25 N.Y.3d 116 (2015)
A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it permits a witness to be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, provided the testimony at trial was adverse to the party calling the witness, nor does it abuse its discretion in excluding certain aspects of expert testimony, provided the expert testimony is not based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed several evidentiary issues in a murder case. The defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing a witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, by permitting impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement, and by excluding certain expert testimony. The Court held that the prosecutor did not call the witness solely to elicit the privilege. The Court further held the trial court properly allowed impeachment of the witness with a prior inconsistent statement because the testimony at trial was adverse to the prosecution. Finally, the Court affirmed the exclusion of certain expert testimony on eyewitness identification, holding that the excluded testimony on “event stress” was not generally accepted within the relevant scientific community and thus within the court’s discretion to exclude it.
Facts
In 2002, there was an altercation between the defendant and a passenger, Korin Bush, in a vehicle driven by Josiah Salley. Ninety minutes later, Salley and Bush approached the same intersection. Bush saw the defendant and another man by a fence. As the light changed, the defendant ran toward their vehicle and fired several shots, killing Salley. The defendant evaded capture for almost two years, but was eventually identified by Bush in a lineup. At trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. At a second trial, Kevin Kirven, who had been with the defendant on the day of the shooting, was called by the prosecution. Kirven invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to several questions. Kirven then testified that he was at the park when the shooting occurred. The prosecutor then sought to impeach Kirven with his prior statement to the police. The defendant presented an expert in eyewitness identification. The court allowed testimony relative to weapon focus and witness confidence, but not event stress.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, the defendant was again convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecution to call a witness to elicit his Fifth Amendment privilege?
2. Whether the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement?
3. Whether the trial court deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial by precluding his identification expert from testifying about the effect of high stress on the accuracy of an identification?
Holding
1. No, because the People did not call Kirven for the sole purpose of eliciting his invocation of the privilege.
2. No, because Kirven’s trial testimony affirmatively damaged the People’s case.
3. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the expert testimony regarding the effect of event stress.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that it is reversible error for a trial court to permit the prosecutor to deliberately call a witness for the sole purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege. However, here, the Court found that the People did not call Kirven solely to elicit the privilege. The Court considered the scope of Kirven’s testimony. The trial court did not err in allowing the People to introduce Kirven’s redacted statement to impeach his credibility. The Court further held that the witness’s testimony that he heard only one shot and did not see the defendant firing at the car had the possibility of jeopardizing the charges of both second-degree murder and attempted murder and affirmatively damaged the People’s case. Finally, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the expert’s testimony regarding event stress because the expert testimony was not based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. The Court acknowledged that the trial court permitted the expert to testify in two key areas — witness confidence and weapon focus.
Practical Implications
This case provides guidance on the limits of calling a witness for the purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege. Prosecutors and defense attorneys should be wary of the potential for improper inferences. The case underscores the importance of carefully evaluating whether a witness’s testimony is adverse enough to warrant impeachment with prior inconsistent statements. Attorneys should be prepared to argue that the trial court’s ruling was correct because the testimony was contrary to prior statements made by the witness. Finally, the case emphasizes the importance of establishing the scientific reliability of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. It also emphasizes the importance of making a record concerning reliability, so that an appellate court can review the trial court’s exercise of discretion.