People v. Wesley, 24 N.Y.3d 170 (2014): Initial Aggressor Rule in Defense of Others – Intervenor’s Perspective

24 N.Y.3d 170 (2014)

When a defendant intervenes in an ongoing struggle to protect a third party, the initial aggressor rule should be applied to the initial conflict, not to the defendant’s actions, to avoid confusion about the justification defense.

Summary

In People v. Wesley, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of the “initial aggressor” rule within the justification defense when a defendant intervenes to defend a third party. The court found that the standard jury instruction on the initial aggressor exception was misleading because it failed to clarify that the initial aggressor determination should pertain to the initial conflict, not to the defendant’s actions in intervening. The defendant arrived on the scene of an ongoing fight to assist his brother and girlfriend. He argued that the court should have clarified that he was not the initial aggressor because he was not involved in the initial conflict between the victim and his brother and girlfriend. The court agreed, holding that the jury instruction was confusing and, without the supplemental instruction, the initial aggressor rule was not applicable.

Facts

The defendant was charged with second-degree murder after he stabbed and killed the victim, who was fighting with the defendant’s brother and girlfriend. The defendant arrived on the scene after the fight began and intervened, claiming he acted in self-defense. The defendant testified that he intervened to stop the victim from harming his brother, who was being beaten with a hammer. The trial court gave a jury instruction on the initial aggressor rule as part of the justification defense, but the court denied defendant’s request to omit the initial aggressor rule from the instructions. The prosecutor argued that the defendant was acting in concert with his brother and girlfriend and therefore was an initial aggressor.

Procedural History

The trial court convicted the defendant of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the initial aggressor rule without providing a supplemental instruction explaining its application to the defendant’s intervention in an existing fight to protect a third party.

Holding

Yes, because the standard initial aggressor instruction was confusing and misleading when applied to the defendant’s actions in defending another, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and dismissed the indictment, with leave for the People to resubmit the charges.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s jury instruction was confusing. The court observed that the initial aggressor rule is not available if the defendant initiated the conflict. However, when an intervenor steps into an ongoing fight to protect a third party, the initial aggressor determination should refer to the original conflict, not the intervenor’s actions. The court cited People v. Melendez, where the court held that the initial aggressor instruction can be confusing and misleading, especially if the intervenor comes into contact with a third party already struggling with another person. The court emphasized that the jury should have been instructed that the initial aggressor rule means that if the defendant somehow initiated or participated in the initiation of the original struggle, or reasonably should have known that the person being defended initiated the original conflict, then justification is not a defense. The court found that failure to provide such clarification created a great likelihood of jury confusion. “If [defendant] had nothing to do with [the] original conflict and had no reason to know who initiated the first conflict, then the defense is available.”

Practical Implications

This case clarifies how the initial aggressor rule should be applied when a defendant intervenes to defend a third party. Attorneys should ensure that jury instructions clearly distinguish between the initial conflict and the defendant’s intervention. Defense attorneys should request supplemental instructions explaining that the initial aggressor determination refers to the original conflict. Prosecutors must be prepared to demonstrate the defendant’s involvement or knowledge of the initial conflict. This case highlights the importance of tailoring jury instructions to the specific facts of a case to avoid jury confusion. It reinforces the principle that a person defending another may have a valid justification defense even if the person being defended was the initial aggressor in the prior conflict, provided that the defendant was not involved in the initiation of the original fight and did not have any knowledge of who initiated the fight.