People v. Small, 257 N.Y. 256 (2015)

Under New York law, the requirements for arraignment “without unnecessary delay” and notice of a grand jury proceeding are not triggered when a defendant is not formally arrested and arraigned on the charges, even if they are in custody on other charges.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s convictions for burglary should be vacated due to alleged violations of the Criminal Procedure Law. The court held that the “unnecessary delay” requirement for arraignment did not apply because the defendant was not formally arrested on the February 23 burglary charges, as correction officers, not police officers, informed him of the new charges. Additionally, the court found that the People were not required to provide notice of the grand jury proceeding regarding the February 23 burglary because the defendant had not been arraigned on those charges. The court, however, found that the defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender because his prior period of incarceration, later deemed unlawful, should not have been used to extend the ten-year limitation.

Facts

The defendant, Samuel Small, was arrested on April 4, 2006, for a burglary on that day. Prior to the grand jury proceeding, the People learned of a burglary on February 23, 2006, and obtained an arrest warrant. However, the defendant was not formally arrested on this warrant because he was already in custody on other charges. The defendant was notified about the February 23 burglary and agreed to testify before the grand jury about both burglaries. The grand jury indicted him on charges related to both the February 23 and April 4 burglaries. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictments on multiple grounds including failure to comply with the arrest warrant and failure to provide grand jury notice. The trial court denied the motions. After trial, the defendant was convicted on the February 23 burglary and sentenced as a second violent felony offender based on a prior robbery conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Procedural History

The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment in the trial court, which was denied. He was convicted and sentenced by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for the February 23 burglary based on the failure to arraign the defendant “without unnecessary delay.”

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for the February 23 burglary based on the failure to give the defendant notice of the grand jury proceeding as required by CPL 190.50(5)(a).

3. Whether the defendant was properly sentenced as a second violent felony offender based on his 1985 conviction.

Holding

1. No, because the “unnecessary delay” requirement did not apply as the defendant was not formally arrested on the February 23 charges.

2. No, because the People were not required to provide notice of the grand jury proceeding since the defendant had not been arraigned on the February 23 charges.

3. Yes, because a period of incarceration based on a parole violation that was subsequently deemed unlawful should not have been used to extend the ten-year limitation for predicate felonies.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that CPL 120.90, requiring arraignment “without unnecessary delay,” applies only after a defendant is arrested pursuant to a warrant by a police officer, not correction officers. The court further found that the period between the defendant’s notification and the grand jury proceeding was not unreasonable since he was already detained on other charges. Regarding CPL 190.50(5)(a), the court stated that notice of a grand jury proceeding is required only for defendants who have been arraigned on the relevant charges. Because the defendant had not been arraigned on the February 23 burglary charges, no notice was required. Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s period of incarceration, deemed unlawful by a habeas court, should not extend the time limit for prior violent felony convictions under Penal Law § 70.04.

The Court emphasized that “the district attorney is not obliged to inform such a person” about the grand jury proceeding, “unless such person is a defendant who has been arraigned in a local criminal court upon a currently undisposed of felony complaint charging an offense which is a subject of the . . . proceeding” (CPL 190.50 [5] [a]).

Practical Implications

This case clarifies that the statutory requirements for arraignment and grand jury notice are triggered by a formal arrest or arraignment. Law enforcement and prosecutors must ensure that they follow proper arrest procedures to trigger these procedural rights. This ruling also highlights the importance of reviewing the basis for prior incarcerations when determining predicate felony status, particularly when habeas corpus proceedings were involved.

Attorneys should carefully examine the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest and the prior incarceration to determine whether the statutory procedural safeguards were followed and to avoid errors in determining a defendant’s sentencing exposure.

The decision reinforces the principle that an unlawful incarceration cannot be used to extend the period for predicate felony status. Subsequent cases will likely cite this decision in evaluating whether pre-arraignment detention triggers notice requirements, and if prior incarcerations qualify for the ten-year look back window.

The court’s holding also underscores that