New York Law Review

Tag: 1968

  • Letendre v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518 (1968): Admissibility of Employee Statements in Fidelity Bond Cases

    21 N.Y.2d 518 (1968)

    In an action by an employer to recover on a fidelity bond, an extrajudicial declaration made by his employee is admissible as affirmative evidence against the surety, provided the declaration is in writing and the declarant is available for cross-examination.

    Summary

    Letendre sued Hartford to recover on a fidelity bond for losses caused by his employee, Tremblay. The key issue was the admissibility of Tremblay’s written confession to embezzling funds, made after the alleged defalcation. The New York Court of Appeals held the statements were admissible, overturning the long-standing rule in Hatch v. Elkins, which had excluded such statements as hearsay. The Court reasoned that the availability of the declarant for cross-examination and the reduced risk of collusion justified admitting the statements as affirmative evidence, thereby furthering the truth-finding function of the courts. The dissent argued for upholding Hatch and excluding the hearsay statements.

    Facts

    Victor Letendre owned a gas station and motel. He secured a fidelity bond on his employee, James Tremblay, before leaving Tremblay in charge while Letendre operated a restaurant in Florida. Upon returning, Letendre discovered discrepancies in business records and bank accounts. Tremblay initially denied any wrongdoing but later confessed to defalcations in a written statement to the insurer’s agent. Subsequently, Tremblay retracted the confession, claiming he only stole a small amount. At trial, Tremblay denied embezzling any funds.

    Procedural History

    Letendre sued Hartford to recover on the fidelity bond. The trial court admitted Tremblay’s inculpatory statements into evidence and returned a verdict for Letendre. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the statements admissible due to Tremblay’s continued employment at the time they were made. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine the admissibility of the statements.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an extrajudicial declaration made by an employee after the acts to which they relate is competent evidence against the surety in an action by an employer to recover on a fidelity bond.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statements were in writing, and the declarant was available for cross-examination, mitigating the dangers of hearsay and furthering the truth-finding function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the rule in Hatch v. Elkins, which had held that extrajudicial statements of a principal made after the fact are inadmissible against the surety. The Court reasoned that the primary justification for the Hatch rule—the fear of collusion between the employer and employee against the surety—did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence, especially where the employee is available for cross-examination. The Court stated, “In an action by an employer to recover on a fidelity bond, an extrajudicial declaration made by his employee should be admissible as affirmative evidence against the surety, where the declaration is in writing and the declarant is available for purposes of cross-examination.” The Court also highlighted that the risk of admitting such statements is no greater than in other types of cases where collusion is possible, and that an employee risks criminal charges by admitting embezzlement, making collusion unlikely. The Court emphasized the injustice of depriving employers of potentially crucial evidence. Judge Breitel’s dissent argued for upholding the Hatch rule, citing its long-standing precedent and alignment with general hearsay principles, as well as the increased risk of collusion when the employee remains employed. He further noted the importance of cautionary instructions to the jury regarding the weight of extrajudicial statements.

  • Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447 (1968): Liability for Injuries to Trespassing Children Caused by Volatile Substances

    Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447 (1968)

    A landowner may be liable for injuries to children trespassing on their property if the landowner knows children frequent the property, the property is easily accessible, and the landowner leaves highly volatile substances accessible to the children.

    Summary

    A 12-year-old boy, Matthew Patterson, was severely burned when he ignited paint solvent he found in an open yard adjacent to the Proctor Paint & Varnish Co. plant. The yard, unfenced and accessible to children, contained cans collecting dripping paint solvent. Patterson, after spilling some of the solvent on his clothes, lit a fire and poured the solvent on it, causing a flare-up that ignited his clothing. The trial court dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the company could be liable given the accessibility of the property, the known presence of children, and the presence of a volatile substance. The court reasoned that the rigid application of the trespass doctrine has diminished and that the volatility of the substance presented a question of fact for the jury.

    Facts

    Proctor Paint & Varnish Co. operated a paint and varnish manufacturing plant in a residential area of Yonkers. Adjoining the plant was an open, unfenced yard. Fill pipes on the plant’s outer wall dripped paint solvent into cans placed by the company. The solvent, resembling water, was a flammable liquid with a flash point of 103 degrees Fahrenheit, making it both combustible and explosive. The company knew that children frequently played in the yard.

    On October 29, 1961, Matthew Patterson, 12, and his younger brother entered the yard by climbing over a wall. Matthew picked up a pail of solvent, spilled some on his clothes, lit a fire, and poured the solvent on the fire, resulting in severe burns.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, finding it legally insufficient. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Two justices dissented in the Appellate Division, believing the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reviewed the dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landowner is liable for injuries sustained by a child trespassing on their property when the child is injured by a volatile substance left accessible on the property, where the landowner knew children frequented the property.

    Holding

    Yes, because the landowner left the property open and accessible to children, knew that children used it for play, and left highly volatile substances accessible to them; a case prima facie is made out if a child is thus injured.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that the rigid application of the trespass doctrine to children injured by dangerous conditions on land had diminished over time. The court distinguished earlier cases that had denied recovery based solely on the child’s trespasser status, citing more recent decisions that had found liability despite the child’s lack of legal right to be on the property. The court emphasized the added element of dangerous volatile substances, noting that the child’s active intervention in igniting the substance did not preclude recovery. Citing Travell v. Bannerman, 174 N.Y. 47 (1903), Kingsland v. Erie County Agric. Soc., 298 N.Y. 409 (1949), and Carradine v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 291 (1963), the court noted that liability had been found in similar cases involving dangerous substances even when the children were trespassing. The court explicitly stated, “The main body of decisions in this court instructs us that the rule today is that if the owner of land leaves it open and accessible to children; if he knows that children use it for play; and if he leaves accessible to them highly volatile substances, a case prima facie is made out if a child is thus injured.” The court found that the volatility of the paint solvent was a question of fact for the jury. The court reversed the dismissal and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418 (1968): Grand Jury Witness’s Right to Counsel

    People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418 (1968)

    A grand jury witness has a right to consult with counsel outside the grand jury room concerning legal rights, but the denial of that right does not give the witness a license to commit perjury or contempt; instead, the witness must persist in refusing to answer, forcing the prosecutor to seek a court ruling.

    Summary

    Ianniello, a bar owner, was indicted for criminal contempt based on allegedly evasive answers to grand jury questions during an investigation into bribery. He was denied permission to consult with his lawyer during questioning. The trial court dismissed the indictment, arguing denial of counsel. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Ianniello was a target of the investigation and thus immune. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that evasive testimony can be prosecuted as contempt, even if the witness is a potential defendant, and that while a grand jury witness has a right to consult with counsel about legal rights, Ianniello’s request was a strategic delay tactic, and thus his contempt charges are valid.

    Facts

    Ianniello, owner of two bars, was called before a grand jury investigating a bribery conspiracy involving police and officials of the State Liquor Authority. He initially refused to be sworn in, citing a pending misdemeanor case. He was assured he was called solely as a witness and offered immunity. He was questioned about conversations with Benny Cohen regarding police payoffs. When he claimed he could not recall these conversations, the prosecutor reminded him of the immunity and his obligation to be truthful. Ianniello asked to consult his attorney to determine if the question was “proper.” This request was denied. He continued to claim he did not recall the conversations. Later, he was questioned about a meeting with Sergeant O’Shea and again claimed he did not recall the conversation. He also claimed he couldn’t recall if anyone had told him to stay away from Sergeant O’Shea or if he had entertained police officers at his farm.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Ianniello for criminal contempt. The Supreme Court, New York County, dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a grand jury witness who is a potential defendant or target of investigation can be prosecuted for contempt based on evasive testimony.
    2. Whether a grand jury witness has a right to consult with counsel during questioning, and if so, under what circumstances.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the witness still has the benefit of an exclusionary rule preventing the use of compelled testimony or its fruits in a prosecution for a previously committed substantive crime.
    2. Yes, but only when the witness requests counsel concerning legal rights, not for strategic advice. In this case, the denial was not improper because the witness’s request was a strategic delay tactic.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule against prosecuting a target witness for contempt was undermined by People v. Tomasello, which held that a witness could be prosecuted for perjury even if a target. The Court stated that a witness cannot have a “license to commit perjury.” The “use” of testimony to establish contempt is different than using it to establish a prior offense. Even if Ianniello was a target, he could be punished for evasive testimony. Regarding the right to counsel, the court acknowledged that a witness has no right to have counsel present in the grand jury room, but the court then addressed the question of whether a witness has the right to leave the room to consult with counsel. The court stated that while a grand jury proceeding is an investigation, not a prosecution, counsel is important to provide notice of rights. The court has a responsibility to prevent unfairness in grand jury proceedings, because the grand jury is an “arm of the court.” A witness may need counsel to determine whether to assert their privilege against self-incrimination, whether a question is relevant to the investigation, or whether a testimonial privilege applies. However, the court emphasized that a witness cannot commit perjury or contempt if their right to counsel is denied; they must persist in refusing to answer, forcing the prosecutor to seek a court ruling. The court found that Ianniello’s request for counsel was not made in good faith because it was limited to whether the question was “proper” and the relevance of the question was not in doubt. Further, he never requested advice on testimonial privileges or self-incrimination, and he had been repeatedly told he was being given immunity. Finally, the court noted that three of the contempt counts were based on testimony given after a week’s recess, during which Ianniello had the opportunity to consult with counsel. The court concluded that Ianniello’s answers “could be found evasive by a jury” and thus he could be held in contempt because his answers were “so false and evasive as to be equivalent to no answer at all.”

  • Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968): Scope of Discovery Under CPLR 3101

    Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968)

    CPLR 3101 should be liberally interpreted to permit discovery of any facts bearing on the controversy that will assist in trial preparation by sharpening the issues and reducing delay.

    Summary

    Former employees of Crowell-Collier Publishing sued for severance and retirement pay, claiming the company had a policy of making such payments upon termination. They sought information on the company’s practices regarding severance and retirement pay at all its locations, as well as information on collective bargaining agreements and general publishing industry practices. The defendant sought to strike most of the interrogatories. The Court of Appeals held that the information sought was material and necessary to the prosecution of the plaintiffs’ action and should be disclosed. The Court emphasized a broad interpretation of CPLR 3101 to facilitate trial preparation and ascertain the truth.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, former employees of Crowell-Collier Publishing’s Springfield, Ohio plant, were discharged when the company suspended publication of two magazines. They sued for severance and retirement pay, alleging that the company had an established policy of providing such payments upon termination, which they relied upon when starting or continuing their employment.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs submitted interrogatories to the defendant seeking information about severance and retirement pay practices at all of the defendant’s plants and offices. The defendant moved to strike most of the interrogatories as immaterial. Special Term granted the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, and granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the information sought by the plaintiffs in their interrogatories, pertaining to the defendant’s severance and retirement pay practices at locations other than the Springfield plant, collective bargaining agreements, and general publishing industry practices, is “material and necessary” to the prosecution of their action under CPLR 3101.

    Holding

    No, because the words “material and necessary” in CPLR 3101 are to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the scope of discovery under CPLR 3101 should be broad and liberally construed. The test is one of usefulness and reason; the inquiry should be “sufficiently related to the issues in litigation to make the effort to obtain it in preparation for trial reasonable.” The Court emphasized that the purpose of disclosure is to ascertain the truth and accelerate the disposition of suits. “If there is any possibility that the information is sought in good faith for possible use as evidence-in-chief or in rebuttal or for cross-examination, it should be considered ‘evidence material * * in the prosecution or defense’.” The court rejected the defendant’s argument that disclosure should be limited to evidence directly related to issues raised by the pleadings, specifically, information about practices at the Springfield plant. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs alleged a company-wide policy and practice, and information about other locations could support their assertion that the policy was also in effect at their place of employment. As the dissenting justices in the Appellate Division observed, “The point is not whether plaintiffs relied on the policy in effect at other locations, but whether the fact that it was in effect at the other locations will not lend support to plaintiffs’ assertion that it was also in effect at the location at which they were employed.”

  • People v. Adams, 21 N.Y.2d 394 (1968): Limits on Using a Co-defendant’s Statement Against Another Defendant

    People v. Adams, 21 N.Y.2d 394 (1968)

    A defendant is denied a fair trial when the prosecutor urges the jury to consider a co-defendant’s statement as evidence against the defendant, even if the judge instructs the jury otherwise.

    Summary

    Adams was convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree assault. During a joint trial with a co-defendant, Love, Love’s unredacted pre-trial statement, containing both inculpatory and exculpatory remarks, was admitted into evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury to only consider the statement against Love. However, during summation, the prosecutor urged the jury to accept Love’s statement as evidence against Adams. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Adams’ conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s remarks denied Adams a fair trial because it was unreasonable to assume the jury could disregard the statement when explicitly urged to consider it by the prosecutor.

    Facts

    On December 4, 1965, Adams and Love, along with others, were driving around Rochester, NY, after drinking alcohol. They encountered another car with Cleveland Chatman (the deceased) and others. After a driving incident and verbal exchange, both cars stopped. Adams, Love, and others exited their car, with Adams concealing a rifle. A fight broke out between Nathan (from Adams’ car) and Cleveland Chatman. Adams fired a shot, missed, and Chatman retrieved a billy club from his car. Adams then pointed the gun at Chatman, made a statement, and shot him, resulting in Chatman’s death.

    Procedural History

    Adams and Love were indicted. Adams was charged with second-degree murder and first-degree assault. Love was indicted for second-degree murder for allegedly providing Adams with the bullet. After a Huntley hearing, the defendants were tried jointly. The jury acquitted Love and convicted Adams on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Adams appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of a co-defendant’s unredacted pre-trial statement, coupled with the prosecutor’s urging the jury to consider the statement against the defendant, denied the defendant a fair trial.
    2. Whether the trial court’s charge to the jury on justifiable homicide, lawful force, and intoxication was so inadequate as to constitute reversible error.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor’s remarks vitiated the protection the judge’s instructions afforded the defendant, making it unreasonable to assume the jury could follow the instructions.
    2. No, because no exception or objection was taken to the charge, and no request was made to charge differently; thus, any question relating to error in the charge is not available on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor’s actions in urging the jury to consider Love’s statement against Adams, despite the judge’s instructions, was fundamentally unfair. The court emphasized that a prosecutor is a quasi-judicial official with a duty to ensure a fair trial. Quoting People v. Lombard, the court stated that a prosecutor’s zeal in advocating their cause does not give them “any warrant to introduce into summation matter which the jury has no right to consider in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Even though there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the court refused to establish a precedent that the fundamentals of a fair trial can be disregarded if there is persuasive proof of the defendant’s guilt. The court cited numerous prior cases where convictions were reversed due to similar errors. Because no objection was made to the jury charge, these issues were not preserved for appeal.

  • Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371 (1968): Child Custody Modification Based on Best Interests Despite Prior Orders

    Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371 (1968)

    A court may modify a prior custody order from another state when the best interests of the child require it, even if the prior order is entitled to full faith and credit, particularly when circumstances have changed significantly since the prior order was issued.

    Summary

    Joseph and Barbara Berlin divorced in Maryland, with Barbara initially receiving custody of their two children. After Barbara moved to New York with the children, Joseph obtained a Maryland order granting him custody, alleging interference with his visitation rights. Barbara then sought custody in New York. The New York Supreme Court awarded custody to Barbara, finding it was in the children’s best interest. The Appellate Division affirmed the custody award but reinstated Joseph’s visitation rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the custody award, holding that the welfare of the children is paramount and justified modifying the Maryland decree, while also remanding the case for appropriate safeguards to ensure the children’s return after visitation with their father.

    Facts

    Joseph and Barbara Berlin divorced in Maryland, with a property and custody agreement incorporated into the divorce decree awarding custody of their two children to Barbara, and visitation rights to Joseph. Barbara was allowed to move the children from the area. Six months later, she moved with the children to New York City. Difficulties arose regarding Joseph’s visitation rights. Maryland courts held Barbara in contempt for interfering with visitation. In 1963, at Joseph’s request, Maryland awarded custody to him, citing a probation report, Barbara’s contempt, and the children’s best interests.

    Procedural History

    The Maryland courts initially granted a divorce and custody to the mother. Subsequently, after the mother moved to New York, the Maryland courts modified the decree to award custody to the father. The mother challenged this modification in Maryland, but the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the change. Following the Maryland determination, the mother sought custody in New York Supreme Court. The New York Supreme Court awarded custody to the mother. The Appellate Division affirmed the custody award but modified the order concerning visitation rights. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a New York court is required to give full faith and credit to a prior custody decree from Maryland, preventing it from modifying the order based on the best interests of the children.
    2. Whether the father’s visitation rights should be suspended due to his prior attempt to forcibly remove the children from New York.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Maryland Court of Appeals had already stated that the award of custody to the father was subject to modification upon a showing that a change in custody would serve the best interests of the children.
    2. No, but the case should be remanded to consider proper conditions to the exercise of visitation rights to ensure the children’s return to New York, because the prior Maryland order, pursuant to which he attempted to forcibly remove the children, was still in effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that even assuming custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit, the Maryland Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the custody award was subject to modification if the children’s best interests warranted it. The court noted the children had been in their mother’s continuous custody for almost eight years, attended school in New York, and had established friendships. A change in custody would be disruptive and potentially harmful. The court stated that while reluctance to modify out-of-state decrees is sometimes appropriate, particularly when a child is brought into the state to avoid a recent custody decree, the focus should always be on the child’s best interest. The court quoted Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, stating, “Upon a change in the child’s residence the decree at the former residence should be given full faith and credit, at least as to conditions existing at the time of its rendition, and the one asserting changed conditions should be compelled to show that they are such as to make him more, or another less, fit to have custody of the child.” The court also stated, “A child is not a chattel” and the key question is the best interest of the child. Regarding visitation, the court agreed with the Appellate Division that suspending visitation was unwarranted, but protective measures were needed given the father’s prior attempt to remove the children. The court suggested considering a bond and a stipulation agreeing to vacate the prior Maryland decree. However, limiting visitation to New York in the presence of a third party was deemed too harsh unless no other option could ensure compliance.

  • Greenberg & Co. v. City Rent Agency, 22 N.Y.2d 327 (1968): Rational Basis Review for Rent Control Determinations

    Greenberg & Co. v. City Rent Agency, 22 N.Y.2d 327 (1968)

    Rent control agency determinations are reviewed to determine if they have a rational basis, considering all factors, and are not arbitrary or capricious, and do not require evidentiary or quasi-judicial hearings.

    Summary

    This case concerns a landlord’s attempt to obtain a rent increase based on the purchase price of an apartment building. Tenants contested the increase, arguing the financing was abnormal and essential services weren’t maintained. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Rent Administrator’s determination to grant the increase should be reinstated. The Court emphasized that review of the agency’s decision is limited to whether it had a rational basis and wasn’t arbitrary, not whether it was supported by substantial evidence. The court found the agency rationally considered the financing terms and service maintenance.

    Facts

    Samuel Greenberg & Co. purchased a residential apartment building in 1962 for $1,010,000. The purchase involved a first mortgage, a second mortgage, a purchase-money mortgage, and cash. The purchase-money mortgage included a subordination clause. The first mortgage was refinanced shortly after the purchase, increasing the principal and interest rate. Two years after acquisition, the landlord sought a rent increase based on a 6% net return on the purchase price. Tenants opposed, claiming the purchase price was excessive, the financing was abnormal, and that the landlord failed to maintain essential services, specifically 24-hour lobby protection.

    Procedural History

    The Rent Administrator granted the rent increase. Tenants applied for a rent reduction based on the failure to maintain essential services. The Administrator directed the landlord to install an intercommunication system and deferred the rent increase. Both sides appealed to Special Term; the landlord prevailed on the rent increase, and the tenants on the essential services issue. The Appellate Division reversed both judgments, annulling the administrative determinations. The landlord appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Rent Administrator properly accepted the purchase price as the basis for a rent increase, despite the tenants’ claims of abnormal financing.

    2. Whether the Rent Administrator’s determination regarding the maintenance of essential services had a rational basis.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Rent Administrator rationally considered the financing terms, including the subordination clause and refinancing, and determined the purchase price was a good index of value.

    2. Yes, because the Rent Administrator’s determination regarding essential services was a factual issue within its discretion to resolve, and no more specific grounds or findings of fact were needed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the scope of judicial review is limited to whether the agency’s action was arbitrary or capricious and whether the determination had a rational basis. It emphasized that the statute doesn’t require an evidentiary or quasi-judicial hearing. The court explained that the agency should consider several factors when determining normal financing, including the ratio of cash payment to sales price, the amount of outstanding mortgages compared to assessed valuation, and the presence of deferred amortization. The court found the subordination clause in the purchase-money mortgage was not abnormal, given the need to refinance the expiring first mortgage. The court also noted that the statute refers to “cash payment received by the seller,” and the seller did receive the cash payment at the time of the sale. The court found the agency considered the factors and made a rational determination. Regarding essential services, the court emphasized that this was a factual issue for the Administrator to resolve. The court noted that the tenants’ 16-year quiescence was relevant to whether the service was essential. The court also stated, "All that is required is that the agency’s determinations have a rational basis in the “ record ” before it and that its determinations not be arbitrary or capricious."

  • People v. Meyer, 21 N.Y.2d 311 (1968): Right to Counsel Attaches at Arraignment

    People v. Meyer, 21 N.Y.2d 311 (1968)

    Once a defendant is formally charged and has legal representation assigned, interrogation without notice to counsel regarding the same or related offenses is a violation of the defendant’s right to counsel, rendering any resulting confession inadmissible.

    Summary

    Meyer was arraigned on a charge of criminally receiving stolen property and assigned counsel. Upon release on his own recognizance, he was immediately arrested by state police, questioned about a related burglary in another county without his attorney present, and confessed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the confession was inadmissible because Meyer was interrogated without notice to his counsel after counsel had been assigned. The court also found reversible error in the trial judge’s failure to submit the issue of voluntariness of the confession to the jury.

    Facts

    The key facts are as follows:
    1. Meyer was arraigned in New York City Criminal Court on a charge of criminally receiving stolen property.
    2. Counsel was assigned to represent him.
    3. He was released on his own recognizance.
    4. Immediately after his release, he was arrested by New York State Police.
    5. Without notice to his assigned counsel, police questioned him about a burglary in Suffolk County involving property related to the New York County charge.
    6. Meyer confessed to the burglary.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a trial court where Meyer’s confession was admitted as evidence, leading to his conviction. Meyer appealed, arguing that the confession was obtained in violation of his right to counsel and that the trial court erred in its instructions regarding the voluntariness of the confession. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the interrogation of a defendant, who is represented by counsel on a related charge, without notice to that counsel violates the defendant’s right to counsel, rendering any confession obtained inadmissible?
    2. Whether a trial court commits reversible error by failing to submit the question of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury after instructing them only to consider its truth or falsity?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once counsel is assigned, interrogation regarding related charges without notice to counsel violates the defendant’s right to counsel.
    2. Yes, because the jury must determine the voluntariness of a confession, not just its truthfulness, before considering it as evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that once a defendant is represented by counsel, any interrogation without notice to that counsel is impermissible. This rule aims to protect the attorney-client relationship and ensure the defendant’s constitutional rights are upheld. Citing People v. Donovan, the court emphasized the importance of an attorney’s presence during interrogation. The court stated that the confession obtained from Meyer should not have been received in evidence due to the violation of his right to counsel.

    Further, the court found reversible error in the trial judge’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the voluntariness of the confession. The court referenced People v. Huntley, highlighting that the jury must determine the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt before considering it as evidence of guilt. The judge’s instruction, which focused solely on the truth or falsity of the confession, deprived Meyer of this crucial safeguard.

    The court’s decision underscores the prophylactic role of counsel in safeguarding a defendant’s rights during custodial interrogation and the necessity for the jury to assess voluntariness of confessions independently.

  • Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 335 (1968): State Taxation of National Banks

    Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 335 (1968)

    National banks are not automatically entitled to constitutional immunity from state taxation, especially when the tax is non-discriminatory and does not impede the bank’s governmental function.

    Summary

    Liberty National Bank & Trust Company challenged New York State and Erie County sales and use taxes, arguing that as a national bank, it was an instrumentality of the federal government and thus immune from state taxation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding that national banks are not automatically immune from non-discriminatory state taxes that do not impede their governmental functions. The court reasoned that modern national banks, unlike those in the past, are privately owned and operated for the benefit of their owners and their regulation is not enough to warrant tax immunity.

    Facts

    Liberty National Bank & Trust Company, a national bank, was subjected to sales and use taxes imposed by New York State and Erie County. The bank claimed immunity from these taxes, asserting its status as an instrumentality of the U.S. government. The bank argued that historical precedent established national banks as tax-immune entities.

    Procedural History

    The case was initially decided in favor of the bank, granting it tax-immune status. The Appellate Division upheld this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, ultimately reversing the lower court’s decision and dismissing the bank’s petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a national bank is an instrumentality of the United States Government and, therefore, as a purchaser, is immune from sales and use taxes imposed by a State and its counties.

    Holding

    No, because modern national banks are privately owned and operated, and are not so closely related to governmental activity as to become a tax-immune instrumentality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the historical precedent of granting tax immunity to national banks, particularly citing M’Culloch v. Maryland. However, the court distinguished the role and function of national banks in the present day from those in the past. The court emphasized that national banks are now privately owned and operated primarily for the benefit of their owners. While they are subject to government regulation, this regulation is not sufficient to render them instrumentalities of the federal government deserving of tax immunity.

    The court referenced Railroad Co. v. Peniston, noting that private corporations performing services for the government are not per se immune from non-discriminatory state taxation that does not impede their service. The court observed a general trend towards curtailing the class of instrumentalities considered tax-immune, stressing the actual effect of the tax on governmental functions rather than a mechanical application of immunity.

    The court addressed the bank’s reliance on Department of Employment v. United States, which granted tax immunity to the American National Red Cross. The court distinguished the Red Cross, highlighting its close ties to the government and its role in fulfilling national commitments. The court found the activities and functions of the Red Cross to be vastly different from those of a national bank.

    Furthermore, the court addressed 12 U.S.C. § 548, noting that it was designed to ensure non-discriminatory taxation of national banks, not to provide blanket immunity. It stated, “[T]he various restrictions [§ 548] * * * places on the permitted methods of taxation are designed to prohibit only those systems of state taxation which discriminate in practical operation against national banking associations or their shareholders as a class.”

    Ultimately, the court concluded that the bank had not presented a rational argument for why it should be exempt from contributing to state and local taxes, especially considering the essential services it benefits from. The court explicitly stated that until the Supreme Court rules that modern national banks are immune from such taxation, it would decline to do so itself.

  • Drogheo v. Drogheo, 22 N.Y.2d 182 (1968): Establishing Family Court Jurisdiction over Foreign Divorce Decrees

    Drogheo v. Drogheo, 22 N.Y.2d 182 (1968)

    The New York State Legislature has the constitutional authority to confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court to enforce and modify alimony and support provisions of foreign divorce decrees, as this constitutes a new class of action or proceeding within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7, of the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    Evelyn Drogheo sought to enforce the support provisions of a Mexican divorce decree against her former husband, Joseph Drogheo, in New York Family Court. The Family Court granted her petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce or modify foreign divorce decrees. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the legislature had the authority to grant such jurisdiction to the Family Court because enforcing or modifying foreign divorce decrees constituted a new class of action, not previously recognized at common law.

    Facts

    Evelyn and Joseph Drogheo entered into a separation agreement in October 1964, which was incorporated into their subsequent Mexican divorce decree. The agreement stipulated that Joseph would pay Evelyn $23 per week for support.
    By May 25, 1966, Joseph was $376 in arrears on these payments.
    Evelyn petitioned the Family Court to enforce the support provision of the Mexican decree, pursuant to Section 466(c) of the Family Court Act.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court denied Joseph’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and his cross-application for downward modification of the support provision; the Family Court granted Evelyn’s petition, determining Joseph to be $445 in arrears and ordering him to pay $23 weekly plus $5 weekly on the arrears (June 16, 1966).
    Another Family Court order fixed total arrears at $652 and required Joseph to post a $250 cash bond or serve 30 days in the workhouse; payments were to be held by the Support Bureau pending appeal (August 29, 1966).
    The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s orders, dismissing Evelyn’s application (date not specified).
    The New York Court of Appeals granted Evelyn leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the right to commence a proceeding to enforce or modify the provisions of a foreign divorce decree in New York courts constitutes a new class of action or proceeding within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7, of the New York Constitution, thereby allowing the Legislature to confer jurisdiction to the Family Court.

    Holding

    Yes, because at common law, New York courts had no jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, and the power of the Supreme Court over such matters is derived solely from statutory grants of authority. The enforcement and modification of foreign decrees, irrespective of the grounds for the divorce, constitutes a new class of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the legislature has the power to create new classes of actions and proceedings, concurrent with the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court, absent statutory authorization, would lack jurisdiction.
    The Court noted that at common law, New York courts lacked jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, with the Supreme Court’s power in such matters derived solely from statute. Before the enactment of Section 466, New York courts could not enforce or modify foreign matrimonial decrees unless the grounds for the decree were recognized in New York.
    The Court emphasized that Section 466(c) empowered the Family Court to enforce and modify foreign decrees regardless of the grounds upon which they were granted.
    Because the right to commence such proceedings was not recognized at common law, it could be considered a new class of proceeding, allowing the Legislature to grant jurisdiction to the Family Court.
    The court quoted Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166 (1967): “Once the Legislature create[s’] the [new] cause of action, jurisdiction to entertain it automatically vest[s] in the Supreme Court by virtue of article VI of the Constitution.” This means that even if Section 466 did not explicitly grant concurrent jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, such jurisdiction would arise automatically.
    Furthermore, the Court stated that judicial policy requires construing legislative enactments to preserve their constitutionality and continuing vitality. Therefore, Section 466 should be interpreted to provide the Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction.