New York Law Review

Tag: 1915

  • In re Slosson’s Estate, 216 N.Y. 79 (1915): Elective Inheritance Rights Under Power of Appointment

    In re Slosson’s Estate, 216 N.Y. 79 (1915)

    When a will grants a power of appointment and the donee partially exercises that power, beneficiaries who would have taken in default of appointment can elect to take under the original will for the portion they would have received in default, even if the donee validly appointed a portion of the estate to others.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether children can elect to take under the original grantor’s will when their mother (the donee of a power of appointment) partially exercises that power, diverting some of the trust estate to other beneficiaries. The court held that the children could elect to take under the original will for the portion they would have received in default of appointment, despite the mother’s partial exercise of the power. This is consistent with the principle that a valid, partial exercise of a power of appointment does not preclude beneficiaries from taking the remaining portion under the original grant.

    Facts

    Peter Naylor’s will created a trust for Josephine Slosson, granting her the power to dispose of the trust estate via her will. The will stipulated that if Josephine did not exercise this power, the trust estate would pass to those who would have received it had Josephine died intestate and owning the property. Josephine’s will disposed of about two-thirds of the trust estate to her children (who would have taken in default) and about one-third to others. The children elected to take the two-thirds share under Naylor’s will, not their mother’s.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court held that Josephine’s will was a valid disposition of the trust estate due to the diversion of one-third to other beneficiaries and thus the children’s shares were subject to a transfer tax. The Appellate Division affirmed this conclusion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the valid disposition by Josephine of a portion of the trust estate to individuals who could only receive it through such disposition negates the right of her children to elect to take the remaining portion of the trust estate under the original will of Naylor?

    Holding

    No, because the valid exercise of a power of appointment as to a part of a trust estate, coupled with either an ineffectual attempt or a failure to exercise it as to the remaining part, does not prevent those entitled from receiving their shares under the original will, as diminished by the exercise of the power.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle established in Matter of Ripley, 192 N.Y. 536, which held that a valid exercise of a power of appointment regarding a portion of a trust estate, coupled with a failure to exercise it for the balance, does not preclude those entitled from taking their shares under the grantor’s will. The court stated that “It is immaterial whether there is a neglect or failure to exercise the power as to the balance of the trust estate, or an attempt to exercise it ineffectual because of the refusal of the donees to accept the disposition. In either of such cases, there is a failure of disposition under the appointment and the original will effects the transfer of the part of the trust estate undisposed of.” The court also referenced Matter of Lansing, 182 N.Y. 238, clarifying that beneficiaries are not forced to take under the power of appointment if they would have taken in default. Here, the children could elect to take under Naylor’s will for the two-thirds they would have received in default, irrespective of Josephine’s partial appointment to others. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the case was remitted to the Surrogate’s Court to modify its order by deducting the value of the children’s shares from the taxable estate.

  • People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75 (1915): Admissibility of Mathematical Probability Evidence

    People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75 (1915)

    Evidence based on mathematical probability, particularly when used to establish the improbability of certain events or conditions, is inadmissible when it lacks a foundation in observed data and relies on speculation rather than demonstrable facts.

    Summary

    Risley, an attorney, was convicted of offering a forged document as evidence. The prosecution presented expert testimony applying mathematical probability to typewriter defects to argue the document was altered on Risley’s machine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that such speculative probability evidence, lacking a basis in actual observed data about typewriters and their use, was inadmissible and prejudicial. The ruling underscores the importance of grounding evidence in factual observations rather than theoretical probabilities, especially when expert testimony may unduly influence the jury.

    Facts

    Risley represented Bennett in a patent dispute against Iron Clad Manufacturing. During a trial in February 1911, Risley offered an affidavit. It was alleged the words “the same” had been fraudulently inserted into the affidavit. The prosecution claimed Risley altered the affidavit to strengthen his client’s case after an appellate court highlighted deficiencies in the evidence. The prosecution presented evidence that Risley had accessed the document at the County Clerk’s office shortly before the trial. Samples of typewriting from Risley’s office typewriter were introduced to demonstrate similarities with the altered document.

    Procedural History

    Risley was convicted in the trial court for offering a forged document in evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Risley appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony based on mathematical probabilities to demonstrate the unlikelihood of the defects in the forged document being produced by a typewriter other than the defendant’s.

    Holding

    No, because the mathematical probability evidence presented by the prosecution was speculative and lacked a sufficient foundation in observed data, rendering it inadmissible and prejudicial to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the admission of mathematical probability evidence to be reversible error. The Court emphasized that the expert witness (a mathematics professor) lacked specific expertise in typewriters and did not account for the human element in operating the machine. The Court distinguished this type of evidence from actuarial tables, which are based on observed data. The Court stated the witness’s testimony “was not based upon actual observed data, but was simply speculative, and an attempt to make inferences deduced from a general theory in no way connected with the matter under consideration supply the usual method of proof.” The Court noted that the jury might give undue weight to such complex and seemingly scientific evidence, potentially obscuring other important facts. Therefore, the Court concluded that allowing such speculative evidence was prejudicial to the defendant and warranted a new trial.