22 N.Y.3d 366 (2013)
Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 does not prohibit a supervising court from including in an order of conditions a provision allowing the Office of Mental Health to seek judicial approval for a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if a defendant, found not responsible for a crime due to mental disease or defect, fails to comply with release conditions and refuses a voluntary examination.
Summary
This case addresses whether a court can order a psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility for a defendant found not responsible for a crime due to mental illness if they violate the conditions of their release and refuse voluntary examination. The New York Court of Appeals held that Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 does not prohibit such a provision in the order of conditions. This allows the OMH to seek judicial approval for a temporary confinement order to conduct an effective psychiatric examination. The court reasoned that such a provision is a reasonably necessary or appropriate condition to ensure public safety and the defendant’s welfare. This decision emphasizes the court’s supervisory authority over defendants found not responsible due to mental illness.
Facts
Robert T. and Allen B. were both found not responsible for violent crimes due to mental disease or defect and were initially committed to secure OMH facilities. Eventually, they were released into the community under orders of conditions. OMH sought to extend these orders, including a provision that if they failed to comply with the conditions or showed signs of deteriorating mental health, they would be subject to a psychiatric examination. If they refused, OMH could apply for a temporary confinement order to conduct an examination in a secure facility. Both Robert T. and Allen B. objected, arguing this conflicted with recommitment procedures.
Procedural History
Supreme Court (Justice Sproat) included the effective-evaluation provision in the amended orders of conditions. Robert T. and Allen B. filed Article 78 petitions in the Appellate Division seeking to prohibit enforcement of this provision. The Appellate Division granted the petitions, holding the provision was barred by Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20(14)’s recommitment procedures. Justice Sproat and the Commissioner appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, upholding the effective-evaluation provision.
Issue(s)
Whether Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 prohibits a supervising court from including in an order of conditions a provision allowing the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility when a defendant found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect fails to comply with the conditions of his release and refuses to undergo voluntary examination.
Holding
No, because Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. The court’s supervisory authority allows it to impose reasonably necessary or appropriate conditions to protect the public and serve the defendant’s interests.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 mandates an order of conditions when a track-one defendant moves to non-secure confinement, allowing courts to fashion orders protecting the public while serving the defendant’s interest in the least restrictive environment. The statute authorizes orders including “any other condition which the court determines to be reasonably necessary or appropriate” (CPL 330.20 [1] [o]). The effective-evaluation provision allows OMH to evaluate defendants who fail to comply with court-ordered conditions and refuse voluntary examination. The Court emphasized that track-one defendants are released with the understanding they may endanger the public if their mental health declines. The Court rejected the argument that the recommitment procedure displaces the court’s ability to fashion more limited remedies, finding the legislature vested courts with authority to impose “any other condition” deemed “reasonably necessary or appropriate”. The Court stated, “[t]he disputed provision simply permits the Commissioner to apply to the court for a temporary confinement order for the purpose of conducting a psychiatric examination. The court, which is ultimately responsible for maintaining ongoing judicial supervision over [Robert T.’s] treatment, must then determine whether it is appropriate to grant or deny the application”. The dissent argued that the provision undermines due process protections by allowing secure confinement based on mere allegations of noncompliance, without a substantive standard or process. The Court distinguished this from recommitment, which requires proof of a “dangerous mental disorder”.