24 N.Y.3d 1108 (2014)
A municipal ordinance that imposes a content-neutral restriction on signs placed on public property is constitutional if it serves a legitimate government interest, such as traffic safety and aesthetics.
Summary
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s decision, reinstating the District Court’s judgments against On Sight Mobile Opticians. The case concerned the constitutionality of a Town of Brookhaven ordinance prohibiting signs on public property. The Court held that the ordinance, which was content-neutral, directly served the Town’s valid interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, aligning with Supreme Court precedent. The Court found the provision severable from other parts of the Town Code related to signs and upheld its constitutionality.
Facts
The Town of Brookhaven filed informations against On Sight Mobile Opticians for violating Town Code § 57A-11 by placing signs advertising its business on public property. The signs were located within the right-of-way of Town roads. Section 57A-11 prohibits signs, posters, and advertising devices on public property, with exceptions for governmental and traffic-related signs.
Procedural History
The District Court rejected On Sight’s challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 57A of the Town Code. On Sight pleaded guilty and appealed. The Appellate Term reversed, finding that while § 57A-11 was constitutional on its own, Chapter 57A as a whole unconstitutionally favored commercial speech over noncommercial speech. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Term’s decision, reinstating the District Court judgments.
Issue(s)
Whether Town Code § 57A-11, prohibiting the placement of signs on public property, is an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech rights.
Holding
No, because § 57A-11 is a content-neutral restriction that serves legitimate government interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, and is therefore constitutional.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the test for severability is “whether the Legislature would have wished the statute to be enforced with the invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether.” Here, the Court found that Section 57A-11 deals specifically with signs posted on public property, a “discrete regulatory topic and regime,” and thus could be severed from any unconstitutional portions of Chapter 57A. The Court relied heavily on Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), in which the Supreme Court upheld a similar Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting signs on public property. The Court emphasized that Section 57A-11 is content-neutral, applying to both commercial and noncommercial signs. The Court stated: “It imposes a content-neutral ban on all signs on public property, and applies to both commercial and noncommercial signs without consideration of their content. Further, it directly serves the Town’s valid interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, as expressly articulated in section 57A-11 (A).” The court thus found the law constitutional.