New York Law Review

Tag: 1972

  • Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972): Apportioning Damages Among Joint Tortfeasors

    Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972)

    Under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive.”

    Summary

    Willis Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane on a construction site contacted high-tension wires owned by Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO). Kelly sued LILCO and Herrick Manor, Inc. (Herrick), the general contractor. Both defendants cross-claimed against each other. The jury found both defendants negligent, and the trial court dismissed the cross-claims, finding both actively negligent. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that damages should be apportioned based on relative fault, and remanding the case for the trial court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court emphasized this new rule does not affect a plaintiff’s right to recover the full amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor.

    Facts

    LILCO owned and maintained high-tension wires along Clinton Avenue. Herrick was the general contractor for an apartment building being constructed near these wires. Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane contacted the wires, causing him to be electrocuted. LILCO knew about the construction but took no protective measures regarding the wires. Herrick’s president knew of the danger posed by the wires and requested LILCO to insulate them but did not warn the workers, including Kelly, of the danger, even when he saw the crane moving towards the wires.

    Procedural History

    Kelly and his wife sued LILCO and Herrick. Both defendants filed cross-claims against each other. The jury found both LILCO and Herrick negligent and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed both cross-claims, finding each party actively negligent. Herrick appealed the dismissal of its cross-claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. Herrick appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive”.

    Holding

    Yes, damages should be apportioned based on the relative fault of each tortfeasor because to require a tortfeasor who is only slightly negligent to pay the same amount as a more negligent co-tortfeasor is inequitable and unjust.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the rule established in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., which permits the apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of the nature of their concurring fault. The court found that the previous rule, which prevented a defendant found guilty of “active” negligence from recovering from another negligent party, was inequitable. The court stated, “To require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance, 10% causally negligent to pay the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90% causally negligent seems inequitable and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault.” This refinement of the contribution rule does not affect the plaintiff’s right to recover the total amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the relative degrees of negligence or fault and the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court clarified that this case addresses contribution between joint tortfeasors and does not concern issues like vicarious liability where the active-passive dichotomy would still apply.

  • People v. Wheatman, 31 N.Y.2d 17 (1972): Defining Accomplice Status Based on Intent

    People v. Wheatman, 31 N.Y.2d 17 (1972)

    A witness is considered an accomplice only if they participated in the crime with the intent to assist, counsel, induce, or encourage its commission; the critical factor is intent.

    Summary

    Wheatman and others were convicted of conspiracy and bribery related to bid-rigging on New York City Housing Authority painting contracts. The prosecution relied heavily on accomplice testimony. A key issue arose regarding the status of Feldman, an employee who made payments to an official at his employer’s direction. The trial court left it to the jury to determine whether Feldman was an accomplice, instructing them to consider whether he acted with intent to further the conspiracy or merely as a conduit for his employer. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on accomplice status, as Feldman’s intent was a question of fact. Independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony.

    Facts

    Several painting contractors, including Jerome, Spector, and Marcus, conspired with New York City Housing Authority employees Wheatman and Lowell, and a union official, Rarback, to rig bids on painting contracts. Esrig, an unindicted accomplice, initiated the conspiracy to control bidding and increase profits. Wheatman and Lowell received bribes for providing confidential bid information. Feldman, an employee of one of the contractors, testified that he drove his employer to meetings and made payments to an Authority inspector at his direction.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the New York County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions of some defendants due to illegally seized evidence, but affirmed Wheatman’s conviction. The Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the illegally seized evidence and then affirmed the remaining convictions after the Appellate Division determined there were no other grounds for reversal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplices’ testimony to satisfy the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine if witness Feldman was an accomplice.

    3. Whether evidence of assaults and threats against witnesses prejudiced the defendants.

    4. Whether the prosecutor’s calling of a witness who refused to testify prejudiced the defendants.

    5. Whether Wheatman’s statement to a security officer was inadmissible under Bruton v. United States.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because independent evidence, such as copies of bid estimates and handwritten lists found in the contractors’ offices, tended to connect the defendants to the crime and reasonably satisfied the jury that the accomplices were telling the truth.

    2. No, because the facts left Feldman’s intent in doubt, making his status as an accomplice a factual question for the jury to decide.

    3. No, because the evidence supported a finding that the assaults were arranged and inflicted in furtherance of the conspiracy.

    4. No, because the jury was instructed to disregard the incident, and there was no indication of the testimony the prosecutor expected or that the refusal was based on self-incrimination.

    5. No, because the rule in Bruton does not apply when the challenged statement does not incriminate any of the declarant’s co-defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, emphasizing that sufficient independent evidence corroborated the accomplices’ testimony, satisfying the requirements of section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now CPL 60.22). The court cited People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, stating that corroborating evidence is sufficient “if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.” The Court determined that it was proper for the trial judge to allow the jury to determine Feldman’s status as an accomplice because there was ambiguity regarding his intent. The court stated that “The generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have been convicted * * * either as principal or accessory * * * The question of intent must always enter as an element of the crime.”, citing People v. Jackerson, 247 N.Y. 36, 42. The court also held that the evidence of assaults was admissible because it was part of the conspiracy, and the incident with the witness who refused to testify was harmless because the jury was instructed to disregard it. Finally, the court clarified that the Bruton rule does not apply when the challenged statement does not incriminate any co-defendants.

  • Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475 (1972): Duty to Warn Golfers of Errant Shots

    Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475 (1972)

    A golfer only has a duty to give a timely warning to other persons within the foreseeable ambit of danger; there is generally no duty to warn persons not in the intended line of flight on another tee or fairway of an intention to drive.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a golfer, was injured when struck by a golf ball driven by the defendant. The incident occurred on a golf course where the ninth tee was adjacent to the eighth fairway. Plaintiff argued the defendant was negligent in driving without warning. The Court of Appeals held that, given the distance and angle between the plaintiff and the intended line of flight, the defendant owed no duty to warn the plaintiff before hitting the ball. The court emphasized that a golfer cannot be expected to anticipate a player suddenly stepping into a zone of danger.

    Facts

    Plaintiff and defendant were playing golf at the Windsor Golf Course. The defendant was teeing off at the eighth tee, while the plaintiff was at the ninth tee, which was adjacent to the eighth fairway. The eighth hole was a straightaway, 195-yard par three, with the eighth green not visible from the eighth tee. The ninth tee was about 150 yards from the eighth tee and partially protected by a mesh wire fence. As defendant was teeing up, plaintiff walked from behind the protective screen to retrieve his golf bag. Defendant drove the ball, which hooked badly to the left, striking plaintiff in the eye and causing blindness. No advance warning was given before the shot, although members of the defendant’s group shouted “fore” as the ball started to hook, but the plaintiff did not hear it.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and alternatively, set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that there was no evidence of the defendant’s negligence as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was negligent in driving a golf ball from the eighth tee without advance warning to the plaintiff, who was near the ninth tee adjacent to the eighth fairway.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff was not within the foreseeable ambit of danger, given his distance from the intended line of flight and the presence of a protective fence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that a golfer has a duty to give a timely warning to other persons within the foreseeable ambit of danger, citing Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311, 318. However, this duty does not extend to persons not in the intended line of flight on another tee or fairway. The court reasoned that even the best golfers can hit errant shots, and it would be unreasonable to require golfers to warn everyone within possible range of a misdirected ball. The court distinguished the facts from cases where the injured party was closer to the line of flight. In this case, the plaintiff was 150 yards away on another tee and approximately 25 yards from the intended line of flight. Further, the court noted that the plaintiff had been behind a protective fence when the defendant prepared to drive, and the defendant could not be expected to anticipate the plaintiff stepping into the danger zone at the last moment. The court emphasized that the relevant question is whether the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff, and any breach of duty to others is immaterial, quoting Prosser, Torts. The court pointed out, “[E]ven the best professional golfers cannot avoid an occasional ‘ hook ’ or ‘ slice ’” (Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 Y 2d, at p. 319). Thus, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law. The court also noted that the golfers on the eighth green, if present, could not be seen from the eighth tee, thus negating any duty owed to them. The court held that any breach of duty to others not injured is immaterial, citing Prosser, Torts.

  • Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.2d 466 (1972): Merchant’s Defense for Reasonable Detention in Shoplifting Cases

    Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.2d 466 (1972)

    Under New York General Business Law § 218, a retail merchant has a defense against false arrest and imprisonment claims if they detain a suspected shoplifter reasonably, and this defense extends to arrests outside the store and to the continued custody by the police, provided the initial detention was reasonable.

    Summary

    Jacques was stopped by a Sears security officer in the parking lot after leaving the store with unpaid merchandise. He admitted to taking the items and was detained until police arrived. Jacques was then arrested and taken to the police station, but the charges were later dismissed. Jacques sued Sears for false arrest. The jury found that Sears had detained Jacques for a reasonable time and with reasonable grounds, but still awarded damages. The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint, finding the verdict inconsistent with the jury’s finding of reasonable detention, holding that the merchant’s statutory defense extended to the police custody following a reasonable initial detention.

    Facts

    Jacques entered a Sears store to buy business supplies, placing 19 reflectorized letters/numbers (worth 10 cents each) in his pocket. He purchased other items (mailbox, keys), but not the letters. Sears security officer, Yarisco, observed Jacques placing the letters in his pocket and leaving without paying. Yarisco stopped Jacques in the parking lot and escorted him back to the security office. Jacques admitted to taking the letters without paying, expressed remorse, and offered to pay for them. Jacques had over $600 cash and a $400 check on his person at the time.

    Procedural History

    Jacques sued Sears for false arrest, false imprisonment, etc., in City Court of Syracuse. The jury returned a general verdict for Jacques, but also answered an interrogatory stating the detention by Sears was reasonable. The County Court reversed the City Court judgment and ordered a new trial, finding the general verdict inconsistent with the answer to the interrogatory. The Appellate Division modified the County Court order to dismiss the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “detention” in Section 218 of the General Business Law encompasses a formal arrest, thus providing a defense for a “reasonable” arrest in a shoplifting situation. Whether a merchant’s defense of reasonable detention extends to the subsequent custody of the suspect by the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the words “arrest” and “detention” are often used interchangeably, and Section 218 of the General Business Law provides a defense for merchants in false arrest suits when the detention is reasonable. Yes, because the merchant’s defense for reasonable detention extends to turning over the suspect to the police under reasonable circumstances, implementing the policy of the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 218 of the General Business Law was enacted to protect merchants from false arrest suits, even if the criminal charges are eventually dismissed. The court stated: “Section 218 of the General Business Law makes reasonableness of arrest available to retail stores and their employees as a defense to civil false arrest suits”. The court also noted legislative history indicating the statute’s purpose was to reduce merchants’ reluctance to apprehend shoplifters due to vulnerability to false arrest suits. The court found the terms “arrest” and “detention” are often used synonymously, and “reasonable detention” includes a full-fledged arrest if there is sufficient cause. Here, the court found that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the finding of a reasonable detention, from the initial stop to the arrival of the police. Jacques admitted to taking the goods without paying, and offered no exculpatory explanation. Regarding the police custody, the court reasoned that Sears was justified in handing Jacques over to the police after the reasonable detention. The court stated that the merchant’s defense for reasonable detention extends “to the turning over of the suspect to the police under reasonable circumstances”.

  • In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352 (1972): Right to Counsel for Indigent Parents in Child Neglect Cases

    In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352 (1972)

    An indigent parent facing the potential loss of a child’s society in a child neglect proceeding is entitled to be advised of the right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford an attorney.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a Family Court is required to advise an indigent parent, charged with child neglect, of their right to assigned counsel. The Westchester County Commissioner of Social Services filed a neglect charge against the appellant, alleging she left her three-year-old daughter unattended. The Family Court advised the appellant she could retain counsel at her own expense but did not inform her of her right to assigned counsel if indigent. The appellant admitted the facts in the petition, and the child was placed in the petitioner’s custody. The New York Court of Appeals held that indigent parents are entitled to be advised of their right to assigned counsel in child neglect proceedings due to the fundamental interest at stake.

    Facts

    In June 1969, the Westchester County Commissioner of Social Services filed a child neglect charge against the appellant. The charge alleged that the appellant left her three-year-old daughter home alone between 1:00 AM and 4:00 AM on June 21. During that time, the child was allegedly kidnapped and raped by a friend of the appellant.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court adjudicated the child neglected and placed her in the petitioner’s custody after the appellant admitted to the allegations in the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order. The appeal then reached the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right based on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court is required to advise an indigent parent, charged with child neglect, that they are entitled to be represented by assigned counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because an indigent parent, facing the loss of a child’s society, is entitled to the assistance of counsel and must be informed of that right; to deny legal assistance under such circumstances would constitute a violation of their due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a parent’s concern for the liberty, care, and control of their child involves a fundamental interest. The court stated that this interest cannot be relinquished to the State without the opportunity for a hearing with assigned counsel if the parent cannot afford one. The court emphasized that once the right to assigned counsel exists, the individual must be informed of that right. The court highlighted the deficiency in the Family Court’s advice to the appellant, which stated, “you must obtain [an attorney] yourself, and pay for him out of your own funds,” excluding the possibility of assigned counsel. This statement, the Court reasoned, could not lead to a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. The court adopted the reasoning of the Federal District Court in Cleaver v. Wilcox, emphasizing the inherent imbalance between the state as an adversary and an unrepresented indigent parent. The court remitted the proceeding to the Family Court for a rehearing, ensuring the appellant would be represented by counsel, while not reversing or vacating the initial order.

  • Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415 (1972): Recovery of Fees Paid Under an Unconstitutional Statute

    Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415 (1972)

    Payments made to the state under a statute later declared unconstitutional are recoverable only if the payments were made under duress or protest; otherwise, they are considered voluntary and non-refundable.

    Summary

    Paramount Film sought to recover motion picture license fees paid to New York State between 1959 and 1965, after the statute requiring these fees was deemed unconstitutional. The fees, though totaling a significant sum over time, were a minor expense relative to film production costs. Paramount had paid these fees without protest. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the payments were voluntary and made without protest, Paramount could not recover the fees, except for a small percentage paid under protest. The court emphasized that the fees were reasonable, the services were rendered, and the costs were likely passed on to consumers.

    Facts

    Paramount Film Distributing Corp. paid motion picture license fees to the State of New York from June 10, 1959, to June 10, 1965. The fees were mandated by Education Law § 120-132. The fee was $3.50 per 1,000 feet for original films, and $4 per 1,000 feet for copies. These statutes were later nullified in Matter of Trans-Lux Distr. Corp. v. Board of Regents. Paramount paid the fees without protest, despite employing legal counsel.

    Procedural History

    Paramount Film sought recovery of the fees in the New York Court of Claims. The Appellate Division sustained Paramount’s right to recover all fees paid since 1959. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether payments of motion picture license fees to the State of New York, made without protest under a statute later declared unconstitutional, were voluntary or involuntary under duress, thus entitling the payor to recover the fees.

    Holding

    No, because the payments were voluntary, made without protest, and the state has already provided the services and expended the funds. Restitution is not warranted where the payer did not object to the fee and the payee has already disbursed the funds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between voluntary and involuntary payments of taxes or fees later declared void, referencing Mercury Mach. Importing Corp. v. City of New York and Five Boro Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. City of New York. In Mercury, the court denied recovery of taxes paid without protest, even though the statute was later deemed unconstitutional, emphasizing that a mistake of law alone does not make a payment involuntary. In Five Boro, recovery was allowed because the fees were deemed involuntary, as electricians would have been barred from working without paying them.

    The court found Paramount’s payments were voluntary because the company did not protest the fees despite having the means to do so. The court stated: “Surely one would expect motion picture distributors, and especially a corporation as large as claimant with its staff of lawyers, to protest if the fees were thought illegal.” The court also noted that the fees were reasonable, the services were rendered, and the costs were likely passed on to consumers.

    Furthermore, the court reasoned that allowing recovery would unjustly enrich Paramount at the expense of the state, which had already used the fees to fund the licensing program. The court cited general principles of restitution, asking whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered. The court found that the state did not receive unjust enrichment, as the fees defrayed the costs of a regulatory program intended to benefit both the industry and the public.

    The court distinguished the case from Trans-Lux and Freedman v. Maryland, noting those cases involved challenges to the licensing requirement itself, whereas this case involved a challenge to the fees after the licensing statute was invalidated on procedural grounds. The court also cited Universal Film Exch. v. Board of Finance & Revenue, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied recovery of license fees paid without protest, citing long acquiescence, services rendered, benefit to the industry, and passing on costs to the public.

  • Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972): Student Voter Residency Requirements

    Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972)

    A state can impose reasonable residency requirements for voting, but these requirements must be applied neutrally and cannot create undue burdens on specific classes of voters, such as students, to effectively deny their right to vote.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of New York Election Law § 151, concerning student residency for voting purposes. A group of students were denied voter registration based on their residency in university dormitories. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the state can ensure that only bona fide residents vote, the law must be applied neutrally without creating a presumption against student residency. The court found that the law itself was not unconstitutional but that the summary denial of registration based solely on student status was improper and required further individualized inquiry.

    Facts

    Several groups of students residing in college or university dormitories in New York were denied voter registration or had their registrations challenged by county election boards. The Suffolk County Board of Elections used questionnaires with an extensive line of inquiry. The Oneida and Onondaga County Boards of Elections either refused registration outright or notified students that their existing registrations would be voided or challenged. The students argued that Section 151 of the Election Law, as amended, was unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    In Palla, Special Term found that the petitioners were subjected to a special line of inquiry and established residency. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for proceedings with sworn witness testimony. In Bell and Gorenberg, Special Term consolidated the actions, upheld the constitutionality of Election Law § 151, and dismissed the petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed in Bell and Gorenberg.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 151 of the New York Election Law, concerning student residency for voting purposes, is facially unconstitutional as violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, or the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

    2. Whether the summary denial of voter registration to students based solely on their student status violates the Election Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute itself is a permissible effort to ensure that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the traditional requirements of bona fide residence.

    2. Yes, because the Board of Elections erred in summarily denying the petitioners’ applications based solely on their student status. The law requires an individualized assessment of residency based on expressed intent, conduct, and attendant circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to vote is fundamental but that states have a legitimate interest in ensuring that only bona fide residents vote. Section 151 of the Election Law, the court stated, does not impose additional qualifications for voting but provides a framework for determining residency, which is a prerequisite for voting. The court acknowledged that students, like other transient populations, may require a more detailed inquiry to determine their true domicile. However, the court emphasized that the inquiry must be neutral and cannot presume that students are not residents. The court stated: “[t]he intention to change is not alone sufficient. It must exist, but must concur with and be manifested by resultant acts which are independent of the presence as a student in the new locality”. The court differentiated this case from others where statutes explicitly disenfranchised specific groups. Here, the court found that the law’s criteria were applicable to all prospective registrants, and the classification of students was a reasonable effort to assure that applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence. The court held that the election boards erred in summarily denying the student’s applications. They should have allowed them the opportunity to demonstrate residency through the procedures outlined in the Election Law. The court remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with the Election Law, emphasizing the need for individualized assessment of residency.

  • People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453 (1972): Self-Help is Not a Defense to Criminal Trespass

    People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453 (1972)

    The right to enter property, even when arguably justified, does not permit the use of force or illegal methods to gain entry; self-help is not a defense to criminal trespass or resisting arrest.

    Summary

    Horelick, a teacher, was convicted of criminal trespass and resisting arrest after he and others forcibly entered a locked high school during a teachers’ strike. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that regardless of whether the school should have been open, Horelick’s use of force to enter was unlawful. The court emphasized that disputes should be resolved through legal channels, not through self-help and force. The decision highlights the importance of maintaining order and resolving conflicts through established procedures, even when motivated by a sincere belief in a cause.

    Facts

    During a city-wide teachers’ strike, a high school principal ordered the school to remain closed and locked. Horelick, a teacher, disagreed with the closure and planned to enter the building. He gained access through a basement window and was confronted by a member of the custodial staff. A struggle ensued as Horelick attempted to unlock the doors to allow others to enter. Police were called, and Horelick resisted arrest, including physically resisting the officer. A crowd of supporters gathered during the arrest.

    Procedural History

    Horelick was convicted of criminal trespass in the second degree and resisting arrest. He appealed the conviction. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Horelick then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person, believing they have a right or duty to be in a building, can use self-help, including force or illegal methods, to enter that building when it is locked and closed, and then resist arrest when police intervene.

    Holding

    No, because regardless of any perceived right or duty, the use of force or illegal methods to enter property, and resistance of arrest, is unlawful and cannot be justified by the belief in the righteousness of one’s cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the central issue was not the lawfulness of the school’s closure, but Horelick’s use of force to enter the building. The court stated, “Even such property rights, by still being subject to restrictions on the use of force, emphasize the policy against self-help by force or other illegal methods.” The court emphasized that established procedures must be followed, even if those procedures are inconvenient. The court highlighted the availability of remedies through superiors, police assistance, and ultimately the courts, rather than resorting to force. It noted that the Penal Law defines trespass in terms of a “license” or “privilege” to enter (Penal Law, § 140.00, subd. 5), and Horelick’s actions exceeded any such license. The court explicitly rejected the notion that controversies should be resolved in the streets or school corridors, stating that “it is not tolerable that the controversies be resolved in the streets or the school corridors, instead of under law, and in the courts, if necessary.” While acknowledging Horelick’s possible sincere motivation, the court held that condoning self-help force would be a grave consequence. The court implied that the appropriate course of action would have been to seek assistance from superiors or the police, and if necessary, to pursue legal action in the courts.

  • Matter of Brown v. Board of Elections, 39 A.D.2d 403 (1972): Constitutionality of Durational Residency Requirements for Voting

    39 A.D.2d 403 (1972)

    Durational residency requirements for voting are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and will be struck down if less restrictive means can achieve the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of New York’s 90-day durational residency requirement for voting. Petitioners, who became county residents in September 1971, were denied voter registration for the November 1971 election because they did not meet the 90-day requirement. The court held that the 90-day residency requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it impinged on the rights to vote and interstate travel. The court reasoned that less restrictive means, such as voter registration and independent verification of residence, could adequately prevent voter fraud, making the durational residency requirement unconstitutional.

    Facts

    Petitioners established residency in Onondaga County in September 1971.

    They attempted to register to vote in the November 2, 1971 general election.

    Registration was denied because they had not resided in the county for 90 days prior to the election, as required by the New York Constitution and Election Law.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners challenged the 90-day residency requirement under Section 331 of the Election Law.

    The lower court upheld the residency requirement.

    This appeal followed, ultimately reaching the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s 90-day durational residency requirement for voting violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the 90-day durational residency requirement infringes upon the fundamental rights to vote and travel, and the state failed to demonstrate that it was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied strict scrutiny, noting that any restriction on the right to vote must be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” Citing Dunn v. Blumstein, the court emphasized that durational residency requirements impinge on constitutionally secured rights, including the right to vote and interstate travel.

    The court found that New York’s 90-day requirement was indistinguishable from the requirement invalidated in Dunn v. Blumstein. It reasoned that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud could be achieved through less restrictive means, such as voter registration systems and independent verification of residence. The court highlighted that New York’s system of permanent personal registration and the practice of keeping registration books open until 30 days before an election undermined the argument that a longer residency requirement was necessary for investigation.

    The court stated, “And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less drastic means’”.

    The court concluded that broadly imposed political disabilities, such as durational residency requirements, are too imprecise to withstand constitutional scrutiny, given the availability of less restrictive alternatives.

  • Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972): Establishing Residency for Student Voters

    31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972)

    A student may establish residency for voting purposes at their college location, but election boards can make detailed inquiries to ensure the claimed residency is bona fide and independent of their student status.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether students can establish residency for voting purposes at their college or university location. The New York Court of Appeals held that students can establish residency where they attend college, but election boards are entitled to make detailed inquiries to ensure that the claimed residency is bona fide and independent of their student status. The court upheld the constitutionality of Section 151 of the New York Election Law, which allows for these inquiries, finding that it does not create an unconstitutional barrier to student voting but rather ensures that all voters meet the traditional requirements of bona fide residence.

    Facts

    Several students residing at college dormitories in New York State were either denied voter registration or notified that their existing registration would be challenged. The Suffolk County Board of Elections denied registration to students at Stony Brook. In Oneida and Onondaga Counties, some students were registered, but later notified their right to vote would be challenged. These students challenged the constitutionality of Section 151 of the New York Election Law, arguing it unfairly restricted their right to vote based on their status as students.

    Procedural History

    In Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, the Special Term initially found that the students had established residency, but the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a hearing. In Bell and Gorenberg, the Special Term upheld the constitutionality of Section 151 and dismissed the petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed in Bell and Gorenberg. The cases were then consolidated and appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 151 of the New York Election Law violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating a special burden for students seeking to register to vote.
    2. Whether Section 151 violates the Voting Rights Act or the Twenty-Sixth Amendment by abridging the right to vote of 18-year-olds.

    Holding

    1. No, because Section 151 represents a permissible effort to ensure that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the traditional requirements of bona fide residence.
    2. No, because the statute does not disenfranchise anyone, but merely determines the place where one may legally vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that residence for voting purposes requires both an intention to reside at a fixed place and physical presence, coupled with conduct indicating such intent. The court emphasized that Section 151 does not impose additional qualifications for student voters but merely provides a framework for determining whether a student has genuinely changed their domicile. The court stated, “That statute, insofar as relevant, provides that for ‘the purpose of registering and voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence… by reason of his presence or absence… while a student of any institution of learning’.” The court found that the statute is neutral and does not disenfranchise anyone but merely determines the appropriate place for an individual to vote. The court acknowledged that students might face a more detailed inquiry into their residency, but this was justified by the fact that their presence in a college town is often temporary. The court held that the classification was reasonable and did not violate equal protection, as it served the legitimate state interest of preventing non-residents from voting. The court held, “We deal admittedly with what is foremost among all political rights — the right to vote. Section 151 distinguishes between residents and nonresidents — not students and other citizens.” The court determined the Board of Elections erred in summarily denying the students’ applications based solely on their student status.