Matter of Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights

The ministerial exception to employment discrimination laws, stemming from the First Amendment, is an affirmative defense and does not strip a government agency of jurisdiction over a complaint.

Summary

In this case, the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) dismissed a complaint filed by Victor Ibhawa, a priest, alleging a hostile work environment against the Diocese of Buffalo, finding the ministerial exception deprived it of jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. The Court determined that the DHR’s decision was based on an error of law and remanded the case back to the DHR to review the other defenses presented by the Diocese.

Facts

Victor Ibhawa, a Black, Nigerian Catholic priest, was hired by the Diocese of Buffalo to serve as a Parish Administrator. After incidents of racial and xenophobic discrimination, culminating in termination of employment, Ibhawa filed a complaint with DHR alleging a hostile work environment and unlawful termination. The Diocese raised several defenses, including the ministerial exception, which argued that DHR lacked jurisdiction because Ibhawa was a minister. DHR dismissed the complaint on the basis of the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional matter, without considering other defenses.

Procedural History

Ibhawa filed a complaint with DHR. DHR dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked jurisdiction due to the ministerial exception. The New York Supreme Court reversed DHR’s dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, finding that the ministerial exception did not definitively bar review. The Appellate Division reinstated DHR’s dismissal, giving deference to the agency’s expertise. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the ministerial exception to employment discrimination law acts as a jurisdictional bar or as an affirmative defense.

Holding

1. No, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, (565 U.S. 171 (2012)) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (591 U.S. 732 (2020)). The Court emphasized that Hosanna-Tabor specifically held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional limitation. The Court noted that “the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar” (Hosanna-Tabor, 565 US at 195 4). The court explained that the DHR erred by treating the exception as a jurisdictional matter. The issue was not whether the agency had the power to hear the case, but whether any of the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, including any statutory defenses, would prevent the case from proceeding. DHR’s determination was therefore affected by an error of law, requiring reversal.

Practical Implications

This decision clarifies the legal nature of the ministerial exception in New York. It forces the DHR to reconsider its decision. The most important implications are that the ministerial exception does not, on its own, prevent a state agency from hearing a case. This decision confirms that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, which means that the employer bears the burden of proving that the ministerial exception applies. The court also emphasizes that the DHR must fully adjudicate a case, considering all defenses raised by the employer, not just the ministerial exception. Moreover, this ruling underscores that state agencies must correctly apply federal constitutional law when evaluating employment discrimination claims in religious contexts, and this is not a matter for agency deference.