New York Law Review

Tag: 1867

  • De Puy v. Strong, 37 N.Y. 372 (1867): Joinder of Tenants in Common in Ejectment Actions

    De Puy v. Strong, 37 N.Y. 372 (1867)

    Tenants in common must either bring separate actions for their respective shares of property or join together in a single action to recover the entire property; some, but not all, tenants in common cannot bring a joint action.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether some, but not all, tenants in common can maintain a joint action of ejectment. The court held that while tenants in common may bring separate actions or join in one action for the entire property, a joint action by some, but not all, is impermissible. The court reasoned that statutory provisions dictate either individual suits or a complete joinder to avoid splitting claims and potentially harassing the defendant with multiple actions. This decision clarifies the procedural requirements for ejectment actions involving tenants in common, ensuring comprehensive resolution of property disputes.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, a subset of the tenants in common, brought an ejectment action against the defendant to recover possession of land. During the pendency of the action, some of the plaintiffs died. The defendant argued that the action was defective because the heirs of the deceased plaintiffs were not brought in as parties.

    Procedural History

    The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed, arguing that the action was improperly maintained by only some of the tenants in common and that the failure to include the heirs of the deceased plaintiffs rendered the action defective. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the propriety of the joint action and the effect of the plaintiffs’ deaths during the lawsuit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a joint action of ejectment can be maintained by a portion of several tenants in common, specifically whether some but not all tenants in common can jointly sue to recover property.

    Holding

    No, because statutory provisions dictate that tenants in common must either bring separate actions for their individual shares or join together in one action for the entire property, thereby precluding a joint action by some but not all tenants in common.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under the Revised Statutes, tenants in common must either bring separate actions for their respective shares or join in one action for the entire premises. The court noted that prior to the Revised Statutes, New York allowed tenants in common to make a joint demise, effectively allowing a joint action of ejectment based on joint possession, despite their separate titles. However, the Revised Statutes aimed to establish a uniform course of procedure for real property actions. The court emphasized that allowing some, but not all, tenants in common to bring a joint action would permit splitting claims and potentially harass the defendant with multiple actions. The court stated, “The real plaintiff, having the right to use all their names, should not be permitted to split up his claim and harass the defendant with several actions in the names of his grantors separately. His right is entire, and the reasonable interpretation of section 111 is, that the term grantor is intended to embrace all the granting parties when they are more than one.” The court concluded that all tenants in common, or their heirs/legal representatives, should be parties to the action, and if any refuse to join as plaintiffs, they may be made defendants.

  • Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N.Y. 235 (1867): Enforceability of Contracts Based on Relationships

    Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N.Y. 235 (1867)

    A contract is not inherently illegal or unenforceable simply because one party has a personal relationship with a government agent, absent evidence that the contract involved corrupt or unlawful means.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of a contract where one party (the plaintiffs) used their relationships with government agents to secure a vessel charter for the defendant. The defendant argued the contract was illegal because the plaintiffs leveraged their familial connections to influence government decisions. The court held that the contract was not illegal simply because the plaintiffs had relationships with government agents. Absent proof of corrupt or unlawful means to secure the charter, the plaintiffs were entitled to their commission. The ruling emphasizes that a mere potential for influence does not automatically invalidate a contract.

    Facts

    The defendant needed to charter his vessel to the government.
    The plaintiffs, one a son and another a son-in-law of a government agent responsible for selecting vessels, were hired by the defendant to secure a charter.
    The plaintiffs successfully secured a charter for the defendant’s vessel.
    The defendant refused to pay the plaintiffs their commission, claiming the contract was illegal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs.
    The General Term reversed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the General Term’s reversal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a contract to secure a government charter is illegal and unenforceable solely because the contractors have close relationships with the government agents responsible for awarding the charter, absent evidence of corrupt or unlawful practices.

    Holding

    Yes, because absent evidence that the plaintiffs agreed to use corrupt means to procure the charter, the contract is not illegal solely due to their relationships with the government agent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant failed to prove the plaintiffs engaged in any corrupt or illegal behavior to secure the charter. The court emphasized that simply having influence or readily influencing government agents due to personal relationships does not automatically invalidate a contract. The court stated, “The plaintiffs did not contract to do an illegal service. They did not agree to use any corrupt means to procure the charter. The fact that the plaintiffs had intimate relations with the government agents, and could probably therefore influence their action much more readily than others, did not forbid their employment.” The court distinguished between having influence and using that influence for corrupt purposes. Because the defendant did not demonstrate corruption, the court held the contract was valid and enforceable. The court reversed the General Term’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

  • Robert v. Good, 36 N.Y. 103 (1867): Admissibility of Evidence and Curing Defects on Appeal

    Robert v. Good, 36 N.Y. 103 (1867)

    An allegation in a complaint that a document was executed is sufficient proof of the document’s delivery, and defects in evidence presented at trial can be cured by the submission of proper evidence during the appeal process, particularly in courts with statutorily defined procedures.

    Summary

    Robert sued Good on an undertaking related to an appeal in the Marine Court. The complaint alleged the execution of the undertaking, affirmance of the judgment, and failure to pay. Good’s answer primarily disputed the affirmance and non-payment. At trial, Robert offered a copy of the undertaking and the justice’s docket, which had a slight name discrepancy. An improperly certified order of affirmance was also admitted. Good moved to dismiss, arguing a lack of proof of delivery, a non-existent judgment, and insufficient evidence of affirmance. The motion was denied, and the jury found for Robert. On appeal, Robert introduced a duly certified copy of the order of affirmance. The Court of Appeals held that the initial evidentiary errors were either non-prejudicial or cured by the evidence presented on appeal.

    Facts

    1. Thomas Robert sued Ezekiel Donnell in the Marine Court.
    2. Donnell appealed the judgment to the General Term of the Marine Court.
    3. Good and Donnell executed an undertaking promising Donnell would pay costs and damages if the judgment was affirmed.
    4. The judgment was affirmed by the General Term.
    5. Donnell failed to pay the judgment.
    6. Robert then sued Good on the undertaking in the New York Common Pleas.

    Procedural History

    1. Robert sued Good in the New York Common Pleas.
    2. The trial court found in favor of Robert.
    3. Good appealed to the General Term of the Common Pleas, which affirmed the judgment.
    4. Good then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the allegation of execution in the complaint sufficiently proves delivery of the undertaking.
    2. Whether the admission of a copy of the undertaking and notice was prejudicial error.
    3. Whether the defect in the evidence regarding the affirmance of the judgment at trial could be cured by submitting a duly certified copy on appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the allegation of execution in the complaint, not being denied in the answer, sufficiently proves complete execution, including delivery.
    2. No, because the proof of the undertaking was not required, as it stood admitted upon the pleadings, so the admission of the copy was not prejudicial.
    3. Yes, because defects in documentary evidence can be cured by supplying the correct evidence during the appellate process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the allegation in the complaint that the undertaking was executed by the defendants, and the absence of denial in the answer, was sufficient proof of the complete execution, including delivery. The Court found the admission of the copy of the undertaking and notice was erroneous, but not prejudicial because proof of the undertaking was unnecessary due to its admission in the pleadings. Regarding the order of affirmance, the court acknowledged that the initial copy admitted at trial was not duly certified and should have been excluded. However, this defect was cured by the duly certified copy supplied during the appeal. The Court emphasized that Marine Court proceedings are statutorily regulated and its judgments are not formally enrolled. The order of the General Term, entered in its minutes, affirming the judgment was proper evidence of the fact, and an exemplified copy or a copy certified by the clerk under the seal of the Court was equally competent and conclusive. The Court cited previous cases such as Ritchie v. Putnam, 13 Wend. 524 and Williams v. Wood, 14 Wend. 126 supporting their reasoning.

  • People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867): Sufficiency of Forgery Indictment Without Addressee

    People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867)

    An indictment for forgery is sufficient even if the forged instrument lacks a specific addressee, provided the instrument on its face demonstrates the potential to injure or affect the rights or property of another.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of forgery for uttering a false instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of goods. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person. The defendant argued that the indictment was deficient because the instrument lacked an addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company, the entity defrauded, was improperly identified. The court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute covered any instrument affecting property rights and that the indictment sufficiently identified the intended victim of the fraud.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for forging an instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of certain goods. The instrument was presented to the Meriden Cutlery Company, and the defendant obtained goods using it. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person or entity. The Meriden Cutlery Company was located in Connecticut and had an agency in New York City where the instrument was presented and the goods were obtained. The indictment charged the defendant with intent to defraud the Meriden Cutlery Company.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because the forged instrument lacked a specific addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company was improperly identified. The Supreme Court reviewed the conviction on a writ of error.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an instrument lacking a specific addressee can be the subject of forgery under the statute.

    2. Whether the Meriden Cutlery Company could properly be regarded as the subject of an intended fraud.

    3. Whether the indictment was defective because it charged the defendant with intent to defraud persons unknown to the jury, when the grand jury and petit jury allegedly knew who was defrauded.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute covers any instrument that affects property rights and aims to prevent any question of whether the specific paper forged is embraced by or specially enumerated in the statute.

    2. Yes, because the evidence showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded, thus making it a capable subject of fraud, or because, even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficiently broad to reach its individual members or agent.

    3. No, because the knowledge of the petit jury is irrelevant to the validity of the indictment, and it is not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded if the indictment indicates a real person or entity that was defrauded or intended to be defrauded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (2 R.S., p. 673, § 33) was broad enough to cover any instrument in writing that purported to be the act of another and by which a pecuniary demand or obligation was created, or by which property rights were transferred, conveyed, discharged, or diminished. The court emphasized the revisers’ intent to create a sweeping provision that embraces every forgery of a writing that could injure an individual or body politic in person or estate. The court distinguished English cases that required a specific addressee, noting that New York’s statute omits the enumeration of specific instruments, instead using the general designation “any instrument.” The court stated, “It is sufficient that the paper or instrument be of such a character that, by its use, another may be deprived of his property, or by which a pecuniary liability might be created.”

    Regarding the identity of the defrauded party, the court held that the Meriden Cutlery Company could be the subject of fraud, whether it was a corporation or a copartnership. Even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficient because it charged an intent to defraud “divers other persons to the jury unknown,” which could include the company’s members or agent. The court emphasized that the proof showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded.

    Regarding the third exception, the court found no error in the refusal to charge that the indictment must be disregarded if the grand jury and petit jury knew who was defrauded. The court reasoned that the knowledge of the petit jury was irrelevant, and it was not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded. The court cited Lowel’s case (1 Leach, 248; 2 East. P.C., p. 990, § 60) to support the proposition that it is sufficient if any person could be indicated from the words used in the indictment, and whether that person was the meditated object of the fraud is a matter for the jury to consider at trial. The court stated that “it is essential to aver that some real person or existent body was defrauded, or that the intent existed to defraud some such.”