Tag: 1900

  • Howarth v. Angle, 162 N.Y. 179 (1900): Enforcing Statutory Stockholder Liability Outside of the Incorporating State

    162 N.Y. 179 (1900)

    A receiver of an insolvent corporation can enforce a stockholder’s statutory liability in a foreign jurisdiction when the liability is considered contractual in nature, arising from an implied promise to adhere to the corporation’s governing laws.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a receiver of an insolvent Washington state bank can sue a New York stockholder in New York to enforce a statutory liability for the bank’s debts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the receiver could maintain the action. The court reasoned that the stockholder’s liability, though statutory in origin, was contractual in nature, arising from an implied promise to adhere to the bank’s governing laws. As such, it could be enforced in New York as a contractual obligation, not solely as a foreign statutory obligation.

    Facts

    The Tacoma Bank, a Washington state corporation, became insolvent, and a receiver (Howarth) was appointed. Angle, a New York resident, owned stock in the Tacoma Bank. Washington law imposed a statutory liability on stockholders for the debts of the corporation. The receiver sued Angle in New York to recover Angle’s proportionate share of the bank’s deficiency, as determined by Washington courts.

    Procedural History

    The receiver sued Angle in New York. The trial court ruled in favor of Angle, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the action could be maintained in New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the receiver of an insolvent Washington bank can enforce a stockholder’s statutory liability in New York, when the liability is considered contractual under Washington law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the stockholder’s liability, though statutory in origin, is contractual in nature, arising from an implied promise to adhere to the bank’s governing laws, and can be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction like a contract.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while statutory liabilities are generally enforced in the state that created them, the liability in this case was contractual. By purchasing stock in the Tacoma Bank, Angle impliedly agreed to be bound by Washington law, which included the statutory liability for the bank’s debts. The court emphasized that “the defendant took stock in the Tacoma Bank subject to the burden of the law, which he impliedly agreed to bear, as he could not otherwise become a stockholder.” This implied agreement created a contractual obligation that the receiver could enforce in New York, much like enforcing a promissory note. The court distinguished this case from situations involving purely statutory liabilities, noting that this was “not because the laws of Washington are in force here, but because the defendant voluntarily assented to the conditions upon which the bank was organized.” The court directly linked the stockholder’s acceptance of the stock with an implied agreement to perform the statutory conditions, making the out-of-state enforcement valid. The court highlighted the importance of enforcing promises, whether express or implied, to ensure creditors are protected. The court noted, “There is no substantial difference between the liability for an unpaid balance on a stock subscription, which is an express contract to take stock and pay for it…and the liability for the unpaid deficiency of assets assumed by the act of becoming a member of the corporation through the purchase of stock, from which a contract is implied to perform the statutory conditions upon which stock may be owned.”

  • People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70 (1900): Mandamus and the Comptroller’s Audit Authority

    People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70 (1900)

    Mandamus does not lie to compel a state comptroller to audit a claim in a specific manner, as the comptroller’s auditing function involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over payments for canal work. The relators, Grannis and O’Connor, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the state comptroller to pay drafts in full for work performed. The comptroller argued the contract was fraudulent due to an inaccurate estimate of rock excavation by the state engineer, leading to an unbalanced bid. The court held that the comptroller possesses the authority to audit claims against the state and cannot be compelled by mandamus to make a specific determination, as auditing involves discretionary judgment.

    Facts

    Grannis and O’Connor entered into a contract to perform work on the Erie Canal. The State Engineer’s estimate for rock excavation was significantly lower (100 yards) than the actual amount (over 30,000 yards). The contractors bid $3 per yard for rock excavation. The Comptroller refused to fully pay the contractors’ drafts, arguing that the rock excavation was only worth $1 per yard. The Comptroller further contended that the contractors knew the actual amount of rock excavation before signing the contract. A referee found no collusion or fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    The relators sought a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel the Comptroller to pay the drafts. The Comptroller opposed, alleging fraud. The case was referred to a referee who found no fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed the referee’s finding. The Comptroller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Comptroller can be compelled by mandamus to audit a claim in a specific manner, given the Comptroller’s authority to audit claims against the state.

    Holding

    No, because the comptroller’s auditing function involves a judicial function requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, and mandamus cannot substitute the court’s judgment for that of the comptroller.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history of auditing authority in New York, noting that the Constitution requires an audit before state funds are disbursed. While the legislature appropriates funds, it is the responsibility of an auditing officer to examine and approve claims. The Court traced the evolution of auditing power, eventually settling with the Comptroller. The Court emphasized that the Comptroller’s role involves more than just a ministerial calculation; it requires the Comptroller to “hear, to examine, to pass upon, to settle and adjust.” The court cited People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners, 149 N.Y. 26, stating, “That would substitute the judgment or discretion of the court issuing the writ for that of the person or persons against whom the writ was issued.” The court found no legislative intent to remove the Comptroller’s audit authority and vest it solely in the State Engineer. Therefore, because the Comptroller’s audit function requires the exercise of discretion, mandamus cannot compel a particular outcome.

  • Walton v. Stafford, 162 N.Y. 558 (1900): Rent Due on Holiday Not Postponed

    Walton v. Stafford, 162 N.Y. 558 (1900)

    Rent due on a legal holiday (that is not a Sunday) is payable on that day, and is not automatically postponed to the next business day unless a statute specifically provides otherwise.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether rent due on a legal holiday is payable on that day or postponed to the next business day. The plaintiff, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, occupied a hotel leased by his assignor from the defendants. The lease stipulated rent was due on the first of each month. The defendants sought to counterclaim for January rent against the plaintiff’s claim for personal property sold to them. The court held that because January 1st was a legal holiday, the rent was still due that day. As the plaintiff only took possession on January 2nd, he was not liable for that month’s rent and the counterclaim failed.

    Facts

    Francis T. Walton leased the Grand Hotel from the Staffords, with rent payable monthly in advance on the first of each month.

    Walton made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors to the plaintiff on January 2, 1894.

    The plaintiff took possession of the hotel on January 2, 1894, and continued to occupy it until January 28, 1894.

    During January, the plaintiff collected rent from sub-tenants but did not pay rent to the Staffords.

    On January 27, 1894, the plaintiff sold personal property located on the premises to the defendants for $811.16.

    The Staffords initiated dispossess proceedings, and the plaintiff surrendered possession on January 28, 1894.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the Staffords to recover the $811.16 owed for the personal property sale.

    The Staffords counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiff was liable for January rent and, after deducting the $811.16, owed them $3,348.84.

    The trial court heard the case based on stipulated facts.

    The Appellate Division’s judgment, presumably in favor of the plaintiff, was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether rent due on January 1st, a legal holiday, was legally due and payable on that day, such that the assignor, and not the assignee, was responsible for its payment?

    Holding

    Yes, because the Court found no controlling authority or statute preventing rent falling due on a legal holiday (that is not a Sunday) from being treated as due and payable on that day.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the stipulation of facts explicitly stated that the January rent was due on January 1st. Even without that stipulation, the court found no legal basis to postpone the rent payment.

    The court reviewed the Statutory Construction Law (Laws 1892, ch. 677, § 27, as amended) and noted that while it addresses computation of time and the transaction of business in public offices regarding holidays, it does not affect the payment of rent.

    The court distinguished the rule for negotiable instruments, where payment is deferred to the next business day if the due date falls on a Sunday or holiday. This rule exists because banks are closed on holidays.

    The court stated, “We thus have holidays distinctly dealt with by the legislature as to computation of time in certain cases, as to the transaction of business in public offices and as to the falling due of commercial paper, but the matter of rent and its payment is unaffected by this legislation.”

    Because the rent was due on January 1st, and the assignee only took possession on January 2nd, no rent became due during the assignee’s occupancy. The rent was a debt owed by the assignor at the time of the assignment.

    The court rejected the argument that the assignee was liable for use and occupation, explaining that the landlord could have removed the assignor and assignee immediately for failure to pay the January rent. Because the assignee was removed before February 1st, no rent ever became due from him.

    The court cited Childs v. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. 52, 60, noting the assignee merely succeeded to the rights of his assignor.