New York Law Review

Tag: 1892

  • Smith v. Griffith, 133 N.Y. 193 (1892): Admissibility of Private Sale Price as Evidence of Value

    Smith v. Griffith, 133 N.Y. 193 (1892)

    The price obtained in a bona fide private sale of personal property is admissible as evidence of the property’s value, even if it’s not conclusive, especially when the seller had an incentive to obtain the highest possible price.

    Summary

    Smith sued Sheriff Griffith for selling goods under execution that Smith claimed to own via a bill of sale. The sheriff argued the goods were the property of A.C. Smith & Co. The central issue concerned the value of the goods, which were described as shopworn books and stationery. The defendant, the sheriff, attempted to introduce evidence of the price the judgment creditors obtained when they resold the goods after purchasing them at the execution sale. The trial court excluded this evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that evidence of the price obtained at a bona fide private sale is admissible as some evidence of value, especially when the seller had an incentive to maximize the sale price.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Smith claimed ownership of goods (books, stationery, etc.) in a store via a bill of sale from A.C. Smith & Co.
    Judgment creditors of A.C. Smith & Co. had the defendant, Sheriff Griffith, levy on and sell the goods under execution.
    The goods were mostly old, shopworn stock.
    The judgment creditors bought most of the goods at the execution sale and resold them in Syracuse and Utica.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff won a verdict at the Circuit Court.
    The General Term affirmed the judgment.
    The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the price obtained at a subsequent private sale of personal property by a judgment creditor who purchased the property at an execution sale is admissible as evidence of the property’s value in an action against the sheriff for conversion.

    Holding

    Yes, because the price obtained in a bona fide private sale, where the seller had an incentive to obtain the highest price, is relevant and admissible as some evidence of the property’s value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the market price of property is the general price for which it may be bought and sold. Evidence of an actual, bona fide sale tends to prove or establish a market price and is therefore some evidence of value, even if not conclusive. The court stated, “It seems plain, however, that proof of the price obtained at an actual sale made bona fide, and not a sale which was in any way forced, would tend in the direction of proving or establishing a market price, and hence would be some evidence of the value of the property sold.” The court emphasized that the judgment creditors (the sellers) had every motivation to obtain the best possible price for the goods. The court distinguished this situation from forced sales or sales where the seller lacked a genuine incentive to maximize price. The court noted the fact that the goods were sold a short distance and within a reasonable timeframe of the conversion, thus strengthening the relevance of the evidence. The court emphasized that the admissibility of the price paid in a private sale has been considered competent in New York for many years and does not require the sale to be at auction to be admissible. The court cited Hoffman v. Conner, 76 N.Y. 121, noting that what a party paid for property is some evidence of its value. Evidence of the price obtained at a private sale is evidence of an actual transaction between parties interested in the price of the article, the one to get the highest and the other to pay the lowest price for the property, and the fact that these diverse interests agreed upon a price was, in the nature of the question, some evidence of the value of the property sold.

  • Hine v. Manhattan Railway Co., 132 N.Y. 477 (1892): Admissibility of Unaccepted Offers to Prove Property Value

    Hine v. Manhattan Railway Co., 132 N.Y. 477 (1892)

    Evidence of unaccepted offers for real property is generally inadmissible to prove its market value because such offers are considered unreliable hearsay.

    Summary

    In this case regarding property damage from an elevated railway, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a property owner could testify about unaccepted offers they received for the property to prove its value before the railway’s construction. The Court held that such evidence is inadmissible. The rationale centered on the unreliability of unaccepted offers, as they lack the scrutiny of cross-examination and depend on numerous unverifiable circumstances. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment, finding the admission of this evidence constituted reversible error because the question of value was sharply contested.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Hine, sought relief for damages to their property allegedly caused by the defendant Manhattan Railway Co.’s construction. To demonstrate the property’s diminished value, Hine testified about specific dollar-amount offers he had received for the property before the railway was built. These offers were unaccepted. The plaintiff intended to use the prior unaccepted offers as evidence of the property’s market value before the railway’s negative impact.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the unaccepted offers. The General Term affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Manhattan Railway Co. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the admission of the offer evidence was an error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner can introduce evidence of unaccepted offers for the purchase of their property as proof of the property’s market value.

    Holding

    No, because unaccepted offers are unreliable hearsay, lacking the safeguards of cross-examination and dependent on numerous unverifiable circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that admitting evidence of unaccepted offers is problematic for several reasons. First, it introduces an absent person’s opinion on value without allowing for cross-examination. The offeror’s opinion may not be competent or based on an expectation of actually purchasing the property at its true market value. The court quoted *Keller v. Paine*, stating: “If evidence of offers is to be received it will be important to know whether the offer was made in good faith, by a man of good judgment, acquainted with the value of the article and of sufficient ability to pay; also whether the offer was cash, for credit, in exchange, and whether made with reference to the market value of the article, or to supply a particular need or to gratify a fancy. Private offers can be multiplied to any extent for the purpose of a cause, and the bad faith in which they were made would be difficult to prove.” The Court emphasized that the question of value was sharply contested, and the court could not determine what weight the inadmissible testimony was given. Therefore, the admission of this evidence was deemed reversible error. The Court distinguished offers made in an open market for standardized goods from offers for unique real estate, noting the latter’s susceptibility to manipulation and lack of transparency.

  • Porter v. Dunn, 131 N.Y. 314 (1892): Husband’s Right to Wife’s Earnings Absent Separate Occupation

    Porter v. Dunn, 131 N.Y. 314 (1892)

    A husband retains the common-law right to his wife’s earnings unless she is engaged in a separate occupation or explicitly claims entitlement to payment for her services.

    Summary

    This case concerns a husband’s claim against an estate for nursing services provided by his wife to the deceased. The court addressed whether the claim belonged to the husband or the wife, given the statutes regarding married women’s rights. The court held that the husband could maintain the claim because the wife was acting under his direction and not in a separate occupation. Furthermore, the court found no binding agreement limiting the compensation for the nursing services and reversed the General Term’s deduction from the referee’s award based on a supposed agreement for a specific sum in the will.

    Facts

    Patrick Kennedy rented a room in the plaintiff’s house and boarded in his restaurant. The plaintiff’s wife, Mrs. Porter, attended to household duties, helped her husband in his business, and also nursed Kennedy, who suffered from consumption. Kennedy had promised to compensate her in his will, initially mentioning $5,000. Mrs. Porter provided constant care for almost eleven years, from December 1877 until Kennedy’s death in November 1888. Kennedy’s will only provided a $500 legacy, which the executor paid. The husband then brought a claim against the estate for the value of the nursing services.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff filed a claim with the executors of Kennedy’s will, which was referred under the statute. The referee reported in favor of the claimant. The Special Term confirmed the referee’s report, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The General Term modified the judgment by reducing the amount allowed and then affirmed the modified judgment. Both parties appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the claim for nursing services belonged to the husband or the wife, considering married women’s rights statutes.
    2. Whether the General Term erred in modifying the referee’s award based on the belief that there was a binding agreement limiting compensation to a specific sum mentioned by the testator.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the claim belonged to the husband because the wife was acting under his direction and not in a separate occupation.
    2. Yes, the General Term erred because there was no evidence of a binding agreement limiting compensation, justifying the reversal of their modification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court reasoned that while married women have the right to engage in separate occupations and retain their earnings, the wife in this case did not do so. She acted under her husband’s direction in providing nursing services. The court stated, “The legislation in this state upon the subject of the rights of married women has only resulted in abrogating their common-law status to the extent set forth in the various statutes. They have not by express provision, nor have they by implication, deprived the husband of his common-law right to avail himself of a profit or benefit from her services.” Therefore, the husband had the right to bring the claim.

    Regarding the second issue, the court found insufficient evidence to support the General Term’s conclusion that there was an agreement limiting compensation to $5,000. Kennedy’s initial statement about a $5,000 bequest did not constitute a binding agreement. The court noted that the testator’s subsequent statements indicated that he would “remember her in his will” which does not equal an agreement to give her a specific amount. The court explained, “The difficulty in the way of sustaining the modification by the General Term upon the facts, is in the very absence of facts to support the theory, expressed in their opinion, of an agreement or obligation limiting a recovery; and there is actually no other basis for their modification if we disregard that theory.” The court held that the referee’s finding as to the worth of the services should not have been disturbed arbitrarily and affirmed the referee’s report.

  • Rumsey v. New York and New England Railroad Co., 133 N.Y. 423 (1892): Upland Owners’ Rights to Water Access

    Rumsey v. New York and New England Railroad Co., 133 N.Y. 423 (1892)

    An upland owner whose land borders a navigable waterway retains the right to access the water, and a grant of land under water to the upland owner is valid, even if a railroad lies between the upland and the channel, provided it doesn’t interfere with the railroad’s rights.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, owning uplands bordering the Hudson River, received a grant from the state for land under water. The defendant railroad, operating on an embankment between the plaintiffs’ land and the river channel, argued that the grant to the plaintiffs was invalid because the railroad, not the plaintiffs, was the “adjacent landowner.” The court held that the plaintiffs, as upland owners, retained the right to access the water, and the grant to them was valid as long as it did not interfere with the railroad’s rights, thus affirming the importance of riparian rights and access to waterways for upland owners.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs owned land bordering the Hudson River.
    In 1881, the defendant railroad constructed a portion of its tracks in the river, between the plaintiff’s uplands and the river channel.
    In 1885, the Commissioners of the Land Office granted the plaintiffs land under the water, extending along their waterfront and beyond the railroad’s line.
    The railroad argued that because its embankment was between the plaintiff’s land and the river, the railroad was the “adjacent landowner,” and the grant to the plaintiff was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the railroad company was the adjacent proprietor and the grant to the plaintiffs was void.
    The General Term affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs, as upland owners whose land borders a navigable waterway, retain the right to access the water, even when a railroad embankment lies between their land and the main channel.
    Whether the grant of land under water to the plaintiffs is valid, given the presence of the railroad, or if the railroad itself should be considered the “adjacent landowner” eligible for the grant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiffs, as upland owners, maintain their riparian rights, including access to the water, even with the railroad’s presence.
    Yes, because the grant to the plaintiffs is valid as long as it doesn’t interfere with the railroad’s operations or rights. The railroad’s limited purpose does not make it an ‘adjacent owner’ within the meaning of the water grant statutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the state’s policy of granting lands under water to promote commerce, traditionally favoring upland owners with waterfront access. The court stated, “From the earliest history of the state its policy has been to grant the lands under water along the shores of the navigable rivers and lakes, for the purpose of promoting the commerce of the state.”
    The court reasoned that the railroad, being a corporation with specific and limited purposes, couldn’t be considered an “adjacent owner” in the same way as an upland owner who could utilize the waterfront for commerce. The court noted, “A railroad corporation has no capacity to acquire lands for any purpose except such as is defined in its charter…Being a creature of law, it possesses those properties only which its charter confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its existence.”
    The court distinguished the case from previous rulings, clarifying that the key issue was the validity of the water grant itself and the interpretation of statutes relating to such grants.
    The court noted that the grant to the plaintiffs expressly reserved the rights of the Hudson River Railroad Company, thus complying with the statute intended to protect the railroad’s interests.
    The court held that the legislature recognized the power of the commissioners of the land office to grant land under water lying outside of the railroad to the upland proprietor, solidifying the rights of upland owners to retain access to the waterway. The court emphasized the legislative intent to “protect the upland owners along the east shore of the river in their access to the water and maintain their rights in the river unimpaired by the construction of the railroad.”

  • Young v. Katz, 131 N.Y. 623 (1892): Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Prove Debt Acknowledgment

    Young v. Katz, 131 N.Y. 623 (1892)

    A party’s self-serving endorsement of interest payments on a promissory note is inadmissible as evidence to overcome a statute of limitations defense unless it’s proven the endorsement was made when it was against the party’s pecuniary interest.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of self-serving endorsements on a promissory note to prove partial payment and thus revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that such endorsements, made by the noteholder, are inadmissible unless proven to have been made at a time when they were against the noteholder’s pecuniary interest. The plaintiff’s attempt to introduce his own endorsements of interest payments failed because he did not prove the endorsements were made before the statute of limitations had run, and the testimony of interested parties was deemed inadmissible under the governing statute concerning testimony against deceased persons’ estates. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed.

    Facts

    Clarissa Darling held a promissory note from Elizabeth Jayne, dated November 17, 1864, payable on demand with interest. Darling died, and Young, as her executor, presented the note as a claim against Jayne’s estate after Jayne’s death in 1884. The note included several endorsements of interest payments, all written by Young. Jayne’s executor disputed the claim based on the statute of limitations.

    Procedural History

    Young, as executor of Darling, presented the note as a claim against the estate of Elizabeth Jayne. The executor doubted the justice of the claim, leading to the appointment of a referee to hear and determine the matter. The referee ruled in favor of Young, the claimant. This decision was appealed, and the lower court’s judgment was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether endorsements of interest payments, made by the holder of a promissory note, are admissible as evidence to overcome a statute of limitations defense without proof that such endorsements were made when against the holder’s pecuniary interest.

    Holding

    No, because an endorsement of part payment is only admissible to rebut the presumption of payment arising from the lapse of time if it appears that when made, it was at variance with the endorser’s pecuniary interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute of limitations for contract actions is six years. To take a case out of the statute’s operation, there must be a written acknowledgment or promise, or proof of part payment. While part payment can be proven by parole evidence, endorsements of payment are only admissible if they appear to have been made by a creditor at a time when they had no motive to give a false credit, specifically before the statute of limitations had operated. The court emphasized that self-serving declarations made after the statutory period are inherently suspect and cannot revive a stale claim. The court cited Roseboom v. Billington, stating, “An indorsement, therefore, on a bond or note, made by the obligee or promisee, without the privity of the debtor, cannot be admitted as evidence of payment in favor of the party making such indorsement, unless it be shown that it was made at a time when its operation would be against the interest of the party making it.” The court also found that the testimony of the plaintiff and other interested parties was inadmissible under Section 829 of the Code, which prohibits testimony about personal transactions with a deceased person against their estate. Because the plaintiff failed to establish that his endorsements were made before the statute of limitations had run and relied on inadmissible testimony, the court reversed the judgment.