New York Law Review

Tag: 1978

  • People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12 (1978): Admissibility of Consensual Eavesdropping Despite Employer Rules

    People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12 (1978)

    It is not unlawful to eavesdrop on telephone conversations with the consent of one party, even if the consenting party is a government employee who may have acted contrary to their employer’s rules.

    Summary

    Defendant, a postmaster, was charged with aggravated harassment for making harassing phone calls to a co-employee. The co-employee, with the knowledge of other postal employees, recorded these conversations. The defendant moved to suppress these recordings, arguing they violated postal regulations. The trial court granted the motion, and the County Court affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that consensual eavesdropping is permissible, irrespective of whether the consenting party violated their employer’s regulations. The court relied on existing penal law and the principle that evidence obtained in violation of internal agency rules is not necessarily inadmissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, McGrath, was the Postmaster of the Germantown Post Office. He made a series of telephone calls to a female co-employee both at the post office and at her home. These calls formed the basis of a charge of aggravated harassment under New York Penal Law § 240.30(1), alleging that McGrath intended to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm the co-employee. The co-employee, with the knowledge and advice of fellow postal employees, recorded these telephone conversations.

    Procedural History

    McGrath was arraigned in Town Court. He moved to suppress the tape recordings of his phone calls. The Town Court granted the motion to suppress the recordings of calls completed at the post office, citing a violation of Postal Regulation 668.291. The County Court affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether tape recordings of telephone conversations, made with the consent of one party but in potential violation of that party’s employer’s (Postal Service) regulations, are admissible in court.

    Holding

    No, because it is not unlawful to eavesdrop on telephone conversations with the consent of one of the parties, and the fact that the consenting party may have violated her employer’s rules does not render the evidence inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals grounded its decision in New York Penal Law § 250.00 and Criminal Procedure Law § 700.05(3), which permit eavesdropping with the consent of one party to the conversation. The court also cited Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, to support the principle of permissible consensual eavesdropping. The court addressed the argument that the postal employee’s actions violated Postal Regulation 668.291, which prohibits employees from recording or intercepting communications without the consent of all parties involved. The court, citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, held that a violation of internal agency regulations does not automatically render evidence inadmissible. The Court emphasized that the key factor was consent from one party to the conversation, irrespective of any potential violation of internal employer rules. The Court stated: “It is not unlawful to eavesdrop on telephone conversations with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation (Penal Law, § 250.00; CPL 700.05, subd 3; Rathbun v United States, 355 US 107), nor is the tape recording evidence in this case to be excluded because the consenting party, who was a government employee, may have acted contrary to the rules of her employer (see United States v Caceres, 440 US 741).” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • People v. Trowbridge, 43 N.Y.2d 937 (1978): Admissibility of Bolstering Testimony and Harmless Error Analysis

    People v. Trowbridge, 43 N.Y.2d 937 (1978)

    The erroneous admission of bolstering testimony is subject to harmless error analysis, requiring a determination of whether the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and whether there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, despite acknowledging that the admission of bolstering testimony regarding the victim’s identification of the defendant was an error. The Court applied a two-stage harmless error analysis. First, it determined that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without considering the error, was overwhelming due to the victim’s credible and unequivocal identification. Second, it concluded that there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the bolstering testimony not been admitted because the testimony only confirmed the fact of the identification, not the reliability of it.

    Facts

    The victim was sexually assaulted by the defendant and two companions in a vestibule after being dragged from the street. The victim had a clear view of her attacker under bright street lighting and good lighting in the vestibule. The assault lasted for 15-20 minutes. Twenty minutes after the assault, police apprehended the defendant a block away. Initially, the victim did not identify the defendant, but after the police turned him around, she made an unhesitating and unequivocal identification.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of bolstering testimony regarding the victim’s identification of the defendant constitutes reversible error, requiring a new trial.

    Holding

    No, because the error was harmless. The evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the bolstering testimony not been admitted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the two-stage harmless error analysis outlined in People v. Crimmins. The Court found that the victim’s identification testimony was “unusually credit-worthy” due to the favorable lighting conditions, the length of the observation, and the unequivocal nature of the identification shortly after the crime. The court also noted that the defendant’s presence in the area in the early morning hours was not explained or controverted. Regarding the bolstering testimony, the Court emphasized that it only confirmed the fact of the identification and did not add any substance to its reliability or probative value. The Court reasoned, “Beyond the fact that she did identify him, there was nothing to shore up the reliability or probative worth of her identification. Unquestionably defendant had been identified; the erroneously admitted bolstering testimony went no further than to corroborate that uncontroverted fact.” Because the victim’s identification was strong and the bolstering testimony added little to the evidence, the court concluded that the error was harmless under the standard for nonconstitutional error. “[U]nless the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming, there is no occasion for consideration of any doctrine of harmless error” (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241).

  • Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 807 (1978): Tax Exemption for Health Service Corporations

    Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 807 (1978)

    A health service corporation, as expressly included in subdivision 3 of section 251 of the Insurance Law, is exempt from state, county, municipal, and school taxes, regardless of whether section 486 of the Real Property Tax Law includes it in its list of exempt corporations.

    Summary

    Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York sought a tax exemption on real property it owned. The Tax Commission denied the exemption, arguing that Section 486 of the Real Property Tax Law, which lists corporations entitled to insurance law exemptions, did not include health service corporations. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Section 251(3) of the Insurance Law explicitly grants tax exemptions to health service corporations, overriding the omission in the Real Property Tax Law. The Court further noted that the propriety of Blue Cross’s holding the vacant property was a matter for the Superintendent of Insurance, not the taxing authorities.

    Facts

    Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York (Petitioner) purchased real property. The Petitioner claimed a tax exemption based on its status as a health service corporation. The Tax Commission of the City of New York (Respondents) denied the exemption. The property remained vacant for 12 years.
    Petitioner’s purchase of the property was authorized by the Superintendent of Insurance.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, ruled in favor of Blue Cross, granting the tax exemption. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a health service corporation is entitled to a tax exemption under Section 251(3) of the Insurance Law, despite not being explicitly listed in Section 486 of the Real Property Tax Law.
    Whether the taxing authorities can deny a tax exemption based on the corporation holding the property vacant for 12 years, when the property purchase was authorized by the Superintendent of Insurance.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 251(3) of the Insurance Law expressly grants tax exemptions to health service corporations, and this provision takes precedence. No, because the propriety of the corporation’s holding the property is a matter for the Superintendent of Insurance, not the taxing authorities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 251(3) of the Insurance Law is explicit in granting tax exemptions to health service corporations. The court stated, “[Subdivision 3 of section 251 of the Insurance Law] expressly includes ‘a health service corporation’ and provides that it ‘shall be exempt from every state, county, municipal and school tax.’” The omission of health service corporations from Section 486 of the Real Property Tax Law does not negate the explicit exemption provided by the Insurance Law.

    The court further addressed the argument regarding the vacant property, stating, “Any question of the propriety of its holding the property in a vacant state for 12 years is for the Superintendent of Insurance, not the taxing authorities, and does not authorize the latter to return the property to the assessment rolls on the theory that because it is not being used it is no longer properly held by petitioner.” This highlights the separation of powers between the Superintendent of Insurance, who oversees the corporation’s activities, and the taxing authorities, who are bound by the explicit tax exemption granted by law. Sections 256 and 260 of the Insurance Law were deemed irrelevant because the Superintendent of Insurance authorized the property purchase. The court implicitly reasoned that because the purchase was authorized, the method of use (or non-use) of the property did not affect the corporation’s entitlement to the tax exemption.

  • People v. назва, 44 N.Y.2d 663 (1978): Exception to Warrant Specificity Requirement

    People v. De Bour назва, 44 N.Y.2d 663 (1978)

    A minor discrepancy in a search warrant’s description of the premises to be searched is not fatal if the warrant names the occupant, the police are led to the correct apartment by an informant, the occupant confirms their identity, and the warrant is amended before the search.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of a discrepancy in a search warrant and whether it invalidates the search. The Court of Appeals held that a minor error in the apartment number listed on a search warrant did not invalidate the search because the warrant also named the occupant, an informant led the police to the correct apartment, the occupant confirmed their identity, and the warrant was amended before the search was conducted. The court emphasized the practical aspects of the situation, focusing on the fact that the police were clearly directed to the correct location and person intended by the warrant.

    Facts

    A search warrant was issued for an apartment described as “25J.” However, the apartment intended to be searched was actually “25C.” The warrant named the occupant of the apartment. An informant accompanied the police to the apartment. The person named as the occupant admitted the police, confirming that he was the person referenced in the warrant. Before any search or seizure occurred, the warrant was amended to reflect the correct apartment designation, “25C.”

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially ruled on the admissibility of the evidence seized. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a discrepancy in the apartment number listed on a search warrant invalidates the search and seizure when the warrant also names the occupant, an informant leads the police to the correct apartment, the occupant confirms their identity, and the warrant is amended before the search.

    2. Whether the prosecution was required to establish due diligence in attempting to locate the informant and produce him at the hearing on the warrant.

    Holding

    1. No, because the warrant also named the occupant, the informant accompanied the police to the correct apartment, the occupant confirmed his identity, and the warrant was amended before any search or seizure was conducted.

    2. No, because the warrant was issued based on the informant’s sworn testimony before the issuing judge, a transcript of which was presented at the hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the discrepancy in the warrant was not material because the warrant named the occupant, the informant guided the police to the correct apartment, and the occupant confirmed their identity. The court also highlighted the fact that the warrant was amended to reflect the correct apartment number before any search or seizure took place. The court cited People v. Taggart, People v. Law, and People v. Nieves in support of its decision, indicating that minor technical defects should not invalidate a search when the officers acted reasonably and in good faith to identify the correct premises. Regarding the informant, the Court stated that there was no obligation to produce him at the hearing on the warrant because the warrant was issued based on his testimony under oath before the issuing Judge, a transcript of which was presented at the hearing. This satisfied the requirements for establishing probable cause. The court emphasized that requiring the prosecution to demonstrate due diligence in locating the informant in this situation would be overly burdensome and unnecessary, given the circumstances.

  • Eaton v. Town of Islip, 43 N.Y.2d 879 (1978): Zoning Ordinance Resulting in Confiscation Requires Compensation

    Eaton v. Town of Islip, 43 N.Y.2d 879 (1978)

    A zoning ordinance that deprives a property owner of all practical use of their land is confiscatory and requires just compensation under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Summary

    Eaton sought to rebuild her house, which was destroyed by a storm, but was denied a building permit due to a town ordinance restricting construction in the “Dune District” to pedestrian dune crossings or fences. Eaton challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional, arguing it deprived her of all practical use of her property. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the ordinance, as applied to Eaton’s property, was confiscatory because it deprived her of any reasonable use without just compensation, violating due process.

    Facts

    In 1958, Eaton’s house was built on her property. On February 6, 1978, a violent storm washed the house out to sea. Eaton applied for a building permit to rebuild, but was denied because of Section 68-59.1 of the Town Code of Islip (the “Dune District” ordinance). The ordinance restricted construction in the Dune District to “an elevated pedestrian dune crossing or a fence of a type approved by the Town of Islip which is designed to hold or increase the dune”.

    Procedural History

    Eaton initiated an action challenging the denial of the permit. Both the lower courts found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Eaton’s property. The Town of Islip appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Islip’s Dune District ordinance, as applied to Eaton’s property, deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property, thereby constituting a confiscatory taking requiring just compensation under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the ordinance restricted construction to uses that deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property, rendering the restriction confiscatory and requiring just compensation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the Town failed to provide sufficient evidence to dispute the lower courts’ determination that the ordinance deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property. The court emphasized that the permissible uses under the ordinance (pedestrian dune crossing or a specific type of fence) did not allow Eaton to use the property in a way to which it was reasonably adapted. The court stated, “The restriction is, therefore, confiscatory and thus would work such a substantial deprivation of plaintiff’s use of her property, without just compensation, as to violate the due process clauses of our Federal and State.Constitutions.” The court distinguished the town’s right to regulate land for public safety (ecology, safeguarding life and property) from its obligation to provide just compensation when such regulation amounts to a taking. The court acknowledged the town’s valid interest in preserving the ecology of the dunes, stating: “The issue is not whether the town may constitutionally so restrict plaintiff’s land ‘to preserve the ecology of the dunes and grasses and by doing so to safeguard life and property’, but whether it can do so without according plaintiff just compensation. We agree that it cannot.” The court dismissed the argument that a prior offer from the federal government to purchase the property negated the confiscatory effect of the ordinance because the narrowly restricted uses remained.

  • Sommer v. Hilton, 46 N.Y.2d 831 (1978): Contract Clause and Rent Control Retroactivity

    Sommer v. Hilton, 46 N.Y.2d 831 (1978)

    The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution is not violated when a state law requires landlords to refund rent exceeding fair market value, if the leases were entered into after the enactment of the law, as the landlords were already operating in a regulated environment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (ETPA), requiring landlords to refund excess rent paid before a rent control resolution’s adoption, unconstitutionally impaired contracts. The court held that because the leases were made after the ETPA’s passage, landlords were on notice of potential rent adjustments. The court reasoned that the ETPA’s power to determine fair market rent and order refunds was a reserved state power, negating any claim of unconstitutional retroactivity under the Contract Clause. Landlords’ argument for a hearing on comparable rents was also rejected because the law distinguishes between tenant and owner applications for rent adjustments. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

    Facts

    Landlords entered into leases with tenants before the Village of Freeport adopted a resolution declaring a rent control emergency under the ETPA. After the resolution, the state division determined that the rent charged exceeded fair market rent and ordered a refund of the excess. The landlords challenged the refund requirement, arguing it was an unconstitutional impairment of contract and that they were entitled to a hearing on comparable rents.

    Procedural History

    The landlords challenged the order requiring a refund of excess rent. The Appellate Division ruled against the landlords. The landlords then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the ETPA’s requirement that landlords refund rent exceeding fair market value, for leases entered into before the adoption of a rent control resolution, constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of contract under the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.

    2. Whether landlords were entitled to a hearing on comparable rents in the process of establishing the fair market rent for the housing units involved.

    Holding

    1. No, because the leases were entered into after the passage of the ETPA, making them subject to the state’s reserved power to regulate rents and order refunds of excess payments.

    2. No, because the ETPA distinguishes between tenant and owner applications for rent adjustments, and the landlords did not file an application that would necessitate consideration of comparable rents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the leases were made after the ETPA’s enactment, which expressly allowed for refunds of rent exceeding fair market value. Therefore, the landlords operated in an “enterprise already regulated in the particular” at the time the leases were made. Citing Ogden v. Saunders and Veix v. Sixth Ward Assn., the court stated that the “retroactivity” claim was invalid because the landlords were aware of the potential for rent adjustments under the ETPA. The court emphasized that every lease entered after the ETPA’s effective date was subject to the State’s power to determine the emergency need for rent control and to require refunds for rent exceeding fair market value.

    Regarding the comparability argument, the court noted that subdivision b of section 9 of the ETPA mandates that the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal be guided by guidelines promulgated by the local rent guidelines board when considering a tenant application. Comparability of rents in the area is only considered for applications made under subdivision a of section 9. Since the landlords did not file an application under subdivision a, their argument for a hearing on comparable rents was rejected. The court pointed out that subdivision a allows an owner to seek adjustment of the “initial legal regulated rent,” which “has nothing to do with local guidelines.”

  • Sovereign Apartments, Inc. v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 44 N.Y.2d 803 (1978): Joinder of Parties with Knowledge of Proceedings

    Sovereign Apartments, Inc. v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 44 N.Y.2d 803 (1978)

    A party with full knowledge of pending administrative proceedings and the ability to challenge a determination within those proceedings can be properly joined in a subsequent legal action arising from that determination, especially when that party refuses to disclose information relevant to their standing.

    Summary

    Sovereign Apartments, Inc. (the landlord) initiated a proceeding to challenge a determination by the New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) that garage services were required under rent stabilization laws. The CAB ordered the landlord to roll back garage rents, arrange refunds, and allowed tenants to deduct overcharges. Meyers Parking System, Inc. (Meyers), the garage lessee, was joined in the proceeding. Meyers argued improper joinder. The Court of Appeals held that joinder was proper because Meyers had knowledge of the CAB proceedings, was subject to the rent stabilization laws as a lessee, and refused to produce the lease under which they claimed to be improperly served. This case clarifies when a party with prior knowledge can be joined in a related proceeding and highlights the impact of failing to disclose relevant information.

    Facts

    The New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) determined that the parking garage service at Sovereign Apartments was a required service under the Rent Stabilization Law and Code.
    The CAB ordered Sovereign Apartments, Inc. (Sovereign), the landlord, to roll back garage rents and arrange for refunds to tenants. The CAB authorized tenants to deduct any unrefunded overcharges from their next garage rent payments.
    Meyers Parking System, Inc. (Meyers) was the lessee operating the parking garage at Sovereign Apartments.
    Meyers was aware of the pending CAB proceeding but refused to produce the lease under which it claimed it should have been formally served.

    Procedural History

    Sovereign commenced an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the CAB’s determination.
    Meyers was joined as a party in the Article 78 proceeding.
    Meyers argued that it was improperly joined.
    The lower courts affirmed the joinder.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, upholding the joinder of Meyers.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Meyers Parking System, Inc., could be properly joined in the proceeding commenced by Sovereign Apartments, Inc., to challenge the New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board determination.

    Holding

    Yes, because Meyers, as lessee, would be subject to rent stabilization laws to the same extent as the landlord, it had full knowledge of the pending board proceeding, and it steadfastly refused to produce the lease under which it claimed a right to have been formally served in the proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Meyers, as the garage lessee, was subject to the Rent Stabilization Law to the same extent as the landlord, Sovereign. The court cited Bank of N. Y., Albany v Hirschfeld, 37 NY2d 501 to support the proposition that a lessee is bound by rent stabilization laws similarly to the landlord.

    The Court emphasized that Meyers was fully aware of the CAB proceedings and could have challenged the determination on any ground in the Article 78 proceeding. By refusing to produce the lease under which it claimed a right to formal service, Meyers weakened its argument against joinder. The court seemed to imply that Meyers was attempting to benefit from the situation without fully disclosing its contractual obligations. The court considered that “Meyers does not dispute that it was fully aware of the pending board proceeding and has steadfastly refused to produce the lease under which it claims a right to have been formally served in the proceeding.”

    The court implicitly applied principles of equity, preventing a party from benefiting from its own lack of transparency. The decision suggests that parties cannot avoid legal proceedings by selectively disclosing information, especially when they have actual knowledge of the proceedings and an opportunity to participate. The Court concluded that under these circumstances, “neither joinder nor issuance of the permanent injunction was improper.”

  • People v. Blackman, 43 N.Y.2d 585 (1978): Harmless Error in Bolstering Identification Testimony

    People v. Blackman, 43 N.Y.2d 585 (1978)

    Improper bolstering of a witness’s identification testimony by police officers is harmless error when the evidence of the defendant’s identity and guilt is overwhelming.

    Summary

    Defendants Blackman and Williams were convicted of robbery and weapons charges. At trial, three police officers testified that the victim identified the defendants shortly after the robbery. The New York Court of Appeals held that this testimony improperly bolstered the victim’s identification, violating established rules of evidence. However, the Court affirmed the convictions, finding the error harmless because the other evidence against the defendants, including their physical description matching the robbers, their presence in an apartment where the perpetrators fled, and the discovery of a matching weapon, was overwhelming. This holding illustrates the application of the harmless error doctrine in cases involving improper bolstering of identification testimony.

    Facts

    A man was beaten and robbed on a Bronx street. An eyewitness described the robbers as one tall and one short and heavyset. The robbers fled into a nearby building. Police apprehended Blackman and Williams in an apartment in the same building. A third man, whom the victim also identified as being with the defendants before the robbery, was also present. The apartment owner testified that the defendants and the third man had left the apartment for about 30 minutes, coinciding with the robbery, and returned with money that they gave her to buy liquor. A gun matching the description of the weapon used in the robbery was found near one of the defendants hiding under a bed.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of robbery in the first degree in a jury trial. Blackwell was also convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and reckless endangerment. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the police officers’ testimony that bolstered the victim’s identification. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting testimony from police officers that improperly bolstered the victim’s identification of the defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the error in admitting the bolstering testimony was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants’ identification and guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that the police officers’ testimony, describing the victim pointing to the defendants shortly after the robbery, improperly bolstered the victim’s identification. The court cited People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, emphasizing that such bolstering testimony should be excluded, regardless of whether it involves oral statements or gestures. However, the Court applied the harmless error doctrine, stating that a Trowbridge error is harmless when “the evidence of identity is so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point” (People v. Malloy, 22 NY2d 559, 567), or when the identification is “clear and strong” (People v. Johnson, 32 NY2d 814, 816). The Court found that the circumstantial evidence strongly confirmed the victim’s identification. The defendants matched the physical descriptions provided by an eyewitness. They were found in an apartment in the building where the robbers fled. A third man identified by the victim was also present. The apartment owner’s testimony placed the defendants at the scene of the crime at the time of the robbery. The matching gun was found near one of the defendants. Considering these facts, along with the victim’s opportunity to observe and prior sightings of one defendant, the Court concluded that the evidence of identification and guilt was overwhelming, rendering the error harmless. The court reasoned that when the other evidence is so strong the bolstering is not prejudicial.

  • Newsday, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 46 N.Y.2d 272 (1978): Interpreting Local Laws Restricting Tax Exemptions

    Newsday, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 46 N.Y.2d 272 (1978)

    A local law or resolution restricting a tax exemption under Real Property Tax Law § 485-b will be interpreted narrowly, and its applicability is limited to the specific terms outlined in the law or resolution itself.

    Summary

    Newsday sought a partial tax exemption for its new publishing plant under Real Property Tax Law § 485-b. The school district passed a resolution to deny this exemption for properties constructed after the resolution’s date. Newsday argued their plant was built in reliance on the exemption. The court held that because Newsday’s plant was substantially (90%) completed before the resolution’s passage, it did not fall within the resolution’s scope, which applied only to properties “constructed, altered, or improved” after the resolution date. Thus, Newsday was entitled to the partial tax exemption.

    Facts

    Newsday, a Long Island newspaper, obtained a building permit in November 1977 for a $6.5 million publishing plant in Huntington. In September 1978, they inquired about a partial tax exemption. By April 9, 1979, the plant was 90% complete. Newsday filed for a partial exemption under Real Property Tax Law § 485-b on May 10, 1979. The town assessor initially indicated the exemption would apply to town, county, and special district taxes, but not school taxes because the school district adopted a resolution on April 9, 1979, that reduced the exemption to zero.

    Procedural History

    Newsday sued for a declaratory judgment stating its entitlement to a partial school tax exemption under § 485-b. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Newsday. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, with one Justice dissenting. The Town of Huntington appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Newsday’s publishing plant, substantially completed before the school district’s resolution denying tax exemptions for properties constructed after the resolution date, fell within the scope of the resolution and was therefore ineligible for the partial tax exemption under Real Property Tax Law § 485-b.

    Holding

    No, because the school board’s resolution, by its own terms, applied only to property “constructed, altered, or improved” after the date of the resolution. Given that Newsday’s plant was 90% complete before the resolution, it did not fall within the resolution’s scope.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the specific language of the school board’s resolution, which applied to properties “constructed, altered, or improved after the date of this resolution.” The court reasoned that the phrase “constructed” could not reasonably be interpreted to include Newsday’s plant, which was already 90% complete when the resolution was passed. The court emphasized the finding of fact that the plant was substantially complete and had received a temporary certificate of occupancy shortly after the resolution. Therefore, the assessor erred in denying Newsday the exemption based on the school board’s resolution. The Court avoided the broader question of whether the plant was entitled to an exemption due to reliance, stating there was no need to reach that argument given the resolution’s plain language. The court noted that while local governments can remove themselves from the tax exemption program under § 485-b, this specific resolution did not apply to Newsday’s project. The court stated that “exemptions existing prior in time to passage of any such local law or resolution shall not be subject to any such reduction so effected”.

  • People v. Graham, 44 N.Y.2d 146 (1978): Jury’s Role in Determining Voluntariness of Confession After Miranda Violation Claim

    People v. Graham, 44 N.Y.2d 146 (1978)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, a trial court must submit the issue of a confession’s voluntariness to the jury, even when the challenge to voluntariness is based solely on an alleged Miranda violation.

    Summary

    Imogene Graham was arrested for possession of heroin. At trial, she challenged the voluntariness of a statement she made to police, arguing that she wasn’t properly advised of her Miranda rights. The trial court, which had previously ruled the statement admissible, refused to instruct the jury on voluntariness, believing that Miranda compliance was a question of law for the court. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that CPL 60.45 and 710.70 require the issue of voluntariness to be submitted to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutes mandate jury consideration of voluntariness even when the challenge is based on a Miranda violation.

    Facts

    Imogene Graham was arrested in a tavern after a purse containing heroin was found on her table. A police officer testified that he saw Graham abandon the purse. Graham testified she was unaware of the purse’s contents and that it belonged to another woman. The officer testified that he asked Graham, “Who are you holding the stuff for?” and she responded, “No, no, he’ll kill me. He’ll kill me.” The officer admitted that he failed to explicitly advise Graham of her right to counsel before questioning her, assuming she understood this right because he had informed her that the court would provide an attorney. Graham denied receiving any warnings.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, the trial court denied Graham’s motion to suppress the statement. At trial, Graham requested the court to charge the jury on the voluntariness of the statement and to allow her to argue the issue during summation. The trial court denied these requests. Graham was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and granted a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in not submitting the issue of voluntariness to the jury. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 60.45 and 710.70, a trial court must submit the issue of the voluntariness of a defendant’s incriminating statement to the jury when the challenge to voluntariness is based solely on the claim that the police failed to provide adequate Miranda warnings.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 60.45 and 710.70 mandate that the issue of a statement’s voluntariness be submitted to the jury, even when the challenge to voluntariness is based solely on an alleged Miranda violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the clear and unambiguous language of CPL 60.45 and 710.70. CPL 60.45(2)(b)(ii) defines an involuntary statement as one obtained “in violation of such rights as the defendant may derive from the constitution of this state or of the United States.” CPL 710.70(3) requires the court to submit the issue of voluntariness to the jury. The court noted that CPL 60.45’s enactment in 1970 followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, suggesting a legislative intent to expand the concept of “involuntary statement” to include violations of constitutional rights during interrogation. The court rejected the argument that determining compliance with Miranda is solely a question of law for the court, stating that juries are regularly instructed on complex legal propositions. The court further stated that any concerns about the wisdom of submitting such issues to the jury should be addressed to the legislature, not the courts. Quoting Allen v Minskoff, the court stated that the laws “ ‘must be read and given effect as [they were] written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have written [them]’ ”.