Doerr v. Goldsmith, 105 AD3d 534 (1st Dept. 2013)
In New York, an owner's liability for injuries caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the application of the rule of strict liability based on the animal's vicious propensities, and negligence is not a viable theory of recovery.
Summary
This case involves a bicyclist who was injured when he collided with a dog that crossed his path. The court affirmed that New York does not recognize a common-law negligence cause of action for injuries caused by domestic animals. The plaintiff argued the owner’s actions in directing the dog into the bicyclist’s path constituted negligence, but the court held that the owner’s liability is determined solely by the application of the rule of strict liability based on the animal's vicious propensities, and that negligence is not a viable theory of recovery. The court emphasized that this rule, established in prior case law, would not be overturned.
Facts
Julie Smith was in Central Park with her boyfriend and her dog, who was not on a leash. The dog was permitted to be off-leash. Smith called to the dog, and as the dog crossed the street, a bicyclist, Wolfgang Doerr, hit the dog and was thrown from his bike, resulting in injuries.
Procedural History
Doerr sued Smith and her boyfriend, asserting a negligence cause of action. The Supreme Court denied Smith's motion for summary judgment, but a divided panel of the Appellate Division reversed. Upon reargument, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order. The Appellate Division granted Smith's motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, and certified the question of whether its order was properly made.
Issue(s)
Whether a negligence cause of action lies against the owner of a domestic animal for injuries caused by the animal, based on the owner's alleged negligence in controlling or directing the animal?
Holding
No, because the owner's liability is determined solely by the application of strict liability based on the animal's vicious propensities, and negligence is not a viable theory of recovery.
Court's Reasoning
The court reiterated the rule established in Bard v. Jahnke, which held that when a domestic animal causes harm, the owner's liability is determined by the rule articulated in Collier v. Zambito. Collier states that an owner is liable if they knew, or should have known, of the animal's vicious propensities. Because the plaintiff brought a negligence claim and did not allege the dog had vicious propensities, the court found the claim to be invalid. The court distinguished Hastings v. Sauve, in which the court had held that negligence claims were available in the context of farm animals, but clarified that it would not extend this exception to domestic pets.
Practical Implications
This decision reinforces the narrow scope of liability for injuries caused by domestic animals in New York. Attorneys must focus on proving an animal's vicious propensities to establish liability, rather than arguing negligence in handling. This ruling impacts how similar cases are analyzed, emphasizing the need to focus on the animal's prior behavior and the owner's knowledge thereof. For attorneys, it highlights the importance of framing the legal argument in the context of strict liability.