New York Law Review

Tag: 1969

  • Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y.2d 176 (1969): Distinguishing Area Variances from Use Variances

    Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y.2d 176 (1969)

    An area variance, which does not alter the fundamental character of a zoned district, requires a less stringent showing of hardship than a use variance, which permits a use not allowed by zoning regulations.

    Summary

    Eaton sought a variance to rent out a gatehouse on their property, which violated a zoning ordinance. The Board of Zoning Appeals denied the variance, and the lower courts initially affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals distinguished between area and use variances, holding that because the variance sought was an area variance (allowing residential use in an already residential zone), the Eatons only needed to demonstrate practical difficulties, not the more stringent “special hardship” required for use variances. The court found that the Eatons had demonstrated sufficient practical difficulties justifying the variance.

    Facts

    The Eatons owned a property in Brookville, NY, with three structures: a main dwelling, a gatehouse, and a guest house. The gatehouse had been used as a residence since before the 1935 zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance initially permitted accessory buildings, but later amendments restricted their use as residences, except for full-time employees. The Eatons rented out both the gatehouse and the guest house. The Village argued this violated the zoning ordinance.

    Procedural History

    The Eatons appealed the Building Inspector’s ruling to the Board of Zoning Appeals, arguing for a valid nonconforming use and seeking a variance. The Board denied the variance. Special Term affirmed the Board’s decision. The Appellate Division upheld the denial of a variance for the guest house but granted a variance for the gatehouse. Both the Board and the Eatons appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Eatons needed to demonstrate “special hardship” to obtain a variance for the gatehouse, considering the zoning ordinance, or whether demonstrating “practical difficulties” was sufficient.

    Holding

    No, because the requested variance was an area variance, the Eatons only needed to demonstrate practical difficulties, not the more stringent “special hardship” required for use variances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between use variances and area variances. Use variances allow a use not permitted by the zoning regulations, requiring a showing of “special hardship.” Area variances, which do not change the character of the zoned district, only require a showing of “practical difficulties.” The court reasoned that because the Eatons sought to continue a residential use in an area already zoned for residential use, they were seeking an area variance. The court found that the Eatons demonstrated practical difficulties by showing that: (1) the gatehouse was designed and used for separate residential occupancy before the ordinance; (2) it represented a substantial investment and generated income; (3) the Eatons purchased the property believing they could validly rent the gatehouse; (4) there were limited alternative uses for the gatehouse; and (5) the only other permitted use of the gatehouse would be for servants, which are not typically provided separate living quarters today. The court noted the board offered no evidence of adverse effects or countervailing public interests. The court also rejected the argument that the Eatons’ difficulties were self-imposed, noting the gatehouse predated the zoning ordinance and the initial permitted use by a gardener. The court stated granting the variance wouldn’t “really change the essential residential character of the neighborhood”. The Court emphasized the need to balance community interests with the owner’s right to reasonable use of their property.

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 219 (1969): Motion to Suppress Evidence Must Be Made in Trial Court

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 219 (1969)

    A motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained via an illegal search and seizure must be made in the court where the indictment will be tried, not before a magistrate who issued the warrant.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested for arson and related crimes after police found them emerging from a burning house believed to contain a stolen safe. After obtaining a search warrant (later conceded to be invalid), police seized the safe and other items. The defendants moved before the Justice of the Peace to suppress the evidence obtained via the warrant. The Justice of the Peace granted the motion. The County Court reversed, directing the Justice to determine if the motion was to “controvert” the warrant (in which case relief could be granted) or to “suppress” the evidence (which the Justice lacked jurisdiction to decide). The New York Court of Appeals held that the Justice of the Peace had the authority to vacate the warrant, but not to suppress the evidence. The Court reasoned that motions to suppress must be made in the court where the indictment is to be tried, allowing the People an opportunity to prove the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

    Facts

    Bob’s Super Market was burglarized, and a safe was stolen. Police investigation led them to a residence on Herr Road. Upon arriving, officers heard movement inside and, after a period of surveillance, observed the house on fire. The defendants emerged from the house and were arrested for arson. Police entered the house and found the stolen safe. Later, an officer obtained a search warrant and seized the safe and other property.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved before the Justice of the Peace for an order suppressing the search warrant and all evidence produced thereby. The Justice of the Peace granted the motion to suppress the evidence. The County Court reversed and remanded, directing the Justice to determine the nature of the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, remitting the case with directions to vacate the search warrant and deny the motion to suppress the evidence, holding that only the trial court could hear the suppression motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Justice of the Peace has the authority to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant he issued, when the warrant is later conceded to be invalid, or whether such a motion must be made in the court where the defendant will be tried.

    Holding

    No, because the Code of Criminal Procedure dictates that a motion to suppress evidence must be made in the court where the indictment will be tried, allowing the People an opportunity to show that the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Justice of the Peace had the power to vacate the invalid search warrant, he did not have the authority to suppress the evidence obtained through it. The court relied on Sections 813-c through 813-e of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specify that a motion to suppress evidence must be made in the court where the defendant is to be tried. Specifically, Section 813-e provides that if an indictment has been returned, the motion “shall be made in the court having trial jurisdiction of such indictment.” The court stated, “In the present case, it is manifest that the application could not have been properly decided by the justice of the peace.” The court emphasized that when the defendants make a motion to suppress in the trial court, “the People will have an opportunity to show (if they can) that the search and seizure which produced the evidence in question were incident to a lawful arrest.” The court cited People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 88-89, 91, in support of the principle that evidence obtained incident to a lawful arrest is admissible. The court also noted that vacating the warrant would not entitle the defendant to restoration of the property, since the seized items were allegedly stolen or used in the commission of the crime, citing Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710.

  • People v. Lippert, 25 N.Y.2d 336 (1969): Defining ‘Drag Racing’ Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law

    People v. Lippert, 25 N.Y.2d 336 (1969)

    To constitute “drag racing” under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1182, there must be evidence of a pre-arranged race or contest for speed, not merely two cars accelerating rapidly from a stop light and jockeying for position.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed Lippert’s conviction for “drag racing” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1182. The evidence showed that Lippert and another driver accelerated rapidly from a stop light and drove abreast at approximately 55 miles per hour, jockeying for position. The Court held that this conduct, while potentially constituting speeding or reckless driving, was insufficient to establish “drag racing” because the prosecution failed to prove an implied race course or pre-arranged contest. The Court emphasized that drag racing requires more than simply two drivers accelerating competitively from an intersection.

    Facts

    The legally significant facts are as follows:
    1. Lippert and a codefendant were driving separate vehicles.
    2. The vehicles were stopped at an intersection.
    3. When the traffic light turned green, both vehicles accelerated rapidly.
    4. The vehicles drove abreast at approximately 55 miles per hour.
    5. The drivers were observed “jockeying for position.”

    Procedural History

    1. Lippert was charged with “drag racing” in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1182.
    2. The lower court convicted Lippert.
    3. Lippert appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented, specifically the rapid acceleration and jockeying for position by two vehicles after a traffic light turned green, was sufficient to convict the defendant of “drag racing” in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1182.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate that the drivers engaged in a pre-arranged race or contest for speed along an implied race course. Simply accelerating quickly and jockeying for position is insufficient to establish “drag racing” under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the term “drag racing,” as used in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1182, implies a pre-arranged race or contest for speed, requiring more than merely two cars accelerating rapidly from a stop light. The Court acknowledged that while the defendant’s conduct could constitute other traffic violations, such as speeding or reckless driving, it did not satisfy the elements of “drag racing”.
    The court referred to the dictionary definition of a “drag race” as “an acceleration contest between automobiles”. It also cited a book on hot-rodding, which emphasizes that “drag racing…is done on a runway, a special course, or a roadway under careful supervision to insure safety and fair treatment to all competitors.”
    The court stated, “Violation of this statute means that, at least by implication, some race course must have been planned by the competitors along a street. It is not enough that an automobile operated by defendant and one by his codefendant left an intersection abreast when the traffic light changed to green and, thereafter, travelled abreast at about 55 miles an hour, each car jockeying for position.”
    The court emphasized the importance of proving a planned race course. The prosecution failed to establish this critical element. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict Lippert beyond a reasonable doubt of “drag racing.”