New York Law Review

Tag: 1916

  • Mills v. Sweeney, 219 N.Y. 213 (1916): Municipal Authority and Public Policy Referendums

    Mills v. Sweeney, 219 N.Y. 213 (1916)

    A municipality cannot enact ordinances for public policy referendums without explicit legislative authority, as such power is not implied from general welfare clauses and is reserved to the state legislature.

    Summary

    This case concerns a taxpayer’s action to prevent the City of Buffalo from spending public funds to publish election notices for a public policy referendum authorized by a city ordinance. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the city’s common council had the authority to enact such an ordinance under the city charter’s general welfare clause. The Court held that the general welfare clause did not grant the power to enact an ordinance involving a referendum, as the state legislature reserves the power to deal with referendums directly and in express terms. The ordinance was deemed invalid, and the injunction against publishing the notices was upheld.

    Facts

    • The City of Buffalo’s common council enacted an ordinance allowing for public policy questions to be submitted to voters via referendum upon petition by 5% of registered voters or by a resolution of the Common Council.
    • The ordinance required the city clerk to publish notices of the referendum questions in daily newspapers.
    • A taxpayer brought an action to restrain the expenditure of public money to publish the election notices, arguing the ordinance was illegal.

    Procedural History

    • The lower court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, enjoining the city from publishing the notices.
    • The Appellate Division certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the common council’s power to enact the ordinance and whether subsequent legislative enactments ratified it.

    Issue(s)

    • Whether the common council of the City of Buffalo had the power to enact an ordinance providing for public policy referendums based on the city charter’s general welfare clause.
    • Whether the ordinance had been ratified by subsequent legislative enactments.

    Holding

    • No, because the general welfare clause does not grant the common council the authority to enact ordinances involving referendums; this power is reserved to the state legislature.
    • No, because the subsequent legislative enactments did not validate the ordinance, as a void ordinance cannot be ratified in such a manner.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the general welfare clause of the city charter, which allowed the Common Council to enact ordinances “for the good government of the city,” did not implicitly grant the power to create a referendum process. The Court emphasized that when the state legislature intends to allow for referendums, it does so explicitly, citing examples in the General City Law, Town Law, Liquor Tax Law, and Village Law. The Court also noted that the city’s charter already contained specific provisions for referendums under certain circumstances, implying that these provisions were exclusive. The Court pointed out the broad and indefinite nature of the ordinance, allowing for potentially useless public action invoked by a small proportion of voters. The court argued that allowing such an ordinance would permit municipalities to infringe upon the spirit and policy of the state, particularly concerning elections. Furthermore, the court cited Dillon’s Municipal Corporations, stating that a municipal corporation cannot adopt bylaws that infringe the spirit or are repugnant to the policy of the state as declared in its general legislation. Regarding ratification, the Court found that the ordinance, being enacted without authority, was void from the start and could not be validated by subsequent general legislative enactments. The Court clarified that it did not question the legislature’s power to provide for advisory referendums but only held that the legislature had not delegated such power to the Buffalo Common Council. The Court emphasized, “All we hold in the present case is that it has not delegated the power to provide for such a referendum in Buffalo to the common council of that city. It certainly has not done so in express terms; and we think it equally clear that it has not done so by implication.”

  • People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98 (1916): Religious Practice Exception to Medical Licensing Laws

    People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98 (1916)

    A person who offers prayer for healing, in accordance with the recognized tenets of a legitimate church, may be exempt from medical licensing requirements, but this exemption does not protect fraudulent or insincere practices done in the name of religion.

    Summary

    Cole, a Christian Science practitioner, was convicted of practicing medicine without a license. He argued that his prayer-based healing practice was protected under a statutory exception for religious practices. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the statutory exception for the “practice of the religious tenets of any church” could apply to Cole’s actions, provided he was genuinely practicing the tenets of the Christian Science Church and not using it as a pretense for an unlicensed medical practice. The court emphasized that the question of good faith in practicing religious tenets should have been presented to the jury.

    Facts

    Willis Vernon Cole, a member of the Christian Science church, maintained an office and offered Christian Science “treatment” (prayer) for the healing of diseases. An investigator from the New York County Medical Society, posing as a patient, visited Cole multiple times seeking treatment for eye and stomach trouble. Cole did not prescribe medicine but offered prayer and advice, such as suggesting the removal of glasses and a porous plaster. Cole stated Christian Science treatment was prayer to God, and that disease was no part of a person’s birthright. It was conceded that Christian Science is a recognized religion founded in 1866 by Mary Baker Eddy. To be a practitioner, the church focuses on the sincerity of the applicant and their faith in the power of prayer.

    Procedural History

    Cole was indicted for practicing medicine without lawful authorization and registration. He was tried in the New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term. The first trial resulted in a hung jury. A second trial resulted in a guilty verdict. Cole appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the judgment. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statutory exception for “the practice of the religious tenets of any church” in New York’s Public Health Law exempted Cole’s prayer-based healing practice from the requirement of medical licensure.

    Holding

    No, the judgement was reversed because the lower court did not let the jury determine if the defendant was in good faith practicing the tenets of such a church within the meaning of the statutory exception, because if Cole’s actions constituted a genuine practice of the religious tenets of the Christian Science Church, he would be exempt from the medical licensing requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted the Public Health Law’s exception for religious practices. The court acknowledged the state’s power to regulate the practice of medicine to protect public health, and emphasized that the definition of practicing medicine was deliberately broad to encompass various methods of treating or curing disease. The court stated that it is a tenet of the Christian Science church that prayer to God will result in complete cure of particular diseases. The Court emphasized that the exception must be applied in good faith, preventing individuals from using religious practice as a mere pretext for operating an unlicensed medical business. The court emphasized that the religious tenets of a church must be practiced in good faith to come within the exception and when such practice is a fraud or pretense it is not protected. The Court found that the trial court erred by not allowing the jury to determine whether Cole was genuinely practicing the tenets of the Christian Science church. Chief Judge Bartlett concurred, arguing for a broader protection of treatment by prayer, questioning the legislature’s power to criminalize such practices. Judge Chase, writing for the majority, stated, “A person should not be allowed to assume to practice the tenets of the Christian Science or any church as a shield to cover a business undertaking.” He further noted that “when wrong is practiced in the name of religion it is not protected by Constitution or statute.”

  • Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439 (1916): Limits on Committee’s Power to Annul Marriage of Incompetent

    Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439 (1916)

    The committee of an incompetent person’s property and person cannot maintain an action to annul the incompetent’s marriage on the ground of lunacy unless explicitly authorized by statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the committee of an incompetent person can bring an action to annul the incompetent’s marriage based on lunacy. The plaintiffs, relatives and committee of Herman N. Walter, an incompetent, sought to annul his marriage to the defendant. The court held that while relatives or a next friend could bring such an action under specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the committee of the incompetent’s person and property lacked the statutory authority to do so. The decision rests on the principle that actions to annul marriages are purely statutory and that the statute’s enumeration of authorized parties excludes others, like the committee. This clarifies the limits on a committee’s power and underscores the need for explicit statutory authorization to act in such matters.

    Facts

    Herman N. Walter, an incompetent person, married the defendant. Plaintiffs, relatives of Walter, were also appointed as the committee of his person and estate. As relatives and the committee, the plaintiffs brought an action to annul the marriage, arguing Walter was a lunatic at the time of the marriage.

    Procedural History

    The lower court held that the plaintiffs, in their capacity as the committee, could not maintain the action to annul the marriage. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals, where the central issue was whether the committee of an incompetent person’s estate could bring such an action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the committee of the person and property of an incompetent may, as such, maintain an action to annul the marriage of the incompetent on the ground that he was a lunatic, absent explicit statutory authorization.

    Holding

    No, because the right to bring an action to annul a marriage is purely statutory, and the relevant statutes (Sections 1747 and 1748 of the Code of Civil Procedure) enumerate specific parties who may bring such an action, excluding the committee of the incompetent’s person and property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that actions to annul a marriage are purely statutory creations. Quoting Stokes v. Stokes, the court emphasized that “an action to annul a marriage is purely statutory.” While equity jurisdiction to annul marriages existed independently of statute, the statutes now expressly define who can bring such actions. The relevant sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1747 and 1748, specify who may bring an action to annul a marriage based on lunacy: relatives of the lunatic, the lunatic after restoration to sanity, or, if no relative brings the action, a next friend of the lunatic. The court applied the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Because the statutes specifically list who can bring the action, the committee, not being among those listed, is excluded. While Section 2340 of the Code of Civil Procedure generally allows a committee to maintain any action the incompetent could have maintained, the court found that this general provision did not override the specific provisions of Sections 1747 and 1748, which explicitly designate who can bring an action to annul a marriage. The court emphasized that if the legislature intended to include the committee, it would have explicitly stated so in the statute. The court concluded that the general words of section 2340 do not enlarge the specific provisions of sections 1747 and 1748 and that these cover cases for which provision had not already been specifically made.