People v. Sibblies, 22 N.Y.3d 1174 (2014)
When the prosecution declares readiness for trial off-calendar but then declares unreadiness at the next court appearance, the intervening time is not excluded from the speedy trial period unless the unreadiness stems from exceptional circumstances arising after the initial declaration.
Summary
Defendant was arrested and charged with felony and misdemeanor offenses. After the felony charge was dismissed and replaced with a misdemeanor information, the People filed an off-calendar certificate of readiness. At the next court appearance, the People stated they were not ready due to awaiting medical records. The Court of Appeals held that the time between the off-calendar declaration of readiness and the subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the People unless their unreadiness is caused by exceptional circumstances that arose after the initial declaration of readiness. The court reversed the Appellate Division order and dismissed the misdemeanor information.
Facts
Marsha Sibblies was arrested on November 27, 2006, and charged with felony and misdemeanor offenses stemming from an altercation during a traffic stop.
On February 8, 2007, the People dismissed the felony charge and replaced it with a misdemeanor information, which started the 90-day speedy trial period.
On February 22, 2007, the People filed an off-calendar certificate of readiness and a supporting deposition.
On March 2, 2007, the People requested the injured officer’s medical records.
On March 28, 2007, the People stated they were not ready because they were awaiting the officer’s medical records.
The People filed a second certificate of readiness on May 23, 2007, 104 days after the speedy trial period began.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor information, excluding the time between the People’s declaration of readiness and the March 28 appearance from the 104-day period.
The defendant was convicted of obstructing governmental administration and resisting arrest, but acquitted of assault.
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the People were ready on February 22, 2007, because they could have made a prima facie case without the medical records.
The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the period between the People’s off-calendar declaration of readiness and their subsequent statement of unreadiness at the next court appearance should be excluded from the speedy trial period under CPL 30.30 when the unreadiness is not due to exceptional circumstances arising after the initial declaration.
Holding
No, because such a period of prosecutorial readiness may not be excluded from the speedy trial period unless the People’s unreadiness is occasioned by an exceptional fact or circumstance that arose after the declaration of readiness.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that CPL 30.30 obligates the People to prepare promptly for trial. To be ready, the People must declare readiness and be in fact ready to proceed. An off-calendar certificate of readiness allows the People to declare readiness even if the statutory period expires before the next court date. However, readiness requires more than simply “mouthing” the words. The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried.
The Court emphasized that if the People are not ready at the court appearance, the defendant cannot ask the court to set the matter for trial, rendering the readiness ineffective and potentially harmful to the defendant by delaying the running of the statutory period. CPL 30.30 demands prosecutorial readiness to reduce delays in criminal prosecutions.
The Court held that if challenged, the People must demonstrate that some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial. The requirement of an exceptional fact or circumstance should be the same as that contained in CPL 30.30 (3) (b), which preserves the readiness period when “some exceptional fact or circumstance,’ [including, but not limited to, the sudden unavailability of evidence material to the People’s case,] occurring after the initial readiness response, makes it impossible for the People to proceed” (People v. Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534, quoting CPL 30.30 [3] [b]). If the People cannot demonstrate an exceptional fact or circumstance, then the time between the filing and the following appearance cannot be excluded.
In this case, the People’s unreadiness was not due to the type of “exceptional fact or circumstance” contemplated by CPL 30.30 (3) (b). It was not occasioned by, for example, the sudden unavailability of a material witness or material evidence, merely the People’s desire to strengthen their case. The 34-day period from the People’s off-calendar declaration of readiness to their in-court statement of unreadiness is chargeable to the People, thus exceeding the 90-day statutory period.
The Court noted that allowing declarations of readiness off-calendar and subsequent declarations of unreadiness at the next appearance without scrutiny creates the possibility that this scenario could be reenacted ad seriatim, which would undermine the purpose of CPL 30.30 to expedite trials. As Chief Judge Lippman stated, “CPL 30.30 is not a mechanism for filibustering trials.”