New York Law Review

Tag: 1971

  • 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 333 (1971): Mootness Doctrine and Superseding Legislation

    8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 333 (1971)

    A case becomes moot when the issue presented in the complaint has been superseded by subsequent legislation, rendering a decision on the original issue unnecessary and advisory.

    Summary

    8200 Realty Corp. challenged the validity of New York City’s Local Law No. 7 of 1972, arguing it violated state law prohibiting local rent control laws more restrictive than those already in effect. While the appeal was pending, the city enacted Local Law No. 51, purportedly in compliance with a new state law authorizing rent exemptions for senior citizens with landlord compensation. The New York Court of Appeals held that Local Law No. 51 superseded Local Law No. 7, rendering the original issue moot. The court reversed the lower court’s order and directed dismissal of the complaint.

    Facts

    The State of New York enacted Chapter 372 of the Laws of 1971, which allowed cities with a population of one million or more to continue rent control but prohibited them from enacting local laws controlling rents that were “more stringent or restrictive” than existing provisions.
    New York City then adopted Local Law No. 7 of 1972, which extended rent increase exemptions for eligible senior citizens.
    8200 Realty Corp., a landlord, sued, claiming Local Law No. 7 was invalid and unconstitutional because it violated Chapter 372 of the Laws of 1971.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, 8200 Realty Corp., was unsuccessful at Special Term and in the Appellate Division.
    While the appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, the city adopted Local Law No. 51 of 1972 pursuant to Chapter 689 of the Laws of 1972.
    Chapter 689 expressly authorized the city to grant rent exemptions to senior citizens if landlords were fully compensated for the losses.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Local Law No. 51 of 1972, enacted after the initial challenge to Local Law No. 7 of 1972, rendered the original challenge moot.

    Holding

    Yes, because Local Law No. 51 superseded Local Law No. 7, thereby resolving the dispute over whether Local Law No. 7 was “more stringent or restrictive” than Local Law No. 31 of 1970.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Local Law No. 51, passed in compliance with Chapter 689 of the Laws of 1972, replaced and superseded Local Law No. 7. Thus, the central issue of whether Local Law No. 7 was more restrictive than previous laws became moot.
    The court emphasized that the issue was not likely to recur, distinguishing it from cases where the court might choose to address a moot issue due to its potential for future repetition.
    The court cited previous cases such as East Meadow Community Concerts Assn. v. Board of Educ., 18 Y 2d 129, 135, to support the principle that courts should not entertain appeals when the issue is moot unless it is likely to recur.
    The court declined to address the constitutionality of Local Law No. 51 because this issue was not presented in the original complaint or argued in the lower courts.
    Finally, the court commented on the negative effects of piecemeal rent control legislation on rental housing maintenance, particularly for elderly tenants, and highlighted the uncertainty and confusion caused by such legislation.

  • Matter of Biggane v. Fire Department Pension Board, 28 N.Y.2d 776 (1971): Due Process Requirements for Pension Benefit Determinations

    Matter of Biggane v. Fire Department Pension Board, 28 N.Y.2d 776 (1971)

    Due process requires that individuals be advised of evidence against them and the final determination in a manner that permits adequate judicial review, but does not always mandate a full adversarial hearing before termination of benefits, particularly when no desperate exigency or established right to those specific benefits exists.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Fire Department Pension Board’s procedures for determining pension benefits afforded adequate due process to the petitioners. The court held that the procedures outlined by the board, which allowed the petitioners to present evidence, were sufficient, provided the petitioners were also informed of the evidence against them and the board’s final determination in a manner facilitating judicial review. The Court distinguished this case from Goldberg v. Kelly, emphasizing that the petitioners did not face the same “desperate” circumstances as welfare recipients whose benefits were being terminated.

    Facts

    The petitioners were seeking certain pension benefits from the Fire Department Pension Board. The specific nature of the benefits beyond ordinary pension benefits guaranteed by the Administrative Code is not clearly specified in this memorandum, but is a focus of the case. The Board of Trustees outlined procedures in a letter dated November 6, 1970, which provided the petitioners with an opportunity to present evidence concerning their claim. The petitioners sought a more extensive adversarial proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The case originated before the Fire Department Pension Board of Trustees. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to the Fire Department Pension Board of Trustees for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the procedures established by the Fire Department Pension Board of Trustees, which afford petitioners an opportunity to present evidence regarding their pension benefits, satisfy due process requirements in the absence of a full adversarial hearing.

    Holding

    No, because while the procedures outlined by the board are proper and sufficient, due process also requires that the petitioners be advised of the evidence against them and the board’s final determination in a form that permits adequate judicial review. The Court found no established right to the specific benefits being sought, distinguishing the case from situations involving termination of welfare benefits where a “desperate” exigency exists.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the procedures formulated by the Board of Trustees were sufficient, but implicitly included the essential right of the petitioners to be informed of the evidence against them and the final determination, thus permitting judicial review. The Court distinguished this case from Goldberg v. Kelly, where the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients were entitled to a pre-termination hearing. The Court emphasized that the petitioners here did not face the “desperate” situation of an “eligible” welfare recipient whose assistance had been cut off. The court distinguished this case by noting, “Here, there is no such “desperate” exigency in respect of one enjoying an established status (see Matter of Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Auth., 29 Y 2d 420); neither has it been demonstrated that petitioners are prima facie or presumptively “ eligible ” for benefits beyond the ordinary pension benefits guaranteed by the Administrative Code and heretofore allowed them by the board of trustees.” The Court also rejected the argument that the medical board’s findings created vested property rights that entitled the petitioners to a complete adversarial proceeding, calling it a “bootstrap argument.” The decision emphasizes a balancing of interests, where a full adversarial hearing is not automatically required unless fundamental rights or dire circumstances are at stake.

  • Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 29 N.Y.2d 762 (1971): Summary Judgment and Controverted Facts in Insurance Policy Termination

    Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 29 N.Y.2d 762 (1971)

    Summary judgment is inappropriate when the record reveals a sharply controverted material issue of fact, and neither party has made a proper evidentiary showing to support their motion.

    Summary

    Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend Rose in an action because the insurance policy had expired. The accident occurred after the policy’s stated expiration date, but the Assigned Risk Plan required proper notification of termination. The central issue was whether Lumbermens had properly notified Rose of the policy’s termination as required by the Assigned Risk Plan. Because conflicting evidence existed regarding whether the required 45-day notice was sent, the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate for either party. The case was remitted for trial to resolve the factual dispute.

    Facts

    Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. issued an Assigned Risk Policy to Rose, with a stated expiration date of April 15, 1966.
    Rose was involved in an accident on December 3, 1966, after the stated policy expiration date.
    Lumbermens sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend Rose.
    The Assigned Risk Plan required a 45-day notice to the insured before termination could be effective.
    There was a dispute over whether Lumbermens sent the required 45-day notice to Rose.

    Procedural History

    Lumbermens brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment.
    Both Lumbermens and the opposing party moved for summary judgment.
    The lower court granted summary judgment, the specific outcome of which is not detailed in the Court of Appeals decision.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision, the specifics of which are not detailed in the Court of Appeals decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denied both the motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, and remitted the case for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether summary judgment is appropriate when there is a sharply disputed issue of material fact regarding whether an insurer properly notified an insured of policy termination under the Assigned Risk Plan.

    Holding

    No, because a sharply controverted issue of fact existed as to whether the 45-day notice, required by the Assigned Risk Plan, was sent to the insured, and neither party made a proper evidentiary showing to support their motion for summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while the failure to file a termination notice with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles doesn’t necessarily continue coverage, the Assigned Risk Plan does require specific notification to the insured. The court stated: “the Assigned Risk Policy issued by Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. would have continued in full force and effect if the insurer failed to comply with the relevant provisions of the Assigned Risk Plan.”

    Because Lumbermens’ obligation to defend hinged on proper notification, the factual dispute over whether the 45-day notice was sent was material. The court found that the conflicting evidence presented by both parties created a “sharply controverted material issue of fact.” The court noted, “Inasmuch as the record discloses a sharply controverted material issue of fact as to whether a 45-day notice, required by subdivision 2 of section 14 of the plan, was sent to the insured, and neither Lumbermens nor plaintiffs-appellants has made a proper evidentiary showing in support of the motion and cross motion… summary judgment in favor of either side is unwarranted.”

    The court cited CPLR 3212(b) and prior cases, including Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox, reinforcing the principle that summary judgment should be denied when a genuine issue of material fact exists. The court effectively stated that summary judgment is not a tool to resolve factual disputes but to determine if such disputes exist requiring a trial.

  • People v. Keough, 29 N.Y.2d 272 (1971): Flag Desecration and Incitement to Violence

    People v. Keough, 29 N.Y.2d 272 (1971)

    The display of photographs that incorporate the flag of the United States, without evidence of incitement to violence or a breach of the peace, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under a statute prohibiting flag desecration.

    Summary

    Keough was convicted of violating New York’s General Business Law for displaying photographs that allegedly desecrated the U.S. flag. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the photographs, unlike the constructions in a prior case (People v. Radich), did not present a likelihood of inciting disorder or a breach of the peace. The court emphasized the absence of any evidence suggesting that the photographs incited violence or public disorder, thus distinguishing the case from situations where flag desecration posed a tangible threat to public safety. The ruling underscores the importance of demonstrating a direct link between the expressive act and the potential for imminent lawless action.

    Facts

    The defendant, Keough, was indicted for violating subdivisions (d) and (f) of section 136 of the General Business Law. The indictment stemmed solely from photographs displayed by Keough, which were alleged to have defied and cast contempt upon the flag of the United States. There was no evidence presented to suggest that the display of these photographs caused any actual disturbance or incited violence.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially disallowed a demurrer to the indictment, relying on a comparison to the factual situation in People v. Radich. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, finding that the display of photographs, similar to the constructions in Radich, threatened the legitimate public interest in preventing a breach of the peace and an outbreak of violence. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the display of photographs that incorporate the U.S. flag, without any evidence of incitement to violence or a breach of the peace, is sufficient to sustain a conviction under a statute prohibiting flag desecration.

    Holding

    No, because the photographs did not present a likelihood of incitement to disorder or a breach of the peace as required to justify a restriction on expressive conduct. There was no evidence the photographs incited violence or public disorder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from People v. Radich, where the displayed constructions were deemed to have a “likelihood of incitement to disorder” and presented an opportunity for protest and counterprotest, leading to a potential for public disorder. The court emphasized that the photographs in Keough’s case lacked any comparable element that would suggest a similar risk of public disturbance. The court stated, “Clearly, however, there is nothing in the photographs, which concededly constituted the sole basis for the indictment before us, comparable in any substantial degree to the ‘constructions’ in Radich (26 Y 2d 114, 117, n. 1) and nothing, certainly, offering the ‘likelihood of incitement to disorder’ and by public exhibition affording an opportunity for protest and counterprotest with ‘consequent potential of public disorder’“, such as was found in Radich. Because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the photographs created a tangible risk of inciting violence or public disorder, the court found the conviction unsustainable. The Court did not reach any constitutional issues, resolving the case on the specific facts presented.

  • Matter of Willard Alexander, Inc. v. Glasser, 29 N.Y.2d 270 (1971): Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Union Constitutions

    29 N.Y.2d 270 (1971)

    When parties agree to abide by a labor union’s constitution and bylaws that mandate arbitration of disputes, that agreement constitutes a written agreement to arbitrate under CPLR 7501, even if the specific contract giving rise to the dispute lacks an arbitration clause.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an arbitration clause within a labor union’s constitution and bylaws constitutes a “written agreement” to arbitrate under New York law (CPLR 7501) between a union member and a licensed booking agent. The Court of Appeals held that it does. Glasser, an orchestra leader and union member, refused to pay commissions to Alexander, a licensed booking agent. Alexander sought arbitration per the union’s rules. The Court found that by becoming a union member and the booking agent agreeing to be licensed by the union, both parties consented to the union’s constitution and bylaws, including the arbitration clause. Therefore, a valid written agreement to arbitrate existed, making the arbitration award enforceable. The decision underscores that membership in an organization implies consent to its rules, including arbitration provisions.

    Facts

    Alexander, a booking agent licensed by the American Federation of Musicians (AFM), arranged two engagements for Glasser, an orchestra leader and AFM member, at Roseland Dance City. Alexander’s commission was to be 10% of Glasser’s total earnings. After Glasser performed the first engagement, Alexander billed him $3,000 for the commission on both bookings. Glasser refused to pay.

    Procedural History

    Alexander requested the AFM’s international executive board to arbitrate the claim. Glasser did not participate in the arbitration. The board awarded Alexander the full amount. Special Term of the Supreme Court confirmed the award. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Glasser appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the obligation of parties to abide by the provisions of a labor union’s constitution and bylaws, requiring the submission of disputes to arbitration, constitutes a “written agreement” between them, within the sense of CPLR 7501, to arbitrate their differences.

    Holding

    Yes, because the mutual obligation of the parties to observe the union’s arbitration provisions constitutes a “written agreement” to arbitrate under CPLR 7501.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Glasser, by becoming a member of the AFM, agreed to abide by its constitution and bylaws, which included a mandatory arbitration clause for disputes between members and booking agents. The court stated, “when a person becomes a member of a labor organization…he thereby agrees, as a matter of law, to abide by the duly enacted provisions of its constitution and by-laws.” Similarly, Alexander, by becoming a licensed booking agent, also agreed to abide by the union’s rules. The court cited Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Griesenbech, where membership in the New York Commodity Exchange, with its arbitration rules, was deemed a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court distinguished the present case by noting that both parties were obligated to observe the union’s arbitration rules, creating a mutual agreement to arbitrate. The court rejected Glasser’s argument that Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was violated, clarifying that the act protects a union member’s right to sue the union, which was not limited by the arbitration rules in question. The court found no reason to set aside the arbitration award.

  • In re Ronald B., 29 N.Y.2d 730 (1971): Single Act Insufficient for Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) Designation

    In re Ronald B., 29 N.Y.2d 730 (1971)

    A single, isolated incident of misconduct, even if it constitutes a crime if committed by an adult, is insufficient to support a determination that a minor is a “person in need of supervision” (PINS) under New York Family Court Act.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a single act of criminal trespass is sufficient to classify a 13-year-old as a “person in need of supervision” (PINS). The New York Court of Appeals held that it is not. The court emphasized that a PINS designation requires more than an isolated incident to justify state intervention. The court also clarified the permissible scope of findings on lesser included offenses when the primary charge is dismissed. This decision underscores the need for evidence of a pattern of misbehavior to support a PINS adjudication and protects against overreach based on isolated youthful indiscretions.

    Facts

    A petition was filed against Ronald B., a 13-year-old, alleging acts that, if committed by an adult, could constitute criminal trespass in the second degree and burglary in the third degree. The petition sought to have Ronald B. declared a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision based on these alleged actions. The only specific misbehavior alleged was a single instance of criminal trespass.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the charge of third-degree burglary at the close of the petitioner’s case. Despite dismissing the burglary charge, the Family Court found Ronald B. to be a “person in need of supervision” based on the evidence presented. Ronald B. appealed this determination, arguing that a single act of criminal trespass was insufficient to support the PINS designation. The appellate division affirmed the Family Court decision, and Ronald B. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a single instance of criminal trespass is sufficient to support a finding that a minor is a “person in need of supervision” under the New York Family Court Act.
    2. Whether the Family Court retains jurisdiction to find a juvenile delinquent on a lesser-included offense when the primary charged offense is dismissed.

    Holding

    1. No, because a PINS determination requires evidence of more than a single, isolated incident of misbehavior. The record must demonstrate a pattern or ongoing behavior that warrants state intervention.
    2. No, because when the Family Court dismissed the burglary charge, the court was thereafter without jurisdiction to find any lesser crime included within the dismissed burglary charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court’s order, holding that the petition and the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the finding that Ronald B. was a “person in need of supervision.” The court relied on its prior decision in Matter of David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, emphasizing that “there must be more than a single isolated incident to support the determination of ‘need of supervision’.” The court reasoned that Article 7 of the Family Court Act does not provide for intervention based on a single illegal act unless that act would constitute a misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult.

    The court further explained that while the facts alleged might have supported a charge of juvenile delinquency based on criminal trespass in the second degree (if properly alleged), the petition only presented this as a lesser included offense of the dismissed burglary charge. Once the burglary charge was dismissed, the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to find Ronald B. guilty of any lesser crime included within it.

    The court acknowledged that the Family Court could find a respondent had committed a lesser included crime and determine them to be a juvenile delinquent based on that crime, but it emphasized that in this instance, the procedural posture (dismissal of the primary charge) precluded that finding. This case is significant because it clarifies the limits of PINS designations and emphasizes the need for evidence of ongoing misbehavior rather than single incidents. It also reinforces the principle that jurisdiction over lesser-included offenses is contingent on the viability of the primary charge.

  • Di Perri v. Boys Brotherhood Republic of New York, Inc., 29 N.Y.2d 298 (1971): Compensability of Off-Duty Recreational Injuries for Live-In Employees

    Di Perri v. Boys Brotherhood Republic of New York, Inc., 29 N.Y.2d 298 (1971)

    An employee required to live on the employer’s premises, away from home, is generally entitled to workers’ compensation for injuries sustained during reasonable recreational activities, even if those activities occur off the employer’s direct premises, provided the employer knows and implicitly approves of the activity.

    Summary

    A 16-year-old kitchen helper at a summer camp, required to live on the premises, was injured while engaging in gymnastics at a neighboring camp’s recreation hall during off-duty hours. The use of the neighboring camp’s facilities was known and permitted by the employer. The Workmen’s Compensation Board awarded compensation, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the injury was compensable because the recreational activity was a reasonable incident of the employment, given the employee’s live-in status and the employer’s implicit approval of the activity.

    Facts

    The claimant, a 16-year-old, worked as a kitchen helper and waiter at a summer camp located about 30 miles from New York City. He was required to live at the camp and in return received board, lodging, and a potential bonus. During a three-day break in the camp’s program, the claimant returned to camp as directed. During his free time, the claimant and some co-employees went to a nearby camp (as they had before, with the employer’s knowledge) to use the recreation hall for gymnastics. While doing gymnastics, the claimant fractured his kneecap.

    Procedural History

    The Workmen’s Compensation Board awarded compensation to the claimant. The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the Board’s decision and dismissed the claim. The Workmen’s Compensation Board appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee, required to live on the employer’s premises, is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained during off-duty recreational activities that occur off the employer’s premises, when such activities are known and implicitly approved by the employer.

    Holding

    Yes, because the recreational activity was a reasonable incident of the employment, given the employee’s live-in status, the employer’s knowledge and implicit approval of the activity, and the limited recreational options available to the employee at the camp.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when an employee is required to live on the employer’s premises, especially at a distance from their home, the employment status continues during the employee’s normal activities. Citing Matter of Davis v. Newsweek Mag., the court stated that an employee is “not expected to wait immobile, but may indulge in any reasonable activity at that place, and if he does so the risk inherent in such activity is an incident of his employment.” The court distinguished the case from situations where recreational activities are purely personal and unrelated to the employment environment, such as in Matter of Kaplan v. Zodiac Watch Co. The court noted that the claimant’s environment (a secluded summer camp) made recreational activities particularly reasonable. The court emphasized that the use of the neighboring camp’s recreational facilities was known and permitted by the employer, making it an “incidental adjunct to the employer’s own facilities.” The court also noted the fairness of the rule, stating that the availability of recreational facilities constituted an inducement for, and part of the contract of employment, especially considering the meager compensation received by the 16-year-old claimant. The court stated that its decision was “dictated by decisional law long established in this court.”

  • Filmways, Inc. v. ABC Consolidated Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 591 (1971): Landlord’s Right to Refuse Consent to Sublease

    Filmways, Inc. v. ABC Consolidated Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 591 (1971)

    A lease provision requiring landlord consent for subletting allows the landlord to consider its own interests and the specific characteristics of the proposed subtenant when deciding whether to grant consent, even if the lease includes a clause against unreasonably withholding consent.

    Summary

    Filmways, Inc. (tenant) sought approval from ABC Consolidated Corp. (landlord) to sublease its entire premises to Textron, Inc. The lease required landlord consent for subletting, with a clause stating consent would not be unreasonably withheld for a sublease of the entire premises to one tenant. The landlord refused consent, arguing the sublease terms were broader than the prime lease. The court held that the landlord’s refusal was reasonable, as the proposed sublease terms regarding use by affiliates and future subletting rights potentially expanded the scope of permissible occupancy beyond what the original lease allowed, justifying the landlord’s refusal to consent to the sublease.

    Facts

    ABC Consolidated Corp. leased the 23rd floor of its building to Filmways, Inc. The lease stipulated that Filmways needed ABC’s written consent to sublet the premises, but ABC agreed not to unreasonably withhold consent for a sublease of the entire floor to a single tenant.
    Filmways sought to sublease the entire floor to Textron, Inc. ABC refused to consent, citing concerns that the sublease granted Textron broader rights than Filmways had under the original lease, particularly regarding use by affiliates and future subletting.
    Filmways sued, seeking a declaration that ABC’s refusal to consent was unreasonable.

    Procedural History

    Special Term granted summary judgment to Filmways, finding ABC’s refusal to consent unreasonable.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ABC’s refusal to consent was reasonable and that ABC was entitled to summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the landlord’s refusal to consent to the sublease was unreasonable, considering the lease provision requiring consent but prohibiting unreasonable withholding of consent for a sublease of the entire premises to one tenant, and considering the terms of the proposed sublease.

    Holding

    No, because the proposed sublease contained terms that were broader than those in the original lease, potentially expanding the scope of permissible occupancy and use of the premises. This justified the landlord’s refusal to consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a landlord has the right to protect its own interests when considering a request to sublet, even when a lease includes a clause against unreasonably withholding consent. The court noted the original lease allowed Filmways’ affiliates and subsidiaries to use the premises, but ABC retained the right to withhold consent if Filmways attempted to grant a similar right to a third party.
    The proposed sublease authorized use by Textron’s affiliates and subsidiaries, and permitted subsequent subleases by Textron without Filmways’ consent, creating the possibility of multiple tenancies. The court reasoned that consenting to the sublease could constitute a waiver of valuable property rights safeguarded in the prime lease.
    The court found that the landlord’s concerns about the expanded use and subletting rights were legitimate and justified the refusal to consent. Even though a letter agreement was drafted to address some of ABC’s concerns, the court found that it was insufficient to bring the sublease fully in line with the original lease terms. The dissent argued that the sublease terms were not sufficiently different and that the landlord was being unreasonable.

  • People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971): Establishing Probable Cause with Hearsay from Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant can be based on hearsay if it provides the magistrate with sufficient information to determine both the reliability of the informant and the reliability of the information provided.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause in a search warrant affidavit when the affidavit is based on hearsay. The District Attorney obtained search warrants based on an affidavit summarizing grand jury testimony alleging a bid-rigging conspiracy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the affidavit was sufficient because the grand jury witnesses testified under oath against their penal interests, and their testimonies corroborated each other. This established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of the information, justifying the issuance of the search warrants. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had found the affidavit insufficient.

    Facts

    The District Attorney investigated a bid-rigging conspiracy involving painting contracts for New York City Housing Authority projects. The conspiracy allegedly involved painting contractors and a Housing Authority official, Wheatman, who provided inside information on bidding estimates. Assistant District Attorney Phillips applied for search warrants for the offices of the contractors, submitting an affidavit based on sworn testimony from witnesses before the Grand Jury. The affidavit stated that these witnesses admitted to being parties to an agreement to rig bids and identified the contracting firms as parties to the agreement. It further alleged that Jerry Jerome obtained Housing Authority estimates and shared them with other conspirators. Based on this information, Judge Fine issued warrants, and a search uncovered relevant documents.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants were convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division, on reargument, affirmed Wheatman’s conviction, finding he lacked standing to challenge the warrants. Wheatman also appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit based on hearsay testimony before a grand jury can establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the affidavit adequately demonstrates the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit summarized sworn grand jury testimony where witnesses admitted to being part of a bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests and corroborating each other’s accounts, which sufficiently established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that for an affidavit based on hearsay to be sufficient, it must allow a magistrate to independently assess the reliability of both the informant and their information. The court noted that reliability can be established in various ways, including prior reliable information, corroboration, statements against penal interest, and sworn testimony. In this case, the informants’ reliability was demonstrated by their sworn testimony before the grand jury, where they admitted to being parties to the bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests. The fact that multiple informants corroborated each other’s testimony further bolstered their reliability.

    Regarding the reliability of the information, the court found it significant that the witnesses had firsthand knowledge of the conspiracy. The affidavit indicated that the witnesses testified to being parties to the agreement and identified the roles of various individuals and companies. The court reasoned that because the bid estimate information was essential to the conspiracy, it was reasonable to infer that copies of the forms would be found in the offices of the conspirators. The court rejected the argument that the affidavit was defective for failing to provide a “substantial basis” for concluding that the material sought would be found in the contractor’s offices.

    The court also addressed the defendants’ request for the names of the grand jury witnesses, stating that revealing their identities would jeopardize the ongoing investigation and potentially expose the witnesses to interference or intimidation. Quoting the decision, the court noted the importance of protecting witnesses “from interference from those under investigation,” preventing “subornation of perjury and tampering with prospective [trial] witnesses” and assuring “prospective witnesses [before the Grand Jury] that their testimony will be kept secret.”

    In conclusion, the court found the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other factual and legal contentions raised by the defendants.

  • People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971): Judicial Scrutiny Sufficient for Obscenity Warrant Without Prior Adversary Hearing

    People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971)

    A judge’s independent viewing of a film and determination of probable cause for obscenity is sufficient for issuing a seizure warrant without requiring a prior adversary hearing.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prior adversary hearing is required before a warrant can be issued for the seizure of an allegedly obscene film. The New York Court of Appeals held that a judge’s independent viewing of the film, followed by a determination of probable cause, satisfies constitutional requirements. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny, not merely a police officer’s assertion, is necessary for issuing warrants related to obscenity. The court distinguished the case from situations involving broad seizures of publications and highlighted the practical difficulties of requiring adversary hearings for warrant applications based on visual media.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted under Section 235.05 of the Penal Law for exhibiting the film “Blue Movie.” A judge attended a public theater showing the film. After viewing the film, the judge determined there was probable cause to believe the film was obscene. Based on this determination, the judge issued warrants for the seizure of the film and the defendant’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the defendant guilty. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, before issuing warrants for the seizure of a film and arrest based on obscenity, the defendant is entitled to an adversary hearing before the issuing judge to contest the film’s obscenity.

    Holding

    No, because independent judicial action of viewing the film and determining probable cause met constitutional requirements; an adversary hearing is not mandated by the Supreme Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the procedure followed—the judge viewing the film and independently determining probable cause—satisfied the requirements established in Marcus v. Search Warrant, which mandates judicial supervision in obscenity cases to prevent seizures based solely on police judgment. The Court distinguished this case from Marcus, where warrants were issued based on a police officer’s conclusory assertions without judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia suggested that a judge’s viewing of the film might be sufficient, without explicitly requiring an adversary hearing.

    The Court further argued that requiring adversary hearings before issuing warrants in obscenity cases presents practical difficulties. Unlike factual disputes where an adversary hearing helps a magistrate determine probable cause, in obscenity cases, the judge has already viewed the film. “But when a Magistrate sees a film, it is not much help to him, or indeed to the parties, in deciding probable cause to have counsel on one side tell him what he has just seen is obscene and on the other that it is not.” The court also distinguished the seizure of a single film as evidence from the wide-ranging seizure of publications that could amount to suppression of expression, as in Marcus. The court found that the New York statute met the standards set forth in Roth v. United States, as it pertained to prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of redeeming social value.

    The court emphasized the need for objective judgment by judges and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, concluding that the film was obscene and prosecution was not barred by the First Amendment.