New York Law Review

Tag: 1968

  • Central School District No. 2 v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 N.Y.2d 213 (1968): Board Discretion in Setting Contribution Rates

    23 N.Y.2d 213 (1968)

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System’s Retirement Board has broad discretion, within statutory limits, to determine the actuarial assumptions and methods used to compute employer contribution rates to ensure the system’s financial soundness.

    Summary

    Central School District No. 2 challenged the contribution rates set by the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System for the fiscal years 1959-1965, arguing they were excessive and improperly calculated. The school district argued the Retirement Board exceeded its statutory authority by including certain items in its actuarial calculations, such as reserves for future interest deficits and actuarial losses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that the Board acted within its permissible statutory limits in setting the contribution rates, emphasizing the Board’s responsibility to maintain the system’s long-term financial stability. The court deferred to the Board’s expertise in actuarial matters.

    Facts

    Several school districts in New York State participated in the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System. The Retirement Board administered the system, which consisted of several funds used to provide benefits for public school teachers. The local school districts, as employers, contributed to the Pension Accumulation Fund, which funded pension benefits. These contributions were made up of a normal contribution, a deficiency contribution, and a special deficiency contribution. The school districts challenged the rates for these contributions, asserting that the Board’s calculations were improper and led to excessive payments.

    Procedural History

    The school districts initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the contribution rates. Special Term agreed with the defendants and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the proceeding was not timely brought. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Retirement Board exceeded its statutory authority in continuing deficiency contributions for the fiscal years 1963 and 1964.
    2. Whether the special deficiency contribution rate set by the Board in 1958 exceeded the rate authorized by statute.
    3. Whether the normal contribution rate fixed by the Board for 1965 was excessive because it included unauthorized components.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Board appropriately considered the fund’s liability for future interest deficits in calculating the deficiency balance.
    2. No, because the Board correctly determined the special deficiency contribution rate.
    3. No, because the term “total liabilities” is broad enough to encompass each of the items contested by the petitioners (reserve against interest deficits, reserve against future actuarial losses, and the “Death-Gamble” liability).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Board had the authority to include the estimated cost of future interest deficits in the deficiency balance, as these were a part of the fund’s total liability. The Court emphasized that the statute requires the Board to determine the deficiency balance based on the “total pension liability on account of all contributors and beneficiaries.” It rejected the argument that the deficiency contribution was limited to meeting the liabilities of teachers employed before the system’s inception. The Court also found that the special deficiency contribution rate was properly calculated based on a 30-year amortization period, and the rate did not need to be adjusted as teachers’ salaries increased. Regarding the normal contribution rate for 1965, the Court held that the Board could include reserves for future interest deficits, actuarial losses, and the “Death-Gamble” liability in its calculations. The Court emphasized that the Board has broad discretion in determining the actuarial assumptions and methods used to compute contribution rates to ensure the system’s financial soundness. The court noted that the Board’s actions were conservative, assuring beneficiaries of sufficient funds while protecting school districts from high future contributions.

  • Camphill, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 23 N.Y.2d 202 (1968): Determining Employee Status Based on Recompense for Services

    Camphill, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 23 N.Y.2d 202 (1968)

    An individual is considered an employee, not a volunteer, under the Disability Benefits Law only if they receive benefits as recompense for services rendered, not merely to enable them to perform their duties.

    Summary

    Camphill, a non-profit organization providing housing and training for mentally handicapped adults, challenged a determination by the Workmen’s Compensation Board that its “coworkers” were employees subject to the Disability Benefits Law. The coworkers lived and worked with the residents, receiving subsistence allowances but no stipulated compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the coworkers were volunteers, not employees, because the subsistence was provided to enable them to perform their services, not as a bargained-for exchange for those services. The court emphasized that the allowances covered the entire household, including residents, and were based on need, not work performed.

    Facts

    Camphill, Inc. is a New York non-profit corporation dedicated to housing, training, and rehabilitating mentally handicapped individuals. The organization operates a village community where mentally handicapped residents (“villagers”) live and work alongside normal adults (“coworkers”). Coworkers live in family-like establishments with the villagers, engaging in activities such as gardening, farming, and crafts. Coworkers receive no stipulated compensation but are provided with full subsistence for their households, including the villagers, and funds for recreational and cultural activities. The allocation of funds is based on household needs, not on the work performed by the coworkers. Many coworkers come from abroad, having been specifically trained for their roles, and arrange for replacements before taking their positions at Camphill.

    Procedural History

    The Workmen’s Compensation Board determined that Camphill’s coworkers were employees and therefore subject to the Disability Benefits Law. The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed the Board’s determination with a memorandum decision. Camphill appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the coworkers at Camphill, who receive subsistence allowances but no stipulated compensation, are considered employees under the Disability Benefits Law, or whether they are exempt as volunteers in a charitable institution.

    Holding

    No, because the subsistence provided to the coworkers is intended to enable them to perform their services, not as a bargained-for exchange or recompense for those services.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key distinction between an employee and a volunteer lies in whether benefits are received as recompense for services rendered. While the Disability Benefits Law does not explicitly define “volunteer,” the court inferred that volunteers are those who do not get paid for their work. The statute defines “wages” as “the money rate at which employment with a covered employer is recompensed under the contract of hiring.” The court acknowledged that a formal hiring agreement or monetary payment is not required to establish an employment relationship, but there must be a legal contract of hire where the worker receives benefits as recompense for services.

    The court emphasized that the allowances at Camphill were provided to enable the coworkers to carry out their work, not as a direct payment for services. “The allowances and subsistence are necessary as a condition for the coworkers to perform their services at the times and places required; but they are hardly, on the undisputed evidence, a bargained consideration or quid pro quo for services rendered.” The fact that the allowances covered the entire household unit and were based on the size and needs of the unit, rather than the output of services, further supported the conclusion that the coworkers were volunteers.

    The court also considered the amount of the allowances, noting that the equivalent value of the average coworker’s allowance was minimal, suggesting that the coworkers were not engaged in Camphill activities for economic gain. The court acknowledged that Camphill could not simply characterize the relationship as voluntary to avoid legal obligations, but found no evidence of subterfuge. “Indeed, the board does not argue that the coworkers are motivated by any considerations other than dedication to the humane tasks upon which they are engaged.”

    Finally, the court noted the legislative history of the Disability Benefits Law, pointing out that the “volunteer” exception was added when the law was expanded to cover nonprofit activities. The court stated that the evident purpose of the statute is to except, as volunteers, charitable workers who dedicate themselves to humane work without expectation of economic gain. The court quoted Matter of Seymour v. Odd Fellows’ Home, 267 N.Y. 354, 356, noting that, “where subsistence payments do not rest, upon an obligation to render services, there is no contract of hire and no employer-employee relationship”.

  • City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175 (1968): Constitutionality of Public Employee Strike Bans

    City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175 (1968)

    A state statute prohibiting strikes by public employees does not violate due process or equal protection clauses of the U.S. or state constitutions because the prohibition is reasonably related to a valid state policy.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of New York’s Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes by public employees. When New York City sanitation workers went on strike, the city sought and obtained an injunction against the strike. The union and its president, De Lury, were found in criminal contempt for violating the injunction. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Taylor Law, finding that the prohibition against public employee strikes does not violate due process or equal protection, as it serves a valid state policy of ensuring uninterrupted government services. The court emphasized the differences between public and private employment and the unique need to maintain governmental functions without disruption.

    Facts

    On February 2, 1968, almost all sanitation workers in New York City failed to report for work, initiating a nine-day strike. De Lury, the union president, addressed striking workers, encouraging them to ensure the strike was “effective 100%.” The strike resulted in a massive accumulation of garbage (10,000 tons per day), creating significant health and fire hazards in the city. The City obtained a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction ordering the strike to end and De Lury to instruct his members to return to work. De Lury did not comply and admitted he took no actions to end the strike.

    Procedural History

    The City initiated an action to enjoin the strike and sought a preliminary injunction. The trial court granted the injunction and subsequently found De Lury and the Union guilty of criminal contempt for disobeying the order. De Lury was sentenced to 15 days in jail and fined $250; the Union was fined $80,000, and its right to dues check-off was forfeited for 18 months. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Taylor Law, prohibiting strikes by public employees, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the state constitution?

    2. Whether the Taylor Law violates the equal protection clause by treating public employees differently from private employees regarding the right to strike?

    3. Whether the defendants were entitled to a jury trial in the criminal contempt proceeding?

    Holding

    1. No, because the prohibition against strikes by public employees is reasonably designed to effectuate a valid state policy.

    2. No, because there are reasonable justifications for the disparate treatment between public and private employees regarding the right to strike.

    3. No, because the New York Court of Appeals had already determined that a jury trial in such circumstances is not required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to strike is not absolute and can be restricted when it conflicts with a valid state policy. It emphasized that a state can prohibit strikes if the prohibition is reasonably calculated to achieve a valid state policy in an area open to state regulation. The court found that preventing strikes by public employees serves a valid state policy of ensuring the orderly and uninterrupted operation of government. It argued that allowing public employee strikes would undermine the legislative process by enabling unions to coerce disproportionate gains at the expense of the public. The court cited prior cases and the Taylor Report, which found that the right of public employees to strike “is not compatible with the orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative government.” Regarding equal protection, the court highlighted the differences between public and private employment, such as the absence of market constraints in the public sector. It stated that “legislative differentiation between public and private employees, insofar as restrictions on their right to strike… are concerned, is reasonable.” Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ claim to a jury trial, citing its recent decision in Rankin v. Shanker. The court also found that De Lury’s actions constituted willful disobedience of the court’s order, especially considering that he actively encouraged the strike to be “effective 100%.” The court quoted Justice Frankfurter from United States v. Mine Workers, emphasizing the importance of obedience to the law and the role of the judiciary in ensuring it: “In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping of specialists or in the service of any special interest… If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.”

  • People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157 (1968): Admissibility of Confession Absent Indigency Warning

    People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157 (1968)

    A confession is admissible, despite the omission of an explicit warning about appointed counsel for indigent defendants, if there is no evidence the defendant was indigent at the time of interrogation.

    Summary

    Kenneth Post was convicted of manslaughter after confessing to hitting his six-week-old child. Prior to his confession, police advised Post of his Miranda rights but did not explicitly state that counsel would be appointed if he was indigent. At trial, Post testified to being employed and owning a car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the omission of the indigency warning was harmless error because Post presented no evidence of indigency at the time of the interrogation. The court reasoned that the Miranda warning regarding appointed counsel is only relevant when a defendant’s indigency is at issue.

    Facts

    Kenneth Post was asked to come to police headquarters to discuss the death of his six-week-old child. Before questioning, police informed Post of his right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and that he had the right to an attorney. Post stated he didn’t want a lawyer and wanted to tell what happened. He made general remarks and confessed to hitting the baby. The police again warned him of his rights, placed him under arrest, and Post reiterated he didn’t want an attorney. He then gave a written confession. The police never explicitly told Post that if he was indigent, counsel would be appointed. At trial, Post testified he attended college, was employed, owned a car, and had debts of $800.

    Procedural History

    Post was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction without opinion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession is inadmissible solely because the police failed to explicitly inform the defendant that counsel would be appointed if he was indigent, even when there is no evidence the defendant was, in fact, indigent at the time of the interrogation?

    Holding

    No, because where a defendant is not told that counsel will be furnished if he cannot afford one, his confession will not be excluded unless there is some evidence that the defendant was indigent at the time of the interrogation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Miranda warning regarding the right to appointed counsel is specifically aimed at protecting indigent defendants. The Court noted, “A suspect is not required to inform the police of his indigency in order to come within the purview of Miranda.” However, the Court continued that, “where a defendant is not told that counsel will be furnished if he cannot afford one, his confession will not be excluded unless there is some evidence that the defendant was indigent at the time of the interrogation.” Here, the defendant presented no evidence of indigency. In fact, Post’s testimony at trial indicated he had been employed, attended college, and owned a car. The court considered the lack of an explicit indigency warning a harmless error under these circumstances. The court cited Miranda v. Arizona, noting that the warning’s applicability hinged on the suspect’s indigency. The Court also pointed to the fact that a police officer said that they would ask Post’s parents to get an attorney for him if he wanted one, and his parents were in the station house at the time of questioning.

  • Hille v. Gerald Records, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 135 (1968): Compensability of Injuries During Commute for Home-Based Work

    Hille v. Gerald Records, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 135 (1968)

    An employee’s injuries sustained while commuting are compensable under worker’s compensation when the employee’s home functions as a regular place of employment, thereby establishing a ‘mixed’ or ‘dual purpose’ for the commute.

    Summary

    Gerald Hille, president of Gerald Records, died in a car accident while driving home from a late-night recording session. The Workmen’s Compensation Board awarded benefits to his family, finding that his work required him to be both an inside and outside worker and that the accident arose from his employment. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence that he had work materials with him that night. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hille’s regular practice of working at home with company equipment transformed his home into a place of employment, making his commute compensable under the “mixed purpose” doctrine.

    Facts

    Gerald Hille, president of Gerald Records, lived in New Jersey and worked in New York City. His duties included arranging recordings and editing tapes. On August 31, 1962, Hille finished a recording session around 2:30 a.m. At approximately 4:30 a.m., his car hit a utility pole in New Jersey, resulting in his death. The company’s director of sales and promotion indicated that it was part of Hille’s job to take tapes home to listen for playbacks and mistakes, and the company’s vice-president corroborated that Hille regularly listened to and corrected recordings at his home, which was equipped with a company-owned tape recorder.

    Procedural History

    The Workmen’s Compensation Board initially awarded benefits to Hille’s family. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Hille had tapes in his possession on the night of the accident. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the death of an employee in an automobile accident on his way home from work arose out of and in the course of his employment, specifically when the employee regularly performs work-related tasks at home using company equipment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the employee’s home had effectively become a place of employment due to the regularity and necessity of his work-related activities conducted there, thus the commute to and from became part of his employment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Hille was not strictly an “outside employee,” he was privileged to perform his tasks in various locations, including his home. Applying the “mixed” or “dual purpose” trip doctrine from Matter of Marks v. Gray, the court emphasized that a commute is compensable if there is either a specific work assignment at the end of the trip or a regular pattern of work at home that transforms the home into a place of employment. The court noted that the quantity and regularity of work performed at home, the presence of work equipment, and special circumstances making it necessary to work at home are key factors. The court found “ample evidence from which the board could permissibly find that he actually used his home as ‘a place of employment’ to carry on his job.” The court distinguished this case from situations involving professionals who occasionally bring work home, cautioning against a “gradual erosion” of the “going and coming” rule. Here, the record showed that Hille regularly worked on tapes at home, sometimes with another employee, using a company-owned recorder, and that this practice was necessary due to his irregular hours and the custom in the industry. As such, his commute met the test of the “mixed” or “dual” purpose doctrine, making his death compensable.

  • Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111 (1968): No Right to Jury Trial in Public Employee Strike Contempt Cases

    Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111 (1968)

    Public employees and their unions do not have a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings for violating no-strike provisions, distinguishing them from private sector employees.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether public employees and their unions are entitled to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Taylor Law’s prohibition against strikes. The Court of Appeals held that neither statutory nor constitutional provisions grant this right. The court reasoned that historical precedent and policy considerations justify treating public and private sector employees differently regarding the right to strike and jury trials for related contempt charges. Prompt resolution of public sector strike-related contempt is crucial to prevent severe disruption of essential services.

    Facts

    The Corporation Counsel of New York City sought an order to punish the defendants (public employees and their unions) for criminal contempt. The claim was that they willfully disobeyed a temporary injunction issued by the Supreme Court restraining them from striking. The defendants demanded a jury trial, arguing they were entitled to it by statute and the Constitution. Special Term rejected their demand, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction against the strike.
    2. Defendants violated the injunction.
    3. Corporation Counsel sought criminal contempt charges.
    4. Special Term denied the defendants’ request for a jury trial.
    5. Appellate Division affirmed the denial.
    6. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether public employees and their unions are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of statutory right under Judiciary Law § 753-a or Labor Law § 808 in criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Taylor Law’s no-strike provisions.
    2. Whether denying public employees and their unions a jury trial in such proceedings violates the equal protection clauses of the United States or New York State Constitutions.
    3. Whether the Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution mandate a jury trial in these circumstances.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Taylor Law was not intended to provide jury trials in contempt enforcement proceedings, and the reference to Labor Law § 807 does not create a right to a jury trial under § 808.
    2. No, because a legitimate distinction between public and private employment is constitutionally permissible regarding the right to strike and jury trials for violations.
    3. No, because the potential penalties for contempt are not “serious” enough to trigger the constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that sections 807 and 808 of the Labor Law, and Judiciary Law, § 753-a, are successors to a provision enacted in the 1930s, New York’s Little Norris-LaGuardia Act and that for decades, these provisions have been held inapplicable to public employees. The court stated that the Legislature would have explicitly granted a right to a jury trial if it had intended to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that statutes which divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.

    Regarding the constitutional claims, the court relied on United States v. Mine Workers, stating that a distinction between public and private employment is permissible. The court noted the necessity of prompt determinations in criminal contempt proceedings under the Taylor Law to deter public strikes. The court stated that a reasonable distinction may be drawn between public and private employment. The court cited McGowan v. Maryland, stating, “The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”

    Finally, the court addressed the defendants’ argument that the Federal Constitution requires a trial by jury. Citing Bloom v. Illinois, the court stated that the decision is limited in its application to “serious” crimes in contradistinction to “petty” offenses. The court determined that the maximum punishment to which the individual defendants are subject—30 days in jail and a fine of $250—does not constitute a “serious” crime. The determination of whether a crime is serious or petty turns not on the amount of the fine which may be imposed but solely on the length of the prison sentence.

  • Matter of Silberman, 23 N.Y.2d 98 (1968): Adoptee Inclusion in Will Interpretation

    Matter of Silberman, 23 N.Y.2d 98 (1968)

    In the absence of an explicit expression in a will to exclude adopted children, a presumption arises that the testator intended to include them as beneficiaries, even when the will uses terms like “grandchildren” or establishes a class closing mechanism.

    Summary

    This case concerns the construction of a will to determine whether adopted children should be included as beneficiaries under two trust provisions. The testatrix, Dorothy Silberman, created trusts benefiting her sons and their children. Her son, Samuel, adopted two sets of children from his wives’ prior marriages. The Surrogate’s Court held that the adopted children were excluded from both trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that absent a clear exclusionary intent in the will, adopted children should be included, according to established New York policy. The Court found no such explicit intent, particularly given the broad “parent-child relationship” language used in the will.

    Facts

    Dorothy Silberman executed her will in 1950 and died in 1951, survived by two sons and three natural grandchildren. Her will established two trusts: Article Twenty-Sixth, a trust for her son Samuel, with the principal to be divided among his children upon his death, and Article Twenty-Seventh, a trust benefiting her sons’ “lawful children” until the youngest reached 21, at which point the class would close. Samuel had two children, Douglas and Rita Frates, from his first wife’s prior marriage, whom he adopted in 1956. After divorcing his first wife, Samuel remarried and adopted his second wife’s two children, Allen and Jane Herskovitz, in 1965.

    Procedural History

    The trustees of Dorothy Silberman’s will initially construed the will to benefit only natural grandchildren. Following the precedent set in Matter of Park, a supplemental petition was filed to determine the rights of the adopted children. The Surrogate’s Court, New York County, held that the adopted children were excluded from the trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the adopted children of Samuel J. Silberman are entitled to share in the principal and income of the trusts created under Articles Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh of Dorothy Silberman’s will, considering the will’s language and New York’s public policy regarding adopted children.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because, absent an explicit purpose stated in the will to exclude adopted children, they are presumed to be included as beneficiaries, as per the established New York policy.

    2. No, the Herskovits children could not benefit under Article Twenty-Seventh because they were adopted after the class of beneficiaries had closed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decision in Matter of Park, which established a strong presumption in favor of including adopted children in testamentary gifts unless the will contains an explicit expression to the contrary. The Court rejected the Surrogate’s reasoning that the use of the term “grandchildren” in Article Twenty-Seventh, combined with the provision for closing the class of beneficiaries when the youngest grandchild reached 21, demonstrated an intent to exclude adopted children.

    The court reasoned that the term “lawful children” also appeared and would encompass adopted children. Furthermore, the Court noted that the presumption in Park applied regardless of whether the will used the word “heir,” “child,” “issue,” or any other generic term expressing the parent-child relationship. The court directly quoted Park, emphasizing that “[i]n the absence of an explicit purpose stated in the will or a trust instrument to exclude such a child, he must be deemed included.”

    The Court dismissed the argument that the class-closing provision evidenced an intent to exclude adopted children, stating that “the possibility of an inequity, especially one so remote…should not cause such provision to be read as an expression of an explicit purpose to exclude adopted children from such class.”

    The court also held that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible because there was no ambiguity within the four corners of the will. The court distinguished Matter of Ricks, where extrinsic evidence was admitted to explain an ambiguity created by alterations on the face of the will itself.

    Finally, the Court held that the Herskovits children, who were adopted after the class closed under Article Twenty-Seventh, were not entitled to benefit under that article. The Court reasoned that the legal effect of adoption is to make the adopted child a natural child from the time of adoption, but not retroactively. The court stated, “The mere happenstance that a child who is adopted after January 8, 1964 may have been born before that date cannot bring such child within the class of beneficiaries of the trust under article Twenty-Seventh.”

  • Matter of McCarthy v. Meisser, 22 N.Y.2d 315 (1968): Presidential Candidate’s Consent Required for Ballot Inclusion

    Matter of McCarthy v. Meisser, 22 N.Y.2d 315 (1968)

    A person named or designated by a party or independent group as a candidate for President of the United States is privileged to decline such office and prevent their name from appearing on the ballot.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a presidential candidate’s name can be placed on the New York ballot without their consent. Senator Eugene McCarthy explicitly declined any nominations for President in New York. Despite this, petitioners sought to have his name included. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Secretary of State’s initial determination to exclude McCarthy’s name. The court held that a candidate’s consent is required to appear on the ballot, particularly when electors are committed to that candidate. The court specifically did not address the situation where electors are uncommitted.

    Facts

    Senator Eugene McCarthy was named as a candidate for President of the United States in New York. Senator McCarthy formally notified the Secretary of State that he declined any and all nominations for President or Vice President in any petition filed with the Secretary of State of New York. The Secretary of State initially refused to direct that Senator McCarthy’s name be placed on the ballot based on this declination.

    Procedural History

    The Secretary of State initially refused to place McCarthy’s name on the ballot. The Appellate Division reversed this determination, ordering McCarthy’s name to be placed on the ballot. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Secretary of State’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person named or designated by a party or independent group as a candidate for the Presidency of the United States can prevent their name from appearing on the ballot by declining the nomination.

    Holding

    Yes, because a person named or designated as a candidate for President is privileged to decline such office and prevent their name from appearing on the ballot, especially when the proposed electors are committed to that particular presidential candidate. The court emphasized the importance of the candidate’s consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that, within the context of New York’s Election Law, a candidate has the right to decline a nomination and prevent their name from appearing on the ballot. The court highlighted Senator McCarthy’s unequivocal declination of the nomination. The court emphasized that the proposed electors were committed to McCarthy, and because McCarthy was unwilling to have his name used, the proposed electors were disqualified. The court explicitly limited its holding to cases where electors are committed to a particular presidential candidate, explicitly stating, “Having chosen a candidate who is unwilling to have his name thus used the proposed electors in this case are disqualified under our law from being on the ballot. We do not pass on the question which may arise in cases where electors are not committed.” The court emphasized the initial action of the Secretary of State, noting that the Secretary initially refused to place McCarthy’s name on the ballot based on his explicit declination. The court stated, McCarthy was “declin[ing] any and all nominations which I may receive for the office of candidate for President and/or Vice President of the United States in any petition filed with the Secretary of State of the State of New York.”

  • Reeves v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 22 N.Y.2d 950 (1968): Employer’s Continued Wage Payments Constitute Advance Compensation

    22 N.Y.2d 950 (1968)

    An employer’s continued payment of full wages to an injured employee, even if the employee is unable to perform their prior job duties, can be considered an advance payment of compensation, thus affecting liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Law’s Special Fund for Reopened Cases.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an employer’s wage payments to an injured employee constituted advance compensation, thereby precluding the Special Fund for Reopened Cases from liability. The employer continued paying full wages to the claimant after his injury, even though he couldn’t perform his original work. The court held that these payments were indeed advance compensation because they were made within three years of the case’s reopening. As a result, the employer and its carrier remained liable, and the Fund for Reopened Cases was not responsible.

    Facts

    Frederick Reeves, the claimant, suffered a work-related injury while employed by Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc. Following the injury, Reeves was unable to perform the same work he had done before the accident. Despite this, Charles Pfizer & Co. continued to pay Reeves his full wages. The Workmen’s Compensation Board initially closed the case on October 27, 1958. The case was later reopened. The central question arose whether these continued wage payments constituted advance compensation.

    Procedural History

    The Workmen’s Compensation Board initially determined the Special Fund for Reopened Cases was liable. However, the Board later rescinded its original order, holding Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., and its carrier liable. The employer and carrier appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the employer’s continued payment of full wages to the claimant, who was unable to perform his previous job duties due to a work-related injury, constituted advance payment of compensation under Section 25-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, thus relieving the Special Fund for Reopened Cases of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the employer continued to pay the claimant his full wages even though he was unable to perform his prior job duties, and these payments were made within three years of the reopening of the case, such payments constituted advance payments of compensation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision, reasoning that the employer’s wage payments, made while the claimant was unable to perform his prior job, effectively constituted advance compensation. The court emphasized that these payments occurred within three years of the case’s reopening. This timeline was crucial because Section 25-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law governs the circumstances under which the Special Fund for Reopened Cases becomes liable. The court cited precedent, specifically Matter of Tremblay v. Warren County Westmount Sanatorium and Matter of Dorfer v. Summerhays & Sons Corp., to support its holding. These cases established that similar payments could be considered advance compensation. Because the employer made advance payments within the statutory period, the Fund was not liable, and the liability remained with the employer and its insurance carrier. The decision hinged on interpreting the nature of the wage payments and their temporal relationship to the reopening of the case, within the framework of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

  • French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46 (1968): Act of State Doctrine and Currency Regulations

    23 N.Y.2d 46 (1968)

    The act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from examining the validity of acts by a foreign government within its own territory, especially regarding currency regulations, unless the Hickenlooper Amendment applies, which requires a claim of title or right to specific property taken in violation of international law.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability of Cuban currency stabilization certificates issued before the Castro regime. When Cuba suspended redemption of these certificates in U.S. dollars, an American investor’s assignee sued Banco Nacional de Cuba. The court addressed sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the Hickenlooper Amendment. The court found the act of state doctrine applicable, barring inquiry into Cuba’s currency regulations, as the Hickenlooper Amendment did not apply since there was no confiscation of specific property. Therefore, the complaint was dismissed.

    Facts

    Alexander Bitter, an American citizen, invested in a Cuban farm in 1957. In 1959, he acquired eight currency stabilization certificates from Banco Nacional de Cuba, guaranteeing payment in U.S. dollars in exchange for Cuban pesos. In July 1959, Cuba issued Decision No. 346, suspending redemption of these certificates to protect its dollar reserves. Bitter tendered his certificates in December 1959, but payment in dollars was refused.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff, Bitter’s assignee, sued Banco Nacional de Cuba in the New York Supreme Court, obtaining a judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting Banco Nacional’s sovereign immunity and act of state defenses. The New York Court of Appeals granted reargument to consider the Hickenlooper Amendment, ultimately reversing the lower court’s decision and dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Banco Nacional de Cuba is entitled to sovereign immunity.

    2. Whether the act of state doctrine bars the plaintiff’s claim.

    3. Whether the Hickenlooper Amendment applies to bar the act of state doctrine in this case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the State Department concluded the activities were commercial (jure gestionis) in nature and did not warrant immunity.

    2. Yes, because the act of state doctrine generally prevents U.S. courts from questioning the validity of a foreign government’s acts within its own territory.

    3. No, because the Hickenlooper Amendment applies only to cases involving a claim of title or right to specific property that has been confiscated, and this case involves a breach of contract due to currency regulations, not a taking of property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the State Department’s position on sovereign immunity was controlling. Regarding the act of state doctrine, the court cited Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, emphasizing that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment of foreign government acts within their own territory. The court determined that Cuba’s Decision No. 346 was an act of state, regardless of whether it complied with internal Cuban law.

    The court held the Hickenlooper Amendment inapplicable because it requires a claim of title or right to specific property that has been confiscated. Here, Bitter had a contract right governed by Cuban law, which was altered by currency regulations. The court emphasized that the amendment was designed to address expropriation of specific assets, not mere breach of contract due to currency controls. Citing the legislative history, the court noted that the amendment was aimed at cases where “expropriated property comes within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”.

    The court further reasoned that currency regulations are a normal exercise of governmental power, not a “confiscation” or “taking.” It cited the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, stating that applying currency exchange requirements to aliens is not wrongful under international law, even if the local currency is less valuable. The court concluded that even if the Hickenlooper Amendment applied, the Cuban action did not violate international law.

    In conclusion, the court stated: “It is plain enough upon the face of the statute — and abundantly clear from its legislative history—that Congress was not attempting to assure a remedy in American courts for every kind of monetary loss resulting from actions, even unjust actions, of foreign governments.”