29 N.Y.3d 364 (2017)

Evidence related to the same crime for which the defendant is on trial is not considered "Molineux" evidence and is admissible if relevant, unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.

Summary

In People v. Frumusa, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a civil contempt order in a criminal larceny case. The defendant was accused of stealing from his hotel business, WHD. The court considered whether the contempt order, which involved the same funds as the larceny charge, constituted inadmissible Molineux evidence (evidence of prior bad acts) and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court held that the contempt order was not Molineux evidence because it related to the same crime charged and was relevant to the defendant’s intent to deprive WHD of its funds. The court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the order, emphasizing that the defendant’s actions in defiance of the order supported the inference of larcenous intent.

Facts

Defendant Frumusa and a partner formed Webster Hospitality Development LLC (WHD) to operate a hotel. Hernandez invested $1 million for a 25% ownership stake. Frumusa controlled 75% and managed the hotel. After encountering financial troubles, Hernandez discovered Frumusa diverted hotel proceeds into accounts for his other businesses. She initiated a civil suit. Frumusa was then indicted for grand larceny. The People alleged that Frumusa stole approximately $300,000 from WHD by diverting funds to his other businesses. A civil court appointed a receiver who prohibited Frumusa from managing WHD assets. A contempt order was issued against Frumusa’s businesses for failing to comply with a court order to return WHD funds to WHD. Frumusa did not dispute transferring funds but claimed he lacked larcenous intent. The trial court admitted the contempt order into evidence over the defendant’s objection. The jury found Frumusa guilty.

Procedural History

Frumusa was convicted of grand larceny in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the contempt order was relevant to intent. The dissent argued the order should have been excluded. The defendant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting the civil contempt order as Molineux evidence.

2. Whether, even if not considered Molineux evidence, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the contempt order.

Holding

1. No, because the contempt order involved the same funds and conduct as the larceny charge, it did not constitute Molineux evidence.

2. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion; the probative value of the contempt order was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals clarified that the Molineux rule applies to evidence of a defendant’s separate crimes or bad acts, designed to show a propensity to commit the charged crime. “Molineux analysis is limited to the introduction of a prior uncharged crime or a prior bad act.” Since the contempt order involved the same funds and conduct as the larceny charge, the court reasoned that it was not Molineux evidence, and therefore, the court applied general evidentiary principles of relevance and prejudice. The court found the contempt order relevant to prove Frumusa’s intent to deprive WHD permanently of the funds (an element of the larceny charge). Evidence is relevant if it makes the determination of an action more probable or less probable. Frumusa’s refusal to return the funds, despite the court order, was probative of his intent. The court then addressed the balancing test, noting that the trial court could exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. However, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court because the contempt order’s relevance to intent outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. “Plainly, almost all relevant, probative evidence the People seek to admit in a trial against a defendant will be, in a sense, prejudicial.”

Practical Implications

This case reinforces the distinction between evidence of a defendant’s propensity for crime (barred by Molineux) and evidence related to the charged crime itself. Attorneys must carefully distinguish between “bad acts” evidence and evidence directly relating to the elements of the crime at issue. Evidence concerning the same funds or transactions as the alleged crime will likely be admissible if relevant to proving an element of the crime, such as intent. Furthermore, the case emphasizes the trial court’s discretion in balancing probative value and prejudice. Attorneys should be prepared to argue both the relevance and the potential prejudice of evidence, and should consider requesting limiting instructions to minimize any prejudice to the defendant. The court also indicated that the failure to request a limiting instruction may impact appellate review of a claim of undue prejudice. This case impacts the way attorneys strategize the introduction and objection to evidence in a trial and is instructive for determining whether to bring a Molineux motion, as such motions may not be applicable when the conduct involves the same crime being charged.