New York Law Review

Tag: 1965

  • Corcoran v. Village of Saddle River, 16 N.Y.2d 463 (1965): Determining Lateral Support Obligations Under City Administrative Code

    Corcoran v. Village of Saddle River, 16 N.Y.2d 463 (1965)

    When an owner insists on maintaining land higher or lower than the legal regulation, the necessity and permissibility of applying administrative code provisions regarding retaining structures require careful factual inquiry into alternative improvement methods and cost burdens.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a provision of the New York City Administrative Code regarding lateral support obligations applies when an owner excavates their land, leaving an adjacent property significantly higher. The plaintiff excavated their land to curb level, creating a vertical height difference with the defendant’s property. The plaintiff then demanded the defendant build a retaining wall at her own expense. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the application of the Administrative Code and the permissibility of such application depended on the specific facts of the case, including whether the plaintiff could have improved their land without such extensive excavation and the reasonableness of the burden placed on the defendant.

    Facts

    Plaintiff acquired land on 75th Street in Queens to construct two-family residences. The property consisted of two parcels separated by defendant’s land. The natural slope of the land was upward from the street, with defendant’s property at a higher elevation. Plaintiff, unable to purchase defendant’s land, excavated their property to street level, leaving defendant’s land significantly elevated above the plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff then demanded that defendant construct a retaining wall to support her property at an estimated cost of $25,000, citing the New York City Administrative Code.

    Procedural History

    Special Term granted summary judgment to plaintiff. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Administrative Code provision was inapplicable. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Administrative Code provision requiring an owner maintaining land higher than legal regulation to build a retaining wall applies to the defendant in this case, and whether such application is permissible, considering the specific facts and potential burden on the defendant.

    Holding

    No, the case was remitted because the applicability and permissibility of applying the Administrative Code provision cannot be determined without further factual development regarding alternative methods of improvement and the reasonableness of the burden imposed on the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the application of the Administrative Code provision was contingent on further factual findings. It was unclear whether the plaintiff could have improved their land without the extensive excavation. The court considered whether a retaining wall was actually necessary, as opposed to alternative solutions like decline grading. The court also noted a lack of clarity regarding offers by the plaintiff to share the cost of the wall or grading. The court emphasized that applying the Administrative Code as the plaintiff desired could place a disproportionately heavy economic burden on the defendant. The court observed that the record was incomplete and prevented the Court from determining the extent of the offers made by the plaintiff to share the cost of appropriate grading or retaining wall construction between the properties. The Court thus needed more information to decide if the Administrative Code applied and, if so, whether its application was permissible under the circumstances. As the Court stated, ‘If eventually held applicable, as now contended by plaintiff, the provisions of the Administrative Code would impose what appears to be at least a disproportionately heavy economic burden of compliance.’

  • People v. Matherson, 16 N.Y.2d 509 (1965): Warrantless Seizure of Obscene Material

    People v. Matherson, 16 N.Y.2d 509 (1965)

    A search warrant for obscene materials must describe the items to be seized with particularity; a warrant that allows the police to determine what is obscene is unconstitutional; Judicially unsupervised police seizure of evidence on which convictions are based is unlawful.

    Summary

    This case concerns the seizure of magazines from a bookstore based on a search warrant. The warrant was issued based on an affidavit describing the magazines as obscene but failed to specifically name or describe them in the warrant itself. The police seized over 1,000 magazines, and the bookstore owners were convicted on counts related to two specific magazines not named in the original affidavit or warrant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the seizure was unlawful because the warrant allowed the police to exercise unsupervised judgment in determining what constituted obscenity, violating constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for the appellants’ bookstore based on an affidavit stating the appellants possessed obscene material and naming specific magazines. The warrant authorized a search for magazines and photographs but did not name or describe the magazines mentioned in the affidavit. During the search, the police seized over 1,000 magazines and calendars and arrested the appellants for violating obscenity laws. The convictions rested on two magazines, “Nude Circle” and “Photo Field Trip,” which were not described in the search warrant or supporting affidavit.

    Procedural History

    The appellants were indicted on 54 counts and moved to suppress the seized material, which the Monroe County Court denied. They pleaded guilty to five counts, and the Appellate Division reversed as to three counts but affirmed the convictions on the remaining two, based on the magazines “Nude Circle” and “Photo Field Trip.” Three counts were previously dismissed by the County Court. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the seizure of the magazines “Nude Circle” and “Photo Field Trip,” which were not specifically named or described in the search warrant or supporting affidavit, was a violation of the appellants’ constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because the seizure of materials not described in the warrant or affidavit allowed the police to exercise unsupervised judgment in determining what was obscene, violating constitutional protections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the seizure was unlawful because the magazines on which the convictions rested were not described in the search warrant or underlying affidavit. The court emphasized that the warrant permitted the police to seize material based on their own judgment of what constituted obscenity, without prior judicial review of the specific items seized. This judicially unsupervised seizure violated the principles established in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), which require judicial oversight to prevent wide police discretion in seizing written material. The court quoted People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, stating, “The basic defect is that the language of the warrant delegates to the police officer executing it the function of determining whether the material is obscene”. The court further noted that the warrant was so broad that it could have permitted the seizure of noted works of art or medical texts simply because they portrayed genitalia. The court found that the seizure was not a valid search incident to arrest because the warrant for arrest concerned different publications, and those publications were not the basis of the convictions. The Court concluded that the judicially unsupervised police seizure of evidence was contrary to both Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals precedent and reversed the lower court’s orders, granted the motion to suppress the seized material, and dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment.

  • Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965): Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees Based on Comity

    16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965)

    A state court may recognize a divorce decree from another jurisdiction, even if not entitled to full faith and credit, based on principles of comity and estoppel, especially when a party has participated in obtaining the decree and a significant amount of time has passed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a Surrogate was correct in recognizing an Alabama divorce decree, even if the decree was potentially subject to attack in Alabama for lack of actual residence. The Court held that the Surrogate was entitled to recognize the Alabama decree based on factors like the wife’s initial consent, the extended period since the divorce was granted, and the lack of demonstrable benefit to the wife from the divorce. The Court emphasized that while full faith and credit might not mandate recognition, comity and estoppel principles allowed the New York court to acknowledge the decree’s validity.

    Facts

    The decedent and his wife married in New York in 1948 and remained residents of New York. In 1959, the decedent obtained an Alabama divorce, allegedly without establishing bona fide residence. The wife signed an appearance and power of attorney for the Alabama proceedings. She claimed she didn’t understand the documents and only learned of the divorce after her husband’s death. The couple continued to file joint tax returns as husband and wife and the decedent provided partial support to the wife.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate Court recognized the Alabama divorce decree and denied the wife’s application for letters of administration after the husband died intestate. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision. Justice Munder dissented, arguing that the Alabama decree was void and not entitled to full faith and credit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate Court was required to give full faith and credit to the Alabama divorce decree, potentially invalid under Alabama law, thus precluding the wife from receiving letters of administration as the surviving spouse.

    Holding

    No, because even if the Alabama divorce decree wasn’t entitled to full faith and credit, the Surrogate court could recognize it based on comity and estoppel principles, considering the wife’s participation in the divorce proceedings, the significant delay before challenging it, and the absence of demonstrable benefit to the wife from the divorce.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court considered Alabama law regarding collusive “quickie” divorces, noting that such decrees could be vacated in Alabama, even on the court’s own motion. However, the Court also acknowledged that Alabama courts might not automatically set aside void decrees, especially if there was a significant delay or if the party seeking vacatur had obtained benefits from the divorce. Referencing Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, the court noted that void decrees are vacatable by the court in which they were rendered, if void on their face. The Court distinguished cases where parties were estopped from challenging divorces due to having received benefits. The Court reasoned that, despite the potential invalidity of the Alabama divorce under Alabama law, the nine-year lapse between the divorce and the challenge raised a strong likelihood of laches. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Hartigan case focused on the *power* of the court to vacate, not an *obligation* to do so. More importantly, the court noted that the doctrine of comity allowed New York courts to recognize judgments from sister states even when full faith and credit did not apply. As the court stated, “Full faith and credit may compel New York to recognize a judgment of a sister State. The absence of full faith and credit does not mandate ignoring the judgment of a sister State”. The court concluded that preventing someone who participated in a fraud on another state’s court from benefiting by changing their position in New York was a valid basis for estoppel. The Court highlighted that it was not dealing with issues of personal jurisdiction or due process violations as in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220. Therefore, the Surrogate was correct in recognizing the Alabama divorce decree.

  • Gasparrini v. Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 105 (1965): Limits of Owner’s Duty to Provide Safe Workplace

    Gasparrini v. Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 105 (1965)

    An owner or general contractor’s duty to provide a safe workplace for subcontractor’s employees does not extend to hazards created by the subcontractor’s own defective equipment or methods.

    Summary

    Gasparrini, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured when a plank provided by his employer broke while he was working on a shopping center under construction. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of Gasparrini, holding that the owner of the shopping center was not liable because the defective plank and the uncovered floor below were not a “place of work” furnished by the owner. The court emphasized that the owner’s duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to the subcontractor’s own equipment or methods, or to hazards created as a detail of the subcontractor’s work.

    Facts

    Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc. owned a shopping center building under construction. Keystone Fireproofing Corporation, Gasparrini’s employer, was a subcontractor hired to install fiber glass insulation between the iron beams and the roof. Gasparrini was injured when a plank he was standing on broke, causing him to fall. The plank was provided by Keystone. The building was a single story with a cellar. Some of the floor was uncovered due to excavation, increasing the distance to the basement in that area.

    Procedural History

    Gasparrini sued Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., the owner, and obtained a judgment in his favor at trial. The owner appealed, arguing that it had not breached any duty of care owed to Gasparrini. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a building under construction is liable for injuries sustained by a subcontractor’s employee when a plank provided by the subcontractor breaks, and the employee falls in an area where the floor below is uncovered due to excavation.

    Holding

    No, because the defective plank furnished by the plaintiff’s employer and the uncovered floor were not a “place of work” furnished by the owner, and the owner’s duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to the subcontractor’s own equipment or methods.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while an owner or general contractor has a common-law duty to provide a safe place to work for employees of subcontractors, this duty does not extend to hazards created by the subcontractor’s own negligence or defective equipment. The court distinguished this case from situations where the owner failed to maintain safe “ways and approaches” to the work site. The court cited several precedents, including Butler v. D. M. W. Contr. Co., where a scaffold erected by the plaintiff’s employer broke, and the court held that the scaffold was neither a place of work nor a way of approach furnished by the owner.

    The court emphasized that the safe place to work rule, whether under statute or common law, does not include the subcontractor’s own plant or the work the subcontractor is doing. The court quoted Wohlfron v. Brooklyn Edison Co., stating that the owner’s duty is “clearly distinguishable from that arising through negligent acts of a subcontractor occurring as a detail of the work.”

    The dissent argued that the issue was based on the alleged concurrent negligence of the owner in failing to cover the excavation into which the plaintiff fell, raising a proper issue of fact for the jury. However, the majority rejected this argument, focusing on the fact that the injury was directly caused by the subcontractor’s own defective plank. This case clarifies that an owner isn’t responsible for the day-to-day safety of a subcontractor’s tools and methods.

  • Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 16 N.Y.2d 136 (1965): Owner Liability and Construction Site Safety

    Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 16 N.Y.2d 136 (1965)

    An owner is not liable for injuries to a contractor’s employee caused by the manner in which the contractor performs the work, especially when the owner does not control the work or the area where the injury occurred.

    Summary

    A bricklayer, Persichilli, died from injuries sustained when bricks fell on him at a construction site. His employer was placing bricks on a floor above where he was working to build a wall. The New York Court of Appeals held that the owner, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, was not liable because the injury resulted from the manner in which the employer carried out the work, and the owner did not control the work or the area. The court emphasized that the area was not a common usage area under the owner’s control, absolving the owner of liability for providing an unsafe workplace.

    Facts

    The decedent, Persichilli, was employed as a bricklayer.
    He was constructing a wall at a site managed by his employer.
    Bricks being placed by his employer on a floor above him fell and fatally injured him.
    These bricks were intended to be incorporated into the wall Persichilli was building as construction progressed.
    The area where Persichilli was working was not a common area controlled by the owner.
    The owner did not direct or control the manner in which Persichilli’s employer performed the work.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision is not explicitly stated, but the Court of Appeals reversed an unspecified order, implying a judgment or order in favor of the plaintiff (Persichilli’s estate).
    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a construction site is liable for injuries to a contractor’s employee when the injuries are caused by the manner in which the contractor performs the work and the owner does not control the work or the area where the injury occurred.

    Holding

    No, because the accident was due to the manner in which the decedent’s employer prosecuted the work, and the negligence, if any, in its occurrence is not attributable to the owner; nor is the owner liable on the theory that it provided an unsafe place to work as the wall was being constructed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the owner’s liability does not extend to injuries resulting from the contractor’s methods when the owner does not control the work or the site. The court relied on precedent, citing cases like Wright v. Belt Assoc., Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., Broderick v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., Mullin v. Genesee County Elec. Light, Power & Gas Co., and Grant v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. The key principle is that an owner is not responsible for the safety of a work site when the contractor has control over the work and the area is not a common area maintained by the owner.
    The court quoted Naso v. Wates & Co. (21 A D 2d 679, 680), summarizing the rule.
    Judge Burke dissented, arguing that a question of fact existed for the jury’s consideration, suggesting disagreement on whether the owner’s lack of control was sufficiently established.

  • Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965): Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees Based on Appearance

    Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965)

    A bilateral foreign divorce decree, obtained when both parties appeared in the foreign jurisdiction, is generally recognized as valid in New York, even if the jurisdictional basis in the foreign court was questionable.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a Mexican divorce decree in New York. The parties, New York residents, obtained a divorce in Mexico where both appeared personally or through counsel. The husband then remarried, and the first wife challenged the validity of the Mexican divorce to claim rights as his widow. The New York Court of Appeals held the Mexican divorce valid, emphasizing that both parties participated in the Mexican proceeding. The court reasoned that allowing collateral attacks on such decrees would undermine the stability of marital status and create uncertainty. The dissent argued that the Mexican decree should not be recognized because the jurisdictional basis was questionable.

    Facts

    Mr. and Mrs. Rosenstiel were married. They experienced marital difficulties, leading them to seek a divorce. They traveled to Mexico and obtained a divorce decree. Both parties appeared in the Mexican court, either personally or through an authorized attorney. The husband remarried after obtaining the Mexican divorce. The first wife challenged the validity of the Mexican divorce after the husband’s death, seeking to assert rights as his widow.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially ruled against the validity of the Mexican divorce decree. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the divorce. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the divorce decree valid and not subject to collateral attack.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a bilateral Mexican divorce decree, obtained with the appearance of both parties, is subject to collateral attack in New York based on the lack of a valid jurisdictional basis in Mexico.

    Holding

    No, because New York recognizes the validity of foreign divorce decrees when both parties appeared in the foreign jurisdiction, regardless of the questionable jurisdictional basis in that jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the importance of recognizing such decrees to maintain marital stability and avoid creating uncertainty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Mexican divorce decree should be recognized because both parties participated in the proceeding. The Court acknowledged the dubious jurisdictional basis in Mexico but prioritized the stability of marital status in New York. It determined that New York public policy supported the recognition of bilateral foreign divorce decrees. The court referenced "a rule of law which is responsive to the needs of stability and regularity in relations of domestic status." The Court noted the dangers of allowing collateral attacks on divorce decrees, stating, "To allow a collateral attack… would be to introduce chaos into a field of law where certainty and predictability are highly desirable." Judge Van Voorhis dissented, arguing that if the Mexican decree was defective, it should not be upheld in New York. Van Voorhis believed that collateral attack should not be disallowed based on the existence of a prior marriage and separation agreement.

  • Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 16 N.Y.2d 24 (1965): Establishing Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Executors

    16 N.Y.2d 24 (1965)

    A state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary’s executor or administrator for causes of action arising from acts the non-domiciliary committed within the state, provided the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York courts can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident executors of a deceased defendant who was properly served while alive. The suit was brought by stockholders against corporate directors for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. One director, Burg, was served in Massachusetts but later died. The plaintiffs sought to substitute Burg’s executors, who resided in Massachusetts. The executors challenged the court’s jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals held that exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident executors was constitutional, as the original action was properly commenced against Burg based on his business activities in New York, and the state has a legitimate interest in providing a forum for resolving disputes arising from those activities.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, stockholders of Hotel Corporation of America, sued 19 individual defendants, including A.S. Burg, for allegedly realizing personal profits through real estate transactions with the corporation, constituting a breach of fiduciary duties.
    Burg, a director, was personally served in Massachusetts under CPLR 302(a)(1) based on his transaction of business in New York.
    Burg voluntarily appeared by filing an answer.
    Burg died, and executors were appointed in Massachusetts.
    Plaintiffs moved to substitute Burg’s non-resident executors as defendants.

    Procedural History

    The other defendants moved for a stay pending the posting of security by the plaintiffs, which was granted. After the stay was lifted, plaintiffs moved for substitution of Burg’s executors. Special Term ordered the substitution. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals by certified question regarding the constitutionality of jurisdiction over the non-resident executors.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York courts can constitutionally obtain in personam jurisdiction over non-resident executors who have committed no acts or transacted no business in the state, where the deceased defendant was properly served before death based on in-state business activity.
    2. Whether the plaintiffs’ application for substitution was made within a reasonable time after the decedent’s death, as required by CPLR 1015(a) and 1021.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the deceased defendant was properly served while alive due to transacting business in New York, and the state’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over the executor in such circumstances, consistent with due process.
    2. Yes, because the delay was not unreasonable given a stay of proceedings was in effect for a significant portion of the time following the defendant’s death, and the decision to allow substitution was within the court’s discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the constitutionality of CPLR 302 and 313, which authorize personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary’s executor or administrator when the cause of action arises from acts within the state. The court noted a shift in jurisdictional concepts since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, which established that due process requires only that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintaining the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
    The court distinguished prior New York cases that questioned the constitutionality of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign executors, emphasizing that CPLR 302 and 313 are narrowly tailored to apply only to causes of action having minimum contacts with New York.
    The court cited McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., noting the trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over non-residents based on a substantial connection with the state. The Court also referenced United States v. Montreal Trust Co., where the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of CPLR 302, finding that the defendant had transacted sufficient business in New York to justify service of process upon his estate.
    The court emphasized that the statutes provide procedural safeguards required for due process of law and are applicable only to causes of action having certain minimum contacts with the state, similar to the reasoning used to uphold non-resident motorist statutes in Leighton v. Roper. The court implicitly adopts the view that the state has an interest in providing a forum for claims arising from activities within its borders, even after the death of the non-resident defendant.
    The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the substitution despite the delay, given the stay of proceedings. The court considered the objection that a judgment might not be enforceable in Massachusetts as speculative and premature, citing Leighton v. Roper.

  • Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 A.D.2d 284 (1965): Statute of Limitations for Injury to Reputation

    24 A.D.2d 284 (1965)

    When the essence of a cause of action is injury to reputation, the statute of limitations for defamation applies, regardless of the specific tort alleged.

    Summary

    Morrison, a university professor, sued NBC after participating in the rigged quiz show “21.” He claimed the scandal damaged his reputation and caused him to be denied fellowships. The court addressed whether the claim was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, even though the plaintiff framed the cause of action as an “intentional wrong.” The court held that because the harm alleged was to his reputation, the defamation statute of limitations applied, barring the suit, as the essence of the action, not its name, controls the applicable statute of limitations.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Morrison participated in the “21” quiz show, which was later revealed to be rigged. The public exposure of the hoax led to the belief that all contestants were privy to the fraud. Morrison alleged that this caused damage to his professional standing and reputation, leading to the denial of fellowship applications.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the first cause of action, arguing legal insufficiency and statute of limitations. The Special Term court upheld the cause of action but dismissed it based on the one-year statute of limitations for defamation. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the cause of action alleged an “intentional wrong” subject to a six-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action alleging injury to reputation, stemming from an intentional wrong other than direct defamation, is governed by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to libel and slander.

    Holding

    No, because the essence of the action is injury to reputation, the one-year statute of limitations for defamation applies, regardless of how the cause of action is framed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the harm alleged by the plaintiff was precisely the same as that caused by defamation: injury to reputation. It emphasized that defamation is defined by its injury—damage to reputation—rather than the manner in which the injury is accomplished. The court stated that “unlike most torts, defamation is defined in terms of the injury, damage to reputation, and not in terms of the manner in which the injury is accomplished.” It quoted the Restatement of Torts definition of defamation to underscore this point: “A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Applying the principle from Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., the court stated, “We look for the reality, and the essence of the action and not its mere name.” Allowing the plaintiff to circumvent the defamation statute of limitations by “redescribing [the] defamation action to fit this new ‘noncategory’ of intentional wrong” would be unreasonable. Since the complaint was filed more than one year after the fixing of the quiz show became publicly known, the action was time-barred.

  • In the Matter of the Arbitration Between United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 16 N.Y.2d 327 (1965): Arbitrability of Subcontracting Disputes Under Collective Bargaining Agreements

    In the Matter of the Arbitration Between UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, 16 N.Y.2d 327 (1965)

    When a collective bargaining agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, disputes regarding subcontracting practices are generally arbitrable, especially if the agreement contains provisions addressing recognition of the union and layoffs.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a dispute over subcontracting work previously performed by union employees is subject to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals held that the dispute was arbitrable because the agreement’s recognition and layoff provisions could be interpreted to address the issue of subcontracting. The court emphasized the presumption of arbitrability in labor disputes and the limited role of courts in determining whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause.

    Facts

    The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers Union (Union) had a collective bargaining agreement with General Electric Company (GE) covering janitors, porters, and charwomen at GE’s Baltimore and Hudson Falls-Fort Edward plants. The agreement contained grievance and arbitration procedures for disputes involving the interpretation or application of the agreement. GE contracted out cleaning services, resulting in the layoff of union members. The Union filed grievances, arguing that GE violated the agreement by subcontracting work that was traditionally performed by union employees.

    Procedural History

    The Union sought arbitration, but GE refused, arguing the dispute was not arbitrable. The Union then initiated a proceeding to compel arbitration. The Special Term court dismissed the petition, finding the dispute did not involve the interpretation or application of any provision of the agreement. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the matter was arbitrable in the absence of clear language excluding the dispute from arbitration. GE appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dispute regarding the company’s decision to subcontract work previously performed by union employees constitutes an arbitrable issue under the collective bargaining agreement’s provisions concerning union recognition and layoffs.

    Holding

    Yes, because the union’s grievances present arbitrable issues as to the “interpretation or application” of the recognition and layoff provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The court found that the broad arbitration clause encompassed disputes requiring interpretation of the agreement’s provisions, even if the interpretation was contested.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on federal law, which establishes a presumption of arbitrability in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce, citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582-583. It emphasized that courts should only determine whether a dispute is arbitrable, not the merits of the dispute itself. The court stated, “It is only where the parties have employed language which clearly rebuts [such] presumption of arbitrability, e.g., by stating that an issue either as to procedure or as to substance is not to be determined by arbitration, that the matter may be determined by the courts.” The court found that the agreement’s recognition clause (Article I), where the company agreed to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative, required interpretation to determine if subcontracting violated that provision. It reasoned that the arbitrator must decide if the recognition clause imposed a continuing duty on the employer to assign work customarily performed in the plant to union members. Furthermore, the court held that the layoff provision (Article XII), applicable to “all cases of layoff or transfer due to lack of work,” presented an arbitrable question because it was unclear whether the subcontracting, where the same work continued to be performed by non-union members, constituted a “lack of work” within the meaning of the clause. The court distinguished its holding from cases where subcontracting involved work union members were unable to perform. The court also rejected the argument that collective bargaining history should be considered when determining arbitrability, stating such evidence bears on the merits of the dispute and not whether the dispute is arbitrable.

  • Spett v. Levine, 16 N.Y.2d 16 (1965): Admissibility of Agent’s Statements as Evidence Against Principal

    Spett v. Levine, 16 N.Y.2d 16 (1965)

    Circumstantial evidence can establish a prima facie case of negligence, and an agent’s statements made within the scope of their authority are admissible as evidence against the principal, especially when the agent has broad managerial responsibilities.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Spett, tripped over a skid in a hallway outside his office and sued Rose Levine, doing business as Harvey Printing Co., alleging negligence. The trial court set aside a jury verdict for Spett, finding insufficient evidence linking Harvey to the skid’s placement. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that circumstantial evidence supported Harvey’s responsibility. The Court also held that an alleged admission by Albert Levine, Harvey’s “general foreman” and Rose’s husband, regarding the skid was improperly excluded and should be admitted in a new trial, as his managerial role made his statements admissible against the principal, Rose Levine.

    Facts

    Spett tripped over a skid (a wooden platform) in the hallway outside his office, sustaining injuries. The skid was located between Spett’s office door and Harvey Printing Co.’s door, approximately 6 to 8 feet apart. Testimony indicated the skid contained cardboard used by Harvey but not by other tenants on the floor. Deliveries were typically left on a loading platform downstairs, and tenants were responsible for moving them to their premises. Albert Levine, Rose Levine’s husband and Harvey’s “general foreman,” allegedly made an admission of responsibility for placing the skid after the accident.

    Procedural History

    Spett sued Rose Levine (Harvey Printing Co.) in Supreme Court. The jury initially found in favor of Spett. The trial court set aside the jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Levine. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for review on the facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Harvey Printing Co. was responsible for placing the skid in the hallway.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony concerning an alleged admission of responsibility made by Albert Levine, the “general foreman” of Harvey Printing Co., shortly after the plaintiff’s accident.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including the skid’s location, the type of cardboard on it, and the usual delivery procedures, was sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer Harvey’s responsibility.

    2. Yes, because Albert Levine’s broad managerial role and apparent authority to act on behalf of Harvey Printing Co. made his alleged admission of responsibility admissible against his wife, Rose Levine, the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it reasonably infers causation or negligence, even if it doesn’t eliminate remote possibilities. The court cited prior cases such as Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp., stating, “It is enough that he [plaintiff] shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred.” Here, the skid’s location, its contents, and the usual delivery practices created a reasonable inference that Harvey was responsible for its placement. The court also determined that Albert Levine’s alleged admission of responsibility was improperly excluded. The court stated that “Where an agent’s responsibilities include making statements on his principal’s behalf, the agent’s statements within the scope of his authority are receivable against the principal.” The court emphasized Levine’s broad managerial responsibilities, stating that he “ran” Harvey and was its “representative to the trade, others in the building, and the landlord.” Because Levine appeared to be more than just a general foreman, but rather the key decision-maker for the company, his statements about the skid’s placement should have been heard as evidence.