New York Law Review

Tag: 1890

  • Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 121 N.Y. 420 (1890): Establishing Public Highway by Dedication and User

    Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 121 N.Y. 420 (1890)

    To establish a public highway by dedication, there must be both an intent by the owner to dedicate the land for public use and an acceptance of that dedication by the public authorities, evidenced by use or some official action.

    Summary

    Speir sued the Town of New Utrecht alleging trespass. The central issue was whether a road crossing Speir’s land was a public highway. The court reviewed the requirements for establishing a public highway through dedication and user. While Speir’s predecessors in title demonstrated an intent to dedicate the road for public use, the court found insufficient evidence of formal or implied acceptance by the Town. The court emphasized that mere public use, without official action or maintenance by the responsible authorities, does not constitute acceptance of a dedicated road, therefore, the road was not deemed a public highway.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Speir, owned land in the Town of New Utrecht. A road crossed his land, and the Town claimed it was a public highway. Speir brought suit alleging trespass by the Town. The Town claimed the road became a public highway through dedication and public use. Prior owners of Speir’s land had petitioned for a land grant indicating the old dock was a landing used by the public, convenient and necessary for commerce, and needed for public access. The road leading to this dock was the subject of the dispute. The Town presented evidence of public use of the road.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term found in favor of the plaintiff, Speir. The General Term reversed the Special Term’s ruling. Speir appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the road crossing Speir’s land had become a public highway through dedication by Speir’s predecessors and acceptance by the Town of New Utrecht, as evidenced by public use and other actions.

    Holding

    No, because while the owners of the land demonstrated an intent to dedicate the road for public use, the Town of New Utrecht did not adequately accept the dedication through official action or sufficient maintenance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that to establish a public highway by dedication, two elements must be present: “…there must be not only an absolute dedication, a setting apart and a surrender to the public use of the land by the proprietors, but there must be an acceptance and formal opening, by the proper authorities or a user.” The court acknowledged evidence suggesting the landowners intended to dedicate the road for public use. However, the court found insufficient evidence of acceptance by the Town of New Utrecht. The court noted that mere public use, even for an extended period, is insufficient to establish acceptance without evidence of the responsible public authority taking control or maintaining the road. The court distinguished between intent to dedicate and actual dedication, requiring affirmative action from the town to demonstrate acceptance, stating, “They are evidence bearing on the intent of the owners—strong evidence, I concede—but not beyond the possibility of answer or explanation.” The court emphasized the lack of evidence showing the Town improved, maintained, or officially recognized the road as a public highway. As a result, the court concluded that the road had not become a public highway through dedication and user. The court cited Ehrichs v. De Mill, 75 N. Y. 370; Thomas v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 99 id. 250 to reinforce its decision to grant a new trial because the plaintiff could possibly recover with further proof. The court modified the General Term’s judgment, reversing the Special Term and ordering a new trial, with costs to abide the event.

  • De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N.Y. 485 (1890): Establishing Domicile for Divorce Jurisdiction

    De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N.Y. 485 (1890)

    For the purposes of matrimonial actions, residency is synonymous with domicile, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain; a foreign divorce decree is invalid if the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant due to lack of domicile in that foreign jurisdiction.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing residency for the purpose of a divorce action and the validity of a foreign divorce decree. The New York Court of Appeals held that for matrimonial actions, residency equates to domicile, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain. The Court found that because the wife was not domiciled in Germany and was not personally served there, a German divorce decree obtained by the husband was invalid in New York. The court emphasized that a state’s jurisdiction over divorce matters depends on the domicile of at least one party within its borders. The decision clarifies the jurisdictional requirements for divorce and the recognition of foreign decrees.

    Facts

    The parties married in Dresden, Saxony, in 1870. In 1881, the wife left the husband in Dresden and moved to New York. In 1882, she commenced an action for separation in New York, serving the husband personally in Dresden. The husband asserted that he was not a resident of New York and that the court lacked jurisdiction. Both parties had been born in New York to parents who were residents, but had spent significant time in Europe after the marriage.

    Procedural History

    The wife filed suit for separation in New York. The husband answered, contesting jurisdiction and asserting counterclaims. The trial court found that both parties were residents of New York but denied relief to both parties on their respective claims. The husband appealed the trial court’s decision to admit certain testimony and exclude evidence of a German divorce decree. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, for the purposes of a separation action, residence is synonymous with domicile, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain.
    2. Whether a foreign divorce decree is valid when the defendant in the foreign action was not domiciled in that jurisdiction and was not personally served there.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in legal phraseology residence is synonymous with inhabitancy or domicile and it is in this sense that the term resident is used in the provisions of the Code before referred to.

    2. No, because a court has no extra territorial jurisdiction, and a person not domiciled in the state or country cannot be charged in personam by adjudication there, unless he is personally served with notice or process within it or voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of its court by appearing in some manner in the action or proceeding sought to be instituted against him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that for matrimonial actions under the relevant New York statutes, residency is equivalent to domicile, meaning a permanent home to which a person intends to return. To change domicile, both the fact of physical relocation and the intention to establish a new domicile must coincide. The court emphasized the importance of domicile in determining jurisdiction over matrimonial matters. The Court held that because the wife was not domiciled in Germany when the husband obtained a divorce decree there and was not personally served in Germany, the German court lacked personal jurisdiction over her, rendering the decree invalid in New York. The court stated that, “a court has no extra territorial jurisdiction, and a person not domiciled in the state or country cannot be charged in personam by adjudication there, unless he is personally served with notice or process within it or voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of its court by appearing in some manner in the action or proceeding sought to be instituted against him.” Because the lower court found that both parties were domiciled in New York at the time the German divorce was issued, the evidence of the German decree was properly excluded at trial.

  • O’Donnell v. McIntyre, 118 N.Y. 156 (1890): Attornment to Tax Title Purchaser is Void

    O’Donnell v. McIntyre, 118 N.Y. 156 (1890)

    An attornment by a tenant to a purchaser of a tax title is void because the tax title purchaser is considered a stranger to the original landlord’s title.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of a tenant’s attornment to a tax title purchaser without the landlord’s consent. The New York Court of Appeals held that such attornment is void. The court reasoned that a tax title purchaser obtains title from the state, not from the original owner, and therefore, there is no privity between them. Because the tax title purchaser is a stranger to the original owner, the tenant’s attornment is invalid and does not affect the landlord’s possession. This decision clarifies the relationship between tax titles and existing tenancies, protecting landlords from losing possession due to unauthorized agreements.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, O’Donnell, owned property that was leased to a tenant named Bates. The defendant, McIntyre, obtained a tax title to the property and subsequently, Bates, the tenant, attorned to McIntyre. O’Donnell then brought suit, claiming McIntyre had no right to possession because Bates’ attornment was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that O’Donnell, as the original owner, had the right to use reasonable force to retain possession and eject McIntyre and that McIntyre had no right to remain after being told to leave. The defendant appealed, arguing that Bates’ attornment to McIntyre was valid. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the attornment of a tenant to a purchaser at a tax sale, without the consent of the landlord, is valid and affects the landlord’s possession.

    Holding

    No, because a purchaser at a tax sale is considered a stranger to the original owner’s title; therefore, the tenant’s attornment is void.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on a New York statute stating that “the attornment of a tenant to a stranger shall be absolutely void and shall not in any way affect the possession of his landlord” unless the landlord consents, it is pursuant to a judgment, or it is to a mortgagee after foreclosure. The court emphasized the distinction between a “stranger” and someone in “privity” with the original owner. It stated, “By privity is meant the mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property…”. The court reasoned that a tax title purchaser obtains title from the state, not from the original owner, establishing no privity between them. The court quoted Becker v. Howard, 66 N.Y. 5: “The purchaser is not subjected to any of the inconveniences of the old title, nor can he take any advantage from it. Covenants running with the land do not bind him, nor do him any good.” Because the tax title purchaser acquires the land free from prior encumbrances and obtains title from the state’s taxing power, they are considered a stranger to the original owner. Thus, the tenant’s attornment to the tax title purchaser was void, and the landlord’s right to possession remained unaffected. The court distinguished Hubbell v. Weldon, noting that privity and attornment were not issues in that case. The ruling protects the original landlord’s possessory rights against unauthorized actions by tenants who attorn to tax title purchasers.