding those issues that were not decided in the earlier proceeding was reasonable, especially in light of pending federal litigation involving some of the same issues. The court stated that the Commissioner’s conclusion that “res judicata and abstention precluded such relitigation was not irrational or unreasonable.”

  • Matter of Walsh v. Smith, 46 N.Y.2d 102 (1978): Determining Income Eligibility for Home Relief When SSI Payments are Recouped

    Matter of Walsh v. Smith, 46 N.Y.2d 102 (1978)

    A Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payment withheld by the Federal Government to recoup a prior overpayment due to administrative error is not considered “available income” to a home relief recipient and cannot be counted when determining their eligibility for, or the amount of, home relief benefits.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a withheld SSI payment, due to recoupment of a prior overpayment, can be considered “available income” when determining eligibility for home relief. The petitioner, an elderly woman, had her SSI benefits reduced to recoup a prior overpayment caused by an administrative error. Consequently, she applied for home relief. The New York Court of Appeals held that the withheld SSI payment cannot be considered available income because the petitioner was not actually receiving it. The court emphasized that eligibility for home relief is based on current income, not past overpayments, and that state regulations require income to be “available” to be counted.

    Facts

    Petitioner, a 91-year-old woman, received Social Security (OASDI) and SSI benefits. The Social Security Administration determined it had overpaid her SSI due to an error in calculating her grant. The Administration reduced her SSI payment and then suspended it entirely to recoup the overpayment. As a result, her income was insufficient to meet her needs, prompting her to apply for home relief.

    Procedural History

    The New York City Department of Social Services initially denied the home relief application. After a fair hearing, the State Commissioner directed the city agency to provide a supplemental grant, including the amount of the recouped SSI payment as “countable income.” Petitioner then initiated an Article 78 proceeding to review the State Commissioner’s ruling. Special Term dismissed the proceeding, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to resolve a conflict with a prior decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an SSI payment, which is being withheld by the Federal Government to recoup a prior overpayment, can be considered “available income” to the recipient for the purpose of determining eligibility for, and the amount of, home relief benefits under New York Social Services Law.

    Holding

    No, because a person is not “receiving” a payment that is being withheld for recoupment. The court found that neither the statute nor the regulations support the inclusion of the recouped amount as available income.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that, according to Section 158 of the Social Services Law, a person “receiving” federal supplemental security income payments is ineligible for home relief. Similarly, Section 142 states that a person “receiving” SSI payments cannot receive other forms of assistance for the same period. Since the petitioner was not actually receiving the SSI payment due to the recoupment, she could not be considered as “receiving” it within the meaning of the statute. The court emphasized that the regulations at 18 NYCRR 352.16(a) require income to be “available” to be considered in determining eligibility. The court cited 18 NYCRR 352.17(b)(4): “When wages are garnisheed, property income assigned, bank accounts attached, or other cash income is unavailable to the applicant or recipient, such income shall not be applied against need”. The court also referenced 18 NYCRR 352.31(a)(2), which states that “All available and unrestricted income of an applicant * * * shall be prorated and applied against his needs”. Therefore, the $12.42 being recouped was not “available” to the petitioner and could not be counted as income. The court distinguished between determining that “receivable but in fact unreceived income” should be counted versus this situation where the petitioner does not receive the income in any way. The court concluded that, while the legislature can determine what constitutes income, neither the statute nor the regulations support counting the recouped amount in this case.

  • Matter of Lumpkin v. Department of Social Services, 45 N.Y.2d 351 (1978): State Court Authority to Review Federal Agency Rulings

    Matter of Lumpkin v. Department of Social Services, 45 N.Y.2d 351 (1978)

    A state court has the jurisdictional power to review and invalidate rulings of a federal agency, but the exercise of that power should be restrained based on principles of judicial abstention, particularly when the federal agency is responsible for administering a program and its funding.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extent to which a state court should review and potentially invalidate a ruling by a federal agency. The dissenting opinion argues that while the court possesses the jurisdictional power to do so, it should abstain from exercising that power in this instance. The dissent emphasizes the importance of maintaining conformity with federal requirements in programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), where federal funding is contingent on adherence to federal regulations and rulings. The dissent suggests the federal court is a more appropriate forum in such cases, allowing for a conclusive, nationwide resolution and full representation of all interested parties.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying welfare claim are not extensively detailed in the dissenting opinion, which focuses primarily on the procedural and jurisdictional issues. The case involves a challenge to a federal agency ruling by a welfare recipient, with the State and local Departments of Social Services advocating for the invalidation of the federal agency’s interpretation.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s disposition favored the welfare recipient. The State and local Departments of Social Services then appealed, seeking a reversal and an invalidation of the federal “Action Transmittal – Interpretation” on which the lower court’s decision was based. The majority opinion reversed the lower court order. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the lower court’s disposition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a state court should exercise its jurisdictional power to review and invalidate a ruling of a federal agency concerning the administration of a federally sponsored program within the state.

    Holding

    No, a state court should abstain from invalidating a federal agency ruling in this context because the federal court is a more appropriate forum for resolving disputes between state and federal agencies regarding the interpretation and application of federal regulations, ensuring a conclusive and nationwide resolution. This is further warranted due to the potential for federal administrative sanctions including withholding of federal funding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting judge acknowledges the state court’s jurisdictional power but argues that the principle of judicial abstention dictates restraint. The dissent reasons that because the State’s administration of the AFDC program and its funding depend on conformity with federal regulations, disputes between the state and federal agencies are best resolved in federal court. This allows both agencies to be parties, ensuring full representation and a binding, nationwide decision. The dissent criticizes the majority’s decision for creating uncertainty, as the federal agency is not bound by the state court’s ruling and can still impose sanctions. The dissent argues that invalidating a federal ruling in an action between an individual welfare recipient and the state agency, without the federal agency’s full participation, is unwise and inconsistent with sound judicial principle. The dissent highlights the potential for state and local departments to diminish welfare benefits in violation of federal regulations, expecting challenges to be mounted in state rather than federal courts.

  • Miller v. Miller, 46 N.Y.2d 704 (1978): Duty of Attorney Purchasing Land Adjacent to Client’s Property

    Miller v. Miller, 46 N.Y.2d 704 (1978)

    An attorney who informs clients about the availability of adjacent land for purchase does not automatically become a constructive trustee of that land if the attorney purchases it themselves, absent a specific agreement or fiduciary duty related to the property.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an attorney, who is also a relative of his clients, becomes a constructive trustee when he purchases land adjacent to their property after informing them of its availability. The plaintiffs, cousins of the defendant attorney, claimed he breached a duty by purchasing the land for himself instead of for their joint benefit. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the defendant did not undertake to purchase the property for the plaintiffs, and no fiduciary duty required him to act in their best interest over his own. The Court emphasized the importance of the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility and found that the evidence weighed in favor of the defendant.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs and the defendant’s father owned property known as Crystal Lake property. The defendant, an attorney, represented the Peakes, who owned an adjacent 83-acre woodlot. The defendant informed the plaintiffs about the availability of the Peake property. Plaintiff John Miller expressed interest in purchasing the woodlot. A dispute arose about whether the defendant agreed to purchase the Peake property for the joint benefit of himself, his brother, and the plaintiffs. The defendant ultimately purchased the Peake property in his own name. The plaintiffs then sued, claiming the defendant should be deemed a constructive trustee of the property.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, finding an implied agreement for joint purchase. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant, as an attorney and relative of the plaintiffs, became a constructive trustee of the Peake property when he purchased it himself after informing the plaintiffs of its availability.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant never undertook to purchase the property for the plaintiffs, and the familial or professional relationship did not create a duty requiring him to act in their interest over his own.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals placed significant weight on the trial judge’s assessment of credibility, noting that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. The Court found that the evidence leaned towards the defendant’s version of events. The Court emphasized that the defendant never explicitly agreed to purchase the property on behalf of all parties. The Court stated that absent such agreement, defendant can only be held a constructive trustee if the law imposed on him the obligation to act in relation to the Peake property for the plaintiffs as well as himself, or in preference to himself. The court highlighted the absence of any legal advantage conferred to the Crystal Lake property owners by acquiring the adjacent parcel. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the familial and professional relationship only required the defendant to inform the plaintiffs of the property’s availability. The court pointed out that the defendant’s opportunity to purchase the land arose from his representation of the Peakes, not from any duty owed to the plaintiffs. Quoting the Restatement of Restitution, the court underscored the requirement of an undertaking to purchase property for another to establish a constructive trust: “Since defendant never undertook to purchase for plaintiffs and his brother and himself, the agency rule stated in the Restatement of Restitution (§ 194, subd [2]), is inapplicable”. Ultimately, the Court found no basis in contract, agency, trust, or restitution law to deem the defendant a constructive trustee.

  • People v. Taylor, 65 A.D.2d 805 (1978): Guilty Pleas and Waiver of Procedural Rights

    People v. Taylor, 65 A.D.2d 805 (1978)

    A defendant’s guilty plea generally waives the right to appeal non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings, even if the defendant attempts to reserve the right to appeal those issues.

    Summary

    The defendant, Taylor, appealed his conviction for assault in the second degree, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed because his wife, the complainant, was not advised of the option to pursue family offense proceedings in Family Court, as required by the Family Court Act. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the conviction. The Court held that Taylor’s guilty plea waived his right to raise this issue on appeal because the alleged failure to advise his wife of alternative forums did not constitute a jurisdictional defect, and a defendant cannot unilaterally reserve the right to appeal issues waived by a guilty plea.

    Facts

    Taylor was charged with assault in the second degree. The charge stemmed from an incident involving his wife. Prior to entering a guilty plea, Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his wife, as the complainant, had not been advised of the procedures available for instituting family offense proceedings in Family Court, as mandated by former subdivision 2 of section 812 of the Family Court Act. The trial court denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree. He then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the failure to advise a complainant of the option to pursue family offense proceedings in Family Court, as required by the Family Court Act, constitutes a jurisdictional defect that survives a guilty plea.

    2. Whether a defendant can unilaterally reserve the right to appeal an issue that is otherwise waived by a guilty plea.

    Holding

    1. No, because the provisions of the Family Court Act regarding advising complainants of family offense proceedings do not affect the court’s fundamental jurisdiction to hear the case.

    2. No, because a defendant cannot unilaterally avoid the consequences of a guilty plea by attempting to reserve the right to appeal issues that are otherwise waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Family Court Act’s requirement to advise complainants of family offense proceedings does not pertain to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or authority. The Court stated, “At most they consist of a threshold, statutory directive with respect to procedures to be followed for access to the Family Court or to the criminal courts, unrelated to the judicial competence of those courts.” The statute aims to inform complainants of their right to choose the court of prosecution, a right the defendant cannot control. The Court emphasized that nothing in the statute suggested that failure to give the advice would strip either Family Court or the criminal courts of jurisdiction.

    Regarding the attempted reservation of rights, the Court stated, “A defendant cannot by a unilateral recital of an intention or desire to preserve a legal contention evade what would otherwise be the consequences of his guilty plea.” The Court clarified that even if defense counsel had explicitly reserved the right to appeal the issue, it would not have been effective because a guilty plea generally waives all non-jurisdictional defects. The court considered it likely that the defense counsel was merely acknowledging the standard rule that jurisdictional challenges are always preserved, even after a guilty plea.

  • Marine Midland Bank v. United States, 46 N.Y.2d 758 (1978): Establishing “Buyer in Ordinary Course” Status

    Marine Midland Bank v. United States, 46 N.Y.2d 758 (1978)

    A party claiming to be a “buyer in the ordinary course of business” under UCC § 9-307(1) must present evidentiary material demonstrating that the seller was in the business of selling goods of that kind.

    Summary

    Marine Midland Bank sought summary judgment against the United States, claiming priority as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision denying the bank’s motion. The court held that the bank failed to provide sufficient evidence that the seller was actually in the business of selling the type of goods purchased, a requirement to qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business under UCC § 9-307(1). The court also noted that it could not grant summary judgment to the defendant (United States) because the defendant had not filed a cross-appeal.

    Facts

    Marine Midland Bank purchased goods from a seller. The bank then claimed priority over the United States’ security interest in the goods, arguing it was a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The bank moved for summary judgment based on this claim. The seller involved in the case was also the seller in the prior case, Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken.

    Procedural History

    The lower court denied Marine Midland Bank’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision. Marine Midland Bank appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Marine Midland Bank presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the seller was in the business of selling goods of the kind purchased, thereby entitling the bank to the status of a “buyer in the ordinary course of business” under Uniform Commercial Code § 9-307(1), and thus priority over a prior security interest.

    Holding

    No, because Marine Midland Bank failed to provide evidentiary material supporting its claim that the seller was in the business of selling goods of the kind purchased. The court also could not grant summary judgement for the defendant as it had not filed a cross-appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must present evidentiary proof to support its allegations. In this case, Marine Midland Bank presented only a conclusory assertion that the seller was in the business of selling such goods, which was insufficient to establish its status as a buyer in the ordinary course of business under UCC § 9-307(1). The court referenced UCC § 1-201, subd [9] and § 9-307, subd [1] regarding the definition of “buyer in ordinary course of business.” The court distinguished this case from Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, noting that the finding that the seller was a seller in the ordinary course in Tanbro was a factual finding supported by sufficient evidence in that specific case. The court stated, “In this motion for summary judgment there is no evidentiary material in the record to support plaintiff’s allegation, and conclusory assertion, that the seller from whom he purchased the goods was in the business of selling goods of that kind (Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-201, subd [9]; § 9-307, subd [1]), or that the defendant was unjustly enriched. This alone is sufficient to sustain the Appellate Division’s determination that the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment.” The court also noted it could not grant summary judgement to the defendant because it had not filed a cross-appeal, citing precedent: “Finally we note that we are unable to grant summary judgment to the defendant because the defendant has not taken a cross appeal to this court (City of Rye v Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 NY2d 470, 474; People v Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., 34 NY2d 646, 648; Kelly’s Rental v City of New York, 44 NY2d 700, 702).”