New York Law Review

Tag: 1972

  • Graff v. Billet, 31 N.Y.2d 899 (1972): Broker Entitled to Commission When Seller Prevents Completion

    Graff v. Billet, 31 N.Y.2d 899 (1972)

    A seller may not avoid paying a broker’s commission if the transaction is terminated due to the seller’s failure to fulfill a condition, whether express or implied, necessary for the deal’s completion, even if the failure is not due to bad faith.

    Summary

    Graff, a broker, sued Billet, a lessor, to recover a commission. Billet signed a lease with a tenant procured by Graff, seemingly to support a variance application. Billet then withdrew the application, preventing the deal’s completion. The court held that the broker was entitled to the commission because the seller wrongfully prevented the completion of the transaction by withdrawing the variance application, which was necessary for the lease to proceed. The court clarified that the seller’s failure to perform a necessary condition did not have to be in bad faith for the broker to be entitled to the commission.

    Facts

    Billet, the lessor, engaged Graff, a broker, to find a commercial tenant.
    Graff procured a tenant, and Billet signed a lease with that tenant.
    One purpose of securing the lease was to support Billet’s variance application pending before the zoning board.
    Billet subsequently withdrew the variance application.
    Withdrawing the variance application rendered the completion of the lease deal impossible.

    Procedural History

    The broker, Graff, sued the lessor, Billet, to recover the broker’s commission.
    The lower court found in favor of Graff, the broker.
    Billet appealed, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a seller can avoid paying a broker’s commission when the transaction is terminated because of the seller’s failure to perform a condition necessary for completion, even if the failure is not due to bad faith.

    Holding

    Yes, because a seller may not avoid payment of the commission when the transaction is terminated by their failure to perform a condition, express or implied, necessary for completion, and this failure does not necessarily need to be born of bad faith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the general rule is that a broker’s commission is earned only when the buyer and seller reach a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the sale, there is an exception. This exception applies when the seller prevents the completion of the transaction by failing to perform a condition necessary for its completion.
    The court emphasized that the failure to perform such a condition does not have to stem from bad faith to trigger the exception. The key is whether the seller wrongfully or arbitrarily prevented completion.
    In this case, Billet’s withdrawal of the variance application, which was essential for the lease to proceed, constituted such wrongful prevention. By signing the lease and then withdrawing the application, Billet rendered the deal impossible, thereby entitling Graff to the commission.
    The court cited Lane-Real Estate Dept. Store v. Lawlet Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 36, 43 and Levy v. Lacey, 22 N.Y.2d 271, 276 to support the principle that a seller cannot avoid a commission when the transaction fails due to their non-performance of a necessary condition.
    The court stated, “Contrary to the intimation in the majority’s statement below, the failure to perform need not necessarily be born of bad faith.”
    The court found that there was a question of fact whether essential agreement had been reached and whether defendant wrongfully or arbitrarily prevented completion, and that the lower courts properly found against the defendant.

  • People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462 (1972): Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462 (1972)

    The right to counsel means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent a defendant; it requires counsel to conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow themselves time for reflection and preparation for trial.

    Summary

    Bennett was convicted of manslaughter. Prior to and during the trial, Bennett requested a new lawyer, arguing that his assigned counsel was unprepared, did not understand him, and was providing inadequate representation. The trial judge denied these requests but intervened significantly during the trial, questioning witnesses and providing curative instructions due to counsel’s deficiencies. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Bennett’s conviction, holding that his counsel’s representation was so inadequate that it rendered the trial a “farce and a mockery of justice,” violating his Sixth Amendment rights. The court emphasized the need for counsel to conduct investigations and prepare adequately for trial.

    Facts

    Bennett was indicted for murder for allegedly shooting Clifford Van Putten in the presence of Amos Grant.

    Before and during the trial, Bennett requested the trial judge to replace his assigned counsel because he felt the lawyer was unprepared, did not understand him, and was not properly representing him.

    Defense counsel’s opening statement presented an accidental shooting defense but argued self-defense in summation, unsupported by evidence.

    The trial judge had to prompt defense counsel to review witness statements and actively cross-examine witnesses himself to elicit favorable information for the defense.

    Defense counsel failed to appear at Bennett’s sentencing, where Bennett received the maximum sentence.

    Procedural History

    Bennett was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree.

    He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Bennett was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to his assigned lawyer’s inadequate preparation and representation at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record revealed a complete lack of investigation and preparation, and defense counsel rendered the trial a “farce and a mockery of justice.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that defense counsel’s performance was so deficient that it deprived Bennett of a fair trial. The court emphasized that the right to counsel requires more than nominal representation; it requires counsel to conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow themselves time for reflection and preparation for trial. “[I]t is impossible to define with any precision what constitutes ‘inadequate’ or ‘ineffective’ legal representation or to formulate standards which will apply to all cases. But, at the very least, the right of a defendant to be represented by an attorney means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent him upon a trial and ask questions.”

    The court noted the trial judge’s extensive efforts to ensure a fair trial, including prompting defense counsel and questioning witnesses. However, it held that the judge’s intervention could not substitute for effective representation by counsel. The court determined that the errors were not harmless and that the failure to present the accused’s cause in any fundamental respect required reversal.

    The Court distinguished between requiring “errorless counsel” and requiring assistance that is “susceptible of being deemed of an assistive nature.” The Court found the latter lacking in this case.

  • Morales v. Eveready Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 46 (N.Y. 1972): Enforceability of Insurance Exclusions Contrary to Public Policy

    Morales v. Eveready Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 46 (N.Y. 1972)

    An insurance policy exclusion that conflicts with the public policy of protecting innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents is unenforceable, even if the exclusion is part of a private agreement between the insurer and the insured.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether an insurance company, Eveready, could disclaim coverage based on a policy exclusion for vehicles not leased on an annual basis. Morales, a driver leasing a car from Abco Leasing Company, was involved in an accident. Eveready, Abco’s insurer, disclaimed coverage. The court held the disclaimer invalid, finding it violated the public policy of ensuring financial responsibility for drivers and protecting accident victims. The court reasoned that once Eveready issued the policy, its obligations extended as broadly as the applicable statutes required, and the attempted exclusion was unenforceable.

    Facts

    On April 8, 1967, Efrain Morales, while driving a car he leased from Abco Leasing Company, was involved in an accident with the plaintiffs, who were passengers in his car. Abco had an insurance policy with Eveready Insurance Company. Eveready’s policy included Automobile Endorsement No. 3, which stated coverage did not apply to vehicles used as “Drive-Yourself private passenger vehicles (except leased on annual basis.)” Eveready disclaimed coverage because Morales did not lease the car on an annual basis.

    Procedural History

    The initial judgment was likely in favor of Eveready, upholding the disclaimer. The Appellate Division reversed this judgment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding the disclaimer invalid and obligating Eveready to defend and pay any judgment against Morales.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an insurance policy exclusion that conflicts with the public policy of protecting innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents is enforceable.

    Holding

    1. No, because once an insurance policy is issued, the insurer’s obligation arises by operation of law and is as broad as the requirements of applicable statutes. Any attempted exclusion not permitted by law cannot limit responsibility under the policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that New York’s public policy, as reflected in the Insurance Law and the Vehicle and Traffic Law, aims to protect innocent victims of traffic accidents by ensuring that motorists are financially responsible. Section 167 of the Insurance Law mandates that liability insurance policies cover those using a vehicle with the owner’s permission. Section 311 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law defines an “owner’s policy of liability insurance” as providing coverage as defined in regulations promulgated by the superintendent of insurance. These regulations, found in 11 NYCRR 60.1, repeat the requirements of Section 167 and Section 311. Section 60.2 lists permissible exclusions, and the exclusion in Eveready’s policy was not among them. Citing the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), the court found the exclusion invalid. The court stated: “Once Eveready issued its policy to Abco, its obligation, with the exception of permitted exclusions, arose by operation of law and was as broad as the requirements of the applicable statutes. Any attempted exclusion, not permitted by law, would not serve to limit its responsibility under the policy, whatever its private agreement with Abco.” The court also noted that Eveready would be unjustly enriched if it collected premiums without providing the required coverage. The court highlighted the importance of protecting the public from uninsured drivers and ensuring compensation for injuries sustained in accidents, stating: “It is the public policy of New York to protect the innocent victims of traffic accidents.”

  • Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972): Determining Appointing Authority Under Court Unification

    Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972)

    Under New York’s court unification provisions, the power to appoint and control court personnel generally shifted from local boards of justices to the Appellate Divisions, except where specifically reserved by statute, such as for personal assistants to judges.

    Summary

    Kleinman, a clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, challenged the Appellate Division’s authority to withhold pay raises previously granted. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, possessed the authority to withhold these raises. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, emphasizing that the power to appoint personal assistants to judges was specifically reserved, unlike the general administrative powers over court staff that devolved upon the Appellate Divisions.

    Facts

    Kleinman was appointed clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, in 1954. Legislation in 1961 and 1962 provided pay raises for nonjudicial court personnel, but allowed the appointing authority to withhold increases if unwarranted. In 1964, the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division in the First and Second Judicial Departments withheld Kleinman’s pay raises, citing their authority under the court unification provisions effective September 1, 1962.

    Procedural History

    Kleinman initiated a proceeding claiming he was underpaid because the Appellate Division lacked the authority to withhold his pay raises. Special Term denied the application and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the determination, with one Justice dissenting. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, the Appellate Division in the Second Judicial Department was the “appropriate appointing authority” empowered to withhold pay raises from the clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court unification provisions vested administrative powers, including the authority to withhold pay raises, in the Appellate Divisions, except where specific statutes reserved such powers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Board of Justices of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was initially the appropriate appointing authority under Section 168 of the Judiciary Law, the court unification provisions of the State Constitution (Article VI) and the Judiciary Law (Article 7-A), effective September 1, 1962, transferred this power to the Appellate Division. Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution grants broad supervisory power to the Appellate Divisions over the administration of courts within their departments. Section 214 of Article 7-A of the Judiciary Law implements this authority, stating that each Appellate Division is vested with “all administrative powers and duties vested pursuant to any provision of law in any judicial or non-judicial personnel of the courts in its department.”

    The court distinguished Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, where it held that the Presiding Justices were not the appropriate appointing authorities for nonlawyer “law secretaries” to Supreme Court Justices. The court emphasized that in Gilligan, Section 222 of the Judiciary Law specifically reserved the power of individual judges or justices to appoint their personal assistants. As the court stated, “the power of an individual Judge or Justice to appoint his personal assistants was expressly reserved and continued. It did not devolve upon the Appellate Divisions.” In Kleinman’s case, no such specific reservation existed, thus the Appellate Division’s power was valid. The court effectively demonstrated how the general rule of unified administrative control yields to specific statutory exceptions.

  • Godbee v. Holmes, 39 A.D.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972): Due Process Rights in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings

    Godbee v. Holmes, 39 A.D.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)

    Prison inmates facing punitive segregation are entitled to rudimentary due process protections, including notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard, but not necessarily the full panoply of rights afforded in criminal trials.

    Summary

    Godbee, a county jail inmate, sued for damages and injunctive relief, claiming his five-day punitive segregation without a hearing violated his rights. The court held that while inmates don’t have a right to a full trial-like hearing for disciplinary actions, they are entitled to minimal due process. This includes being informed of the charges against them and having a chance to respond. The court also addressed the issue of censoring inmate mail to attorneys, stating that while such censorship is permissible, it cannot be arbitrary or capricious and requires good cause related to prison security or illegal schemes. The court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that factual issues remained regarding the reasons for the segregation and the censorship of mail.

    Facts

    Godbee was an inmate in a county jail. He was placed in punitive segregation for five days. Godbee claimed he did not violate any jail rules. He alleged the segregation was intentional and malicious. The Sheriff contended he had a right to place prisoners in solitary confinement for violating jail discipline. Godbee claimed he was denied a hearing with notice, witnesses, counsel, and an impartial examiner.

    Procedural History

    Godbee filed suit seeking monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The lower court granted summary judgment against Godbee, dismissing his claims. Godbee appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed the lower court’s decision in part, reinstating some of Godbee’s claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an inmate has a right to a hearing before being placed in punitive segregation.
    2. Whether prison officials can censor letters from an inmate to his attorney.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because an inmate is entitled to rudimentary due process, including notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard, before being placed in punitive segregation.
    2. Yes, but with limitations, because detention officials can censor letters to attorneys, but this cannot be done arbitrarily or capriciously, and good cause must exist related to prison security or illegal schemes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a full trial-like hearing is not required, minimal due process is necessary to prevent illegitimate punishment. Citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, the court emphasized the right to know the charges and evidence and to explain one’s actions. The court stated, “To require detention officials to write out the charges against a prisoner does not seem to impose too heavy a burden; nor is it an undue burden to allow the prisoner to defend himself against those charges.” The fact-finder need not be from outside the detention facility, but should be someone unlikely to prefer charges as part of their normal duties.

    Regarding mail censorship, the court acknowledged prison officials’ right to censor mail to attorneys (Matter of Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433), but stressed it cannot be arbitrary. “Detention officials must have good cause before censoring an inmate’s letter to an attorney.” The court cited Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, noting that false information or attacks on officials do not constitute good cause. Censorship requires a threat to prison security or an illegal scheme.

    The court also addressed the claim of cruel and unusual punishment, stating that while punitive segregation itself isn’t inherently cruel and unusual, conditions could be so subhuman as to constitute such punishment. The court compared the conditions to those in La Reau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, emphasizing that conditions must be “barbarous” or “shocking to the conscience” to violate the Eighth Amendment.

    The court concluded that Godbee had stated a cause of action for intentional and malicious action by respondents in subjecting him to punitive segregation without a legitimate reason, failing to provide rudimentary due process, and capriciously censoring his mail. The court cautioned that damages should be closely related to the wrong and punitive damages reserved for egregious actions or patterns of wrongdoing.

  • Mascioni v. Rossi, 30 N.Y.2d 645 (1972): Assignability of Land Tenancy Under Rent Control

    Mascioni v. Rossi, 30 N.Y.2d 645 (1972)

    Under rent control laws, whether a statutory tenant of land has the right to assign their tenancy depends on the specifics of their oral agreement and relevant circumstances, and common-law property principles are not mechanically applied.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a tenant of land, protected under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, has the right to assign their tenancy. The Court of Appeals held that the 1962 amendment to the rent control law, which included rented land under “housing accommodations,” aimed to protect tenants similarly to those renting other forms of housing, but did not explicitly grant the right to assign a tenancy. The court remanded the case for a determination based on the nature of the oral tenancy agreement between the parties, emphasizing that common-law property principles are not automatically applicable under rent control and the tenant’s investment and other circumstances should be considered.

    Facts

    The landlord and tenant entered into a month-to-month oral tenancy agreement in 1964. The tenant was not an original party to the initial lease between the landlord and the previous tenant. The tenant then sought to assign his tenancy. The central question was whether this statutory tenant of land had the right to assign the tenancy under the existing rent control laws.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division concluded that the Emergency Housing Rent Control Act does not grant a statutory tenant of land the right to assign his tenancy. The case was remanded to the Commissioner of the Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance of the City of New York for further determination of the parties’ rights based on the nature of their oral tenancy agreement. The landlord appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, a statutory tenant of land has the right to assign their tenancy in the absence of an express agreement regarding assignability.

    Holding

    No, not definitively, because the determination depends on the nature of the oral tenancy agreement between the landlord and tenant, and common-law property principles should not be mechanically applied to situations under rent control. The case was remanded for further fact-finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the 1962 amendment to the rent control law aimed to provide tenants of land the same protections as those renting other forms of housing, but it did not explicitly address the right to assign tenancies. While common law generally allows assignment of a tenancy in the absence of a restrictive covenant, this rule cannot be automatically applied under rent control. The court emphasized that the rights of the parties depend on the specifics of their oral agreement. Relevant factors to consider include the tenant’s investment in the house and any other circumstances that shed light on the parties’ expectations and intentions regarding assignment. The court quoted Matter of Park East Land Corp. v. Finkelstein, 299 N.Y. 70, 75, stating that “common-law property principles will not be mechanically applied to situations under rent control.” The Court noted the need for a development of the facts surrounding the 1964 month-to-month oral agreement to resolve the controversy between the parties.

  • Matter of Eric W., 31 N.Y.2d 370 (1972): Concealment of Prior Arrest as Misconduct for Unemployment Benefits

    Matter of Eric W., 31 N.Y.2d 370 (1972)

    A willful, false statement regarding a material fact on an employment application, such as concealing a prior arrest, constitutes misconduct in connection with employment, thereby disqualifying the claimant from receiving unemployment benefits.

    Summary

    Eric W. was discharged from his position as an audit clerk at a stockbrokerage firm after the firm discovered that he had falsified his employment application by concealing a prior arrest. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board sustained the initial determination of the Industrial Commissioner, disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits due to misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that deliberately concealing a prior arrest on an employment application constitutes misconduct connected to employment, particularly in a position requiring trustworthiness and integrity, such as handling valuable securities. The court emphasized the employer’s legitimate need to assess a prospective employee’s background and the employer’s regulatory obligations related to employee records.

    Facts

    The claimant, Eric W., applied for a position as an audit clerk at a stockbrokerage firm.
    On his employment application, he falsely stated that he had never been arrested.
    In fact, he had been arrested one month prior to submitting the application.
    Approximately nine months after being hired, the employer discovered the falsification.
    Eric W. was subsequently discharged due to the falsified information.

    Procedural History

    The Industrial Commissioner initially determined that Eric W. was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits due to misconduct.
    The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board sustained the Commissioner’s determination.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision.
    Eric W. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the concealment of a prior arrest on an application for employment constitutes “misconduct” in connection with employment within the meaning of the Labor Law, thereby disqualifying the claimant from receiving unemployment benefits.

    Holding

    Yes, because a willful, false statement as to a material fact on an application for employment, such as concealing a prior arrest, constitutes misconduct in connection with employment under the Labor Law, thereby disqualifying the claimant from receiving unemployment benefits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “misconduct” in the context of unemployment benefits includes a willful, false statement about a material fact on an employment application. The court emphasized that employers, particularly in industries dealing with valuable assets, have a legitimate concern in knowing a prospective employee’s background, including any brushes with the law, to assess their character, integrity, and fitness for the position. The court noted that stockbrokerage firms are required to maintain and verify personnel records, including records of arrests, as per federal regulations and New York Stock Exchange rules. The court stated, “Certainly the employer, such as the stockbroker in this case, had a legitimate concern in knowing of a prospective employee’s background, including any brushes with the law, in order to intelligently pass on his character and integrity, as well as his fitness for the position he seeks.” While acknowledging that an arrest alone proves little, the court asserted that the answer regarding prior arrests necessitates further inquiry and investigation. The court concluded that the employer’s interest required the claimant to reveal his arrest record to properly evaluate his integrity and fitness, and failure to do so constituted misconduct under the Unemployment Insurance Law.

  • Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.2d 292 (1972): Justification as a Defense to False Imprisonment

    Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.2d 292 (1972)

    A school bus driver, entrusted with the care of student-passengers and public property, has a duty to take reasonable measures for the safety and protection of both, and restraint that is reasonable under the circumstances to prevent damage to property is a potential justification for actions that might otherwise constitute false imprisonment.

    Summary

    A 14-year-old student, Jacques, was injured while jumping from a school bus after the driver, Mooney, announced he was taking the rowdy students to the police station due to vandalism on board. Jacques and his father sued for false imprisonment and negligence, but the negligence claim was dropped. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to amend their answer to plead justification and excluded evidence related to it. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the amendment and excluding evidence of justification, as the bus driver’s actions might have been justified given his duty to protect the passengers and property. The court further clarified that damages could be mitigated by the plaintiff’s own negligence in attempting to escape.

    Facts

    On the last day of school, Jacques, a 14-year-old, boarded a school bus owned by the New York City Transit Authority. The students were rowdy and vandalizing the bus. The driver, Mooney, warned the students and, after further damage, announced he was taking them to the police station. The driver bypassed regular stops, and some students jumped from the bus without injury. Jacques positioned himself in a window to jump, and as the bus turned, he either jumped or fell, and the bus’s rear wheels ran over him, causing severe injuries.

    Procedural History

    Jacques and his father sued the New York City Transit Authority and the driver for negligence and false imprisonment. The negligence claim was waived at trial. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to amend their answer to include the defense of justification and excluded related evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion to amend their answer to plead the defense of justification.
    2. Whether a plaintiff’s negligence in attempting to extricate himself from an unlawful confinement should diminish his damages for bodily injuries sustained as a result of the false imprisonment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend, as the plaintiffs should have been prepared to meet the defense of justification, and they could not have been prejudiced by the amendment. The trial court’s rulings precluded the defendants from introducing any evidence in this regard and were manifestly unfair.
    2. Yes, because a person falsely imprisoned still has a duty to exercise reasonable care for their own safety, and if the plaintiff acted unreasonably in attempting to escape, recovery for bodily injuries may be barred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defense of justification should have been considered. The court stated that “restraint or detention, reasonable under the circumstances and in time and manner, imposed for the purpose of preventing another from inflicting personal injuries or interfering with or damaging real or personal property in one’s lawful possession or custody is not unlawful.” The court noted the bus driver had a duty to protect the passengers and the property. The reasonableness of the driver’s actions should be determined by considering all circumstances, including the need to protect persons and property, the duty to aid in investigating damage, the manner and place of the occurrence, and the feasibility of alternative actions. The court also addressed the issue of damages, stating that while damages for bodily injuries may be awarded in false imprisonment cases, the plaintiff still has a duty to exercise reasonable care for their own safety. Quoting Meagher v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 27 Y 2d 39, 44, the court noted that “alighting from a moving vehicle, absent some compelling reason, is negligence per se.” Thus, upon retrial, if the plaintiff was found to be falsely imprisoned but acted unreasonably for his own safety, recovery for bodily injuries would be barred. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Cerami, 30 N.Y.2d 245 (1972): Right to Counsel During Psychiatric Examinations

    People v. Cerami, 30 N.Y.2d 245 (1972)

    A criminal defendant has the right to have counsel present during psychiatric examinations conducted by the prosecution’s expert to ensure effective cross-examination regarding the defendant’s sanity.

    Summary

    Michael Cerami was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. His defense was insanity, but a prosecution psychiatrist examined him pre-trial without notifying his counsel. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Cerami was entitled to have counsel present at the psychiatric examination to make the right of cross-examination more effective. The court reasoned that the pretrial psychiatric examination is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. The failure to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony due to the lack of notice to counsel regarding the first examination was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Michael Cerami shot and killed Stanley Bohrer, his former supervisor, who had asked for Cerami’s resignation from his teaching position years earlier. Cerami claimed insanity, asserting he was a paranoid schizophrenic who believed Bohrer had wrongfully terminated him and spread rumors about him. The defense presented evidence of Cerami’s prior diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia from multiple hospitals and a psychologist. The prosecution sought to rebut this defense with the testimony of its own psychiatric expert, Dr. Pollack, who had examined Cerami twice before trial.

    Procedural History

    Cerami was indicted for manslaughter. After a jury trial in the Monroe County Court, he was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s conviction should be set aside because pretrial psychiatric examinations, conducted by the prosecution’s expert regarding the defense of insanity, occurred without notice to or the presence of defendant’s counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant is entitled to counsel’s presence at the first psychiatric examination to ensure the effective right of cross-examination, and the failure to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony due to a lack of notice to counsel was prejudicial error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, which established that pretrial psychiatric examinations are a critical stage in a criminal prosecution, entitling the defendant to have counsel present to make more effective the basic right of cross-examination. The court reasoned that the prosecution’s notice of a psychiatric examination must include sufficient details (date, time, and place) to permit defense counsel to attend. The court found that the defense counsel was not given adequate notice regarding Dr. Pollack’s first examination of the defendant. The court rejected the argument that the defense waived the objection by waiting until the suppression hearing, as any prejudice to the prosecution could have been alleviated at that time. The court stated that any expert opinion based even in part upon an improper examination should be excluded. Quoting People v. Keough, the court emphasized that it is irrelevant that the psychiatrist may have properly acquired some part of the foundation for his expert opinion apart from the invalid examination.

  • People v. Spencer, 29 N.Y.2d 446 (1972): Requirement of Factual Support for Coram Nobis Relief

    People v. Spencer, 29 N.Y.2d 446 (1972)

    A defendant seeking coram nobis relief based on the unconstitutionality of predicate felony convictions must provide factual support for those claims; a mere allegation of not being advised of the right to challenge the convictions is insufficient to warrant a hearing.

    Summary

    Spencer, a third-felony offender, sought coram nobis relief, arguing he wasn’t advised of his right to challenge the constitutionality of his prior felony convictions during his resentencing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order for a hearing, holding that Spencer’s petition lacked factual support for his claims of unconstitutionality. The court emphasized that a defendant must present specific facts demonstrating the invalidity of the predicate convictions, not just allege a procedural deficiency in being informed of the right to challenge them. Without such factual allegations, a hearing is unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources.

    Facts

    Spencer pleaded guilty to attempted burglary (1947) and grand larceny (1952). He did not appeal either conviction. These served as predicate felonies for his 1957 robbery conviction, resulting in a 45-60 year sentence as a third-felony offender. In 1969, following a Montgomery hearing, Spencer was resentenced nunc pro tunc. In 1971, Spencer filed a coram nobis petition, seeking a hearing and resentencing, claiming he wasn’t informed of his right to challenge the predicate convictions.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Spencer’s coram nobis petition without a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a hearing on whether Spencer was advised of his right to challenge the predicate convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s original denial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant seeking coram nobis relief from a third-felony offender sentence is entitled to a hearing based solely on the allegation that he was not advised of his right to attack the constitutionality of his predicate felony convictions, without providing any factual basis for challenging those convictions.

    Holding

    No, because a coram nobis petition requires factual support for any claims of unconstitutionality; a mere allegation of not being informed of the right to challenge the predicate convictions is insufficient to warrant a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Spencer’s coram nobis petition lacked any factual allegations to support his claim that his predicate felony convictions were unconstitutional. The court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant was not informed of their right to appeal, stating that even in such cases, a defendant must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue existed. Referring to People v. White, 309 N.Y. 636, 641, the court stated “the defendant is not entitled to a hearing on charges lacking factual support.” The court rejected the argument that the failure to advise Spencer of his right to attack his predicate convictions in 1957 constituted a due process violation warranting resentencing. The court found the lack of factual allegations to support the unconstitutionality claims fatal to Spencer’s petition, reasoning that a hearing without such support would be a waste of judicial resources. The court noted Spencer was a third-felony offender who entered pleas on all three indictments without advancing a single cognizable constitutional issue. Extending the rationale of People v. Lynn, the Court implicitly suggested that just as a “genuine appealable issue” is required when claiming a failure to be advised of appeal rights, a “genuine constitutional issue” is required when claiming a failure to be advised of rights regarding predicate felonies. As such, the Court reversed, emphasizing judicial economy and the need for factual grounding in coram nobis proceedings. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.