New York Law Review

Tag: 1863

  • Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 1863 N.Y. Gen. Term. LEXIS 104 (1863): Legislative Power to Grant Competing Franchises

    1863 N.Y. Gen. Term. LEXIS 104

    A state legislature can grant a franchise that impairs or destroys the value of a previously granted franchise, absent an express prohibition in the original grant.

    Summary

    Fort Plain Bridge Co. sued Smith for building a competing bridge near its own, alleging it infringed on their franchise. The court held that the state legislature’s repeal of a section in Fort Plain Bridge Co.’s charter that prohibited competing bridges meant the company had no exclusive right. Absent an express prohibition in the original grant, the legislature could authorize a competing bridge even if it diminished the value of the original franchise. Furthermore, to claim nuisance, the plaintiff needed to prove special damages distinct from the general public.

    Facts

    Fort Plain Bridge Co. was incorporated with the right to build a bridge and collect tolls. Initially, their charter prohibited any other bridge within a mile. Smith constructed a competing bridge near Fort Plain’s bridge after the legislature repealed the exclusive provision in Fort Plain’s charter. Fort Plain Bridge Co. claimed Smith’s bridge infringed upon their franchise and was a nuisance.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, which ruled in favor of Smith. Fort Plain Bridge Co. appealed to the General Term of the Supreme Court of New York, arguing that Smith’s bridge unlawfully interfered with their franchise. The General Term affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the state legislature’s repeal of the exclusivity clause in Fort Plain Bridge Co.’s charter allows the legislature to authorize a competing bridge.
    2. Whether the construction of a bridge without legislative authority constitutes a nuisance that can be challenged by a party who does not suffer specific damages different from the general public.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because after granting a franchise, the legislature can grant a similar franchise to another party, even if it impairs the first franchise’s value, unless expressly prohibited in the original grant.
    2. No, because to maintain an action against a public nuisance, the plaintiff must demonstrate special damages distinct from those suffered by the general public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge to establish the principle that a state legislature can grant a franchise that diminishes the value of a prior franchise unless explicitly prohibited. The repeal of the exclusivity clause in Fort Plain’s charter removed any such prohibition. The court stated, “Since the case of The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge (11 Peters, 420), it has been understood to be the law, that it is competent for the legislature, after granting a franchise to one person, or corporation…to grant a similar franchise to another…the use of which shall impair or even destroy the value of the first franchise, although the right so to do may not be reserved in the first grant; unless the right so to do is expressly prohibited by the first grant.” Regarding the nuisance claim, the court reasoned that even if Smith’s bridge obstructed navigation, only those who suffered unique damages could bring a cause of action. The court cited precedent that “no one has the right to abate it, or sustain an action for damages occasioned by the erection, unless he has himself sustained some damages not sustained by the rest of the community.” The court acknowledged the possibly unfair outcome, stating, “I am free to say that I would be glad to see the old common law restored, which denied to the legislature the power to take away or impair a franchise granted by it; but the law is settled the other way, and we must conform to it.”

  • Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863): Enforceability of a Lease Despite Landlord’s Lack of Title

    Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863)

    A tenant’s obligation to pay rent under a lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title to the property, especially where the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the tenant has not been evicted.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a tenant can avoid paying rent by claiming the landlord had no valid title to the property. Smith (landlord) sued Wait (tenant) for unpaid rent under a two-year lease. Wait argued Smith lacked title and that a third party, Williams, had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The court held that Wait was obligated to pay rent because the lease implied a covenant of quiet enjoyment, which served as sufficient consideration, and because Wait had not alleged actual eviction from the premises. The court emphasized that the agreements for quiet enjoyment and rent payment were independent.

    Facts

    The key facts are:

    1. Smith leased property to Wait for a two-year term in a written agreement, reserving rent payable quarterly.
    2. The written lease was not an indenture (a deed executed by both parties) but a parol demise (oral or simple written lease).
    3. Wait allegedly promised to pay the rent.
    4. Wait claimed Smith lacked any interest or estate in the property.
    5. A third party, Williams, obtained a judgment against Wait in a separate action to recover possession of the property.
    6. Wait did not allege that he had been evicted or deprived of possession as a result of Williams’ judgment.

    Procedural History

    The case originated from a suit by Smith against Wait for unpaid rent. Wait presented a defense claiming Smith lacked title and that Williams had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The lower court’s ruling on the demurrer is not specified, but the Court of Appeals reviewed the case on appeal from that ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tenant can refuse to pay rent based on the landlord’s alleged lack of title to the property when the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
    2. Whether a judgment obtained by a third party to recover possession constitutes a valid defense against rent payment when the tenant has not alleged actual eviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the agreement for quiet enjoyment implied in the lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title and serves as sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent.
    2. No, because the tenant must plead and prove actual eviction from the premises to assert a valid defense against rent payment based on a third party’s claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the agreement to pay rent and the agreement for quiet enjoyment are independent covenants. The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment acts as a sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent, regardless of the landlord’s actual title. The court referenced The Mayor of New-York v. Mabie and Tone v. Brace to support the existence of an implied agreement for quiet enjoyment. Drawing on Whitney v. Lewis, the court highlighted that a covenant for quiet enjoyment is sufficient consideration even if the grantor lacks title.

    Furthermore, the court stated that to properly plead an eviction as a defense, the tenant must allege an actual eviction or expulsion from the premises and being kept out of possession until after the rent became due. Simply stating that a third party obtained a judgment to recover possession is insufficient. As the court noted, “In pleading an eviction, the plea must state an eviction or expulsion of the tenant from the demised premises, and the keeping him out of possession until after the rent became due; otherwise it is bad.”

    The court underscored the principle that without a deed executed by both parties or an actual entry, the strict landlord-tenant relationship might not exist, but the independent agreement for quiet enjoyment remains enforceable.