New York Law Review

Tag: 1909

  • Kellogg v. Freeland, 195 N.Y. 451 (1909): Sufficiency of Denial Based on Lack of Information

    Kellogg v. Freeland, 195 N.Y. 451 (1909)

    A party cannot deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding matters presumptively within their knowledge or readily ascertainable, especially concerning their own prior legal proceedings.

    Summary

    Kellogg sued Freeland for breach of warranty on a violin sale where Freeland acted as an agent. Freeland’s answer included an affirmative defense that Kellogg had previously sued and received satisfaction from the principal, Hey, for the same breach. Kellogg replied that he lacked sufficient information to confirm the prior judgment’s satisfaction. The court found Kellogg’s denial insufficient, as the prior legal action was presumptively within his knowledge. A plaintiff cannot feign ignorance of easily obtainable information, especially concerning the resolution of their own lawsuits. Obtaining satisfaction from the principal bars a second action against the agent. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Special Term’s order.

    Facts

    Kellogg purchased a violin from Hey through Freeland, who acted as Hey’s agents. Kellogg alleged Freeland provided a personal warranty on the violin’s quality. Kellogg sued Freeland for breach of this warranty. Freeland’s answer claimed that Kellogg had previously sued Hey in federal court for breach of a similar warranty related to the same violin. Freeland alleged that Kellogg obtained a judgment against Hey, which included damages and costs, and that Hey fully paid and satisfied this judgment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered Kellogg to reply to Freeland’s affirmative defense. Kellogg replied with a denial of sufficient knowledge or information to confirm the judgment against Hey was satisfied. Freeland moved for judgment based on the insufficiency of Kellogg’s reply. The Special Term granted Freeland’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed. Freeland appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Kellogg’s reply, denying sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief about the prior judgment’s satisfaction, was sufficient to contest Freeland’s affirmative defense.
    2. Whether settlement and satisfaction from a principal on a breach of warranty claim bars a subsequent claim against the agent for the same breach.

    Holding

    1. No, because Kellogg could not claim ignorance of readily ascertainable facts regarding a prior lawsuit he initiated.
    2. Yes, because obtaining full satisfaction for a breach of warranty claim from the principal necessarily discharges the agent’s liability for the same breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Kellogg’s denial was insufficient because it concerned matters presumptively within his knowledge. The court stated, “It is quite incredible that plaintiff should have had no knowledge concerning the termination of his lawsuit, and equally inconceivable that after the lapse of two years he should neither have received nor sought information on this subject.” The court emphasized that the facts were largely of record and easily verifiable. The court cited numerous cases supporting the practice of treating such denials as frivolous, thereby entitling the defendant to relief. Even if the denial had some force, Kellogg’s admission that the claim against Hey was settled and compromised undermined his case. The court held that settling with the principal for full damages on a warranty claim precludes a second action against the agent for the same claim, even with a purported reservation of rights: “If the claim has been settled, that is satisfied, there is nothing to be reserved as a basis for prosecution of another liable for the same claim.”

  • People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909): Materiality as Essential Element of Attempted Subornation of Perjury

    People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909)

    Attempted subornation of perjury requires the false testimony solicited to be material to the issue in the underlying case; otherwise, it cannot constitute the crime of attempted subornation of perjury.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury for soliciting false testimony in a divorce case. The solicited testimony concerned an act of adultery different from the one alleged in the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the solicited testimony was immaterial to the issue presented in the divorce case. Since materiality is an essential element of perjury, an attempt to suborn immaterial testimony does not constitute attempted subornation of perjury. The Court clarified that an attempt to induce false testimony may be punishable under a separate statute concerning falsifying evidence, but not under the perjury statutes.

    Facts

    Frank J. Gould was the defendant in a divorce action brought by Helen K. Gould. The complaint alleged a single act of adultery committed by Frank J. Gould with an unknown woman in North Sydney, Cape Breton, Canada, on July 25, 1907.
    The defendant, Teal, attempted to procure false testimony from Mabel MacCauslan. Teal solicited MacCauslan to testify that in March 1908, she saw Frank J. Gould coming out of a bedroom in Bessie Van Doren’s apartment in New York City, suggesting adultery between Gould and Van Doren.
    The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery, at a different time and place, and with a different person than the act alleged in the divorce complaint.

    Procedural History

    The defendant, Teal, was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury in the trial court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reviewed the case based on exceptions to evidentiary rulings made during the trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person can be convicted of attempted subornation of perjury based on evidence that the solicited false testimony was not material to the issue in the underlying case.

    Holding

    No, because attempted subornation of perjury requires that the solicited testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury. Since perjury requires that the false testimony be material, soliciting immaterial testimony cannot constitute attempted subornation of perjury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that materiality is an essential element of perjury. The statute defines perjury as “willfully and knowingly testifies falsely, in any material matter.” Subornation of perjury requires inducing another to commit perjury; therefore, if the person suborned does not commit perjury, the suborner is not guilty of subornation.
    Attempted subornation of perjury, then, requires an act done with the intent to commit subornation of perjury, but failing to do so. The crime of subornation of perjury can only occur if the false testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury.
    In this case, the testimony Teal attempted to procure from MacCauslan was “irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial” to the issue in Gould v. Gould. The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery than the one alleged in the complaint.
    “If false testimony is not material it cannot support an indictment for perjury. The testimony upon which such a charge is predicated must be false ‘in any material matter.’”
    The Court rejected the argument that the testimony might become material if the complaint were amended, stating that the charge of perjury cannot depend on issues or events arising after the testimony is given. The Court also noted that the legislature had provided for cases where the false testimony is immaterial via a statute concerning “Falsifying Evidence.”

  • Berrien, Matter of, 194 N.Y. 327 (1909): Authority of Court to Appoint Trustee for Personal Property Trust

    Matter of Berrien, 194 N.Y. 327 (1909)

    When a trustee of a personal property trust dies, the trust vests in the Supreme Court, which has the authority to appoint a successor trustee and need only provide notice of the application to the beneficiaries as it deems appropriate.

    Summary

    This case concerns the appointment of a trustee for a personal property trust after the original trustees had died. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to appoint a new trustee upon the petition of the life tenants, without providing notice to the remaindermen. The Court held that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction, as the Personal Property Law only requires the court to provide such notice to the beneficiaries as it deems appropriate, unlike the Real Property Law which mandates notice to beneficiaries. The court reversed the lower court’s decision that had vacated the trustee’s appointment.

    Facts

    Joseph Corlies, Sr., died in 1860, leaving a will that created a trust for his two daughters, Cornelia and Emily, with the remainder to their children. The will named his widow and three sons as executors and trustees, granting them the power to sell real estate and convert a portion of the estate into cash for investment. The executors sold a property in 1868, but one executor was absent, leading to questions about the validity of the title. After the deaths of all original executors and trustees, Cornelia’s husband, Earnshaw, was appointed trustee but later died. Years later, in 1907, Edward Berrien was appointed trustee upon the petition of Cornelia and Emily. Emily later sought to remove Berrien, alleging fraud, but the court found no fraud. A dispute arose between Stern (the property owner) and Corn (a potential buyer) regarding the title, leading to further litigation and challenging Berrien’s appointment.

    Procedural History

    Emily Beese petitioned the court for the removal of Berrien as trustee, alleging fraudulent inducement in his appointment. The Special Term found no fraud but vacated the order appointing Berrien, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to make the appointment. This order was appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to appoint a trustee for a personal property trust under Section 8 of the Personal Property Law without providing notice to the remaindermen.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 8 of the Personal Property Law vests the trust in the Supreme Court upon the death of a surviving trustee and authorizes the court to appoint a successor, requiring only such notice to the beneficiaries as the court deems appropriate, unlike the Real Property Law which mandates notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the testator’s will contained an imperative power to sell, effectively converting the real estate into personalty as of the date of his death, citing Doane v. Mercantile Trust Co., 160 N.Y. 494. Therefore, the trust should be treated as one involving personal property. Section 8 of the Personal Property Law dictates that upon the death of a surviving trustee, the trust vests in the Supreme Court, which can then appoint a successor. Unlike the Real Property Law, the Personal Property Law does not mandate that the remaindermen (beneficiaries) be brought into court with notice before a trustee is appointed; it only requires “such notice as the court may direct.” The Court emphasized that the statute gives the court discretion to determine what notice is appropriate under the circumstances. The court stated, “It appears to me that the design of the statute was to give the court that power.” While the court acknowledged that providing notice to the remaindermen is generally good practice, it declined to make it a jurisdictional requirement. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to appoint Berrien as trustee.

  • Dieterich v. Fargo, 194 N.Y. 359 (1909): Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent Regarding Transportation of Deer

    Dieterich v. Fargo, 194 N.Y. 359 (1909)

    When interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, considering the language used, the purpose of the law, and the mischief it seeks to remedy; however, courts cannot add exceptions to a statute where the legislature has not explicitly provided them.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of a New York statute prohibiting the transportation of deer. The plaintiff sought to ship deer raised on his private park, arguing the law only applied to wild deer. The Court of Appeals held that the statute’s prohibition against transporting deer did not apply to deer raised in private parks for commercial purposes, as the legislature’s intent was to protect wild deer populations from over-hunting. The court reasoned that the statute aimed to eliminate the market for illegally killed wild deer, and transporting lawfully owned, tame deer did not undermine this purpose.

    Facts

    The plaintiff owned a private park where he raised deer for commercial purposes, specifically for sale as venison.
    He delivered several deer carcasses to the defendant, a common carrier, for transportation.
    The defendant refused to transport the deer, citing Section 81 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law, which prohibited common carriers from transporting deer or venison.
    The plaintiff argued that the statute only applied to wild deer, not those raised in captivity for commercial purposes.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that the statute prohibited the transportation of all deer, regardless of whether they were wild or tame.
    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the statute did not apply to deer raised in private parks for commercial purposes. Dieterich v. Fargo, 119 A.D. 315 (1907).
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 81 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law, which prohibits the transportation of deer, applies to deer raised in private parks for commercial purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, in the negative. The prohibition against transporting deer does not apply to deer raised in private parks for commercial purposes because the legislature’s intent was to protect wild deer, and this does not include lawfully owned deer intended for commercial purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of ascertaining the legislature’s intent when interpreting a statute. It noted that the primary objective of the Forest, Fish and Game Law was to protect wild game from depletion due to over-hunting.
    The court reasoned that the prohibition on transporting deer was intended to eliminate the market for illegally killed wild deer. Transporting deer raised in private parks, which were lawfully owned and raised, did not undermine this purpose. The court stated, “In order to arrive at the intention of the lawmakers it is proper to consider the mischief sought to be remedied by the statute.”
    The court found it significant that the statute made an exception for a single deer carcass when accompanied by the owner, suggesting that the legislature was primarily concerned with commercial trafficking in illegally obtained wild deer.
    The court distinguished between wild and privately-owned deer, stating that the rationale for restricting the transportation of wild deer did not apply to deer raised and possessed as property. The court reasoned that “the object of the statute is to protect wild deer, not to interfere with private property.” Therefore, the general language of the statute should be interpreted in light of this objective.
    The dissent argued that the statute should be interpreted literally to include all deer, regardless of whether they are wild or tame. The dissent feared that allowing the transportation of tame deer would create a loophole that would make it easier for poachers to transport and sell wild deer illegally. The dissent stated, “The statute should be construed in the light of the evil it sought to remedy, and when it says that deer shall not be transported, making no exception of tame deer, I think it means all deer.”

  • Mason v. Williams, 131 A.D. 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909): Testamentary Capacity and Suicide

    131 A.D. 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)

    Suicide alone does not establish lack of testamentary capacity, and a will made by a person contemplating suicide is not automatically invalid unless made under undue influence or lacking testamentary capacity.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to the validity of a will of a testator who died by suicide shortly after executing a codicil. The defendants contested the will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and that the will was made with suicidal intent, rendering it against public policy. The court affirmed the judgment upholding the will’s validity, holding that suicide alone does not prove lack of testamentary capacity and that there was no evidence to support the claims of undue influence or that the will was made with suicidal intent so as to be against public policy. The court emphasized the absence of any manifest mental derangement beyond the act of suicide itself. The Appellate Division found no basis to overturn the lower court’s decision.

    Facts

    Henry T. Bason, a county judge, executed a will in November 1902 and a codicil in March 1903. He died by suicide shortly after executing the codicil. The will primarily bequeathed his property to his mother; the codicil made specific gifts to various individuals and entities. Bason had been a patient at a sanitarium for neurasthenia (nervous exhaustion) before executing the will. Defendants, distant relatives, challenged the will’s validity, alleging Bason lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced.

    Procedural History

    The will and codicil were admitted to probate in the Surrogate’s Court. The plaintiff, as executor, initiated an action under section 2653a of the Code of Civil Procedure to establish the validity of the probate. The trial court directed a verdict sustaining the will. The contesting defendants appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the mere act of suicide shortly after executing a will and codicil establishes a lack of testamentary capacity.
    2. Whether a will made with suicidal intent is void as against public policy.
    3. Whether there was sufficient evidence of undue influence to invalidate the will.

    Holding

    1. No, because insanity is not inferable from the mere act of suicide, and there was no other evidence of mental unsoundness.
    2. No, because the record shows no evidence to suggest that either instrument was drafted or executed with suicidal intent. Further, even if the testator contemplated suicide, the will disposes of his property as he might do during his lifetime, conferring no benefits that he might not bestow without any suicidal intent.
    3. No, because the claim of undue influence was unsupported by proof, and the disposition of property was a natural one.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the mere fact of suicide does not justify an inference of lack of testamentary capacity. It cited Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y. 561 and Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398, to support the principle that insanity is not inferable from suicide alone. The court distinguished Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 513, noting that in Riggs, the beneficiary committed a crime (murder) to obtain property, whereas in the present case, the testator’s suicidal intent did not directly affect the disposition of property in a way that violated public policy. The court found no evidence of undue influence, noting that the testator left his property to friends, associates, and charities in a manner consistent with his interests during his lifetime. The court emphasized that the defendants failed to demonstrate any manifestation of mental derangement beyond the act of suicide and some prior treatment for neurasthenia. The court stated, “Mental derangement cannot be predicated solely upon the circumstance that he killed himself. Insanity is not inferable from the mere act of suicide.”

  • Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288 (1909): Rule Against Perpetuities and Contingent Life Estates

    Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288 (1909)

    A trust is invalid if, under any possible contingency, it could suspend the absolute power of alienation for longer than two lives in being at the creation of the trust.

    Summary

    This case addresses the application of the rule against perpetuities to testamentary trusts. The testator created a trust that, depending on various contingencies, could potentially extend beyond two lives in being at the time of his death. The court found that the possibility of such an extension rendered the entire trust invalid, emphasizing that the validity of a trust is determined not by what actually happens, but by what could possibly happen under its terms. This ruling underscores the strict interpretation and application of the rule against perpetuities to prevent prolonged restrictions on property alienation.

    Facts

    The testator’s will established a trust for the benefit of his wife, son, and daughter. After the wife’s death, the will divided the estate into two independent trusts for the son and daughter. The son’s trust was to last for his life or until he reached 30 years of age. The will specified different contingencies: if the son died before the wife, his income share would be split between the wife and daughter; if the son survived the wife, his trust would be bounded by his life or reaching age 30.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially upheld the validity of the trust but deemed the accumulation of income provision void. The General Term reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the trust’s validity under the rule against perpetuities.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trust is valid if, under any possible contingency, it could suspend the absolute power of alienation for a period longer than two lives in being at the time of the trust’s creation.

    Holding

    No, because New York’s rule against perpetuities prohibits any trust that, under any circumstance outlined in the will, could suspend the power of alienation beyond two lives in being at the testator’s death.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the validity of a trust under the rule against perpetuities is determined by possible, not actual, events. The court stated, “Where a trust is created which by no possibility and in no contingency can endure longer than during the existence of two lives in being, of what consequence can it be that if one contingency happen, the estate is to be measured by two named lives, and if the other contingency happen, the estate is still to be measured by two named lives, but one of them is different from the one named in the other contingency?” The court determined that the will’s provisions, particularly those related to the son’s potential death before the wife, created a scenario where the trust term was limited by the lives of the wife and daughter. However, if the wife died first, the trust was limited by the lives of the wife and son (or until the son reached 30). Since the two lives measuring the duration of the trust differed based on the contingency, the court had to determine if this arrangement violated the rule. The Court of Appeals reversed the General Term and affirmed the Special Term, holding the trust valid.