23 N.Y.3d 777 (2014)
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, requiring counsel to advise noncitizen clients of deportation risks, does not apply retroactively in state court postconviction proceedings.
Summary
Defendant Baret, a noncitizen, pleaded guilty to a drug charge in 1996. Years later, relying on Padilla v. Kentucky, he sought to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him about deportation risks. The New York Court of Appeals held that Padilla does not apply retroactively in state postconviction proceedings. Applying federal retroactivity principles established in Teague v. Lane, the court determined that Padilla announced a new rule, not simply an application of existing ineffective assistance standards, and does not fall within the narrow exceptions to non-retroactivity. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Facts
In 1995, Roman Baret was indicted on multiple drug sale and possession charges. In 1996, he pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree sale of a controlled substance as part of a plea bargain. During the plea colloquy, he acknowledged his rights and stated the plea was voluntary. He later moved to withdraw the plea, claiming threats from a codefendant, but the motion was denied. He failed to appear for sentencing, leading to a bench warrant, and was sentenced in 2004 to 2 to 6 years’ incarceration.
Procedural History
Baret appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in 2008. In 2010, Baret moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing ineffective assistance based on Padilla v. Kentucky. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, applying Padilla retroactively to pleas taken after 1996, and remanded for a hearing. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively in state court postconviction proceedings in New York.
Holding
No, because Padilla announced a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure that does not fall within the narrow exceptions to non-retroactivity established in Teague v. Lane and therefore does not apply retroactively in state collateral review under CPL 440.10.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that, under Teague v. Lane, new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure generally do not apply retroactively to cases that were final before the new rule was announced. A new rule exists if the result was not dictated by precedent at the time the conviction became final. The court acknowledged that Danforth v. Minnesota allows states to give broader retroactive application to new rules than federal courts do under Teague. However, it declined to do so here.
The court found that Padilla established a new rule by imposing a new obligation on states because, before Padilla, New York law, as articulated in People v. Ford, did not require counsel to advise defendants of potential deportation consequences. The court rejected the argument that Padilla merely clarified existing ineffective assistance standards under Strickland v. Washington.
The court further reasoned that Padilla does not qualify for the watershed exception to the Teague doctrine. Watershed rules must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction and alter the understanding of bedrock procedural elements. While important, advice regarding immigration consequences does not go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence. The Court quoted Schriro v. Summerlin, stating, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’”
Finally, the court applied the three-part test from People v. Pepper. The court found that Padilla did not involve standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence. It also considered the reliance of law enforcement on the prior standard and the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice, concluding that these factors also weighed against retroactivity.
The court distinguished People v. Eastman, emphasizing that in Eastman, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed whether the rule at issue (Cruz v. New York) applied retroactively in collateral proceedings.
Because the Appellate Division decision mandated a hearing nearly two decades after the plea, it imposed significant administrative burdens based on faded memories and off-the-record conversations. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order.