New York Law Review

Tag: 1971

  • People v. Carfero, 27 N.Y.2d 427 (1971): Defendant’s Right to Inspect Confession

    People v. Carfero, 27 N.Y.2d 427 (1971)

    A defendant is entitled to examine their confession or other statements made to law enforcement before trial to intelligently prepare a defense, absent specific circumstances indicating it would harm the public interest.

    Summary

    The defendant, Carfero, was convicted of first-degree murder after confessing to the crime. Prior to trial, his request to inspect his confession was denied, though he received a copy the day before the trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the pretrial motion for inspection should have been granted, the denial was harmless error because the defense received the confession before the trial began. The court reasoned that denying inspection could hinder the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, but in this case, the late disclosure did not prejudice the defendant.

    Facts

    Christa Carfero was stabbed to death. Three days later, police took the defendant into custody for questioning. The defendant claimed he had “nothing to hide” and went to the station. He was informed of his Miranda rights and questioned about the Carfero murder. He stated he “didn’t do anything” and didn’t need a lawyer. After two hours, he confessed to the murder. He was re-advised of his rights and signed a written confession prepared by the police.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder. He moved for inspection of his confession before trial, but the application was denied. He received a copy of the statement during a Huntley hearing. The hearing judge found the confession admissible, determining the defendant had been properly advised of his rights and had waived them knowingly and intelligently. The trial commenced the next day.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s pretrial motion to inspect his confession, and if so, whether such error warrants reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, the motion for inspection should have been granted, but no, the error was harmless because the defendant received the confession before the trial began and was not prejudiced by the delayed disclosure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a defendant should generally be allowed to inspect any statements made to law enforcement to prepare a defense. Examination of the confession allows for assessing its voluntariness, factual accuracy, and potential prejudicial content. The court emphasized the importance of allowing defense counsel to identify and address any issues before trial. The court noted that the new Criminal Procedure Law (effective September 1, 1971) would expressly provide a defendant with the right to “a written or recorded statement” made to law enforcement, if the statement is under the custody or control of the District Attorney. The court acknowledged the error in denying the motion but concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced because his lawyer received the confession the day before the trial. The court applied Code of Criminal Procedure § 542 stating the error was harmless. The court found no support for the claim that the defendant was harmed by the late receipt of the confession. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was affirmed.

  • People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 370 (1971): Speedy Trial Rights and Delays Due to Incarceration

    People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 370 (1971)

    A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated when the prosecution fails to make a diligent effort to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial, absent a showing of good cause for the delay.

    Summary

    Minicone, incarcerated in federal prison, was indicted in New York. Despite knowing his location, the District Attorney took no action to secure his return for 11 months. Minicone moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay violated Minicone’s rights because the prosecution failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay, and his incarceration did not excuse the inaction. The court emphasized the prosecution’s duty to actively pursue bringing an incarcerated defendant to trial.

    Facts

    On February 2, 1966, while Minicone was in federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia, a New York Grand Jury indicted him for robbery, grand larceny, and assault for crimes allegedly committed in 1963.
    He had also been indicted in 1964 for other, unrelated crimes. In May 1966, Minicone inquired about the status of the 1964 indictment, but the District Attorney did not mention the 1966 indictment.
    In November 1966, after Minicone moved to dismiss the 1964 indictment, the District Attorney sought to have him produced in New York for the 1964 charges.
    A warrant for the 1966 indictment was lodged in Georgia in December 1966, but Minicone had already been transferred to New York City. He was arraigned on both indictments in January 1967.

    Procedural History

    Minicone moved to dismiss the 1966 indictment, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit larceny.
    He appealed the conviction based on the denial of his speedy trial rights to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an 11-month delay between indictment and arraignment, during which the defendant was incarcerated in federal prison and the prosecution took no action to secure his presence in New York, violates the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution failed to show good cause for the delay, and the defendant’s incarceration did not excuse the inaction. The District Attorney knew where the defendant was incarcerated but did nothing to secure his return to New York to face the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that while motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial are discretionary, the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay. Minicone’s incarceration in federal prison did not, in itself, constitute good cause. The court emphasized that the District Attorney was aware of Minicone’s location but neglected to take steps to bring him to trial. The court distinguished this case from situations where delays are justified by extraordinary circumstances or the defendant’s actions. The court noted that the defendant’s attorney answering “ready” to calendar calls indicated a desire for a prompt trial, not a waiver of speedy trial rights. Because the delay was solely due to the District Attorney’s inaction and the People failed to offer any valid excuse, the Court held that Minicone was denied his right to a speedy trial. As the court stated, the fact of incarceration “affords neither explanation nor excuse”. The court found the delay unreasonable under the specific circumstances of the case.

  • Potter v. Furniture Mfrs. Bldg., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 205 (1971): Liability for Dangerous Conditions on Leased Premises

    Potter v. Furniture Mfrs. Bldg., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 205 (1971)

    A landlord is not liable for injuries sustained by a business invitee of a tenant on premises controlled by the tenant when the landlord could reasonably believe the tenant would remedy a temporary condition.

    Summary

    Marion Potter was injured when she tripped over a bed frame inside the furniture suite of Van Stee Corporation, a tenant of Furniture Manufacturers Building, Inc. Potter was a business invitee of Van Stee, brought to the suite by a retail dealer. The bed frame had been moved to the suite by Building employees after a furniture exposition. The Court of Appeals held that while Van Stee could be liable for negligence, the Building was not, because it was reasonable for the Building to assume that Van Stee would not leave the bed frame in a dangerous position for an extended period. The sole liability should rest on the party controlling the premises and responsible for the dangerous condition.

    Facts

    Furniture Manufacturers Building, Inc. (Building) owned a building leased to furniture manufacturers. Van Stee Corporation (Van Stee) leased a suite in the building. Van Stee also temporarily displayed furniture on the ninth floor for a furniture exposition held in September 1962. After the exposition, Building employees moved Van Stee’s displayed material, including a bed frame, from the ninth floor to Van Stee’s regular suite, placing the material just inside the entrance. It was Van Stee’s practice to allow retail dealers to bring retail customers into its suite. On December 29, 1962, Marion Potter, a retail customer, was brought to Van Stee’s suite by a retail dealer. Potter tripped over the bed frame and was injured. The incident occurred under circumstances of location, color, and lighting where a jury could find negligence on Van Stee’s part and a lack of negligence on Potter’s part. The material had been moved sometime between the end of September and November 15.

    Procedural History

    Potter sued both Van Stee and Building for her injuries. The trial court found both defendants liable. The appellate division affirmed. Building appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a building is liable for injuries sustained by a business invitee of a tenant on premises controlled by the tenant, when the injury is caused by a condition the owner could reasonably believe the tenant would remedy.

    Holding

    No, because in these circumstances the sole liability should rest on the party having control of the premises where the danger caused injury to its business invitee.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the responsibility of Van Stee and Building, stating that Mrs. Potter was in the premises as a business invitee of Van Stee. The court reasoned that Building, in returning the bed frame and other material to Van Stee’s suite, “would be justified in believing the material would not be left over a long period of time in position to become a danger to customers in premises which Van Stee controlled and used in its business.” Because the material was moved sometime between the end of September and November 15, and the accident occurred on December 29, the court concluded that “the sole liability should rest on the party having control of the premises where the danger caused injury to its business invitee.” The court emphasized Van Stee’s control over the premises and its responsibility for maintaining a safe environment for its business invitees. The decision highlights the importance of control over the premises in determining liability for injuries sustained due to dangerous conditions. It suggests that landlords are not automatically liable for injuries on leased premises, especially when they have reason to believe the tenant will address potential hazards.

  • In the Matter of the Grand Jury of the County of Erie, 28 N.Y.2d 179 (1971): Limits on Grand Jury Report Publication

    In the Matter of the Grand Jury of the County of Erie, 28 N.Y.2d 179 (1971)

    A grand jury report, while an arm of the judicial system, is not a truly judicial body, and its proceedings are only qualifiedly judicial; thus, individuals named in such reports are entitled to due process protections before the report is made public.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible scope and procedural safeguards required when a grand jury issues a report criticizing public officials without bringing criminal charges. The Court of Appeals held that while grand juries have the power to issue such reports, individuals named in those reports are entitled to certain due process protections, including the right to inspect the grand jury minutes and respond to the allegations, before the report is made public. This decision balances the grand jury’s investigatory role with the need to protect individuals’ reputations from unfounded accusations.

    Facts

    A grand jury in Erie County investigated potential misuse of property and services, including narcotics, at a public hospital. The grand jury chose to issue a report detailing its findings and recommending disciplinary action against certain supervisors, rather than indicting them on criminal charges. The report was critical of the supervisors but did not allege specific criminal intent.

    Procedural History

    The Erie County Court initially approved the grand jury’s report for public release. The implicated supervisors appealed, arguing that the report violated their due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision. The supervisors then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether individuals named in a grand jury report criticizing their conduct are entitled to procedural due process protections, such as the right to inspect grand jury minutes and respond to the allegations, before the report is made public.

    Holding

    Yes, because individuals named in a grand jury report are entitled to procedural due process before the report is publicly released, including an opportunity to review the grand jury’s minutes and submit a response.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that grand juries play an important role in investigating potential wrongdoing and ensuring accountability, and it noted that grand jury reports can serve a valuable public function. However, the court emphasized that such reports can also inflict significant reputational harm on individuals named within them. Quoting from the dissent: “To the same extent that those named within its pages cannot review the entire record, cannot present or cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise lack the rights and safeguards afforded defendants in criminal actions, so, too, the report cannot and should not be afforded the legal status of a judgment of conviction.”

    Balancing these competing interests, the court held that due process requires that individuals named in a grand jury report must be afforded certain procedural safeguards before the report is made public. These safeguards include the right to inspect the grand jury minutes to determine the basis for the allegations against them and the opportunity to submit a response to the grand jury’s findings. The court reasoned that these protections are necessary to ensure that grand jury reports are fair and accurate and that individuals are not unfairly prejudiced by unsubstantiated accusations. As stated in the dissent, “The interpolation by the court of a right to inspect the grand jury minutes, a right given nowhere in the particular statute and given only limitedly in the statutes and cases governing proceedings after criminal indictment, has no warrant in law, the precedents, or policy.”

    The dissent argued that the majority’s decision unduly restricts the grand jury’s investigatory power and blurs the line between investigations and criminal trials. It also noted that other investigative bodies, such as executive and legislative commissions, are not subject to similar procedural requirements. According to the dissent, the majority’s holding would “be all but unthinkable and quite unsettling.”

  • Franklin v. Mandeville, 28 N.Y.2d 68 (1971): Weighted Voting and Equal Protection

    Franklin v. Mandeville, 28 N.Y.2d 68 (1971)

    A county charter provision that permanently restricts the voting power of a town or city’s supervisors, regardless of population size, violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to Nassau County’s weighted voting plan, where the Town of Hempstead, despite having a majority of the county’s population, was restricted from exercising a majority vote on the Board of Supervisors due to a charter provision. The New York Court of Appeals held that the charter provision, which capped the voting power of any single town or city’s supervisors at 50%, unconstitutionally deprived residents of equal representation, violating the one person, one vote principle. The court ordered reapportionment but modified the lower court’s order to delay implementation until after the 1970 census data became available.

    Facts

    The Town of Hempstead constituted 57.12% of Nassau County’s population.
    Under the existing weighted voting plan, Hempstead’s representatives could cast only 49.6% of the Board of Supervisors’ vote.
    The Nassau County charter (§ 104, subd. 2) stipulated that “nor shall the supervisor or supervisors of any town, or city be entitled to cast more than fifty per centum of the total vote of said board.”
    Two previous attempts to reapportion the board via referendums in 1965 and 1967 failed.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs challenged the weighted voting plan.
    Special Term granted summary judgment, declaring the plan unconstitutional.
    The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Special Term’s decision.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a county charter provision that limits the voting power of any town or city, regardless of population, violates the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the charter provision perpetuates inequality and deprives residents of a town or city with a majority population from exercising a majority vote, regardless of how large that majority might be now or in the future.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the key issue was not merely the existing inequality but the fact that the charter provision mandated and perpetuated it. It stated, “Important as is the fact of the present inequality, it is of even greater moment that inequality in some degree is mandated and, indeed, perpetuated by the charter provision”.
    The court distinguished this case from Abate v. Mundt (25 N.Y.2d 309), noting that the charter provision actively prevented any town or city from achieving majority representation, regardless of population growth.
    The court acknowledged the population growth in Hempstead and Nassau County, highlighting how this exacerbated the inequality created by the charter provision.
    The court ordered reapportionment to address the constitutional violation. However, it modified the lower court’s order to postpone the implementation of a new plan until after the 1970 census data was available. The existing plan was to remain in effect as a temporary measure until then.

  • Matter of City of New York (Neptune Ave.), 28 N.Y.2d 146 (1971): Condemnation Award Based on Probable Subsidized Use

    Matter of City of New York (Neptune Ave.), 28 N.Y.2d 146 (1971)

    A condemnation award can be based on the fair market value of property considering its highest and best use as a site for subsidized housing (e.g., a Mitchell-Lama project) if there is a reasonable probability that such a subsidy would have been granted and the project constructed but for the condemnation.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the possibility of obtaining a Mitchell-Lama subsidy (a New York State program fostering low-cost housing) can be considered when determining the highest and best use of land taken by condemnation. The Court of Appeals held that it can, provided there is a reasonable probability that the subsidy would have been granted and the project constructed. However, because the claimants in this case failed to adequately demonstrate the likelihood of securing a Mitchell-Lama subsidy, the court reversed the lower court’s award and remanded the case for new findings.

    Facts

    The City of New York condemned vacant land in Brooklyn for a high school. The land was divided into three pieces and near a subway station, stores, and schools. Across the street was Harway Terrace, a Mitchell-Lama high-rise housing project built in 1961. The claimants’ experts argued the highest and best use of the property was as a site for a high-rise apartment building, valuing it at $3.25-$3.35 per square foot. The city’s expert said the highest and best use was for one and two-family dwellings, valuing it at $0.75-$1.50 per square foot. The city’s expert also noted that an apartment building could only be built if a Mitchell-Lama subsidy was obtained.

    Procedural History

    The trial court awarded the claimants $2.90 per square foot without a written opinion. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The City of New York then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the possibility of obtaining a Mitchell-Lama subsidy can be considered in determining the highest and best use of land taken by condemnation, and thus in calculating the condemnation award.

    Holding

    No, because the claimants failed to adequately demonstrate a reasonable probability that a Mitchell-Lama subsidy would have been granted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that a condemnation award should be determined based on the fair market value of the property in its highest and best use, often determined by comparable sales. It emphasized that the asserted highest and best use must be reasonably probable in the near future, not speculative. The court acknowledged that governmental activity, such as zoning variances, can be considered if obtaining such variances is reasonably probable, citing Masten v. State of New York, 11 A.D.2d 370, affd. 9 N.Y.2d 796. The court reasoned that while sales of other Mitchell-Lama project sites indicated a market for subsidized housing and the possibility of securing a subsidy, the claimants failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the reasonable probability of obtaining a Mitchell-Lama subsidy for the subject property. Specifically, the court noted the “total absence in the record of any evidence concerning the chances of success or failure in obtaining a Mitchell-Lama subsidy.”
    As the court stated, “Without such proof, the award cannot stand.” The court emphasized that while the claimants’ expert testified to some plans to purchase the land as a Mitchell-Lama site, the extent of these plans was not adequately explained, and there was no evidence adequately establishing the likelihood of securing a subsidy. The court concluded, “The absence of evidence adequately establishing the likelihood of securing a subsidy makes it impossible to say that there was a reasonable probability that a Mitchell-Lama subsidy could have been obtained to develop this property as a profitable high-rise apartment building site.”

  • People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418 (1971): Admissibility of In-Court Identification After Pretrial Identification

    People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418 (1971)

    An in-court identification is admissible if the prosecution establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the witness’s ability to recognize the defendant is based on an independent source and is not tainted by an earlier suggestive pretrial identification procedure, but the admissibility of prior photographic identification, when elicited by the defendant, is not preserved for review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of an in-court identification following a pretrial identification. The court held that the in-court identification was permissible because the trial court correctly determined, after a voir dire, that the witness’s identification ability was independent of potentially suggestive pretrial procedures (photographic display and a showup). Additionally, the court declined to address the admissibility of prior photographic identification since the defense counsel initially elicited that information during cross-examination, failing to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Facts

    The complaining witness identified the defendant in court. Prior to trial, the witness had identified the defendant through photographs shown by the police and in a showup in the courthouse corridor.

    Procedural History

    The trial judge conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the in-court identification. The trial court found the in-court identification admissible. The defendant appealed, arguing that the in-court identification was tainted by the prior photographic display and showup. The defendant also argued that the fact that the witness had previously identified the defendant through photographs was improperly brought before the jury.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the in-court identification was admissible, considering the witness had previously identified the defendant through photographs and a showup?

    2. Whether the admission of evidence regarding the witness’s prior photographic identification of the defendant is grounds for reversal when that evidence was first elicited by the defendant’s counsel?

    Holding

    1. No, because the record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s finding that the witness’s ability to recognize the defendant was not the product of, or affected by, the prior photographic display or the showup.

    2. No, because the question of its admissibility against the defendant has not been preserved for appellate review since this fact was first elicited by the defendant’s own counsel upon cross-examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, emphasizing that the trial judge had properly conducted a voir dire to assess the basis of the witness’s in-court identification. The court found that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the determination that the in-court identification was based on an independent source, untainted by the pretrial identification procedures. Citing People v. Ballott, the court reiterated the importance of determining whether the witness’s recognition of the defendant stemmed from an independent recollection. As the Court stated, the record supported the finding that the witness’s ability to recognize the defendant was not the product of, or affected by, either the photographs she saw or by the showup. Regarding the photographic identification, the court noted that since defense counsel first elicited the information about the witness identifying the defendant through photographs, the defendant could not later claim it as grounds for reversal. The court declined to reconsider its prior holdings on this matter, noting that the issue had not been properly preserved for review. The court effectively applied the invited error doctrine, preventing a party from raising an issue on appeal that they themselves introduced at trial.

  • Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 28 N.Y.2d 62 (1971): Statute of Limitations and Laches in Declaratory Judgment Actions Regarding Marital Status

    Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 28 N.Y.2d 62 (1971)

    A declaratory judgment action regarding marital status accrues upon the maturation of the right being asserted (e.g., a widow’s pension), not necessarily when the controversy regarding marital status first arises; furthermore, laches requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the opposing party.

    Summary

    Erminia Sorrentino sued to declare her the lawful widow of Alphonse Sorrentino, challenging the validity of his Nevada divorce and subsequent remarriage to Verna Mieyzwa. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations did not bar the action, as Erminia’s right to a widow’s pension only matured upon Alphonse’s death, and she promptly sued thereafter. The court also found no laches, as Erminia’s delay in bringing the action did not unduly prejudice Verna, especially since Verna could testify to Alphonse’s domicile in Nevada. The court upheld the finding that Alphonse never established a bona fide residence in Nevada, rendering the divorce invalid.

    Facts

    Erminia and Alphonse Sorrentino married in 1927 and separated in 1939, after which Alphonse voluntarily paid support. In 1951, Alphonse obtained a default divorce decree in Nevada and immediately married Verna Mieyzwa. Erminia was served with process but, relying on legal advice, did not appear in the Nevada action. Alphonse and Verna resided in New Jersey until Alphonse’s death in 1965. In 1952, Erminia obtained a support order from the New York Family Court, which implicitly recognized her marital status. Both Erminia and Verna applied for a widow’s pension after Alphonse’s death.

    Procedural History

    Erminia sued in Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment that she was Alphonse’s lawful widow and that the Nevada divorce was invalid. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint but, after granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, ruled in Erminia’s favor. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and laches.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a divorce decree begins to run when the party becomes aware of the controversy or when the right being asserted matures (e.g., entitlement to a widow’s pension).

    2. Whether Erminia’s delay in bringing the action constituted laches, barring her claim.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute of limitations begins to run when the right being asserted matures, not simply when a justiciable controversy arises.

    2. No, because laches requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the opposing party, and neither was sufficiently established here.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute of limitations should not bar an action to enforce a right before it has even matured. Erminia’s right to the widow’s pension only matured upon Alphonse’s death; thus, the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Regarding laches, the court emphasized that mere delay is insufficient; prejudice to the opposing party must also be shown. The court noted that Erminia had diligently obtained a support order and a determination that she was still married to Alphonse. Moreover, the court found that Verna was not unduly prejudiced by Alphonse’s death, as she could testify to his intent regarding domicile in Nevada. The court cited Feldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 123, 125, stating that “Laches…is not mere delay but delay that works disadvantage or injury.” The court also distinguished cases where remarriage and reliance on the divorce decree created prejudice. The court was bound by the finding that Alphonse never established a bona fide residence in Nevada, thus the divorce was invalid.

  • Gallo v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 36 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971): Jury Decides Negligence When Facts Allow Differing Inferences

    Gallo v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 36 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)

    When reasonable people could reach different conclusions based on the evidence, the question of negligence, including contributory negligence, is a matter for the jury to decide.

    Summary

    A 72-year-old woman, Gallo, was injured when she tried to step across a hole in the sidewalk caused by Supermarkets General Corporation’s repaving work. The defendant failed to provide warnings or cover the hole. The Appellate Division reversed a jury verdict for Gallo, finding her contributorily negligent as a matter of law because she knew of the hole and had an alternate route. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury because reasonable people could disagree about whether her actions constituted negligence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Gallo, a 72-year-old woman, was injured when she attempted to step across a hole in the sidewalk. The hole was located on the inside of the curb edge at a crosswalk. The hole was about a foot and a half wide and three or four inches deep. The defendant, Supermarkets General Corporation, caused the hole during repaving work in a seven-block area. The defendant failed to place any warning signs around the hole. The defendant failed to cover the hole. The plaintiff was returning from shopping when the injury occurred. The plaintiff was trying to find an unbroken portion of the sidewalk to cross at the corner rather than in the middle of the block.

    Procedural History

    The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Gallo. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the jury verdict. The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law when she attempted to cross a sidewalk defect that she knew existed, and when an alternative route was available?

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s knowledge of the danger and the presence of an alternate route were circumstances from which the jury might or might not infer negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the issues of the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence were questions of fact for the jury to determine. The court cited Meyer v. West End Equities and Cesario v. Chiapparine to support its position that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the danger and the availability of an alternate route were factors that the jury could consider, but that did not automatically establish contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court stated that “plaintiff’s knowledge of the danger and the presence of an alternate route were circumstances from which the jury might or might not infer negligence on the part of the plaintiff.” Because reasonable people could disagree about whether the plaintiff’s actions constituted negligence, the court held that the Appellate Division erred in finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the role of the jury is to weigh the evidence and draw inferences, and it is only when no reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiff that a court can direct a verdict.

  • Matter of Estate of Totten, 269 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1971): Revocation of Totten Trusts Through a Will

    Matter of Estate of Totten, 269 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1971)

    A Totten Trust, a bank account held in trust for another, is presumed to be an absolute trust if the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation; this presumption can be overcome by a will manifesting a clear intention to revoke the trust, but general language bequeathing all funds on deposit is insufficient if other factors indicate a contrary intention.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a will’s general bequest of all funds on deposit was sufficient to revoke four Totten Trusts established by the testatrix. The Surrogate’s Court held that the will did revoke the trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the will’s language, in the context of the entire estate and surrounding circumstances, was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the Totten Trusts were not revoked. The court emphasized the need to scrutinize the will as a whole and the surrounding circumstances to determine the testatrix’s true intention, particularly when the will’s language is not explicitly clear.

    Facts

    The testatrix had six separate bank accounts: four in Totten Trust form for the benefit of others, and two in her name alone. Her will contained a clause that stated: “I give and bequeath any and all funds on deposit to my credit, in any bank or trust company or similar financial institution.” The funds in the Totten Trust accounts represented slightly more than one-third of the total estate. The testatrix continued to have interest posted to the trust accounts until her death.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court initially determined that the will’s language revoked the Totten Trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, finding the will’s language to be a clear expression of intent to revoke the trusts. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case to the Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the general language in the testatrix’s will, bequeathing “any and all funds on deposit to my credit,” was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the Totten Trusts, established by the testatrix, were not revoked before her death.

    Holding

    No, because the language in the will, considered in the context of the testatrix’s entire estate and surrounding circumstances, was insufficient to demonstrate a clear intention to revoke the Totten Trusts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by reiterating the presumption that a Totten Trust becomes an absolute trust upon the depositor’s death if no revocation or disaffirmance has occurred. While this presumption can be overcome by a will demonstrating a clear intention to revoke, the court found the will’s language in this case insufficient. The court reasoned that the will’s general language, bequeathing all funds on deposit, did not explicitly mention or disaffirm the Totten Trusts. Crucially, the court noted that the trust accounts did not comprise the majority of the estate’s assets, and the testatrix maintained other bank accounts in her own name. These factors suggested that the will’s language was not necessarily intended to encompass the Totten Trust accounts. The court also pointed to the fact that interest continued to be posted to the trust accounts up to the date of death, and a clause in the will contemplated “property passing outside [the] Will,” both indicating an intention not to revoke. The court emphasized the importance of examining the surrounding circumstances and the will as a whole to ascertain the testatrix’s true intention. The court quoted Matter of Totten (179 N. Y. 112, 126): “In case the depositor [of a Totten Trust] dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor.” The court concluded that the will’s language, in itself, was not enough to overcome this presumption, requiring a deeper scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances to determine the testatrix’s true intent.