New York Law Review

Tag: 1971

  • People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971): Preserving Issues for Appellate Review

    27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971)

    An appellate court will generally not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal that were not presented in the lower courts.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the relator, Menechino, could not raise the issue of the standard of proof used by the State Board of Parole for the first time before the Court of Appeals. Menechino argued that the Board used a constitutionally impermissible standard (preponderance of evidence). The Court of Appeals found that because this issue wasn’t raised in the Supreme Court or at the Appellate Division, it couldn’t be considered at this stage. The court further noted, even if they were to consider a related argument about the sufficiency of the evidence, there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination.

    Facts

    The relator, Menechino, was adjudged in violation of parole by the State Board of Parole. He then sought relief, arguing that the parole revocation was improper. The Supreme Court initially granted his petition on grounds that were later rejected by the Appellate Division. Menechino appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted Menechino’s petition. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision. Menechino then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the New York Court of Appeals can consider an argument that the State Board of Parole employed a constitutionally impermissible standard of proof when that argument was not raised in the lower courts (Supreme Court and Appellate Division)?

    2. Whether the determination of the Board of Parole was supported by substantial evidence?

    Holding

    1. No, because this issue was not raised in the Supreme Court or at the Appellate Division, it may not be raised for the first time in the Court of Appeals.

    2. Yes, because there was substantial evidence in the record to sustain the determination of the Board of Parole.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that issues must be preserved for appellate review. It cited Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, stating that arguments not raised in lower courts are generally barred from consideration on appeal. As the court stated, “Inasmuch as this issue was not raised in the Supreme Court or at the Appellate Division it may not be raised in our court.” The court also briefly addressed Menechino’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that even if it were properly before them, there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision. The court noted the relator abandoned the original argument on which the Supreme Court had granted relief.

  • People v. Usher, 29 N.Y.2d 234 (1971): Scope of Felony Assault Predicate Felonies

    People v. Usher, 29 N.Y.2d 234 (1971)

    The felony assault statute, unlike the felony murder statute, does not limit the predicate felonies to only those that are inherently dangerous; any felony can serve as the basis for a felony assault conviction if physical injury results during its commission.

    Summary

    Usher, while driving a stolen car and being chased by police, crashed into a taxi, injuring the occupants. He was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property, felony assault, and other charges. Usher appealed, arguing that the felony underlying the assault (possession of stolen property) was not a dangerous felony and therefore could not support a felony assault conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the felony assault statute does not limit predicate felonies to only dangerous felonies, distinguishing it from the felony murder statute. The court also rejected Usher’s due process argument, stating that the legislature can hold a felon criminally accountable for injuries proximately caused during the commission of any felony.

    Facts

    Defendant Usher was in possession of a stolen automobile.
    While being pursued by the police, Usher crashed the stolen vehicle into a taxicab.
    Two occupants of the taxicab sustained physical injuries as a result of the collision.

    Procedural History

    Usher was convicted at trial of criminal possession of stolen property, two counts of felony assault, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and possession of a dangerous instrument.
    Usher appealed the conviction, arguing that the felony assault conviction was invalid because the underlying felony (criminal possession of stolen property) was not a dangerous felony.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    Usher appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the felony of criminal possession of stolen property can serve as a predicate for a felony assault conviction under Penal Law § 120.05(6).
    Whether the felony assault statute, as applied to a nonviolent felony such as possession of stolen property, is unconstitutional.

    Holding

    Yes, because the language of the felony assault statute is clear and unambiguous, and does not specify that only violent felonies can serve as a predicate. The legislature intended to distinguish between the felony murder and felony assault statutes.
    No, because due process does not preclude a legislative determination that a felon who proximately causes injury to another during the commission of a felony can be held criminally accountable, regardless of the nature of the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative intent could be inferred from the specific language of the statute. The felony assault statute states that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when, during the commission of a felony, they cause physical injury to another person. The statute does not limit the predicate felonies to violent crimes, unlike the felony murder statute, which specifically enumerates the felonies that can serve as a predicate.

    The Court noted that the felony murder statute was intentionally revised to narrow its scope, while the felony assault statute was not. The court stated that “the change from the former law was deliberate, its effect ameliorative, and brought the law of felony murder into line with that in the vast majority of other jurisdictions by specifically limiting its application to felonies involving violence or substantial risk of serious injury and death.”

    The Court rejected Usher’s argument that the felony assault statute was unconstitutional as applied to nonviolent felonies. The court stated, “we do not think that due process precludes a legislative policy determination that the felon who proximately causes injury to another, irrespective of the nature of the underlying felonious act, may be held criminally accountable.”

    The Court acknowledged the criticism of constructive malice in felony murder, but maintained its permissibility as a legislative policy choice.

    Finally, the Court noted that Usher’s argument regarding error in submitting the criminal possession of stolen property and unauthorized use of a vehicle charges to the jury was not preserved for review because no objection was made at trial.

  • People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196 (1971): Hearing Requirements for Appeal Rights After Guilty Plea

    People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196 (1971)

    A defendant who pleads guilty is not automatically entitled to a hearing to determine if they were informed of their right to appeal unless they can show they disputed the validity of the judgment during the appeal period and had a genuine appealable issue.

    Summary

    Lynn pleaded guilty to manslaughter and later sought resentencing to pursue an appeal, claiming he wasn’t informed of his appeal rights. The court held that defendants who plead guilty have a higher burden to demonstrate entitlement to a hearing on their right to appeal than those convicted after trial. Specifically, they must show they disputed the conviction’s validity during the appeal period and had a genuine appealable issue. Lynn failed to meet this burden because his attorney’s affidavit was equivocal, and he didn’t demonstrate a genuine appealable issue related to the excessiveness of his sentence.

    Facts

    In June 1962, the defendant, Lynn, pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, satisfying an indictment for second-degree murder. He was sentenced as a second-felony offender to 20 to 25 years imprisonment. Lynn did not appeal this conviction. Nine years later, in August 1971, Lynn initiated a coram nobis proceeding, seeking resentencing to allow him to take an appeal, claiming he was not advised of his right to appeal and that his sentence exceeded his expectations.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Lynn’s motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed this denial without issuing an opinion. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who pleaded guilty is entitled to a hearing on a claim that they were not advised of their right to appeal, absent a showing that the validity of the judgment was disputed during the appeal period and there was a genuine appealable issue.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who pleads guilty must show that during the time allowed for taking an appeal, the defendant disputed the validity of the judgment of conviction, and had a genuine appealable issue which, but for ignorance of or improper advice as to their rights, they might have raised on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between defendants convicted after trial and those who pleaded guilty. While the right to appeal is fundamental, a guilty plea waives certain rights and implies a decision to forego appellate review. The court reasoned that because of this waiver, a defendant who pleads guilty must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue and that the validity of the judgment was disputed during the appeal period to warrant a hearing on the failure to advise of appeal rights.

    The Court stated, “during the time allowed for taking an appeal, the defendant disputed the validity of the judgment of conviction and that he had a genuine appealable issue which, but for ignorance of or improper advice as to his rights, he might have raised on appeal.” The court found that Lynn’s claim of an excessive sentence was not credible, particularly since he could have received a longer sentence. Furthermore, his former attorney’s affidavit was equivocal, and Lynn had previously brought post-conviction proceedings on other grounds, undermining his current claim.

    In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that Lynn did not meet the necessary conditions for a hearing, as his claim was weak, and he failed to demonstrate a genuine appealable issue that he would have raised had he been properly advised of his appellate rights. Therefore, the Appellate Division’s order was affirmed.

  • People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 N.Y.2d 23 (1971): Right to Counsel at Parole Revocation Hearings After Criminal Conviction

    People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 N.Y.2d 23 (1971)

    A parolee is entitled to the assistance of counsel during a final parole revocation hearing, even if the revocation is based on a new criminal conviction committed while on parole.

    Summary

    Combs, a former state prisoner on parole, had his parole revoked after being convicted of third-degree assault. The Parole Board denied him the right to counsel at his final revocation hearing, citing a regulation that barred counsel for parolees convicted of new crimes. Combs sought habeas corpus relief, which was initially granted by the Wyoming County Court. The Appellate Division reversed, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the parolee was entitled to counsel. The Court of Appeals emphasized that revocation is not automatic and counsel could influence the Board’s decision regarding the length of time before the prisoner is reconsidered for parole.

    Facts

    In 1970, Combs was convicted of felonious sale of a dangerous drug and sentenced to a maximum of five years. He was released on parole in November 1971. In February 1972, a parole violation warrant was issued based on allegations of assault, associating with a criminal, failing to report to his parole officer, and absconding from supervision. He was arrested in Florida and returned to New York where he pleaded guilty to third-degree assault. At the parole revocation hearing, he was denied counsel because of the assault conviction. His parole was revoked based on the conviction and absconding.

    Procedural History

    Combs sought habeas corpus relief in Wyoming County Court, which granted his release and return to parole supervision. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the County Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parolee convicted of a new crime committed while on parole is entitled to the assistance of counsel at a final parole revocation hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because revocation is not automatic and counsel could influence the Parole Board’s discretion regarding the length of time before the prisoner is reconsidered for parole, and other factors related to the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, which established the right to counsel at parole revocation hearings. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli made the right to counsel dependent on the circumstances of each case, the New York Court of Appeals stated it was not required to retreat from its holding in Menechino, which was based, in part, on the State Constitution.
    Even with a new criminal conviction, revocation is not automatic; it rests in the Parole Board’s discretion. “The offense committed or the circumstances, including the facts which may have induced a plea to a lesser offense, surrounding the crime may be such that counsel by offering testimony or effective reasoning might persuade the board not to revoke parole.” Moreover, counsel can assist in determining the period of time before the prisoner is reconsidered for parole. Effective counsel may be able to obtain more favorable treatment for the parolee.
    The Court invalidated a Parole Board regulation (7 NYCRR 1.19 [c]) that barred counsel from final parole revocation hearings for parolees convicted of a crime while on parole, finding it inconsistent with the parolee’s right to counsel under the State Constitution.

  • Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 28 N.Y.2d 555 (1971): Determining Ownership for Insurance Coverage

    Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 28 N.Y.2d 555 (1971)

    In disputes regarding insurance coverage, courts will look to the substance of a transaction to determine ownership of a vehicle, especially when a clear intention of ownership exists between the parties, irrespective of the timing of specific legal formalities.

    Summary

    This case addresses a dispute between two insurance companies, Cosmopolitan (Island’s insurer) and Fidelity (Valient’s insurer), regarding which company should cover an accident involving a tractor. The tractor was part of a scheme where Valient would own the tractor used for Island’s trailers. The court held that Valient was the owner of the tractor at the time of the accident, despite the fact that some steps in the ownership transfer were not yet formally completed, because the evidence demonstrated a clear intention and ongoing scheme to transfer ownership to Valient. The court emphasized that the insurers stand in the place of their insureds and are responsible accordingly.

    Facts

    Island, which owned trailers, and Valient, a driver, devised a plan for Valient to own a tractor to move Island’s trailers. Island initially funded the tractor’s purchase, which Valient later reimbursed with a bank loan guaranteed by Island. Valient’s insurer, Fidelity, endorsed its policy to cover the tractor and received an additional premium from Valient before the accident. Although the bill of sale hadn’t been delivered and the tractor wasn’t registered in Valient’s name until after the accident, the court focused on the underlying agreement between the parties.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled in favor of Fidelity, finding that Valient was the owner. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Valient was the owner of the tractor at the time of the accident, such that Fidelity, as Valient’s insurer, was responsible for covering the incident.

    Holding

    Yes, Valient was the owner, because the evidence demonstrated a clear intention and ongoing scheme between Valient and Island for Valient to own the tractor, irrespective of the timing of specific legal formalities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the critical factor was the overarching scheme and the parties’ intent. The court noted, “each step was part of a single scheme with an unequivocal purpose, eventually consummated, and that the parties to the arrangement or scheme, Valient and Island, so regarded it.” The court found it immaterial that the purchase was initially funded by Island, or that the bill of sale and registration occurred after the accident. The key was the parties’ agreement that Valient would be the owner. The court emphasized that insurance companies stand in the place of their insureds. The court also addressed potential impacts on third parties, clarifying that the decision doesn’t affect the rights of those injured in the accident to rely on Vehicle and Traffic Law provisions for establishing liability. The court also noted that Fidelity, Valient’s insurer, was never misled and had even collected an additional premium to cover the tractor prior to the accident, further supporting the conclusion that Fidelity should be responsible. The court determined that instances suggesting ownership in Island, like one payment of repairs, were insufficient to outweigh the clear intent and relationship between Valient and Island regarding the tractor’s ownership. The court essentially looked beyond the superficial legal steps to ascertain the true nature of the agreement between the parties.

  • Engels v. City Assessor of City of Niagara Falls, 28 N.Y.2d 120 (1971): Defining ‘Income’ for Senior Citizen Property Tax Exemptions

    Engels v. City Assessor of City of Niagara Falls, 28 N.Y.2d 120 (1971)

    For purposes of determining eligibility for a senior citizen property tax exemption, ‘income’ does not include return of capital, and capital gains may be offset by capital losses, but deductions for depreciation of income-producing property are not permitted.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether certain receipts should be considered ‘income’ when determining eligibility for a real property tax exemption for senior citizens. The taxpayer, Engels, applied for an exemption, but the city assessor denied it, calculating her income as exceeding the statutory limit. The disputed income included return of investment from a mutual fund and annuities, a capital gain without deducting a corresponding capital loss, and rental income with a depreciation deduction. The Court of Appeals held that return of capital is not income and capital gains should be offset by capital losses, but depreciation deductions are not allowed when calculating ‘net rental income’ for exemption eligibility. Thus, Engel’s income qualified her for the exemption.

    Facts

    Engels, a senior citizen, applied for a real property tax exemption. The City Assessor of Niagara Falls denied the application, asserting her income exceeded the local limit of $3,600. The assessor’s calculation included the following disputed items: $406.14 return of investment from a mutual fund, classified as dividend income; a capital gain of $240.65 from the mutual fund without deducting a capital loss of $366.71 from the same investment; total annuity payments of $1,382.12, treating the entire sum as income rather than just the taxable portion; and $217 “net rents” from a room rental after Engels claimed a $250 depreciation deduction, resulting in a claimed net rent loss.

    Procedural History

    Engels initiated a certiorari proceeding challenging the assessor’s denial. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, directing that the exemption be granted. The City Assessor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a return of capital from investments should be considered ‘income’ for the purposes of determining eligibility for a real property tax exemption under Real Property Tax Law § 467.

    2. Whether capital gains should be offset by capital losses when calculating ‘income’ under Real Property Tax Law § 467.

    3. Whether a depreciation deduction should be allowed from net rental income when calculating ‘income’ under Real Property Tax Law § 467.

    Holding

    1. No, because a transfer, return, or redelivery of capital is not income.

    2. Yes, because it is only fair to carry the assumption further and offset capital gains with capital losses as do the tax laws.

    3. No, because depreciation is a theoretical calculation, and the numerous methods of calculating depreciation make it an unreliable standard for determining income for the purposes of the exemption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that exemption statutes are construed strictly against the taxpayer but not so narrowly as to defeat the statute’s purpose, which is to help elderly persons with small incomes remain in their homes. The Court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to incorporate federal or state tax rules into the exemption statute, and the term “income” must be judicially construed. “The term ‘ income ’ has no fixed meaning and it is evident that section 467 by its listing of types of income did not intend to use the term ‘ income ’ in any classic sense, if there be one, in the law of income taxation.”

    Regarding return of capital, the court stated that “a transfer, return, or redelivery of capital is not income.” As for capital gains and losses, the court reasoned that since capital gains are taxable as income, it’s fair to offset them with capital losses. The court disallowed the depreciation deduction, explaining that depreciation is a theoretical calculation with varied methods and may not reflect actual income. The court also noted the State Board of Equalization and Assessment’s opinion that depreciation was not deductible, and the Legislature’s failure to redefine “net rental income” suggests agreement. Based on these adjustments, Engel’s income was $3,507.85, below the city’s $3,600 limit.

  • People v. Washington, 27 N.Y.2d 401 (1971): Defendant’s Prior Knowledge as a Bar to Relief for Perjured Testimony

    People v. Washington, 27 N.Y.2d 401 (1971)

    A defendant with prior knowledge of a witness’s perjury regarding promises of leniency from the prosecution, who fails to disclose this knowledge to the court or jury, is barred from later seeking relief based on that perjury.

    Summary

    Washington sought coram nobis relief, arguing that a prosecution witness, Anderson, falsely testified he had no expectation of leniency. The prosecutor knew this was false but did not correct it. Normally, this would warrant a new trial. However, Washington knew of the promises to Anderson *before* his trial. Despite this knowledge, Washington did not reveal it when questioned about Anderson’s motives. Washington’s counsel also confirmed that Washington had told him about the promises before the trial. The court held that because Washington knew of the perjury and failed to act, he was barred from relief. The court emphasized it would be punishing the People rather than protecting legitimate interests of the defendant.

    Facts

    1. Martin Anderson, a key prosecution witness in Washington’s trial, testified he had no reason to expect leniency in exchange for his testimony.
    2. This testimony was false; Anderson had received assurances of leniency from the prosecutor.
    3. After Washington’s trial, the indictment against Anderson was dismissed based on his cooperation in Washington’s trial.
    4. Prior to his own trial, Washington was informed by Anderson about the promises of leniency.
    5. During his trial, when questioned about Anderson’s motives, Washington was evasive and did not disclose his knowledge of the promises.

    Procedural History

    1. Washington was convicted based, in part, on Anderson’s testimony.
    2. Washington then filed a coram nobis application, claiming that Anderson’s false testimony warranted a new trial.
    3. The lower court denied the application.
    4. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, who knew before his trial that a prosecution witness perjured himself regarding promises of leniency and failed to disclose this knowledge, is entitled to coram nobis relief based on that perjury.

    Holding

    1. No, because both the defendant and his counsel, with knowledge of the facts, stood silently by and did nothing themselves to remedy the situation; the court will not merely punish the prosecution and thus penalize the People, where there cannot be said to be legitimate interests of the defendant to be protected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the prosecutor’s failure to correct Anderson’s false testimony would normally warrant reversal under People v. Savvides. However, the court distinguished this case because Washington knew of the perjury before his trial and failed to disclose it. The court reasoned that allowing Washington to benefit from this situation would be unfair because he knowingly withheld information that could have been used to impeach Anderson’s testimony. The court stated, “Where, however, as here, both the defendant and his counsel, with knowledge of the facts, stood silently by and did nothing themselves to remedy the situation, we would make a very limited exception to the Savvides rule. To do otherwise, in our view, would be merely to punish the prosecution, and thus to penalize the People, where there cannot be said to be legitimate interests of the defendant to be protected.” The court emphasized the need to protect the integrity of the trial process and prevent defendants from strategically withholding information to secure a later advantage. The court declined to penalize the People when the defendant possessed, and failed to utilize, the pertinent exculpatory information.

  • People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.2d 231 (1971): Indigent Defendant’s Right to Independent Psychiatric Expert

    People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.2d 231 (1971)

    An indigent defendant who has been examined by court-appointed psychiatrists and found competent to stand trial is not constitutionally entitled to the appointment, at state expense, of an independent psychiatrist to assist in their defense, absent a showing of partiality or incompetence of the court-appointed experts.

    Summary

    Brown was indicted and, pursuant to statute, examined by court-appointed psychiatrists who found him competent to stand trial. Brown’s counsel challenged the report, citing a prior accident that allegedly changed Brown’s behavior, but did not request a hearing or another psychiatric exam. Brown pleaded guilty. On appeal, Brown argued he was entitled to an independent psychiatrist at state expense. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Constitution does not require the state to furnish an independent psychiatrist where the defendant has been examined by impartial, competent court-appointed experts.

    Facts

    Brown sustained a cerebral contusion in an automobile accident 16 months before his indictment. Court-appointed psychiatrists examined Brown and reported he was not insane or an imbecile, understood the charges and proceedings, and could make his defense. The report noted Brown’s accident recovery and found no symptoms of organic brain injury. They observed his evasiveness during later interviews but did not attribute it to the accident or mental illness. At sentencing, Brown’s counsel argued the accident changed Brown’s behavior but did not allege insanity or incompetence, and declined a competency hearing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court confirmed the psychiatrist’s report and accepted Brown’s guilty plea. At sentencing, Brown’s counsel reiterated objections and stated that Brown would seek another examination if he had funds. Brown appealed, arguing the court should have inquired further and appointed an independent psychiatrist. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who has been examined by court-appointed psychiatrists and found competent to stand trial is constitutionally entitled to the appointment, at State expense, of an independent psychiatrist to assist with the preparation and presentation of his defense?

    Holding

    No, because the court-ordered psychiatric examination adequately protected Brown’s rights, and under these circumstances, Brown had no additional constitutional right to the appointment of another psychiatrist for his exclusive benefit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, stating the Constitution imposes no duty upon the State to provide an independent psychiatrist when the defendant has been examined by court-appointed psychiatrists and had a hearing on the sanity issue. The court acknowledged the interplay of constitutional rights to counsel, a fair trial, and equality might require the State to pay expert witness fees in some cases where expert testimony is crucial to an indigent’s defense. However, this case did not present such a situation because Brown was examined by two court-appointed experts, whose report was available to defense counsel, and whose professional standing, competence, and impartiality were not questioned. The court declined to constitutionally mandate a “battle of experts” by supplying defense counsel with funds to seek a “psychiatric advocate” for the defendant. The court emphasized that there was no question about the impartiality of the appointed psychiatrists. As such the court found no need to provide additional resources for the defendant.

  • Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971): Double Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity for Mistrial

    Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971)

    A mistrial granted without manifest necessity, and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defendant, Grant, whose trial was terminated by a mistrial declared by the judge due to a potential, albeit remote, appearance of bias. The New York Court of Appeals held that declaring a mistrial under these circumstances, over the defendant’s strenuous objection and without manifest necessity, violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights, thus prohibiting a retrial. The court emphasized that the appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient to justify a mistrial; there must be a demonstrable and substantial basis, a “manifest necessity,” to override the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by the original tribunal.

    Facts

    The trial court judge, during Grant’s trial, recalled that his cousin was acquainted with Grant’s father. Grant’s father had previously contacted the judge’s chambers about a complaint of police harassment unrelated to the current case. The judge had no personal interaction with Grant or his father, and the contact was minimal (a call to the judge’s clerk a year prior). The judge, concerned that this recollection “might in some conceivable way affect his judgment,” “disqualified” himself and declared a mistrial “in the interests of justice.”

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced without a jury, and after a police witness testified, jeopardy attached. Grant’s counsel objected to the mistrial, arguing that no cause existed and noting a tactical advantage gained from the police officer’s testimony. After the mistrial was declared, Grant sought relief under CPLR Article 78, seeking to prohibit retrial based on double jeopardy. The Appellate Division prohibited the retrial. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mistrial, declared by a judge due to a remote possibility of bias and over the defendant’s objection, constitutes manifest necessity, thus permitting a retrial without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because the judge’s subjective appraisal of a remote possibility of bias was not within the ambit of the well-established rule that “manifest necessity” must be shown to justify a mistrial. The remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant, interdicted the mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the mistrial was improperly granted because it lacked “manifest necessity.” The court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a tribunal they believe to be favorably disposed to their fate. The court quoted United States v. Jorn, stating that the judge must consider “the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate”. Although the appearance of impropriety is a valid concern, it cannot be used as an “escape hatch from the performance of an unpleasant duty.” The court emphasized that “the necessity must be ‘manifest,’” and the remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with the prejudice to the defendant (losing a tactical advantage), made the mistrial improper. The Court distinguished between a genuine, demonstrable need for a mistrial and a mere subjective apprehension of bias. The court noted that a mistrial declared in the public interest and against the defendant’s will must have some basis of demonstrable substance.

  • Judiciary Law §791: Who Gets Fines for Criminal Contempt?

    In the Matter of the Application of David B. Coston, as County Clerk of New York County, for a Judgment Declaring Whether the City of New York or the State of New York is Entitled to Receive Fines Imposed in Certain Criminal Contempt Proceedings., 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971)

    Fines imposed for criminal contempt of court are payable to the treasurer of the county in which the court imposing them is sitting, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 791.

    Summary

    This case concerns the disposition of fines levied against public employee unions for criminal contempt for violating the Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes by public employees. The County Clerk of New York County brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the City of New York or the State of New York was entitled to receive the fines. The New York Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 791, the fines were payable to the treasurer of the county in which the court imposing the fines was sitting, which in this case was the City of New York’s finance administrator.

    Facts

    Three New York City unions, representing sanitation workers, teachers, and supervisory school personnel, were found guilty of criminal contempt for violating the Taylor Law by striking. The Supreme Court, New York County, fined the unions, resulting in a total of nearly $500,000. The County Clerk held these funds, and both the City and State claimed entitlement to them, leading to the declaratory judgment action.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, granted summary judgment in favor of the City of New York, concluding that the City was entitled to the funds. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted the State leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether fines imposed for criminal contempt of court for violating the Taylor Law are payable to the State of New York or to the county in which the court imposing the fines is sitting, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 791.

    Holding

    No, because under Judiciary Law § 791, fines for criminal contempt are payable to the treasurer of the county in which the court imposing them is sitting.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Judiciary Law § 791, which governs the disposition of fines when no special provision has been made. This section directs the clerk of the court to issue a warrant to the sheriff, commanding them to collect the fine and pay it to the county treasurer. The court emphasized the criminal nature of contempt proceedings, stating that a fine for criminal contempt is a “punishment for the wrong in the interest of public justice, and not in the interest of an individual litigant.” The court reasoned that, similar to other criminal offenses where fines are payable to local subdivisions or county treasurers, fines for criminal contempt should be paid to the treasurer of the county where the court is located. The court rejected the State’s argument that § 791 only describes the procedure for collecting fines and does not address title, stating that statutes rarely specify which governmental body receives title when directing payment to a county or city treasurer. The court also dismissed the State’s reliance on the Finance Law, noting that those provisions only apply after it has been established that the fines belong to the State, which was not the case here. The court found that the City, through its finance administrator, was the proper recipient of the fines.