<strong><em>People v. DiPippo</em></strong><em>, 24 N.Y.3d 129 (2014)</em></p>

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense, including the opportunity to introduce evidence of third-party culpability, provided that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice, delay, or confusion.

<strong>Summary</strong></p>

In <em>People v. DiPippo</em>, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence. The defendant, convicted of felony murder and rape, sought to introduce evidence suggesting that another individual, Howard Gombert, was responsible for the crimes. The trial court excluded this evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of the evidence violated the defendant’s right to present a complete defense. The court found that the proffered evidence, including a declaration against penal interest from Gombert and evidence of a similar modus operandi in other sexual assaults, was sufficiently probative to be admissible, despite the absence of direct evidence placing Gombert at the crime scene. The court emphasized the importance of balancing probative value against potential prejudice and confusion, ultimately concluding that the trial court erred in precluding the evidence.

<strong>Facts</strong></p>

The defendant, Anthony DiPippo, was convicted of felony murder and rape in connection with the 1994 disappearance and death of a 12-year-old girl. DiPippo sought to introduce evidence suggesting that Howard Gombert was the perpetrator. The evidence included: (1) an affidavit from a fellow inmate of Gombert, Joseph Santoro, claiming that Gombert confessed to the crime and described his interactions with the victim; (2) statements from witnesses establishing Gombert’s acquaintance with the victim, access to a car matching a description of the car involved, and statements from police regarding a witness who saw the victim get into a car driven by a person resembling Gombert; and (3) evidence of similar sexual assaults committed by Gombert, which the defense argued reflected a similar modus operandi.

<strong>Procedural History</strong></p>

DiPippo was initially convicted, but the conviction was vacated on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. On retrial, DiPippo sought to introduce evidence of third-party culpability, which the trial court initially denied. After hearing additional testimony, the court reaffirmed its ruling excluding the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

<strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>

1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from introducing evidence of third-party culpability.

2. Whether the proffered evidence, including the statements attributed to Gombert and the “reverse <em>Molineux</em>” evidence, possessed sufficient probative value to be admissible.

<strong>Holding</strong></p>

1. Yes, because the trial court improperly prevented the defendant from presenting a complete defense by excluding evidence of third-party culpability.

2. Yes, because the evidence, considered as a whole, was sufficiently probative to be admitted, as its probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice and confusion.

<strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong></p>

The court held that the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”. The court recognized that third-party culpability evidence is subject to a balancing test, where the probative value of the evidence is weighed against the risks of trial delay, prejudice, and confusion. The court emphasized that the evidence must not rest on mere suspicion or surmise. The court found that the inmate’s testimony of Gombert’s statements was admissible as a declaration against penal interest. Gombert’s statements were corroborated by other evidence. The court also found that evidence of other sexual assaults committed by Gombert showed a unique modus operandi connecting him to the charged crime. While the defense could not definitively place Gombert at the exact scene, the court determined that the evidence was sufficiently probative. The court distinguished the case from others where similar evidence had been excluded due to lack of specificity or connection to the crime, concluding that here, the potential probative value of the evidence was substantial and that it was error to preclude it.

<strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>

This case clarifies the standards for admitting third-party culpability evidence in New York. Attorneys should consider the following:

• When assessing the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence, the court must balance its probative value with the potential for prejudice, delay, or confusion.
• Declarations against penal interest are admissible if the declarant is unavailable, aware of the statement’s against-interest nature, possessed knowledge of the facts, and the statement is supported by independent circumstances that attest to its trustworthiness and reliability.
• Evidence of a similar modus operandi by a third party is highly relevant in determining whether a third party committed the crime.
• Although direct evidence placing a third party at the crime scene is desirable, its absence does not automatically render third-party culpability evidence inadmissible. Corroborating evidence is key.
• This case suggests that a court may be more inclined to admit evidence of third-party culpability where the prosecution’s case relies on circumstantial evidence.

<strong>Meta Description</strong></p>

In <em>People v. DiPippo</em>, the Court of Appeals establishes clear standards for admissibility of third-party culpability evidence, emphasizing the importance of a complete defense and the need to balance probative value and potential prejudice.

<strong>Tags</strong></p>

DiPippo, New York Court of Appeals, 2014, Third-Party Culpability, Declaration Against Interest, Modus Operandi, Criminal Defense