Orellana v. Town of Carmel, 2024 NY Slip Op 05131: Determining if Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) Exempts Municipal Defendants from Liability for Ordinary Negligence

2024 NY Slip Op 05131

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts parties “actually engaged in work on a highway” from liability for ordinary negligence, but this exemption does not apply to individuals merely traveling between work sites without actively performing a protected task on the road.

Summary

In Orellana v. Town of Carmel, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the exemption from ordinary negligence liability provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The court considered whether the Town of Carmel’s Superintendent of Highways, who was involved in a collision while driving to the office after inspecting road conditions, was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that because the superintendent was not actively performing any protected work, the exemption did not apply. Therefore, the municipal defendants were not shielded from liability for ordinary negligence, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability was granted.

Facts

During a snowstorm in December 2018, Michael J. Simone, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, was driving to his office after assessing road conditions and directing his team to salt the roads. While en route, Simone stopped at a stop sign, observed snow accumulation, and proceeded through the intersection. He then collided with Ana Orellana’s vehicle. Orellana sued, claiming negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding they were protected by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

Procedural History

The plaintiff commenced a negligence action. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, ultimately reversing the Appellate Division’s decision, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and granting plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

Issue(s)

Whether the Superintendent of Highways was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident, thereby exempting the municipal defendants from liability for ordinary negligence under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b).

Holding

No, because the Superintendent was not actively performing any protected work at the time of the accident, the defendants were not exempt from liability for ordinary negligence.

Court’s Reasoning

The court relied on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), which provides that the rules of the road do not apply to those “actually engaged in work on a highway.” The court cited prior cases like Riley v. County of Broome, which clarified that the focus is on the nature of the work being performed (construction, repair, maintenance) and not just the vehicle performing the work. The court emphasized that the exemption only applies when such work is in fact being performed at the time of the accident. In this case, the superintendent had completed his assessment and directed the salting of the roads. The court found that, at the time of the accident, Simone was merely traveling on the highway, and not actively engaged in road work. The court held that this did not satisfy the requirements for the exemption.

Practical Implications

This decision clarifies the limits of the exemption provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Attorneys should focus on whether the party was actively engaged in construction, repair, or maintenance, not just whether the vehicle was equipped for such work or traveling on a road. A vehicle traveling between work sites or performing preliminary assessments might not qualify for the exemption. This ruling supports a narrower interpretation of the statute, suggesting that the exemption is reserved for situations involving immediate, active work on the highway. This decision highlights that mere travel or preparation is insufficient; actual performance of highway work is required to invoke the protections of the statute. This is a case that must be considered when assessing liability of municipalities and their employees in cases involving accidents on highways.