New York Law Review

Tag: 1888

  • Breen v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 109 N.Y. 297 (1888): Res Ipsa Loquitur in Common Carrier Cases

    109 N.Y. 297 (1888)

    In cases involving common carriers, an accident that injures a passenger raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier, shifting the burden to the carrier to prove it was not negligent.

    Summary

    The plaintiff was injured while exiting a train when it suddenly started. She sued the railroad company, alleging negligence. The court addressed whether the mere occurrence of the accident created a presumption of negligence against the railroad. The Court of Appeals held that because the train’s operation was under the railroad’s control and the accident was one that ordinarily would not occur if the carrier used proper care, a presumption of negligence arose. This shifted the burden to the railroad to prove it was not negligent.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant’s elevated train. As she was stepping off the train at a station, the train suddenly started with a jerk. The sudden movement threw her down, causing severe injuries. She claimed the railroad’s negligence caused her injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. in a New York state court. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the occurrence of an accident on a common carrier, resulting in passenger injury, raises a presumption of negligence against the carrier, thereby shifting the burden to the carrier to prove its lack of negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a passenger is injured due to an accident involving a common carrier, and that accident is one that would not ordinarily occur if the carrier exercised due care, a presumption of negligence arises against the carrier.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that common carriers have a duty to provide passengers a reasonable opportunity to safely exit their trains. The court noted the plaintiff’s evidence warranted a conclusion that she was not at fault for her injuries. Because the train and its movements were controlled by the defendant’s employees, the court held that the accident raised a presumption that the railroad was negligent. The court cited precedents establishing this principle, stating the burden was then on the defendant to “repel such presumption.” The defendant attempted to prove the accident was not due to a flaw in its system by presenting evidence about how its trains were operated. The defendant argued that a passenger pulling the emergency cord caused the train to start prematurely, but the jury did not find this argument persuasive, and the Court of Appeals found no error in the lower court’s instructions regarding this issue. The court emphasized that if the jury believed the passenger’s actions caused the train to start, the defendant would not be negligent, but because the jury evidently rejected that explanation, the presumption of negligence stood.

  • Central Trust Co. v. N.Y.C. & N.R.R. Co., 110 N.Y. 250 (1888): Priority of State Taxes in Receivership

    Central Trust Co. v. N.Y.C. & N.R.R. Co., 110 N.Y. 250 (1888)

    When a corporation is in receivership, the state retains a paramount right to collect taxes due on the corporation’s franchise from the receiver, especially when the receiver is operating the business and generating revenue.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the state’s claim for unpaid corporation taxes had priority over other claims against a railroad company in receivership. The court held that the state’s claim for taxes on the corporation’s franchise took precedence over other claims, including those of mortgagees. This decision emphasizes the state’s inherent power to collect taxes necessary for its functioning, even when a corporation is insolvent and its assets are managed by a court-appointed receiver. The court reasoned that the receiver’s operation of the railroad benefited from the franchise granted by the state and thus was subject to the associated tax obligations.

    Facts

    A receiver was appointed for the New York City and Northern Railroad Company in foreclosure proceedings. The company owed taxes to the state under the corporation tax act of 1880. The Attorney General filed a petition seeking an order directing the receiver to pay these taxes from the funds in his possession, which were generated from the gross earnings of the railroad operation. The receiver argued that the taxes were the sole responsibility of the corporation and should not be prioritized over the claims of mortgagees.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term granted the Attorney General’s petition, ordering the receiver to pay the taxes and, if necessary, issue receiver’s certificates to raise funds. The General Term reversed this decision, holding that the statutory proceedings for tax collection were the exclusive remedy and had not been followed. The Attorney General appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statutory remedies for collecting corporation taxes are the exclusive means of enforcing such claims against a corporation in receivership, or whether the court can directly order the receiver to pay the taxes from available funds.

    Holding

    No, because when a corporation’s property is sequestrated and in the hands of a receiver, the court has the authority to directly order the receiver to pay outstanding taxes, especially when the receiver is operating the business under the corporate franchise and has sufficient funds to cover the tax liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statutory procedures for tax collection were designed for ongoing, solvent corporations. When a corporation is insolvent and in receivership, these procedures are impractical and ineffective. The court emphasized that the receiver’s operation of the railroad relied on the franchise granted by the state, making the state’s claim for taxes a paramount right. The court stated, “We are of the opinion that the railroad when in the receiver’s hands and operated by him, is operated under and by virtue of the franchise which has been conferred upon the corporation by the state…” The court further explained that the state’s right to collect taxes is an essential power of government, and the court has the discretion to ensure these obligations are met. The court distinguished the Massachusetts case cited by the receiver, noting that in that case, the corporation’s franchise had effectively ceased to exist, whereas, in this case, the franchise was actively being used by the receiver. The court also cited Union Trust Company v. I. M. R. R. Co., noting that the Supreme Court prioritized state tax claims. The court modified the Special Term order to remove the provision for issuing receiver’s certificates, as sufficient funds were available to pay the taxes.

  • Smyth v. Sturges, 108 N.Y. 495 (1888): Easements and Nuisance Law for Sensitive Property Use

    Smyth v. Sturges, 108 N.Y. 495 (1888)

    A property owner cannot claim nuisance when their sensitive use of property is affected by a pre-existing, ordinary use of neighboring property, especially when the sensitivity was unknown to the neighbor.

    Summary

    Smyth sued Sturges, arguing that the vibrations from Sturges’s machinery interfered with Smyth’s use of his land for a medical practice. The court held that Sturges’s operation was not a nuisance. The court reasoned that Sturges’s activities were lawful and conducted in a reasonable manner. The court further stated that Smyth had not proven that the noise and vibration were excessive or unreasonable, especially since Smyth’s use of the property was unusually sensitive, and the problem arose only after Smyth built the structure for his medical practice. The court emphasized the need to balance the rights of property owners in a way that allows for reasonable use of land.

    Facts

    Smyth owned land and built a structure to practice medicine. Sturges owned adjacent land and operated machinery. After Smyth built his structure, the vibrations from Sturges’s machinery interfered with Smyth’s ability to practice medicine. Sturges’s machinery operation was a pre-existing use.

    Procedural History

    Smyth sued Sturges, claiming nuisance and seeking an injunction to stop Sturges’s operation of the machinery. The trial court ruled in favor of Smyth. Sturges appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Sturges’s operation of machinery constituted a nuisance, entitling Smyth to an injunction, given the pre-existing use and the sensitive nature of Smyth’s use of his property.

    Holding

    No, because Smyth’s unusually sensitive use of his property was affected by a pre-existing use that was not a nuisance at the time it started.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Sturges’s activities were a lawful and reasonable use of his property. The operation of machinery was not inherently a nuisance. The court emphasized that the interference with Smyth’s practice arose only after Smyth constructed the structure for his medical practice. The court stated that “the law… must be applied with reference to all the circumstances” and that “a person who moves into a street… which is already the chief seat of some noisy trade, must be prepared to bear the incidental annoyances.” The court considered the sensitive nature of Smyth’s use of the property, noting that what might be an annoyance to a medical practice may not be to another type of business. The court also stated: “If the defendant’s machinery had never been a cause of annoyance, the plaintiff could not, by erecting a delicate apparatus in his building, and using it in a business which would be disturbed by such machinery, create a right to restrain the defendant.” The court concluded that Sturges’s use was not a nuisance, because it did not unreasonably interfere with the ordinary use of Smyth’s property, and Smyth’s sensitivity was not known previously.