New York Law Review

Tag: 1881

  • Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N.Y. 501 (1881): Fixtures and the Duty to Deliver Property as Contracted

    Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N.Y. 501 (1881)

    A vendor of real property must convey the property in substantially the same condition as it was when the agreement of sale was made; removal of fixtures constitutes a failure of performance, barring a legal claim for damages.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a buyer was obligated to purchase property after the seller’s tenant removed fixtures between the contract signing and the closing date. The New York Court of Appeals held that the seller materially breached the contract by failing to deliver the property in the same condition as when the agreement was made. The buyer was justified in refusing to complete the purchase, and the seller (or their assignee) could not recover damages for the buyer’s failure to perform. The court reasoned that the buyer was entitled to receive the property with all fixtures intact and functioning as part of the real estate.

    Facts

    The vendor, Trask, agreed to sell stores to the defendant. At the time of the agreement, the property included gas piping, partitions, lead pipe, plumbing work, a water closet, and basins. These items were attached to the building and appeared to be part of the realty. The tenant, after the sales agreement but before conveyance, removed these fixtures, cutting pipes and dismantling partitions. The defendant then refused to take the property in its altered condition.

    Procedural History

    The vendor, Trask, assigned his right to damages (if any) to the plaintiff, Murdock. Murdock sued Gifford for breach of contract. The General Term affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of the defendant, Gifford. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the removal of fixtures from a property between the signing of a sales agreement and the closing date constitutes a breach of contract by the vendor, excusing the purchaser from their obligation to buy the property and precluding the vendor from claiming damages.

    Holding

    Yes, because the purchaser is entitled to receive the property in substantially the same condition it was in when the agreement was made, and the removal of fixtures constitutes a failure of performance by the vendor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the agreement to sell contained no reservations regarding the fixtures. “The defendant was entitled to the stores in the condition in which they were when bargained for, and his refusal to take them in an altered and inferior condition was not a breach of his contract.” The court acknowledged that in equity, the vendor might have been able to compel performance with a monetary adjustment for the removed fixtures. However, because the vendor (through the assignee) sought damages at law, strict compliance with the contract’s terms was required. The vendor’s failure to deliver the property in its original condition constituted a breach, thus barring the vendor’s (or assignee’s) claim for damages. The court distinguished between remedies at law (strict compliance) and remedies in equity (where compensation could potentially remedy the breach). Because the plaintiff sought legal damages, they had to show the vendor performed all conditions of the contract. Since the fixtures were removed, the vendor failed to perform.

  • Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881): Enforceability of Parol Agreements for Easements

    Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881)

    An easement, which is an interest in land, requires a written conveyance (deed) or a legally sufficient substitute like prescription; a mere parol agreement or license, even with consideration, is generally revocable and does not create a permanent easement.

    Summary

    Wiseman sued Lucksinger to enforce an easement for a drain running through Lucksinger’s property. Wiseman claimed he purchased the right for $7 and enjoyed it for over 25 years until Lucksinger blocked the drain due to nuisance issues caused by Wiseman’s alterations. The court found no written conveyance existed, only a lost receipt. The Court of Appeals held that the oral agreement, even with consideration, was a mere revocable license, not an enforceable easement. Wiseman’s use was permissive, not adverse, precluding a prescriptive easement claim. Equity will not enforce a parol agreement absent clear terms, acts of part performance unequivocally related to a permanent easement, and circumstances making reliance on the agreement reasonable. Therefore, Lucksinger was within his rights to revoke the license.

    Facts

    • Wiseman and Lucksinger owned adjoining lots in Syracuse.
    • Lucksinger built a drain across his and Stern’s land to the street sewer.
    • Wiseman paid Lucksinger $7 for the right to connect his drain to Lucksinger’s drain.
    • Wiseman connected his drain and used it for 25 years.
    • Wiseman replaced his plank sewer with a larger tile sewer which, combined with changes to his privy vault, caused waste to flow back into Lucksinger’s basement.
    • Lucksinger cut off the connection to stop the nuisance.
    • No deed or written agreement for the easement existed, only a lost receipt for the $7 payment.

    Procedural History

    Wiseman sued Lucksinger in equity court seeking to restore his drainage rights and restrain Lucksinger from interference. The trial court ruled in favor of Wiseman, declaring an easement and enjoining Lucksinger. The General Term affirmed. Lucksinger appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a parol agreement supported by consideration can create an enforceable easement allowing Wiseman to drain his property through Lucksinger’s land in perpetuity.
    2. Whether Wiseman acquired a prescriptive easement based on 25 years of usage.

    Holding

    1. No, because an easement requires a written conveyance or a legally sufficient substitute; the parol agreement created a revocable license, not an easement.
    2. No, because Wiseman’s use was permissive and not adverse; therefore, no prescriptive right was established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the right to drain through Lucksinger’s land constituted an easement, which is an interest in land. The statute of frauds requires such interests to be created by a written conveyance. A parol agreement, even with consideration, constitutes a mere license, which is revocable at will. Citing Hewlins v. Shippam, the Court emphasized that an easement cannot be conferred except by deed.

    The court acknowledged that equity might enforce parol agreements in certain circumstances, but only where the contract is complete and sufficient, its terms are well-defined, and there are acts of part performance unequivocally related to the agreement. Here, the receipt was equivocal, and the circumstances did not suggest a permanent arrangement. The court noted the lack of specificity regarding the duration of the agreement and the heavy burden a perpetual easement would place on Lucksinger’s property.

    The Court distinguished the case from those where significant, permanent improvements were made in reliance on an agreement, creating an equitable estoppel. Wiseman’s temporary plank sewer was not a substantial enough improvement to justify equitable intervention.

    The Court also rejected Wiseman’s claim of a prescriptive easement because his use was permissive, not adverse. The initial agreement purchased permission for use. Quoting St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, the court stated, “The occupation of a grantee of the fee is perhaps hostile to his grantor, but not so as to a licensee.” Permissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right.

    The court concluded that Lucksinger had merely exercised his legal rights and had not acted fraudulently. Therefore, the judgments were reversed, and a new trial was ordered.