New York Law Review

Tag: 1969

  • People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants

    People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969)

    A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit containing specific facts establishing unlawful activity on the premises to be searched; a conclusory statement that individuals frequenting the premises are “LSD users and sellers” is insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions for possession of dangerous drugs, holding that the search warrant used to seize the drugs was issued without sufficient probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that “LSD users and sellers” frequented the defendant Waitz’s cottage. The court found this statement to be a conclusory assertion lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises. Furthermore, the court held that the warrant, which described the cottage but not the surrounding area, did not justify the search of the defendant’s car when it was driven onto the property while officers were present. Because the warrant lacked proper foundation and the car search exceeded its scope, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant for a cottage belonging to defendant Waitz. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage. When the police arrived to execute the warrant, the defendant’s automobile was driven onto the property. The police searched the car, as well as the cottage, and seized LSD, marijuana, and hypodermic needles.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs based on the evidence seized during the search. Justice McInerney granted a certificate of reasonable doubt, questioning whether the mere presence of alleged drug users and sellers at a house was sufficient for probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, and the People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit stating that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” a premises provides sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for that premises.
    2. Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of a specific building extends to a vehicle that is driven onto the property while the search is being conducted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit contains a conclusory statement lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises.
    2. No, because the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the automobile was not included in the warrant’s description of the premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked the factual substance required to establish probable cause. The statement that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage was deemed a conclusory characterization, without any specific facts to suggest that illegal activity was occurring within the premises. The court cited Spinelli v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas, emphasizing that a mere assertion of police suspicion or reputation is insufficient to justify a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. “But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.”

    The court also addressed the scope of the search warrant, noting that it authorized the search of the cottage but did not mention the automobile. Citing People v. Rainey, the court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution require that a search warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.” Since the warrant did not include the automobile, the search of the car was deemed unlawful. Probable cause must be shown in each instance, and a warrant to search a building cannot be extended to justify the search of a separate location, such as a vehicle that happened to be present at the time of the search. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from both the cottage and the car should have been suppressed, leading to the reversal of the defendants’ convictions.

  • Matter of American Title Ins. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 25 N.Y.2d 181 (1969): Taxation of Title Examination Fees as Premiums

    Matter of American Title Ins. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 25 N.Y.2d 181 (1969)

    Fees charged by title insurance companies for title examinations, conducted as a prerequisite to issuing title insurance policies, are considered part of the ‘gross direct premiums’ subject to state franchise tax.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether fees for title examinations, conducted by title insurance companies before issuing policies, are taxable as ‘gross direct premiums’ under Section 187 of the Tax Law. The Tax Commission argued that these fees, along with others, were taxable, leading to an additional assessment against American Title. The Appellate Division agreed regarding title examination fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory scheme, incorporating both Insurance and Tax Laws, mandates taxation of these fees as part of the overall premium. This decision ensures consistent taxation across insurance and non-insurance businesses.

    Facts

    American Title Insurance Company charged fees for title examinations as part of its title insurance business. These examinations constitute approximately three-quarters of the overall cost of title insurance. Historically, the company and others in the New York metropolitan area reported title insurance premiums earned and service charges (including title examinations) as separate income items in annual statements filed with the Superintendent of Insurance. The company only paid taxes on the portion of fees labeled as ‘premiums,’ which was a small fraction of the total fees collected for title insurance.

    Procedural History

    The Tax Commission issued an additional tax assessment against American Title Insurance Company, arguing that fees for title examinations should be included in the calculation of ‘gross direct premiums.’ American Title challenged this assessment. The Appellate Division upheld the commission’s determination regarding title examination fees but eliminated taxes on other services. The Court of Appeals granted permission for further appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether fees charged by title insurance companies for title examinations, performed prior to the issuance of title insurance, constitute ‘gross direct premiums’ subject to taxation under Section 187 of the Tax Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory framework, encompassing both the Insurance Law and the Tax Law, treats these fees as part of the overall premium for title insurance, thus making them subject to franchise tax.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 187 of the Tax Law requires a tax on premiums, and Section 550(1) of the Insurance Law broadly defines ‘premium’ to include all compensation received for insurance contracts. Furthermore, Section 46(18) of the Insurance Law defines ‘title insurance’ as encompassing not only insuring the correctness of searches but also procuring and furnishing related information. The court emphasized that the Insurance Law and Tax Law must be read together. To exclude title examination charges, which constitute a significant portion of the policy’s cost, would allow title insurance companies to avoid paying their fair share of taxes compared to other businesses. The court cited Matter of City Tit. Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y., 13 N.Y.2d 686 (1963), as prompting the reevaluation of past practices. The court noted that the policies themselves often state that title insurance is provided “in consideration of the payment of * * * charges for examination of title and of the premium”. The court also stated that a tax on insurance premiums is analogous to a tax on the ‘ ‘net income’ ’ of other types of business corporations. Therefore, the court concluded that the entire cost of the policy, including both the ‘risk’ and the ‘title examination’ portions, is subject to taxation.

  • Levine v. Guidera, 24 N.Y.2d 305 (1969): Determining Compensation Beyond Partnership Agreement Terms

    Levine v. Guidera, 24 N.Y.2d 305 (1969)

    When a partnership agreement specifies compensation for certain services, a question of fact exists as to whether additional compensation is warranted for services falling outside the scope of the agreement’s specified duties.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute among partners regarding a fee taken by the general partners for negotiating the sale of partnership property. The limited partners argued that the fee was improper because the partnership agreement limited compensation to specific management duties. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of partial summary judgment to the limited partners, holding that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the services rendered fell outside the scope of the partnership agreement and, if so, whether failure to obtain prior approval precluded compensation.

    Facts

    A limited partnership, Madison Discount Co., was formed to hold title to a shopping center. The general partners, Guidera and Goodman, were responsible for managing the property. The partnership agreement provided a $1,200 annual management fee for specific duties: preparing statements, collecting rents, making disbursements, and general maintenance. The primary lessee defaulted and the partners decided to sell the property. Guidera and Goodman negotiated the sale and took a $10,000 fee without prior authorization from the limited partners. The limited partners objected to the fee.

    Procedural History

    The limited partners sued the general partners. The Special Term granted partial summary judgment to the limited partners, concluding the fee was improper given the limitations in the partnership agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a material issue of fact exists regarding whether the services performed by the general partners in negotiating the sale of the partnership property were outside the scope of the management services covered by the compensation provision of the partnership agreement, thus entitling them to additional compensation.

    Holding

    No, because the language in the partnership agreement regarding compensation for management services raises a triable issue as to whether the negotiation services performed by the defendants are beyond the bounds of the agreement and hence compensable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prohibition on compensation beyond what was stated in the agreement had to be read in context. The $1,200 annual fee was designated for “ministerial work” related to managing the property under a net lease. The Court emphasized that the general partners were responsible for preparing statements, making disbursements, collecting rent, and hiring an accountant. However, the unexpected default by the lessee forced the partners to sell the property, necessitating significant negotiations. The court posed the question of whether the $1,200 management fee was intended to cover the difficult and time-consuming negotiations involving the sale of the property, spanning “five and one half” months and involving multiple offers. The Court noted, “The limitation in the agreement regarding compensation for management services raises a triable issue as to whether the negotiation services performed by the defendants are beyond the bounds of the agreement and hence compensable.” The Court also acknowledged the general principle that partners are not typically entitled to compensation for services, but clarified that this principle usually applied when partners had equal interests and responsibilities. The Court found that the interests and liabilities of the general partners and special partners were not equal, which is why the agreement limited compensation to the management of the premises. The Court stated that, “Whether then the defendants are entitled to compensation for other services presents an issue of fact.”

  • People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 244 (1969): Admissibility of Confession and Joinder of Offenses

    People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 244 (1969)

    A defendant’s confession is admissible if the defendant has not retained counsel, does not desire counsel at the time of questioning, and multiple charges of similar character may be joined in a single indictment and trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the homicide of Richard Fuller and in the second degree for the homicide of Catherine Herrell. The defendant argued his confession was involuntary because police continued questioning him after he mentioned having an attorney, and that it was improper to charge him with two separate murders in a single indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had not retained counsel for the current case, and he did not desire counsel during questioning. The court also held that Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the joinder of similar offenses in a single indictment and trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with two counts of murder for killing Catherine Herrell and Richard Fuller. The defendant made statements to the police and the district attorney. The defendant told a police officer that he “had” a lawyer who had represented him “down South in another case”, but clarified that he did not wish to speak to that lawyer and would seek an attorney if needed when he went to court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for Fuller’s homicide and in the second degree for Mrs. Herrell’s homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing his confession was involuntary and the joinder of offenses was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s confession was involuntary and should not have been admitted into evidence because police continued questioning him after he mentioned having an attorney.
    2. Whether the defendant was improperly charged in a single indictment and tried in a single trial for two separate murders.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant had not retained an attorney for the current case, did not express a desire to speak with the attorney he had from a previous case, and indicated he would seek counsel when he went to court.
    2. No, because Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that a defendant may be indicted for “two or more acts…constituting crimes of the same or a similar character”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that further questioning of an accused in the absence of counsel is proscribed only after the police learn that an attorney has entered the proceeding in connection with the charges under investigation. Since the defendant did not have an attorney representing him in this case, or desire one at that time, there was no violation of his right to counsel.

    Regarding the joinder of offenses, the Court cited Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly allows for the joinder of similar offenses in a single indictment and trial. The Court referenced precedent such as People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447 (1937), which upheld the constitutionality of this practice. The court stated, “There is nothing unique about a statute which provides that a person may be tried in a single trial for a number of crimes of a similar nature”.

    The Court found no merit in the defendant’s arguments and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

  • Burns v. 500 East 83rd Street Corporation, 24 N.Y.2d 117 (1969): Defining ‘Tenant in Occupancy’ for Co-op Conversion Rights

    Burns v. 500 East 83rd Street Corp., 24 N.Y.2d 117 (1969)

    A subtenant in exclusive possession of a rent-controlled apartment for the entire term of the lease, with the landlord’s explicit consent to the sublet, qualifies as a ‘tenant in occupancy’ and is entitled to the exclusive right to purchase the co-operative shares allocated to that apartment during a co-op conversion.

    Summary

    This case addresses the rights of a subtenant in a rent-controlled apartment during a building’s conversion to cooperative ownership. Burns, a subtenant, sought to compel the building owners to offer her the co-op shares allocated to her apartment. The court held that because Burns was in exclusive possession for the entire lease term with the landlord’s explicit permission and treated as a tenant, she qualified as a ‘tenant in occupancy’ under rent control regulations, entitling her to purchase the co-op shares. This decision clarifies the definition of ‘tenant in occupancy’ to include subtenants with long-term, landlord-approved arrangements, preventing landlords from circumventing tenant protections during co-op conversions.

    Facts

    Burns was a subtenant occupying a rent-controlled apartment. The original tenant, Henderson, had a lease containing a clause that the landlord would grant permission for a sublet to Burns. Burns continuously occupied the apartment throughout Henderson’s two-year lease. The landlord accepted rent payments directly from Burns. During this period, the building’s owners initiated a cooperative conversion plan, which, under New York City rent regulations, gave ‘each tenant in occupancy’ the right to purchase the allocated shares. The landlord refused to offer Burns the shares, arguing she was merely a subtenant.

    Procedural History

    Burns sued the building owners and managers seeking an order compelling them to offer her the co-op stock allocated to her apartment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Burns appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a subtenant in exclusive and continuous possession of a rent-controlled apartment for the entire term of a lease, with the landlord’s express consent to the sublease, qualifies as a “tenant in occupancy” under Section 55(c)(3) of the Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations, thereby entitling her to the exclusive right to purchase the co-operative shares allocated to the apartment?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the rent regulations define “tenant” to include “subtenant” and “sublessee,” and the landlord’s explicit consent to the sublet, coupled with the subtenant’s continuous and exclusive occupancy, demonstrates that the subtenant is the “tenant in occupancy” for the purposes of the co-op conversion offering. The court found that Henderson was not a “tenant in occupancy” because he did not live in the apartment. The Court held, “It was for the protection of just such an occupant of rent-controlled accommodations that section 55 (subd. e, par. [3]) was promulgated.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the broad definition of “tenant” in the relevant regulations, which explicitly includes “subtenant” and “sublessee.” It reasoned that Burns’s continuous and exclusive occupancy of the apartment, coupled with the landlord’s express consent to the sublease, established her as the “tenant in occupancy” within the meaning of Section 55(c)(3) of the Rent, Eviction, and Rehabilitation Regulations. The court noted that Henderson, the named tenant, did not occupy the premises during the lease term, further solidifying Burns’s claim. The Court stated, “It is not open to dispute, therefore, that plaintiff was for the entire period of the lease the ‘tenant in occupancy’ of the apartment literally within section 55 (subd. c, par. [3]) of the Regulations.” The court distinguished Burns’s situation from “casual occupation, or other kinds of relationships with landlords,” suggesting that the specific facts—long-term occupancy and landlord approval—were crucial. Furthermore, the court suggested that the subletting for the entire lease period, expressly approved by the landlord, may have had the legal effect of an assignment of the lease. The court ultimately decided it was unnecessary to reach the question whether she is also an assignee of the lease because she was found to be a tenant in occupancy.

  • Matter of Elias v. Serota, 24 N.Y.2d 68 (1969): Interpreting Corporate By-Laws for Filling Board Vacancies

    Matter of Elias v. Serota, 24 N.Y.2d 68 (1969)

    When a specific corporate by-law addresses filling board vacancies, it takes precedence over general by-laws requiring a supermajority for transacting business, especially when applying the general rule would paralyze corporate functions.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over the validity of an election to fill a vacancy on a corporate board of directors. The petitioner challenged the election, arguing that a supermajority vote was required under the corporation’s general by-laws. The Court of Appeals held that a specific by-law addressing the filling of vacancies controlled over the general quorum and voting requirements. The Court reasoned that applying the general rules would lead to corporate paralysis, and the specific by-law was designed to ensure the corporation’s continued functioning. The court emphasized that the specific by-law complemented statutory provisions regarding filling vacancies, and should prevail over the general by-laws.

    Facts

    The corporation had five authorized directors. Two directors resigned, leaving three directors in office: the petitioner and the respondents, Moskowitz and Barrakette. A meeting was held where respondents Moskowitz and Barrakette voted to elect respondent Brody to fill one of the vacant positions. The petitioner objected, arguing that the election required a unanimous vote of the existing three directors.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner sued under Section 619 of the Business Corporation Law to invalidate the election. Special Term found the election valid and denied the application. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a specific corporate by-law allowing “the directors in office” to fill vacancies on the board takes precedence over general by-laws requiring a 75% quorum and 75% vote for transacting business when those general rules would prevent the filling of vacancies.

    Holding

    Yes, because the specific by-law addressing the filling of vacancies is designed to ensure the continued functioning of the corporation and complements statutory provisions regarding filling vacancies, and thus prevails over general by-laws that, if applied, would paralyze the corporation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the specific language of by-law 14, which granted “the directors in office” the power to choose successors to fill vacancies. This by-law was authorized by Business Corporation Law § 705(a), which allows directors to fill vacancies even if less than a quorum exists, unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws provide otherwise. The Court distinguished this specific provision from the general quorum and voting requirements in the certificate of incorporation and by-laws, which required 75% of the directors for any business transaction. The Court reasoned that applying the general rules would make it impossible to fill vacancies when the board was reduced to three members, as 75% of the original five directors would be four, an unattainable number. The Court stated: “Rather, it seems to us, the vitality of the corporation was to be preserved and the paralysis of its functions and its mandatory dissolution were to be avoided by the specific, exclusive and practical procedure enacted as by-law 14, complementing, as it does, section 705 (subd. [a]) of the Business Corporation Law. By-laws 20 and 21 apply to the company’s ‘business’, in general; by-law 14 to its special and vital function of succession.” Therefore, the specific by-law regarding filling vacancies controlled over the general quorum and voting requirements, ensuring the corporation’s continued operation.

  • Matter of Leirer v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 25 N.Y.2d 63 (1969): Post-Election Challenges to Candidate Qualifications

    Matter of Leirer v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 25 N.Y.2d 63 (1969)

    A Board of Elections lacks the authority to withhold certification from a duly elected candidate after the election based on a challenge to their qualifications that could have been raised prior to the election.

    Summary

    The Nassau County Board of Elections refused to certify Leirer as a Democratic Committeeman, despite him receiving sufficient votes, because he wasn’t a registered Democrat when he filed his designating petition. Leirer had changed his registration shortly before the election, but it hadn’t taken effect yet. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Board could disqualify a candidate after the election based on a pre-election qualification challenge. The Court held that the Board could not withhold certification post-election, emphasizing the need for finality in elections and the availability of pre-election challenges. This encourages parties to diligently vet candidates before the election.

    Facts

    Leirer, a Democratic Committeeman, changed his enrollment from “blank” to Democrat on March 26, 1969.
    He filed designating petitions for Democratic Committeeman in the primary election held on June 17, 1969.
    No objections to his qualifications were filed before the election.
    After Leirer won the election, the Board of Elections refused to certify him, arguing he wasn’t a registered Democrat when he filed his petitions.

    Procedural History

    Special Term granted Leirer’s application to compel the Board to issue a certificate of election.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the challenge to Leirer’s enrollment was untimely, coming after the election.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Elections has the authority, after an election, to withhold certification of a duly elected candidate, on grounds that would have justified invalidating the candidate’s nominating petition prior to the election.

    Holding

    No, because the Board of Elections does not have the authority, after the election, to withhold certification of a duly elected candidate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged Leirer was likely unqualified at the time of the primary, and the Board could have disqualified him before the election. Citing Matter of Freilich v. Christenfeld (25 N.Y.2d 799), the court noted that a change in enrollment becomes effective only after the general election. However, the crucial point was the timing of the challenge.

    The Court emphasized the importance of finality in elections, citing Matter of Buechel v. Bosco (9 A.D.2d 916), which dismissed a post-election challenge to votes as untimely to prevent disenfranchisement of voters. The Court also referenced Bramley v. Miller (270 N.Y. 307) stating: “The result of a vote taken on election day is not rendered void because of the irregularity of a nominating convention or nominating petitions. Whatever objection there may be to the questions to be submitted or to the nominations as made must be raised and disposed of before election day. The result of the election is final and wipes out all these prior irregularities, if there be any.”
    The Court reasoned that voters need assurance their votes won’t be wasted by later disqualification. Parties have procedures and time to challenge candidates before the election. “The need for finality in the electoral process demands that we place such a burden on the party organization and opposing candidates.” The court clarified that other proceedings, such as *quo warranto*, could address more fundamental defects.
    The court dismissed concerns that this would allow a surreptitious takeover of a party stating that these fears are unwarranted as it merely places the burden on the party to police its own primary.

  • People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 474 (1969): Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony After Secret Examination

    People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 474 (1969)

    A psychiatric examination of a defendant by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, conducted without notice to the defendant’s counsel or court permission, violates the defendant’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, rendering the psychiatrist’s testimony inadmissible.

    Summary

    McKinney was convicted of murdering his wife after pleading not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecution, without informing McKinney’s counsel or obtaining court approval, had him examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Abrahamsen, who testified that McKinney was faking mental illness. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Dr. Abrahamsen’s testimony was inadmissible because the examination violated McKinney’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The court also found error in admitting testimony that McKinney had invoked his right to counsel when initially questioned.

    Facts

    Following the murder of his wife, McKinney was arrested and informed officers he would not speak without his lawyer present. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. While jailed and awaiting a court-ordered competency evaluation, the District Attorney arranged for Dr. Abrahamsen to examine McKinney’s sanity without notifying McKinney’s attorney or seeking court approval. Dr. Abrahamsen concluded McKinney was malingering and testified to this effect at trial. At trial, a police officer testified that McKinney asserted his right to counsel upon arrest.

    Procedural History

    McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that Dr. Abrahamsen’s testimony was inadmissible and that the admission of testimony regarding McKinney’s invocation of his right to counsel was also erroneous. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a psychiatric examination of a defendant by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, conducted without notice to the defendant’s counsel or court permission, violates the defendant’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

    2. Whether it is permissible to present evidence that the defendant invoked his right to counsel as evidence of guilt or to rebut an insanity defense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because such an examination constitutes a secret interrogation that contravenes the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    2. No, because using the defendant’s assertion of his constitutional right as evidence against him is impermissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding, especially during interrogation. Citing People v. Waterman, the court emphasized that any secret interrogation after indictment, without counsel, violates basic fairness. While acknowledging the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Baird, which allowed court-ordered psychiatric examinations outside the presence of counsel, the court distinguished the present case. The key difference was that Dr. Abrahamsen’s examination was conducted secretly, without court permission or notice to defense counsel. The court reasoned that this secrecy deprived the defendant of the opportunity to seek a protective order to prevent the disclosure of incriminating information. The court highlighted the inherent dangers of secret examinations, where probing questions, hypnosis, or drugs could be used to extract information without proper safeguards. The court further stated, “In the absence of any notice to counsel or of judicial supervision, a ‘medical examination’ may well develop into precisely the sort of ‘secret interrogation’ which this court decried and found objectionable in People v. Waterman.” Furthermore, the court found it was reversible error to admit testimony that McKinney invoked his right to counsel when questioned, as it created an inference of guilt. The court stated: “To sanction the surreptitious examination of such a defendant, or to allow his insistence upon his constitutional rights to be used against him, would seriously impair the value of those protections.”

  • Matter of Martin Dennis Co. v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 84 (1969): Public Access Requirements for Restaurant Liquor Licenses

    Matter of Martin Dennis Co. v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 84 (1969)

    A restaurant granted a retail license for on-premise liquor consumption must generally be open to the public to advance “public convenience and advantage,” as intended by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.

    Summary

    Martin Dennis Co., operating a restaurant called “Numero Uno,” had its liquor license canceled by the State Liquor Authority (SLA) for effectively operating as a private club and discouraging public access. The restaurant argued that it catered to a membership club and gave members preference. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the SLA’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law requires restaurants with on-premise consumption licenses to serve the general public, promoting public convenience and advantage.

    Facts

    The State Liquor Authority (SLA) investigated Martin Dennis Co.’s restaurant, “Numero Uno,” after receiving complaints. An investigator attempted to make reservations and gain admission but was denied because he was not a member of the “Numero Uno” club. The restaurant’s manager testified that before 7:00 p.m., reservations were accepted only from club members (1,300-1,500 members). After 7:00 p.m., members received preference, and non-members were seated if space permitted, for a $7.50 fee. After 10:30 p.m., seating was on a first-come, first-served basis. The restaurant did not advertise, and a plaque on the outer wall identified the premises as “Numero Uno.”

    Procedural History

    The State Liquor Authority (SLA) canceled Martin Dennis Co.’s liquor license. The company appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the SLA’s decision. The State Liquor Authority appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law requires restaurants holding retail licenses for on-premise consumption to admit the general public.

    Holding

    Yes, because the legislative intent behind the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law is to advance “public convenience and advantage,” which requires retail on-premise restaurant licenses to serve the general public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the SLA’s determination that the restaurant was not open to the general public was supported by substantial evidence. The court emphasized that its review in administrative proceedings is limited to determining whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, citing Matter of Playboy Club v. State Liq. Auth., 23 N.Y.2d 544, 547. The court stated, “A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for the considered judgment of an administrative tribunal if there is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’ (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229).” The court reasoned that although the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law does not explicitly state that restaurants must be open to the general public, the legislative intent is clear. Section 2 states that regulation of alcoholic beverages by the SLA should be for the “public convenience and advantage.” The court distinguished Playboy Club v. Hostetter, 40 Misc 2d 449, noting that the Playboy Club admitted all who paid the admission fee. The court concluded that because “Numero Uno” discouraged public admission, the SLA’s cancellation of the license was justified.

  • George v. Shultis, 24 N.Y.2d 240 (1969): Sufficiency of Tax Deed Description for Identification and Adverse Possession

    George v. Shultis, 24 N.Y.2d 240 (1969)

    A tax deed with an imperfect property description is valid if the land can be identified with reasonable certainty, and such a deed can form the basis for a claim of adverse possession if the claimant’s use of the land is consistent with ownership under a written instrument.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of a tax deed with errors in the property description and whether it can serve as a basis for adverse possession. The Court of Appeals held that even with inaccuracies, the tax deed was sufficient because the property could be identified with reasonable certainty due to its unique location bounded by town lines. Furthermore, the court found that the tax deed could support a claim of adverse possession because the purchaser demonstrated use of the land consistent with ownership under a written instrument, despite imperfections in the deed’s description.

    Facts

    In 1931, Defendant George purchased tax liens on a property based on a 1930 assessment. In 1933, he received a tax deed from the Ulster County Treasurer. The assessment contained errors in the compass directions of boundary lines and the quantity of land. The property was wild forest land in the Town of Olive, uniquely bounded on the west by the Town of Denning and touching the Town of Shandaken. Plaintiff’s predecessors had not paid taxes on the land after 1929, and in 1963, Plaintiff bought their interests. Defendant Shultis was a contract purchaser from George.

    Procedural History

    The trial court (Special Term) upheld the tax deed’s validity, finding the land identifiable. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming the description patently erroneous. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tax assessment with errors in the property description is valid if the property can be identified and located with reasonable certainty.
    2. Whether a tax deed with an imperfect description can serve as a valid written instrument for a claim of adverse possession.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Real Property Tax Law § 504(4) states that errors do not invalidate enforcement if the parcel can be identified with reasonable certainty.
    2. Yes, because the tax deed provides a written instrument upon which the claimant relied for possession, and the claimant’s use of the land was consistent with ownership under that instrument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (Real Property Tax Law § 504, subd. 4) provides that an error or omission “shall not prevent” the enforcement of the tax “if the parcel can be identified and located with reasonable certainty.” The court emphasized that the location of the land, bounded by specific town lines, made it uniquely identifiable, despite errors in compass directions and acreage. The court noted that the description had been used since 1921, and the prior owner had paid taxes based on this assessment, suggesting they knew which property was being assessed. The court contrasted older cases with a stricter view of assessment roll descriptions with the modern view expressed in McCoun v. Pierpont, which favors a common-sense approach. Quoting Judge Cardozo, the court stated, “The verdict of common sense in such a situation is the verdict also of the law. That verdict, we think, must be that misconception is impossible”. Regarding adverse possession, the court noted that Defendant George used the land for recreation, hunting, and timber, consistent with ownership. The court cited Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 512(3), stating that land is possessed where, not enclosed, “it has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber, either for the purposes of husbandry or for the ordinary use of the occupant.” The court emphasized that the tax deed, though imperfect, was a “written instrument” that George relied upon, satisfying the statutory requirements for adverse possession, differentiating this case from a claim for possession without such an instrument.