New York Law Review

Tag: 1894

  • Lyon v. Manhattan Railway Co., 142 N.Y. 298 (1894): Independent Physical Examinations Apart from General Discovery

    Lyon v. Manhattan Railway Co., 142 N.Y. 298 (1894)

    A court order for a physical examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury case must be part of, or connected to, an examination of the party before trial, not an independent procedure.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of a statute permitting physical examinations of plaintiffs in personal injury cases. The court held that the statute, Section 873 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Chapter 721 of the Laws of 1893, does not authorize a standalone physical examination independent of a broader pre-trial examination. The court reasoned that reading the amendment as part of the general scheme for examination of parties before trial allows for a fair and open inquiry into the truth, preventing surprise tactics at trial. A contrary reading would render the examination useless and potentially prejudicial.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a young girl, alleged she sustained serious spinal and nervous system injuries as a passenger on the defendant’s train due to a collision.

    The defendant sought a court order compelling the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by two medical experts at her residence, in the presence of women of her choosing, but without the referee present unless she elected otherwise.

    Procedural History

    The defendant obtained an order for a physical examination from a judge of the trial court.

    The General Term reversed the order, holding that a physical examination could only be ordered in conjunction with a broader examination before trial.

    The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 873 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, authorizes a court to order a physical examination of the plaintiff in a personal injury action independent of an examination of the plaintiff before trial.

    Holding

    No, because the amendment to Section 873 must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Code provisions related to examinations before trial in order to ensure a fair and useful process; a standalone physical exam would lack procedural safeguards and fail to accomplish the legislature’s intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the amendment to Section 873 should be construed in conjunction with the existing framework for pre-trial examinations. The court stated: “It is a settled rule of statutory construction that an original statute with all its amendments must be read together and viewed as one act passed at the same time.”

    The court reasoned that a standalone physical examination would be impractical and ineffective. The referee appointed to oversee the examination would lack the power to administer oaths or compel answers. Experts wouldn’t be required to make reports to the court and the defendant would only gain the ability to have two physicians inspect the Plaintiff for external symptoms, with no guarantee as to whether the expert testimony would be for or against the defendant.

    The court observed that the term ‘physical examination’ implies more than just observation; it includes inquiry through questions and answers about the cause, nature, and extent of the injury. Without these disclosures the examination would be of limited value.

    The court stated, “It must be held that the legislature intended to enact some useful and practical rule in the administration of justice, that would promote the discovery of truth and not to do a vain thing.”

    Reading the amendment as part of the general scheme for examination of parties before trial allows the referee to take testimony, administer oaths, and authenticate proceedings, while the plaintiff is bound to answer proper questions about the nature and extent of the injuries. The Court stated, “It becomes a fair struggle for truth, and both parties may participate.”

    The court also cautioned that using the power conferred by the amendment unfairly could create sympathy, stimulate prejudices, and possibly enhance damages against corporations. Quoting The Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, the court acknowledged the sensitivity surrounding compulsory physical examinations: “The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass.”

  • Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N.Y. 538 (1894): Liability for False Imprisonment Based on a Defective Warrant

    Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N.Y. 538 (1894)

    A person who actively instigates an arrest based on a warrant issued pursuant to a fatally defective information can be held liable for false imprisonment because the warrant is void ab initio.

    Summary

    Hewitt sued Newburger for false imprisonment, arguing he was arrested based on a warrant issued without legal authority. Newburger swore out an information alleging Hewitt threatened to damage property. The warrant led to Hewitt’s arrest, but the proceedings were later dismissed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of Hewitt’s claim, holding that because the information and warrant failed to allege the requisite unlawful and criminal intent, the warrant was void. As Newburger actively procured the arrest, he was liable for false imprisonment.

    Facts

    Newburger swore out an information against Hewitt, alleging that Hewitt threatened to tear down a wall being erected by City Mills. A warrant was issued based on this information, and Hewitt was arrested. Hewitt was detained for a few hours and released, and the proceedings were dismissed shortly after.

    Procedural History

    The Montgomery County Circuit dismissed Hewitt’s complaint for false imprisonment. The General Term of the Supreme Court, Third Department, affirmed the dismissal. Hewitt appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Newburger was liable for false imprisonment when he instigated Hewitt’s arrest based on a warrant issued pursuant to an information that failed to allege the necessary elements of a crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because the information and warrant were fatally defective as they failed to allege unlawful and criminal intent, rendering the warrant void and Newburger liable for false imprisonment as he actively procured the arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the information and warrant were deficient because they did not allege that Hewitt acted “willfully or maliciously” (as required by Penal Code § 639) or “unlawfully and willfully” (as required by Penal Code § 654) when he allegedly threatened to damage the wall. The court stated that “the fatal vice of the information and warrant is that they utterly fail to aver the unlawful and criminal intent which constitutes crime.” Citing People v. Stevens, 109 N.Y. 159, 163, the court emphasized that a criminal intent is crucial for transforming a trespass into an indictable offense. Because the information lacked these essential elements, the recorder’s act was without jurisdiction, rendering the warrant void. The court also emphasized Newburger’s active role in procuring the arrest, stating he was “active and officious” in ensuring Hewitt’s arrest, thus establishing his liability. The court highlighted the distinction between civil injury and criminal action, emphasizing that the presence of criminal intent dictates the classification. “But the word ‘willfully’ in the statute means something more than a voluntary act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful. It includes the idea of an act intentionally done with a wrongful purpose, or with a design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wantonness or lawlessness.” (Wass v. Stephens, 128 N.Y. 123, 128). As there was no evidence of such intent, the process was void, and the defendant was liable.