New York Law Review

Tag: 1960

  • Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 N.Y.2d 792 (1960): Establishing Standing to Challenge Zoning Ordinances

    Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 N.Y.2d 792 (1960)

    A party challenging a zoning ordinance must demonstrate a direct and substantial injury as a result of the ordinance to establish standing; a prior ruling on a variance does not automatically confer standing in a subsequent challenge to a related ordinance.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standing requirement for challenging zoning ordinances. The plaintiffs, seeking to invalidate a city ordinance regarding a parking area adjacent to a supermarket, had previously been involved in a case concerning a zoning variance for the supermarket itself. The Court of Appeals held that the prior ruling on the variance did not automatically grant the plaintiffs standing in the current challenge to the parking ordinance. The court emphasized that to have standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate a direct and substantial injury, specifically, that their properties were materially damaged in pecuniary value by the ordinance. Because the plaintiffs failed to adequately prove such damage in the present case, the dissenting opinion argued that the lower court’s decision finding a lack of standing should be upheld.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, property owners near a supermarket, challenged a city ordinance relating to a parking area for the supermarket.
    An earlier proceeding (Matter of Blumberg v. Feriola) involved the same plaintiffs and a challenge to a zoning variance that allowed the supermarket to extend 21 feet into a restricted lot.
    The Appellate Division had reversed the Special Term’s decision in the prior proceeding, finding that the supermarket owner knew of the restriction when purchasing the property.
    The ordinance under review in this case specifically concerned the parking area adjacent to the supermarket.

    Procedural History

    Special Term initially determined that the plaintiffs had not established they were damaged by the parking ordinance.
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the plaintiffs’ standing was established in the earlier Article 78 proceeding.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order without opinion, leading to Justice Bergan’s dissenting opinion addressing the standing issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior ruling granting standing in a zoning variance case automatically confers standing in a subsequent case challenging a related, but distinct, zoning ordinance.
    Whether plaintiffs challenging a zoning ordinance must demonstrate direct and substantial injury (material damage in pecuniary value to their property) to establish standing.

    Holding

    No, because the issues and defendants in the prior zoning variance case were different from those in the current case regarding the parking ordinance; the prior ruling did not automatically confer standing to challenge the subsequent ordinance.
    Yes, because standing to challenge a zoning ordinance requires a showing that the property belonging to the plaintiffs was materially damaged in pecuniary value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting Justice Bergan argued that the Appellate Division erred in assuming that the prior Article 78 proceeding automatically conferred standing in the current action. He highlighted that the issues and parties involved were distinct. The prior case concerned a zoning variance for the supermarket building itself, whereas the current case focused on a separate ordinance regulating the parking area. The defendants also differed: the prior case involved the Zoning Board of Appeals, while the current case did not.

    Bergan cited established precedent (Isen Contr. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, Buckley v. Fasbender, Brechner v. Incorporated Vil. of Lake Success, and Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck) to support the principle that plaintiffs must demonstrate substantial property damage to challenge local legislative enactments. He quoted Brechner, which relied on Marcus, stating that “the interest necessary to sustain such an action arises only when the property belonging to plaintiffs was materially damaged in pecuniary value”.

    Bergan emphasized that proving damage from the construction of a shopping center is different from proving damage specifically from the adjacent parking lot, which the ordinance permitted. He concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the requisite damage and should not be relieved of the need to prove it in this action, citing Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, and Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp.

  • Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc.2d 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960): Enforceability of Zoning Regulations Post Variance

    Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc.2d 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)

    A zoning variance runs with the land, and subsequent owners are entitled to the benefits of that variance unless it was explicitly personal to the original applicant.

    Summary

    Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. sought a permit to construct a supermarket on property previously granted a zoning variance for that purpose. The permit was denied based on new interpretations of the zoning ordinance. The court addressed whether a prior zoning variance, allowing supermarket construction despite zoning restrictions, remained valid for a subsequent owner. The court held that the variance ran with the land. Unless explicitly personal to the original applicant, the new owner was entitled to the variance benefits, and the permit should be granted. This emphasizes the enduring nature of zoning variances tied to specific properties and the importance of clear limitations on such variances.

    Facts

    In 1957, Andrews, the prior owner of the property, obtained a variance to erect a supermarket, a use otherwise prohibited by the zoning ordinance. Subsequently, Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. purchased the land from Andrews. In 1960, Bar Harbour applied for a permit to construct the supermarket pursuant to the variance previously granted. The Building Inspector denied the permit. The denial was based on an interpretation of the ordinance by the Town Attorney different from that when Andrews obtained the variance. No conditions limiting the variance to Andrews were imposed when it was granted.

    Procedural History

    Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. applied to the Building Inspector for a permit, which was denied. Bar Harbour then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court of New York, seeking to compel the issuance of the permit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a zoning variance allowing the construction of a supermarket runs with the land and is thus available to subsequent owners, absent explicit restrictions limiting the variance to the original applicant.

    Holding

    Yes, because zoning variances typically run with the land unless the granting authority explicitly restricts the variance to the original applicant. Since no such restriction was imposed when Andrews obtained the variance, Bar Harbour, as the subsequent owner, is entitled to its benefits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that zoning variances generally attach to the land rather than the individual owner. The court stated that unless there is clear evidence that the variance was intended to be personal to the original applicant, subsequent owners should be able to rely on the existence of the variance. The court emphasized that no conditions were imposed upon Andrews, the original applicant, that would restrict the variance to him personally. Therefore, Bar Harbour, as the new owner, could rely on the validity of the previously granted variance. The court noted the lack of legal changes or factual alterations that would justify reversing the prior determination. The court cited Dexter v. Town Board, 36 N.Y.S.2d 502 as a case where a variance was held to run with the land. The court emphasized that absent a clear showing that the variance was personal, it must be presumed to benefit the land itself. The court ordered the building inspector to issue the permit, solidifying the principle that variances generally transfer with property ownership and ensuring predictability in land use regulations.