New York Law Review

Tag: 1949

  • Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Lilly, 299 N.Y. 281 (1949): Calculating Appeal Deadlines Based on Notice of Entry

    299 N.Y. 281 (1949)

    The time limit to take an appeal is 30 days after service upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order and written notice of its entry, unless the appellant themselves entered the order or served notice of its entry.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the deadline for filing an appeal under New York law (CPLR 5513[a]). The Court of Appeals held that the 30-day appeal period begins when the appellant is served with both a copy of the order/judgment and written notice of its entry, unless the appellant themselves entered the order or served the notice. In this specific instance, because the appellants did not enter the order and the respondent served the notice of entry, the appellants’ time to appeal ran from the date they received notice of entry.

    Facts

    The specifics of the underlying dispute are not detailed in this decision, as the focus is solely on the procedural issue of the timeliness of the appeal. The key fact is that the appellants sought to appeal an order, but the respondent argued that the appeal was untimely.

    Procedural History

    The case involves a motion to compel the plaintiff to accept service of a notice of appeal. The lower court denied the motion, effectively ruling that the appeal was untimely. This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appellants’ time to appeal ran from the date of service of the order with notice of entry upon them, where they did not enter the order and the respondent served the notice of entry.

    Holding

    Yes, because under CPLR 5513(a), the 30-day appeal period begins when the appellant is served with a copy of the order or judgment and written notice of its entry, unless the appellant themselves entered the order or served the notice of its entry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on a strict interpretation of CPLR 5513(a), which specifies the time limit for taking an appeal. The statute states that the appeal must be taken within 30 days after service upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order “and written notice of its entry.” The single exception is when the appellant themselves entered the judgment or order or served notice of its entry, in which case the appeal is limited to 30 days after “he did either.” The court distinguished this case from People ex rel. Manhattan Stor. & Warehouse Co. v. Lilly, 299 N.Y. 281, where the appellant was treated as having entered the order. Here, the appellants did not enter the order, and the respondent served the notice of entry. Therefore, the court concluded that the appellants’ time to appeal ran from the time they were served with notice of entry. The court explicitly states the relevant rule: “The basic time limit to take an appeal is within 30 days after service upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order “and written notice of its entry” (CPLR 5513 [a]). The single exception to the general rule is where the appellant himself ‘ ‘ has entered the judgment or order or served notice of its entry ”, in which event his appeal is limited to 30 days after “ he did either ”.

  • H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949): State Restrictions on Interstate Commerce of Milk

    H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)

    A state may not discriminate against interstate commerce, even under the guise of promoting local economic interests, by denying a license to a business seeking to operate in interstate commerce if the sole reason for the denial is to protect local businesses from competition.

    Summary

    H.P. Hood & Sons sought a license to operate an additional milk receiving depot in New York to ship milk to Boston. New York denied the license, arguing it would reduce the supply of milk available to local consumers and harm existing local milk dealers. The Supreme Court held that New York’s denial of the license unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. The Court emphasized that the Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting protectionist measures that benefit in-state businesses at the expense of out-of-state competitors, even if the state’s intentions are to stabilize the local economy.

    Facts

    1. H.P. Hood & Sons, a milk distributor based in Boston, Massachusetts, already operated three milk receiving depots in New York.
    2. Hood sought a license from the New York Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets to operate a fourth depot in Greenwich, New York.
    3. The proposed Greenwich depot was intended to increase the volume of milk Hood could ship to Boston.
    4. Existing milk dealers in the area protested the granting of the license, arguing it would divert milk from local markets.
    5. The Commissioner denied the license, finding that the additional competition would “tend to a destructive competition in a market already adequately served” and would be contrary to the public interest.

    Procedural History

    1. The Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets denied Hood’s application.
    2. The decision was affirmed by the New York courts.
    3. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York’s denial of a license to operate a milk receiving depot, based on the grounds that it would increase competition and divert milk from local markets, constitutes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a state cannot discriminate against interstate commerce to protect local economic interests, even if the stated purpose is to ensure an adequate supply of milk for local consumers or to prevent destructive competition among milk dealers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent states from erecting trade barriers that would Balkanize the national economy. New York’s denial of the license was explicitly intended to protect local milk dealers from competition, thereby impeding the flow of milk in interstate commerce. The Court stated, “Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.” The Court acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in regulating the milk industry but emphasized that such regulation could not be used as a tool for economic protectionism. The Court further noted that the “Constitution when ‘read in the light of our whole experience’ forbids a state to promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce.” The Court concluded that New York’s actions directly violated the Commerce Clause’s prohibition against state laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce, even if motivated by local economic concerns.