New York Law Review

Tag: 1968

  • Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409 (1968): Consequential Damages and Noise Pollution After Partial Taking

    Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409 (1968)

    When a portion of a property is taken for public use, the decrease in value to the remaining property due to factors like noise, loss of view, and loss of privacy, all resulting from the public use, can be considered in determining consequential damages.

    Summary

    The State of New York condemned a portion of the Dennisons’ secluded, quiet property to construct a highway. The Dennisons sought compensation for the partial taking, arguing that the new highway caused a loss of privacy, seclusion, and view, as well as increased noise. The Court of Claims awarded damages, considering these factors, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while noise alone might not be compensable, it can be considered as one factor in determining the overall decrease in the value of the remaining property after a partial taking. The court emphasized the difficulty of separating the noise element from other valid elements of consequential damage.

    Facts

    The Dennisons owned a secluded, quiet property in Lake George, New York, characterized by wooded and landscaped land. The property featured tall trees, underground utility services, and a stream, providing privacy and a scenic view. The State condemned a portion of the property to construct a highway, which ran approximately 200 feet from the Dennisons’ residence. The highway embankment stood about 20 feet above the Dennisons’ lawn, obstructing their view, eliminating their privacy, and introducing traffic noise and odors.

    Procedural History

    The Dennisons filed a claim in the Court of Claims seeking damages for the partial taking of their property. The Court of Claims awarded damages, considering the loss of privacy, seclusion, view, and the increase in noise. The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in determining consequential damages for a partial taking of property, the court can consider the impact of noise, loss of privacy, and loss of view resulting from the use of the condemned portion, even if noise alone might not be compensable.

    Holding

    Yes, because the courts below did not make a separate award for damages due to noise but rather considered it as one factor in determining the decrease in value to the remaining property along with loss of privacy, seclusion and view. The court reasoned that segregating the noise element from other elements would be practically impossible, and any reduction on remand would be arbitrary and speculative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that consequential damages, which result from the use of the parcel taken, are entitled to consideration in a partial taking case. While the State argued that damages common to the public, such as highway noise affecting properties adjoining a public highway, should be excluded, the court found that the lower courts did not make a separate award for noise. Instead, the court considered noise as one factor in determining the overall decrease in the property’s value. The court emphasized the practical difficulties of separating the noise element from other conceded elements of damage, such as loss of privacy and view.

    The court cited precedent (South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Kirkover) which has recognized that, where there has been a partial taking of property of the kind present here, the noise element may be considered as one of several factors in determining consequential damages. The court also acknowledged the argument that property owners must endure certain inconveniences for the benefits of modern transportation but concluded that the practical difficulties in separating noise damages outweighed any benefit from applying the State’s theory. Chief Judge Fuld, in his concurrence, noted the specific tranquility of the property as a factor distinguishing the case. The dissent argued that the burden is on the claimant to show consequential damages flowing from the taking and that traffic noise is a universal condition of modern life, not unique to the claimant, and should thus be excluded as an element of damage. The dissent further argued that damages from future traffic noise should be segregated or be excluded if the party cannot prove the specific injury to them not shared by the general public.

  • Varkonyi v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig), 22 N.Y.2d 333 (1968): Forum Non Conveniens and the Balance of Hardships

    22 N.Y.2d 333 (1968)

    When deciding whether to dismiss a case based on forum non conveniens, courts must balance the burden on the local courts and hardship to the defendant against the availability of an alternative forum for the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s interest in litigating in the chosen forum.

    Summary

    This case addresses the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in New York. The plaintiffs, representing the estates of passengers killed in a plane crash in Peru, sued the Brazilian airline (Varig) and the American aircraft manufacturer (Boeing) in New York. The defendants moved to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, arguing that New York was an inconvenient forum. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred by failing to consider all relevant factors, including the unavailability of another forum where both defendants could be sued together. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration of all relevant factors.

    Facts

    A Boeing 707, operated by Varig, crashed in Lima, Peru, killing all passengers. The decedents were nationals of Hungary, Great Britain, and Mexico. The plaintiffs, representing the deceased passengers, sued Varig (a Brazilian corporation doing business in New York) and Boeing (a Delaware corporation also doing business in New York) in New York. The plaintiffs resided in Hungary, Great Britain, and Florida. The cause of action arose outside of New York.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaints on the condition that the defendants waive the statute of limitations defense in any actions commenced in a proper jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the complaints based on forum non conveniens by failing to adequately consider the unavailability of another forum in which both defendants could be joined.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division failed to consider all relevant factors, including the absence of another forum where both defendants could be sued, constituting an error of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that New York courts are not obligated to hear cases between nonresident parties on causes of action lacking a connection to New York. The decision to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is generally discretionary. However, this discretion must be exercised by weighing all pertinent considerations. The court stated, “Among the pertinent factors to be considered and weighed, in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, are, on the one hand, the burden on the New York courts and the extent of any hardship to the defendant that prosecution of the suit would entail and, on the other, such matters as the unavailability elsewhere of a forum in which the plaintiff may obtain effective redress and the extent to which the plaintiff’s interests may otherwise be properly served by pursuing his claim in this State.” The Court found the Appellate Division erred by not considering the “special circumstances” identified by the Special Term, mainly the absence of another forum where both the airline and the manufacturer could be sued together. The court emphasized that it is an error of law for the Appellate Division to exclude consideration of such circumstances. Because the Appellate Division disregarded these factors, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for further consideration. The court also noted that the residence of one plaintiff in New York could be considered on remand. The court clarified its power to review issues related to abuse of discretion even when lower courts refuse jurisdiction, citing Langfelder v. Universal Labs., 293 N.Y. 200, 206 as precedent.

  • Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330 (1968): Absolute Privilege for Statements to Bar Grievance Committees

    Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330 (1968)

    Statements made in a complaint to a bar association’s grievance committee are absolutely privileged, shielding the complainant from libel actions, to encourage reporting of attorney misconduct and maintain high standards within the legal profession.

    Summary

    Wiener, a New York attorney, sued Weintraub for libel based on a letter Weintraub sent to the Grievance Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, alleging dishonesty and fraud. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the letter was absolutely privileged. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that complaints to bar grievance committees are part of a “judicial proceeding” and thus protected by absolute privilege. This privilege is essential to encourage reporting of attorney misconduct without fear of reprisal, thereby upholding the integrity of the legal system.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Wiener, an attorney, alleged that the defendants, Weintraub, falsely and maliciously accused him of dishonesty and fraud. This accusation was made in a letter the defendants sent to the Grievance Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a), arguing the letter was absolutely privileged and therefore not actionable. Special Term granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made in a letter to a bar association’s Grievance Committee, accusing an attorney of professional misconduct, are protected by absolute privilege, thus precluding a libel action based on those statements.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Grievance Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body, an arm of the Appellate Division, and the filing of a complaint initiates a judicial proceeding. Thus, statements made within that context are absolutely privileged, shielding the complainant from libel actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that statements made during judicial proceedings are privileged if they are material and pertinent to the questions involved, regardless of the motive behind them. Citing precedent such as Marsh v. Ellsworth and Youmans v. Smith, the court extended this privilege to proceedings before a bar association’s Grievance Committee, characterizing such committees as quasi-judicial bodies. The court noted that these committees are now the primary venue for addressing complaints of professional misconduct, previously handled by the General Term of the Supreme Court. The court adopted the reasoning in Doe v. Rosenberry, confirming that grievance committee proceedings constitute a “judicial proceeding.”

    The court emphasized the public interest in encouraging the reporting of attorney misconduct. It stated, “Assuredly, it is in the public interest to encourage those who have knowledge of dishonest or unethical conduct on the part of lawyers to impart that knowledge to a Grievance Committee…If a complainant were to be subject to a libel action by the accused attorney, the effect in many instances might well be to deter the filing of legitimate charges.”

    The court acknowledged the potential for false and malicious complaints but found that the need to maintain high ethical standards in the legal profession outweighed the potential harm to individual attorneys. Additionally, the court noted that Judiciary Law § 90(10) protects the confidentiality of grievance proceedings, further mitigating any risk of prejudice. In conclusion, because the statements made to the Grievance Committee were relevant to the matter at hand, the defendants were protected by absolute privilege, and the lower courts’ dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

  • People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1968): Right to Counsel Attaches Upon Attorney’s Communication with Police

    People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1968)

    Once the police are aware that a defendant is represented by counsel, or that an attorney has communicated with the police to represent the defendant, the accused’s right to counsel attaches, and this right is not dependent on a formal retainer or a request from the attorney not to question the defendant.

    Summary

    Arthur was arrested for throwing his son into a river. An attorney, Stern, who knew Arthur, saw the news and went to the police station, identifying himself as Arthur’s attorney and asking to see him. The police allowed Stern to see Arthur after questioning. Stern advised the police that Arthur was sick and shouldn’t be questioned further. The next day, police questioned Arthur without counsel, and he made incriminating statements. The court held that Arthur’s right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after Stern had communicated his representation, regardless of a formal retainer or an explicit request to cease questioning. The confession and subsequent statements were deemed inadmissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, Arthur, threw his two-year-old son into a river.

    He was arrested and confessed to the crime.

    Attorney Stern, who knew Arthur and had previously represented him, saw a news report about the incident and went to the police station.

    Stern identified himself to the police as Arthur’s attorney and asked to see him.

    The police allowed Stern to see Arthur after they finished questioning him.

    Stern told the police that Arthur was unwell and should not be questioned further.

    The next morning, police questioned Arthur without his attorney present, and Arthur made incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Arthur was indicted for attempted murder in the first degree.

    His written confession was admitted into evidence at trial.

    A detective testified to Arthur’s incriminating statements made the day after the arrest; this testimony was not objected to.

    Arthur was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Arthur appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that his confession and subsequent statements were inadmissible because they were obtained after his attorney had requested to see him.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s written confession was inadmissible because it was obtained after his attorney had requested to see him?

    Whether the oral admissions made to the detective were inadmissible because they were obtained in the absence of counsel after his attorney had been granted access to him?

    Holding

    Yes, because once the police are aware that a defendant is represented by counsel, they cannot question the defendant in the absence of counsel without an affirmative waiver of the right to counsel in the attorney’s presence.

    Yes, because the right to counsel attaches when the attorney communicates with the police for the purpose of representing the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that prior cases like People v. Donovan, People v. Failla, and People v. Gunner established a broad protection of the right to counsel, not solely dependent on retained counsel. The critical factor is that the police were aware that Arthur had an attorney who was seeking to represent him. The court stated: “[O]nce the police know or have been apprised of the fact that the defendant is represented by counsel or that an attorney has communicated with the police for the purpose of representing the defendant, the accused’s right to counsel attaches; and this right is not dependent upon the existence of a formal retainer.”

    The court rejected the argument that Stern needed to explicitly instruct the police not to question Arthur. Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police are barred from questioning the defendant without a waiver of the right to counsel in the attorney’s presence. The court emphasized that “[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel.”

    The court addressed the lack of objection to the detective’s testimony, noting that the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right warranted review despite the lack of a specific objection at trial.

    The court concluded that both the written confession and the oral admissions were obtained in violation of Arthur’s right to counsel and were thus inadmissible. This case expands the right to counsel by clarifying that it attaches as soon as the police are aware an attorney is representing or attempting to represent a suspect, emphasizing the state’s duty to respect that right.

  • People v. Battle, 22 N.Y.2d 323 (1968): Entitlement to Lesser Included Offense Instruction

    People v. Battle, 22 N.Y.2d 323 (1968)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Defendant Battle was convicted of second-degree assault for allegedly stabbing Cage during a street fight. At trial, the judge refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Battle was entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence presented a reasonable doubt as to whether Battle committed the stabbing, while still establishing a lesser assault. The court emphasized that the defendant is entitled to the most favorable view of the evidence when determining whether a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted.

    Facts

    The altercation began as a fist fight between Battle, Cage, and Pitman. Cage initiated the fight by striking Battle, knocking him down. Pitman then intervened, and both Battle and Pitman chased Cage into a house. Cage testified that Battle stabbed him, but admitted he did not see a knife in Battle’s or Pitman’s hand. Another witness, Minor, testified to seeing Battle stab Cage, but also stated he was not present during the fight, potentially discrediting his testimony. Cage himself stated Minor arrived after the fight.

    Procedural History

    Battle was convicted of assault in the second degree in the trial court. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. Battle appealed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ordering a new trial based on the improper denial of the lesser-included offense instruction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree when there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense of assault in the second degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Battle stabbed Cage, which is a necessary element of assault in the second degree, while the evidence clearly supported a finding of a lesser assault.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser included offense if some reasonable view of the evidence would permit the jury to conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense. The court relied on Code of Criminal Procedure § 445, and prior case law, including People v. Malave, 21 N.Y.2d 26 (1967); People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558; and People v. Schleiman, 197 N.Y. 383. The Court stated the defendant is entitled to the most favorable view of the record when determining if such a charge is warranted.

    Here, the court found that the testimony regarding the stabbing was contradictory and questionable. Cage did not see a knife, and Minor’s testimony was inconsistent. This created a reasonable doubt that Battle committed the stabbing, which is an element distinguishing second-degree assault from the lesser third-degree assault. Therefore, the jury should have been given the option to convict on the lesser charge. This is especially important because, even if Battle did not inflict the stabbing himself, to be found guilty of the greater offense, he would have to knowingly participate in the stabbing.

    The court emphasized the importance of allowing the jury to consider the lesser charge in cases where the evidence is not conclusive on the elements that elevate the crime to a higher degree. This approach safeguards the defendant’s right to have the jury fully consider all reasonable interpretations of the evidence. The court drew a similarity to the facts in People v. Lindsey, 12 N.Y.2d 421.

    The court did not address the precise elements that constituted the assault in the third degree. Instead, the Court focused solely on the fact that there was enough evidence for the jury to reasonably doubt the more serious stabbing offense while clearly being able to infer a lesser assault.

  • Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 818 (1968): Actual Malice Standard for Public Figures

    22 N.Y.2d 818 (1968)

    To recover damages for defamation, a public figure must prove that the defendant published the defamatory statements with actual malice, meaning with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether they were true or false.

    Summary

    Linus Pauling, a well-known public figure, sued National Review for defamation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Pauling’s complaint, holding that he failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted with actual malice. The court emphasized that, under the First Amendment as interpreted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, public figures must prove that defamatory statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The court found no evidence that National Review acted with the requisite level of fault.

    Facts

    Linus Pauling was a prominent and controversial public figure. National Review published statements that Pauling claimed were defamatory. Pauling then sued National Review, alleging defamation.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts dismissed Pauling’s complaint. Pauling appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public figure, in order to recover damages for defamation, must prove that the defendant published the defamatory statements with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for whether they were true or false.

    Holding

    Yes, because the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, requires public figures to prove actual malice in order to recover damages for defamation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, which established the actual malice standard for defamation cases involving public figures. The court stated, “The statements which they made concerned one who, concededly, was and is a ‘public figure’. (See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 162.) Accordingly, we need go no further than to say that we find, as did the courts below, that the plaintiff failed to establish the fact, essential to the cause of action, that the defendants published the statements in question either with ‘knowledge’ of their falsity or with ‘reckless disregard’ of whether they were true or false (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280; see, also, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U. S. 563, 573) or with a ‘high degree of awareness’ of their probable falsity (Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74) or that the defendants ‘in fact’ entertained ‘serious doubts’ as to their truth. (St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731.)” The court found that Pauling had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that National Review acted with the requisite level of fault. This case reinforces the high burden that public figures face when bringing defamation claims, requiring them to prove not only that the statements were false and defamatory, but also that they were published with actual malice. This standard is designed to protect freedom of speech and the press, even when that speech is critical of public figures. The ruling underscores the importance of a free press in a democratic society, even if that means some degree of potentially harmful falsehood is tolerated. The court’s decision reflects a balancing of interests between protecting reputation and promoting robust public discourse.

  • Diamond International Corp. v. Little Kildare, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 819 (1968): Establishing a Public Highway Through Usage

    22 N.Y.2d 819 (1968)

    Mere usage by the public of a private road, even for an extended period, is insufficient to convert it into a public highway without evidence that public authorities have maintained, controlled, or adopted the road for the statutory period.

    Summary

    Diamond International Corporation sued Little Kildare, Inc. to establish a private right-of-way across Little Kildare’s land. Diamond International claimed a public highway existed based on public usage of the relocated Water Road. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision favoring Diamond International, holding that mere public usage is not enough to establish a public highway. There must be evidence that public authorities maintained or adopted the road as their own for the statutory period to demonstrate an exercise of public dominion.

    Facts

    Water Road was relocated. Diamond International Corporation claimed a right to use the road across Little Kildare, Inc.’s property, arguing that it had become a public highway due to public usage.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, St. Lawrence County, ruled in favor of Little Kildare. The appellate division reversed that decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division’s decision and reinstated the Supreme Court’s original judgment, thus denying Diamond International’s claim of a public highway.

    Issue(s)

    Whether mere usage by the public of a relocated private road is sufficient to convert it into a public highway, absent evidence that the road was maintained, controlled, or adopted by public authorities for the statutory period.

    Holding

    No, because mere usage by the public of a private road as relocated is not sufficient to convert it into a public highway absent a showing that the road was kept in repair or taken in charge and adopted by public authorities for the statutory period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on established New York law concerning the creation of public highways. The Court referenced prior decisions (Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357; People v. Sutherland, 252 N.Y. 86; Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 121 N.Y. 420) and Section 189 of the Highway Law to support its ruling. The key point was that simply using a road, even if the public does so regularly, does not make it a public road. “Mere usage by the public of Water Road as relocated is not sufficient to convert this private road into a public highway absent a showing that the road was kept in repair or taken in charge and adopted by public authorities for the statutory period.” There needs to be an indication that the public, through its government, has asserted dominion and control over the road. The record lacked evidence that the public had maintained or taken charge of the relocated Water Road. The absence of this evidence was fatal to Diamond International’s claim.

  • Matter of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346 (1968): Enforceability of Judgments Against Impounded Funds of Non-Resident Beneficiaries

    Matter of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346 (1968)

    A judgment creditor can seek to satisfy a judgment from funds impounded for a non-resident beneficiary, but the Surrogate Court must determine if such satisfaction aligns with the statute’s purpose of preventing funds from being circumvented by foreign governments.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a judgment obtained against a Soviet Union resident, who was a beneficiary of a New York estate, can be satisfied from funds impounded due to concerns about the beneficiary’s ability to access those funds. The petitioner, the decedent’s brother, obtained a default judgment against his sister and sought to access her impounded inheritance. The court held that while the judgment was valid, the Surrogate Court must determine whether allowing the judgment to be satisfied from the impounded funds would conflict with the statute’s purpose of preventing the circumvention of funds by foreign governments. The case was remanded for a hearing and further findings.

    Facts

    Sam Leikind died, leaving a portion of his estate to his sister, Dvaireh Kaminsky, a resident of the Soviet Union. Due to concerns that Dvaireh would not have the benefit, use, or control of the funds due to her residency, the funds were impounded under section 269-a of the Surrogate’s Court Act. The petitioner, Sam’s brother and administrator of the estate, sued Dvaireh in Supreme Court for money owed, based on a letter acknowledging a prior debt. Jurisdiction was obtained by attaching the impounded funds, and service was made by publication. Dvaireh did not appear, and a default judgment was entered against her.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner sought to satisfy the Supreme Court judgment from the impounded funds, but the Director of Finance refused. The petitioner moved in Supreme Court for an order to release the funds, which was denied, with leave to apply to the Surrogate Court. The Surrogate Court denied the application. The Appellate Division reversed, granting a stay to allow the Attorney-General to challenge the default judgment in the Supreme Court. Both parties appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the impounding of the funds violated the Federal Constitution under the ruling of Zschernig v. Miller?

    2. Whether the Surrogate’s finding that the default judgment could not support a release of the funds was an abuse of discretion?

    Holding

    1. No, because the New York statute, unlike the Oregon statute in Zschernig, contains no provision for reciprocity or escheat and does not facially interfere with foreign relations.

    2. No, but the matter should be remanded to the Surrogate for a hearing and further findings as to the effect to be given the default judgment, to determine if satisfying the judgment would conflict with the statute’s purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Zschernig v. Miller, where the Supreme Court found an Oregon statute unconstitutional because it involved the state courts in foreign affairs. The New York statute, unlike the Oregon statute, lacks reciprocity or escheat provisions and does not on its face require intrusive inquiries into foreign governments. The court stated that impounding funds is permissible if the State courts simply determine whether a foreign country prevents its residents from actually sharing in the estates of New York decedents, without interference with foreign relations.

    The court recognized that funds in custodia legis, in which the owner has a present interest, may be attached or garnished for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction. The Supreme Court had acquired jurisdiction over Dvaireh’s funds. However, the judgment does not automatically entitle the petitioner to satisfaction from the impounded funds. Satisfaction can be obtained when the purposes of the restraint have been achieved or if satisfaction would no longer interfere with those purposes.

    The primary purpose of the statute is to prevent the transmission of funds to a beneficiary in a foreign country where such transmission might be circumvented by confiscation. The court emphasized that not all obligations derived from the distributee are excluded, only those based on a voluntary transfer or commitment contradicting the distributee’s disability to control the fund.

    The court remanded the case to the Surrogate to determine whether the underlying debt was genuine and whether payment to the judgment creditor would be solely for his benefit and not used to defeat the statute’s purposes. The Surrogate is tasked with determining whether satisfaction of the judgment from the impounded funds at this time conforms to the purposes of the statute, not with invalidating the Supreme Court judgment itself.

  • Matter of Wallace v. Power, 22 N.Y.2d 771 (1968): Valid Enrollment Despite Erroneous Form

    Matter of Wallace v. Power, 22 N.Y.2d 771 (1968)

    A party enrollment remains valid when a voter, through no fault of their own, is given and completes an incorrect form by the Board of Elections, especially when the prior enrollment was not officially cancelled until after the filing of a designating petition.

    Summary

    Wallace, an enrolled Democrat, moved within his Senate district. He requested a transfer of his enrollment with the Board of Elections but was provided a new enrollment form instead. He signed it. Subsequently, he filed a designating petition for Senator, and his enrollment was challenged. The court held that his enrollment was valid because the Board provided the wrong form, his previous enrollment was not canceled until after he filed his petition, and the situation was distinguishable from cases of lapsed enrollment due to failure to vote. Therefore, his designating petition was valid.

    Facts

    Wallace was a long-time enrolled Democrat who voted in the 1967 general election.
    Between January 1967 and March 1968, he moved within the 11th Senate District.
    On March 28, 1968, he requested a transfer of his enrollment at the Board of Elections due to his change of address.
    The Board provided him with a new enrollment form instead of a transfer form, which he signed.
    His prior enrollment was not canceled by the Board until after May 14, 1968, when he filed a designating petition for the Democratic nomination for Senator.

    Procedural History

    Wallace filed a designating petition for the Democratic nomination for Senator.
    The validity of his enrollment was challenged.
    The Appellate Division’s decision was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Wallace’s enrollment as a Democrat was valid, despite signing a new enrollment form instead of a transfer form after moving within the same Senate district.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Board of Elections provided the incorrect form, and his prior enrollment was not officially canceled until after he filed his designating petition. The court distinguished this from cases involving lapsed enrollment due to failure to vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Wallace was entitled to a transfer of enrollment under Election Law § 187, subd. 8.
    The Board of Elections erred by providing him with a new enrollment form, which is typically used when a registration has lapsed due to a failure to vote. The court emphasized the distinction from cases where enrollment lapses due to failure to exercise the franchise. Those lapsed enrollments are “not reinstated until after the next general election”.
    The court highlighted that Wallace’s prior enrollment remained active until officially canceled by the Board of Elections, which occurred after he filed his designating petition. This fact was crucial in distinguishing this case from typical lapsed enrollment situations.
    Because Wallace took appropriate action by appearing before the Board and requesting a transfer, the error of the Board should not invalidate his enrollment. The court emphasized that the prior enrollment “continued until changed or until it lapsed pursuant to law”.
    The court implicitly considered the policy implications of invalidating Wallace’s enrollment due to the Board’s error, potentially disenfranchising a candidate who acted in good faith. The Court of Appeals sought to ensure that the mistake of the Board of Elections did not negatively impact the petitioner’s eligibility.
    Judge Scileppi dissented, presumably adopting the reasoning of the Appellate Division, which is not detailed in this memorandum opinion.

  • Wolfe v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 292 (1968): State Cannot Reduce Damages After Taking by Offering Stipulations

    Wolfe v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 292 (1968)

    The amount of damages for a property appropriation by the state is fixed at the time of the taking, and the state cannot later reduce those damages by offering stipulations or agreements that limit the scope of the original taking.

    Summary

    Wolfe owned land with access to Front Street and Dorman Road, though access to Dorman Road was largely blocked by a ravine. The State appropriated a portion of the land, including permanent easements for drainage. After the initial trial court found the appropriation deprived Wolfe of all access and awarded damages, the Appellate Division reversed, suggesting the State stipulate that Wolfe could build a bridge across the easement. On retrial, the State offered a quitclaim deed and stipulation, reducing the damages awarded. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the State cannot reduce damages after the taking by offering stipulations that limit the original appropriation’s scope.

    Facts

    Wolfe owned 156 acres with frontage on Front Street (a main highway) and Dorman Road. A deep ravine largely obstructed access to Dorman Road. In February 1962, the State appropriated .9 acres in fee and two permanent drainage easements totaling .7 acres. The appropriation reserved to the owner the right to use the easement area, provided it didn’t interfere with the State’s use, “in the opinion of the Superintendent of Public Works”. Wolfe argued that all reasonable access was lost, rendering the remaining land of nominal value.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims initially awarded Wolfe $71,100, finding the appropriation deprived him of all access. The Appellate Division reversed and remitted, suggesting the State stipulate that Wolfe could build a bridge across the drainage easement with a perpetual right to use it; otherwise, the original award should stand. On retrial, the State offered a quitclaim deed and stipulation, and the Court of Claims awarded reduced damages of $60,713. Wolfe appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, challenging the Appellate Division’s intermediate order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State may change the terms of an appropriation or modify its original taking by filing a correction map or adopting some other procedural device after the initial taking, so as to mitigate the consequences to the owner and reduce the compensable damages to be paid.

    Holding

    No, because the amount of damages to which the claimant is entitled as the result of an appropriation is to be measured and fixed as of the time of the taking.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that damages must be assessed based on what the State actually took, regardless of intended use. The permanent easements were broadly defined, and the reservation of rights to the owner did not diminish their scope or render their description ambiguous. The reservation allowed the Superintendent of Public Works to determine if the owner’s use interfered with the State’s easement. The State sought to modify the original appropriation, not clarify an ambiguity, by offering a stipulation and quitclaim deed years later. The Appellate Division acknowledged that the taking destroyed Wolfe’s access, making any right to access dependent on the State’s consent. The Court distinguished Jafco Realty Corp. v. State and Clark v. State, where the original easements reserved access to the claimants. The Court stated, “Once the land is actually taken… the owner cannot be compelled to take it back.” The court found that “the Appellate Division was fully aware that the easement taken had cut off the claimant’s access and that any right he had to any access was dependent upon what the State might consent to.” This procedure violates the rule prohibiting the State from reducing damages by subsequently limiting its original appropriation.